يتناول هذا الكتاب المواجهة السياسية والعسكرية والثقافية التي وقعت بين الفرنسيين والمصريين في السنوات الأخيرة من القرن الثامن عشر، ويعتمد في المقام الأول على قراءة موسعة لمذكرات وخطابات خلفها وراءهم شهود عيان على ذلك العصر، وخاصة ماسجله "بونابرت" نفسه. يطرح مؤلف هذا الكتاب أسئلة منها كيف كون كل من الفرنسيين والمصريين رؤيته عن الآخر، وكيف ارتسمت صورة كل فريق في ذهن الآخر. والكتاب يقوم على أساس أن حضارة البحر الأبيض المتوسط ، في سياقها الواسع، ظلت حضارة واحدة منذ زمن بعيد
من الجوانب المهمة التى أبرزها هذا الكتاب، أنه سجل جوانب كبيرة من العمليات العسكرية الفرنسية التى أبرزت وحشية "جيش الشرق" الاستعمارى الذى حاول الفرنسيون، ومن لف لفهم من الكتاب والمؤرخين، إخفاءها تحت قناع الحداثة والتحديث. فها هم الضباط والجنود الفرنسيون يكتبون ويسجلون فى أوراقهم ومذكراتهم وخطاباتهم لذويهم، ما أحدثوه من تدمير وإحراق لقرى بأكملها. فى هذا الصدد يثبت المؤلف نصوصًا وشهادات فرنسية لضباط الحملة وجنودها الذين تكرر ذكر أسمائهم ومصادرهم.
John Ricardo I. "Juan" Cole (born October 23, 1952) is an American scholar and historian of the modern Middle East, Islam and South Asia. He is Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History at the University of Michigan. As a commentator on Middle Eastern affairs and US politics, he has appeared in print and on radio and television, and testified before the United States Senate. He has published many books on the modern Middle East and has translated Kahlil Gibran and Omar Khayyam. Since 2002, he has written a weblog, Informed Comment (juancole.com).
ربما أن تلك الشهادة والدراسة لأحد المؤرخين الغربيين لن تغير من النظرة الاستعمارية التي نظرت الي بلادنا كسوق لتصريف المنتجات ومواد خام جاهزة لمصانع أوروبا , لكننا وفى هذا العصر الذي لا نجد فيه سوي بعض الطمأنينة بأنه يمكن أن يكون هناك علي هذا الكوكب من يؤمن بأن مظالمك السابقة لا تنفصل أبداً عن مظالمك الحالية . وأن شعارات التقدم والحضارة وعبئ الرجل الأبيض لم تعد تصبح جديرة بالاحترام أو الاهتمام الأن ، ربما يعد الأمر بديهياً لنا ولكننا علينا ألا ننسي أن هناك الالاف بل الملايين من عاشوا في بؤس أو أزهقت أرواحهم فى لعبة الحداثة المستوردة قسراً تلك .
My big take-away from this work is that the most barbaric atrocities can be perpetrated in the name of liberal democracy. Napoleon invaded Egypt, partly to lift it from its backwater status, to renew it to its previous glory, and to introduce it to the glorious principles of the French Republic. In the process he massacred the women and children of numerous villages and decapitated hundreds of men, on many occasions putting their heads on poles to intimidate the conquered. This book covers only the first year of Napoleon's occupation of Egypt in 1798, before he was defeated in his advance against Syria and subsequently returned to France, leaving others to take care of the disaster that was his grand Egyptian geopolitical strategy.
This was the first biographical material I have read about Napoleon. He was a most brutal, heartless war criminal. If history provides lessons at all, this episode should teach us to be skeptical of grand western designs to make other cultures more like us through military force, even in the name of such honorable principles as liberty, equality, and fraternity.
Not enough detail to be useful or compelling. There are first hand accounts that, if included, would have added much needed details about the experience of being in Egypt during that period.
Jó volt, érdekes leírása a hadjáratnak egyenlő részt memoárokból és egyenlo részt tudományos kutatásból építkezve.
