Haven’t bothered doing reports on the books I’ve been reading for some time, but here’s one I needed to write up recently for my Provocateurs and Peacemakers group:
PARLIAMENTARY AMERICA: The Least Radical Means of Radically Repairing Our Broken Democracy
By Maxwell L. Stearns, a constitutional law professor and professor of Law and Economics for over 3 decades.
In the months and probably years ahead, more and more of us are going to be thinking about possible fixes for the extreme polarity that characterizes our country and government. Maxwell Stearns is here with an answer that is radical just where it needs to be, yet doable with three amendments to our constitution. Admittedly, many more of us will have to be desperate before such amendments might get passed … but that day may come.
Main points:
- The two-party system guarantees not everyone will be represented.
- We’re in the midst of a 3rd Constitutional crisis.
- We can learn from other democracies that have certain features that work better than ours.
- Our present system doesn’t allow, practically, for more than 2 parties.
- 3rd parties can only serve as spoilers or randomizers, making our vote meaningless.
- But when we have 5 parties, or 6 or 8 parties, and a system where they need to form coalitions to form a majority government, more of us can be represented: And our politicians are forced to work together, meaning politicians are no longer elected according to their ability to appeal to an ever-more extreme party base, but in large measure according to their ability to collaborate effectively, to serve more people.
- So this parliamentary, muti-party system that Stearns proposes is a more representative democracy, representing more viewpoints, more people.
Stearns begins by showing how we are in the midst of a 3rd Constitutional Crisis:
What were the first two?
- First was the framing of the constitution itself: This was after the American Revolution, when the 13 states were ineptly ruled by our Articles of Confederation, which gave the states all the real power and the Congress –1 branch—tried to raise taxes and regulate commerce but the states just said: ”No thanks” and erected trade barriers against each other and gutted the economy. The Philadelphia Convention was supposed to address all this, not to write a constitution, but they ended up writing the constitution, which made “we the people” a higher power than the states. And Stearns point was we learned from our mistakes and we weren’t afraid to make things up as we went along, to build on what England and other governments had learned through the centuries.
- The second constitutional crisis was the Civil War, along with the period of Reconstruction that followed it. The Reconstruction Amendments couldn’t survive Lincoln’s death when his southern-sympathizing successor Andrew Johnson took office and the North prematurely withdrew their troops so that the amendments were no longer enforced, depriving Blacks of their recently granted civil rights. But the point is, we eventually started making these critical changes, these amendments, once again in the spirit of continuing to “form a more perfect union” and “promote the general Welfare.” We changed in reaction to the crisis.
And today, according to Stearns, we’re in the midst of a 3rd constitutional crisis, which is the result of a 2-party presidential system that isn’t working.
He explains that the framers of our constitution explicitly wanted to avoid the birth of parties or factions; yet the constitution they wrote paved the way for our presently entrenched 2-party system, which we’ve been accommodating for over 2 centuries.
Says: “The two-party system creates a zero-sum power struggle—a party is either in power or in opposition.” [Your side is either represented, or you’re opposed to your government.]
And: “The 2-party system not only suffers from the limited range of candidates; it also suffers from the voters’ inability to express at the ballot box what they care most deeply about.” [p. 212]
He describes our present voting system, with its primary-caucus cycle and then our votes filtered through the Electoral College of 538 electors: Which has produced the “third-party dilemma” —
so that each time a third presidential candidate and party run a campaign, they have no real ability to compete against the 2-party system, but they do have the ability to take more votes away from one side than the other, and become spoilers, which is what happened in 2000 with Ralph Nader, helping George W. Bush beat Al Gore.
But another possibility is that third parties can become randomizers, meaning they pull votes from both other parties so that the election really becomes a matter of chance: As in 1992 with Ross Perot weakening George H.W. Bush against Bill Clinton, and back n 1980 John Anderson’s 3rd party helping to make the outcome between Reagan and Jimmy Carter a matter of chance.
Stearns explains that: “Our voting process rewards strategy over sincerity, and it increasingly plays to the base of each party rather than the center of our politics.”
And describes how, esp since 1994, this has pushed the center of both parties farther and farther apart.
The heart of the book is a tour of a number of current democracies around the world, which alone is worth the price of the book. He shows the strengths and weaknesses of each system, and we see where he gets his ideas for the best features to adapt as our own. So he tells us about the various kinds of parliamentary democracies in England, France, Germany, Israel, Taiwan, Brazil, and Venezuela.