Sikeresen megdöntötte a 'franciák gyakorlatoztak a Szfinxen, mekkora királyok voltak Egyiptomban' sztereotípiámat, átalakítva egy kezdeti győzelmek utáni fogcsikorgatva fenntartott uralom képévé. Úgy látszik, manapság olyan történelmi könyveket választok, amikben folyamatosan újragondoltatják velem a klasszikus háborúk valódi menetét. A filmekből és játékokból álló régebbi tudásom szerint, ha megnyerted a nagy csatát akkor onnantól kezdve pirosra volt színezve a provincia és a tiéd lett. Olvasva az egyiptomi közvélemény, a beduinok, a helyi erős emberek és a folyamatos vidéki lázadozások felsorolását realizáltam, hogy sokszor megtartani nehezebb a hódításod mint elnyerni. Gondoljunk bele szegény több ezer francia katona és tiszt esetébe, akik nagy csatában legyőzték a régi Ottomán rendszer seregeit, majd elvágta a torkukat egy falusi paraszt valahol a Nílus deltában (persze 'minek ment oda').
All in all nekem mint európai kolonializmus, és Napoleon iránt érdeklődőnek nagyon érdekes ismeretterjesztő olvasmány volt.
I found this book greatly disappointing. As someone interested in military history and more than a little bit fond of reading about the Middle East [1], I wanted to read a military history of the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon's army. Not only did I want this, but I expected it as well. Alas, my expectations were not met, not by a long shot. So, instead of listening to a well-crafted military history about an interesting time where Napoleon and the French Directory threw away centuries of alliance with the Ottoman Empire in order to engage in an abortive invasion of Egypt and Syria as an imperial possession to help with the conquest of India from Great Britain, this book tediously and repetitively discusses matters of anti-imperialist rhetoric and the sexual and religious interests of Frenchmen and Egyptians and Ottoman notables and so on. This is not a worthless or useless book, but it is definitely a frustrating book if one does not share the mindlessly hostile anti-imperialist view of the author, who appears to view any sort of empire as an evil, and any sort of move by Western nations to seek their own interests as illegitimate by definition. Needless to say, I take issue with that.
In terms of its contents, the book takes a generally chronological view of Napoleon's excursion in Egypt, from the conception of the invasion to its execution and closing with Napoleon's surprising escape and the return of French troops in a state of some disgrace. The book spends surprisingly little time talking about Napoleon's invasion of Syria, despite its importance, and does not spend a great deal of time talking about the efforts of the French to conquer Upper Egypt. What instead happens is a lot of discussion about the different willingness of various groups to make peace and work with the French, often based on confessional grounds. Throughout the book, for example, the author shows the Coptic Christians of Egypt as well as Greeks as being more friendly to the French than many of the local Muslims, showing that Ottoman Egypt was by no means the tolerant realm to Christians that it is often argued at by contemporary Muslim apologists. It is the author's strange obsession with odalisques and public women (i.e. prostitutes) and their relations with French soldiers and the way that women were judged as suitable mistresses that marks much of the content of this book, and while that is likely to improve the book's sales it makes the book no more edifying or historically worthwhile.
If you enjoy books that make fun of the hypocrisy of imperial rhetoric and that show Napoleon in a less than flattering light, there are ways that you may enjoy this particular book. If you want to read large amounts of material from the diaries and letters of soldiers and Muslim clerics that show the uneasy accommodations and playing both ends against the middle that took place and the way that women served as unwilling pawns and go-betweens and currency in the exchanges of the time, there is much here that shows this book to meet the contemporary interest in war and society. If you are looking for an account that shows the finding of and translation of the Rosetta Stone, or that shows the military operations of Napoleon and his subordinates and enemies in great detail, this book will likely be somewhat of a disappointment as it was to me. More so than most books, a book like this one is likely to require the proper set of expectations in order to be fully enjoyed. Many contemporary histories like this one simply lack an interest in the historical questions that many readers and listeners are most interested in, and that leads to a great disconnect between the two, as people study what others simply do not greatly care about and that is indeed offensive and partisan in its approach.
Definitively proves that invading the Middle East is for suckers. Juan Cole is one of the most informed and sane voices in the national discussion of anything related to Middle Eastern history, culture or politics.
I find that the book has only focused on the year Napoleon has stayed in Egypt not the whole story of the French invasion from the beginning till the end. The next 2 years of the invasion were mentioned in only 2 lines, which doesn't give a holistic narration of this historical era.
I had to wait and read another book on the topic to confirm some information before I felt ready to provide an honest review of this book. It was not the most pleasant read. Not because the facts might be unpleasant to someone who has had a long time interest in Napoleon Bonaparte but because as a reader, I could not help but feel a strong bias on the part of the author when I tend to prefer objectivity. Additionally and as mentioned by other readers, the book only covers the 1st year or so of the Egyptian campaign, which deprives the reader of useful information and hindsight.
Regarding the author's bias against the French, it is always present throughout the book up to the point where it becomes annoying. One of the first proof of his bias is in his assertion that French historians tend to be silent about the ''negative'' aspects of the campaign. This is simply not true. France is probably one of the few countries in the world where the inhabitants are so critical of their own history. Recent French historiography about Bonaparte's campaign of Egypt have not occulted the horrors committed by the French. Refer to La Campagne D'Egypte by Jacques-Olivier Boudon (although this was published in 2018 so maybe it was not such a widespread view in 2007 when Napoleon's Egypt was published). Regardless, the main problem of the book is in its premise: the author has a mindset and he seeks to make the facts suit his mindset. In particular, he asserts that Bonaparte's Egyptian campaign was a colonial enterprise (which it was) set against an innocent native population that was living its life peacefully. This premise has two issues. First, while the enterprise had colonial aims indeed, the Egyptians were under Ottoman rule (or, to be exact, Mamluk rule, so hardly free and leaving peacefully anyway), and the average person saw the French as invaders but not as colonists. So when Mr. Cole writes on page 60 that a woman was resisting colonial subjugation by killing a French soldier, it is not credible that the woman actually view her gesture as such. She probably simply saw an invader (invasion does not necessarily mean colonialism). And so the author tries to impose on the natives, political views and aims that they did not have yet at the time. Other biases are shown throughout the book with the author's recurrent intention to show the French as violent barbarians while he seeks to present the locals as more enlightened. The problem is that he is clumsy about it and shows, despite his intent, that the locals were not better (and not worse) than the invaders. On page 61, he explains that a French prisoner is executed and the money is given back to the French because the chief of the tribe that captured the prisoner valued social peace above wealth (because the ransom would have had to be shared among his men and they were bickering about it). Yet, for all his attempt to show that the chief of the tribe valued social peace above wealth, Mr. Cole only manages to show that locals could be cruel and execute an unarmed prisoner just as the French could. Mr. Cole keeps trying to put blame on the French whenever he has a chance. When they are not responsible for one thing, they certainly are for another. For example, he asserts that it is because of the French presence that the practice of veiling among Muslim women became widespread because Muslims were humiliated by the fact that non-Muslims were in positions of power. That is a personal view of the author and would need much further study to be established as fact. What is fact, however, is that veiling was already quite widespread as French testimonies early in the campaign show when they first entered Alexandria and Cairo. So Muslim women in Egypt did not wait for the French to come to increase their practice of veiling. The French presence might have been one factor among many but it was likely at the bottom of the list. He even clearly says on page 89 that a merchant's whole harmer was veiled and on page 189 he explains that women in Cario who had relationships with French soldiers removed the veils, proof that if anything, the French presence encouraged the removing of the veil. Other signs of bias appear again and again when, for example, Mr. Cole says that when the French killed all the dogs in Cairo on page 79, they endangered public health (they did not since he makes not mention of any public health issue arising from this event), or when he says at one point that the French encountered a woman who had had her eyes gouged out and had been abandoned in the desert with her child by the locals because she had committed adultery and he will then hurry to add soon after that Muslim women in the 19th century had probably more status and power that anywhere else in the world. Yet, he fails to mention that if this has some truth, it was mostly true for the elites only and that in Europe, women who were part of the elites also had status and power (ask Madame de Pompadour and Louis XV a few decades earlier). Plus, he adds on page 101 that Bonaparte sought to implement a society where restrictions were removed on women. This statement from the author seems to confirm that women in Egyptian society also had their share of restrictions. Throughout the book, Mr. Cole presents Bonaparte as being contemptuous (p.101, although this is his personal interpretation of the tone of the quote), stupid, incapable, clumsy, arrogant, and so on. The only quality he grants him is his tactical talent on the battlefield. Obviously, only a contemptuous, stupid, incapable, clumsy, and arrogant person could have successfully mounted an expedition and defeated time and time again his enemies on the battlefield while implementing an efficient administration, and eventually came to dominate Europe for a decade. Mr. Cole keeps showing his bias by making comments such as his mention on page 132 that in regions dominated by Muslims, other religions were allowed to exist while virtually no Muslims resided in Europe throughout the Middle Age. The problem with this statement is that it is true but incomplete. Yes, Muslims society did have a certain degree of tolerance and allowed other religions to exist. However, those religions had to remain discreet (after all, Coptic Egyptians were not the ones in power) and furthermore, there were few Muslims living in Europe because Europe was traditionally Christian and the only regions were there were Muslims were the regions that had been invaded by Muslims (Spain for example). So Spain was the only region where Muslims ruled and, over time, became dominant as the Christians decreased and the Muslims increased. Europeans were only successful in invading the Holy Land during the First Crusade and they remained there for 100 years. During their stay, they tolerated other religions as well. So this is proof that where Christians invaded regions where Muslims were more numerous, Christians also allowed other religions to exist. But maybe Mr. Cole still believes in the myth of the Andalusian paradise, which would explain his somewhat meek view on the topic. I could keep going like this for a long time but I will spare you and myself the details.