Some of these, like Germany, have come up with a system to “never again” allow a fascist party to gain power, called MMP, mixed-member proportionality. This combines two kinds of governing members: those elected by their party, and those elected by their districts. So voters each cast two ballots, one for a candidate running for their district (like our U.S. House district), and one for their party. So the 2nd ballot determines the party proportional representation in their Bundestag, their parliament. So for citizens, both their geographical concerns and their ideals are represented.
Most of these governments are set up to encourage multiple parties. But not just any tiny extreme group can form a party. There’s always a threshold, whether minimum of 5 or 10 % or whatever, so they often end up with between 4 and 8 parties. The Netherlands has a less than 1% threshold, so I guess they could end up with dozens of parties.
Stearns created a chart (p. 166) where he shows where each country falls within 3 categories along the side: presidential, hybrid, or parliamentary — and 3 categories along the top: purely districted, hybrid, and purely proportional.
Our own form of government falls under the category of presidential and purely districted, AKA 2-party presidentialism, which was in place earlier than most of these other democratic systems, before anyone could learn from our history, and its considered a combination of some of the worst democratic features in terms of what our system has become today, falling short of its original intent to promote a separation of powers, and checks and balances, because its extreme partisanship in recent years has impeded effective governance and widened cultural gaps—the opposite of promoting “the general welfare” as intended.
He says: “The greatest threat to a democracy is extremes. Once we recognize the general failings, or threats, associated with presidentialism and executive hybrids, it is clear that we must consider the alternative of parliamentary democracy. The question is which parliamentary system is most effective. MMP is a conceptual midpoint between the extremes of the United Kingdom’s strictly districted approach and Israel’s pure proportionality.” (p 167)
And: “A parliamentary MMP system encourages voters to vote sincerely for parties that reflect their ideological views, rather than admonishing them strategically to select the least bad of two options.” (p. 168:)
He proposes to do all this with 3 amendments:
1 Expanding the House of Representatives,
2 Having House party coalitions choose the president, and
3 Giving the House the power to terminate the presidency of a president who loses their confidence by failing to do the job well.
So for the FIRST AMENDMENT, voters will cast two ballots, first for named candidates in their geographical districts, as today, and second for one in a list of qualifying parties, those that meet a 5% threshold. This second ballot creates more parties, and it means the House will double in size from 435, under current law, to 870 members.
What this accomplishes is this, he says: “With multiple parties in the House, no party is ensured a majority, thus making coalition building among parties essential…. Today, compromise is all too often regarded as a sign of political weakness…. Coalition building rewards cooperation, not ever-widening entrenchment.” (p. 178)
He says it also ends incentives for hyper-partisan gerrymandering, because the parties and the issues take center stage.
The SECOND AMENDMENT—having House party coalitions choose the President—lessens the campaign expense and the power of money and shortens our absurdly long campaign season and bypasses the electoral college. It avoids the cult of personality and also rewards the citizen’s sincere expression of political preferences and gives them greater input on public policy.
And with Mixed Member Proportionality, he says, it “lets voters express preferences outside the over-simplified liberal-to-conservative dimension.” (213z)
He says: “Coalitions that broaden perspectives, accommodate competing views, and moderate the extreme edges of he most strident ideologies improve outcomes for more citizens.”
The THIRD AMENDMENT reinvents Presidential removal through use of the “no confidence” vote, which overall can create more confidence in a good leader.
Our present system of impeachment has turned out to be mostly for show, as in the case of the four impeachments of Andrew Johnson, Bill Clinton, and Donald Trump twice, none producing a conviction. Nixon was the only one ever to be convicted.
A no-confidence vote strengthens the separation of powers. The current power of the President makes party loyalists hesitant to cross him. “Congressional leaders will be more willing to hold a deeply problematic president accountable if their political fortunes no longer depend upon executive grace.” [219]
The amendment replaces “high crimes and misdemeanors” with “Maladministration.” And it spells out 4 categories of maladministration [p. 224x].
He lays out the process for how he thinks this reformed system can be put in place, which comes down to these three amendments being accepted by a 2/3-vote by Congress.
The constitution has been amended 27 times before, but there are people who benefit from the current, 2-party system who would fight it, like small states that benefit from the electoral college, and people who love partisan politics.
He examines other proposals for change, most of them smaller ones like implementing ranked choice voting or dumping the electoral college, but gives reasons why none of these fix the 2-system.
So he says: Whenever the crisis becomes obvious to enough people, here’s a plan and a way forward, giving us specific changes that will solve the worst of our present problems with our 2-party system.
He gives the proposed text for his three amendments in the appendix.