The point is that the author does not approach his subject with objectivity and his view (at the time of this book's publication) is not in line with the most recent historiography. He lists the horrors of the French but his manner of depicting them make it sound like the ones perpetrated by the locals were either justified or acceptable. He also spends a very strange amount of time and energy focusing on the sexual aspects of the French presence with their taste in women and how they behaved. It does border on obsession . Finally, he presents the situation in such a way that it seems that French had it all wrong from the beginning to the end, did not understand the locals at all, and that they actually never managed to control Egypt. One wonders how the French managed to stay for so long since they stayed until 1801. Despite Mr. Cole's attempt, while his account in useful in shedding light on the horrors that are usually involved in war and conquest and in showing that the French did not have it easy, one should not be mistaken: the French had a strong grip on Egypt (and a full account of the campaign until 1801 would have shown that), they perpetrated horrors just as the locals did (funny how the author failed to quote the memoirs of the French who mentioned that it was common practice for French prisoners to be sexually assaulted by Bedouins and Arab, or how there had been reports of French soldiers being attached to a tree and burnt alive), but they soundly defeated almost every army that was thrown at them. They eventually capitulated even though the British feared them simply because the French army had been in Egypt for so long and wanted only one thing: to return to France. The French presence also left its mark as the fiscal administration it implemented was used by subsequent governors of Egypt and the French military model served to build and modernize the army. Finally, the scientific aspect of the expedition was a resounding success which was rightly celebrated and Bonaparte's attempt to collaborate with religious authorities was not as stupid and worthless as the author makes it sound.
Overall, the book is interesting but I would recommend it only as a complementary reading on the subject.
كتاب يحكي ببساطة عن المواجهة السياسية والعسكرية التي تمت بين المصريين والفرنسيين إبّان الحملة الفرنسية على مصر في نهايات القرن الثامن عشر، كان ذلك الزمن هو زمن السعار الذي أصاب أوروبا فحولها من دول نتنة الرائحة -وهذه ليست سبة وإنما واقع- إلى دولٍ ذات نفوذ استعماري واضح، في الكتاب تشعر أن الكاتب وجه كتابه ليس للمصريين وإنما للفرنسيين، فهو يحكي دقائق الحياة اليومية للحملة الفرنسية في مصر، كما يحكي بإنصافٍ تلك الفظائع التي ارتكبها جيشُ الشرق في حيوات الأبرياء. الكتاب مرهق جدًا في الحقيقة وتشعر بتلاحق الأنفاس أحيانًا وبالملل أحيانًا أخرى مما كتب، لكنه مفيد مهم، وفيه شق اجتماعي لا يمكن إغفاله، تستطيع أن تستشف حياة المصريين الاجتماعية في ذلك الوقت، هو كتاب تكميلي طبعًا فهو لا يسرد تاريخًا مفصلًا وإنما يقرأ التاريخ بزاوية معينة، اتفق واختلف كثيرًا مع أهم مصدر عربي للتاريخ في ذلك الوقت وهو تاريخ الجبرتي، وتستطيع بشيءٍ من جهدٍ أن تجد خطًا واحدًا متوافقًا بينهما. أفضل شيءٍ في الكتاب أنه يدحض بمنتهى القوة تشدق المستشرقون وأذنابهم في الوطن العربي أن الحملة الفرنسية كان غرضها التنوير!
Not as dry as it first seems, this is a detailed account of Napoleon's disastrous campaign and occupation of Egypt. It shows its work by comparing the contradictions between various first hand accounts and fact checking them when needed. The author at times calls out hypocrisy with disarmingly dry sarcasm and I appreciated the focus on the societal impact of the invasion with Napoleon himself taking a secondary role in the narrative. A facinating chapter in history that foreshadowed modern conflict between the West and Middle East.
I was about to write 'timely' with regard to Juan Coles book on Napoleons invasion of Egypt in 1798 but that would have been the case if it had been published in 2002/03 prior to the invasion of Iraq.
The book covers in detail the first year of the three year occupation, it would have obviously been better (from this readers point of view at any rate) if it had covered the occupation to the end. The downside of this would have been a 6 or 7 hundred page book. I could have lived with that!
The book details the hazy rationale for the invasion, the preparations and voyage to Egypt with the invasion of Malta en route. The account of the landings and the battles leading to Cairo will no doubt please those who are primarily interested in military history. For me it is the attention Cole pays to the politics, economics and culture of both Egypt and France that make the book.
Juan Coles reference points are the numerous, though somewhat purged official French accounts, the diaries and correspondence of the French Military (some of which was thoughtfully published at the time after been intercepted by the British Navy). There is also recourse to Egyptian and Ottoman sources, the acerbic historian and cleric Al-Jabarti being the most entertaining.
The confusion and collison between the French Revolutionary Army and the people of Egypt is explicated by the author with some skill. Napoleon was acutely aware of the importance (in his eyes) of gaining legitimacy for his occupying government. He aimed to attain this by insitutionalising and co-opting the Muslim clerics something he never quite managed to pull off. The standard theme of colonialism - divide and rule - is clearly apparent in colaboration between the French and various Minorities - Copts, Georgians and Jews which undermined his legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim population. Overall one is left with a clear and comprehensive understanding of the issues relating to the occupation without diminishing the narrative progression of the history.
Well reccomended account of an early Western violent intrusion into the Middle East.
Not much that's inspiring in this account of the French invasion of Egypt. Not the author's fault. The material is legitimately disheartening. Not much noble or good goes on in this narrative, either on the part of the French or the Egyptians for that matter, except for the parts where the Egyptians put up resistance to the egotistical maniacal French. One thing for sure is that the invasion of Egypt didn't turn out half as exotic or exciting as they thought when the idea was first contemplated. The European rationalists (or shall we cynics) didn't understand the Muslim Ottoman Egyptians, and sadly the Egyptian ruling class (religious and otherwise) cowered to the French.
I like Juan Cole. Like most people who wish to be informed on events in the modern Middle East, especially in Iraq, I regularly turn to Cole's `Informed Comment' blog.
I'd also previously enjoyed Cole's work on the later British invasion of Egypt in 1882 and so looked forward to his account and interpretation of the earlier European foray into the Middle East as represented by Napoleon's invasion of Egypt. In Cole's view, one needs to understand nineteenth century Egypt in order to understand the modern Middle East and so this book represents the start of that thesis.
I wasn't disappointed either. This is the first work on Napoleon's invasion of Egypt I've read, although I was familiar with the story - the strategic thinking which lay behind attempting to cut the British link to India, to, perhaps, even march on India. The `romantic' view that is attached to the invasion - the Rosetta stone, the cataloguing of Egyptian history, the notion that the French bring the Enlightenment to the benighted natives in their mission civilisatrice.
Cole has no time for this nonsense and rightly so. Cole is interested in the real `cultural encounters' which happened between real people. Cole has delved into the memoirs of the many of the French participants and the, sadly few, Egyptian accounts, to recount the sometimes funny, sometimes tragic and sometimes bloody encounters between the occupied and the occupiers. Cole provides interesting accounts of the sexual encounters between French men and Egyptian women and the cultural understandings and misunderstandings that resulted. These cultural encounters and the military encounters form most of the work.
What is interesting from the start is how the French invasion of Egypt was not just part of a strategic move against British interests but a proposed colonial action for the French middle class who had lost out due to the abolition of slavery in the Caribbean and, essentially, were seeking `compensation' elsewhere.
It's clear from the start, however, that the French are not going to succeed in Egypt. Their army marches across the desert from Alexandria to Cairo in heavy woollen uniforms with no water canteens in 115 degrees and die in large numbers.
After the initial easy military conquest the French become bogged down in large numbers of small skirmishes, popular uprisings, street assassinations all directed against their rule. Napoleon attempts to co-opt the sheikhs of Al Azhar to his rule and they, in turn, organise a popular uprising in Cairo. The French respond by slaughtering civilians, executing hundreds and mounting heads on spikes in a bid to cow the natives. The French are cut off from France after the British victory at the Battle of the Nile. Napoleon began to run out of money and so resorted to forced loans, seizures of property of wealthy and poor Egyptians alike. Making the occupied pay for the occupation.
Cole concentrates on the first year of the occupation. The remaining years to 1801 followed the pattern set by year one until the combined British and Ottoman forces forced the French out.
Napoleon in Egypt by Juan Cole brought back memories of my own master’s thesis about the propaganda campaign that Napoleon ran to turn this venture into a success. Cole does a great job of showing the hopes the French had for this venture and what they planned to try and make themselves not look like conquers. Unfortunately for the French after successfully taking Malta and a landing in Egypt the rest of the plan went downhill. The locals did not welcome them with open arms, the Beys, the peasants, the tribes outside the cities all rejected them. Decades of French diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire went up in smoke and Nelson sunk the French Fleet cutting them off. This book looks at the social ramifications, economic trends and military struggles of Napoleon’s time in Egypt. While he would eventually sneak back to France and establish himself as Emperor while his troops surrendered and were ferried back to France by the British. Overall great book on the subject!
Interesting view of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, with much focus on the the Egyptian / Muslim point of view, and significant reference to first hand accounts. In light of recent middle-eastern conflicts, it would appear that similar emotions were being triggered in the Muslim world at the end of the eighteenth century. The French, Napoleon in particular, try to adapt to a series of situations that hadn't been expected or envisaged, but ultimately fail due to the loss of their fleet, stranding them in a foreign land, with a harsh climate and thoroughly mis-understood culture.
My low rating has little to do with the quality of the book itself; it's just not as much my sphere of interest topic-wise. The narrative did flow well, and the fact that it's narrated by Grover Gardner certainly makes it worth a read. Unlike a lot of history books, I would recommend this solely towards an older audience (16-18+) because there is a notable amount of adult material throughout.
This was an interesting one. I would have given this 5 stars but it fell short in a couple of areas in my opinion: Cole appears to have relied on a selected few firsthand accounts from Egyptian sources; it also reads as though he was conflicted as to what lane to take while writing, writing military vs. Social history. The author tries to do both and as such it reads disjointedly. Cole also throws the odd quip in every now and then that makes you wonder what he was really thinking while he was writing the book. For these reasons I would have given it 3 stars.
Where the book really shines is, and rises to 4 stars is, Cole does a great job of making clear two things: The extraordinary, and sometimes absurd, lengths Napoleon and the French army undertook to attempt to control and hold Egypt, and the agency that the Egyptian people held onto and took back from the French in the face what probably looked like impossible circumstances. In the end, you realize that Napoleon never really had control of Egypt in the manner in which he thought he did, and in Fact there was no such thing as "Napoleon's Egypt."
A wonderful account of this chapter of Napoleon's war-making history by a historian-scholar of the region. I particularly liked the discussion of the utilization of revolutionary rhetoric to justify the conquest, which our current "liberal" imperialism directly echoes.
I read this to prepare a lecture on Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and it was exactly what I needed. The writing was clear and lively, the quotations shocking and at times humorous. Cole is notable for his use of Arabic as well as European sources and for his interest in the damages done by the invasion -- material and human -- as well as the revolutionary changes it brought in Egypt and in Europe. This is a great book to read to understand how important Egypt is to modern European history.
Hm, let's see here .... a greedy overbearing western power embarks on an unprovoked, voluntary war against an ancient middle-eastern culture it knows next to nothing about. And the decider-in-chief is an unfailingly arrogant, self-absorbed little man whose vanity knows no bounds. Sure, a little familiar, maybe, but it probably looked like a slam-dunk ..... at the Ministry Of War in Paris.
M. Bonaparte would later regret the outcome of his excellent Egyptian adventure of the summer of 1798. Regret it to the extent of having to anonymously slip out of the country a year later and, once back in France, having inveigled the title of Napoleon I --- ordering the official state papers pertaining to the Free French Republic Of Egypt destroyed. It's not at all unlikely that the sorry, blood-soaked affairs of the Egyptian occupation were a kind of learning curve for Bonaparte. Several problems that resulted in the disaster :
The Sharifs Didn't Like It. Nor did the sheikhs, beys, bedouin, mamluks, clerics, emirs, sufi, jihadis, sultans or the eventual mujahadeen that arrived from Syria, Arabia, and all over the Ottoman Empire to extract the French from Egypt.
The British Didn't Like It. The worldclass British fleet managed a brilliant en-passant victory over the French by avoiding a head-on conflagration in the Mediterannean, as the massive French Expeditionary forces made their way to Egypt. Rather than suffer the inevitable attrition of a direct attack, the British under Nelson executed a fade-away and waited till Napoleon was well up the Nile toward Cairo -- before burning his standing fleet to the waterline as it stood in the port of Alexandria. Napoleon thus had his exits barred, supply-lines cut, and had to create his occupation from what little he found on the ground. The British kept up a naval embargo at the mouth of the Nile for the entire time the French were in-country, a very dangerous flank for Bonaparte.
The French Didn't Like It. The inherent contradictions of a revolutionary 'Rights Of Man' entity like the early French Republic carrying on a bloody occupation of a sovereign nation might have been enough, but there was worse. Unfamiliarity with language and custom, and the divided loyalties and shifting allegiances of a diverse middle-eastern country took their inevitable toll. Conspiracy was in season that summer, and there is some substance to the author's assertion that frenchmen just don't do very well in countries that can't produce wine.
Nobody Expects The Bubonic Plague. Conditions in the now-very-profitable red-light quarters of the Egyptian cities led to an outbreak of the Plague in several places, putting further pressure on the occupying force to take itself away from the sources of contagion.
The French in Egypt under Bonaparte provide a perfect object-lesson in how to wear out any welcome there might have been. An example : "As early as the twenty-seventh of July, Bonaparte first asked some associates for ideas on reforming Egypt. How best to administer civil and criminal law, for instance ? Not waiting for an answer, he issued orders about provincial administration that same day... Bonaparte's technique throughout his military career was to make the conquered pay for their conquest and to terrify them into submission..."
In every page of Mr. Cole's book on this strikingly ill-fated imperial misadventure there is the constant echo of the current United States occupation of Mesopotamia. It is to his credit that he neatly organizes and tells the tale without blatantly noting those obvious similarities. He's confident enough of the message--- and it's a sorry one--- that he lets the reader draw the ethical, cultural and moral conclusions for himself.
Based on the detailed account of the chronicles of this invasion, and on several other books: I can argue that capitalism and commercial activities emerged within the remnants of the feudal Mamluk class. Ali Biek al kebir, one of the representatives of the newly emerged class attempted to take the lead in the political scene and reshape the superstructure—political and legal institutions of that epoch. His attempt ended up failing. Napoleon and his atrocious invasion resulted in shaking and destroying the social fabric of the Egyptian society— the fabric that has the stamp of the Mamluks and ottomans to a certain degree. This led to the weakening of the emires, and paved the path to Mohamed Ali to give them the final blow and establish his modernity project—an incomplete one.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
Really great book, from a great writer and historian. Napoleon's Egyptian invasion was short lived but, despite having lived in Egypt for two years, I knew almost nothing about it. Interestingly, it is often ascribed as having been influential, particular relating to Egypt's judicial and administrative systems. Cole is mixed on its impact, and instead focuses on the practical realities of occupation, the variety of strategic errors and, most fascinatingly, Napoleon's attempt to co-opt popular Islam (to the extent of trying to convince Egypt he and his soldiers were on the verge of converting) as a way to control the country. Obviously it didn't work, but it seemed to delude him for much of the time he was there.
The book clearly relates to the Iraq War, in a "those who forget history are condemned to repeat it" way. Many of Napoleon's boneheaded, hubristic mistakes are ones that we have seen during the last six years, and will doubtless be repeated again. Still, it's a very interesting and engaging story. Also one of the best pieces of "popular" history I've read. We're all familiar with the grand, sweeping, Civil War and WWII stories that everyone has read, but I much prefer these smaller pieces focusing on lesser known aspects of world history. I would put this up with Jonathan Spence's "Treason by the Book" as an example of a sharp historian taking a little slice of history, magnifying it, and making it an exciting read.
A lesson you think the West would have learned by now. Juan Cole's Napoleon's Egypt is a well thought out visit to Napoleon's invasion of the Middle East in the late 18th Century. Interestingly, the further you get into the book, the further Napoleon fades into the background. The book tends to focus more on the relationship between the French army, the Ottoman-lead government in Egypt, and the Arabs and Bedouins who lived there. Not quite a social history in my opinion, but more so a demonstration of how Eastern and Western cultures did and did not understand each other. Reading about the French opinions of Bedouins, Arabs, their Ottoman allies, and most particularly Eastern women, one can see how the locals did not see the Army of the Orient as enlightened liberators bringing the ideas of the French Revolution, but rather an army of occupation. What I found most interesting was how Napoleon's fascination with the East played out with all the scientists that he brought with on the campaign to research the area. Unfortunately this interest did some seem strong enough to truly respect said culture. Yes Napoleon revelled in his self-proclaimed title as Pasha, but these attempts to integrate into the Arab culture gets less ink here than the handling of prostitutes. But in the end, there are scarily too many resemblances here to more modern interventions in the Middle East by Western powers.
If writing a book -- and making an intelligible argument -- is analogous to the putting together of pieces of a puzzle, then Mr. Cole has essentially taken a handful of puzzle pieces and dropped them on the table. I cannot say I disagree with Cole's analysis, nor that the book was singularly bad, but rather that his project got broken up on the fence -- the fence between scholarly analysis and popular history. In short, it succeeds at neither providing something *useful* for historians, nor something *interesting* for the broader reading public.
But since the reader of any review (if anyone reads them) is interested in his fundamental, over-arching argument, it is that the Enlightenment-inspired project of spreading republicanism to Egypt failed due to internal contradictions (e.g. failure to translate equality to Egypt, demeaning of women and Egyptians, use of force to justify rule, corruption amongst the French, etc.).
- كتاب تشعر انه موجه للقاريء الفرنسي في المقام الأول.
- الكتاب يعج بتفاصيل واسهاب لدقائق الحياة اليومية للغزاة الفرنسيين في مصر، بما أوقع ايقاع الكتاب في مواضع كثيرة.
- ثمة معلومات شيقة عن مصر ونمط حياة المصريين ودقائق معيشتهم.
- يورد الكاتب ثورة المدنيين المصريين ضد الفرنسيين كأول ثورة يثورها المصريين أنفسهم لا المماليك ضد المستعمر، وكيف بذلوا كل غال ونفيس من أموالهم ودماءهم لإنجاحها لولا عدم تدريبهم القتالي بطبيعة الحال، وافتقارهم للأسلحة الحديثة من مدافع متحركة ومسدسات وبنادق.
- الكتاب وفق مؤلفه الأميركي يرى ان ادعاء ان الحملة الفرنسية على مصر كانت بقصد التنوير، هو في الواقع محض ادعاء وهراء، وقدم الكثير من الأسانيد، من المصادر الفرنسية ذاتها بما يُعضد ذلك.
- يستنكر الكاتب اتجاه بعض المثقفين والمسئولين المصريين بالاحتفاء بمقدم الحملة التي أتت لغزو بلادهم وحلب خيراتها وقتلت آلاف مؤلفة من أهلها.
- الكتاب شيق وإضافة، وان كان تحتاج في قراءته للاستعانة بكثير من طول النفس.
A fascinating account of the French encounter in the late 18th century occupying Egypt. It was the first time since the Crusades that a western power occupied Muslim lands, and some of the issues they faced resonate very much today in the US occupation of Afghanistan, as well as the US experiences in Iraq. It's surpring how little has changed in over 200 years.
One of the most interesting insights is in how the soldiers behaved, some of the issues they faced, and also how the natives of Egypt viewed the occupiers. It's a very honest account and analysis that has no good guys and really no bad guys. There are times when you actually fee bad for Napoleon (when the British navy intercepted a French mail ship, and published some of Napoleon's letters in which he expresses how upset he was that his wife was openly cheating on him). A very interesting read.
The book was lightly informative, especially if you don't have much previous knowledge of the French occupation of Egypt. However it was littered with too many anecdotes that I suspect were meant to serve as entertainment to a wider audience. There is not much in-depth analysis, although there were a few striking innuendos toward the end of the book that proved quite interesting (one example is Boisy suggesting the idea of a Jewish colony in Palestine to serve as a tool for French imperial designs in the region, a little under a century before Herzl founded modern Zionism). All and all I think its a good introductory book but certainly wouldn't consider it a great scholarly source on the subject.
Abrupt in transitions, divergences into back stories, and an anticlimactic denouement, this book feels like it needed editing. Sure, it's not fiction, it doesn't need drama. But it still can use a sense of pacing, or at least consistent structure with regards to sections of historical narrative, source comparison, and revisionist afterthought.
But, hey, cannons and tricolors and plagues and Bedouins and Beys! The backdrop to the invasion is a rainbow of a cosmopolitan Mediterranean trading state, the Ottoman Empire, and even "folk Islam." Throw on top of that the pragmatic cynicism of the Revolution and its disdain for superstition, and yeah, fun times.
In 1798 Napoleon invades Egypt in order to bring it freedom. Sound familiar? Egypt seems to have been doing fine without the French, and Napoleon planned poorly. He is attacked by the local populace and the Bedouins. The British Navy (under Nelson) destroys the French fleet and they are trapped in Egypt. The Ottoman Sultan orders a holy war on the French...Napoleon misjudged their enthusiasm for his attacking their province.
This is a fascinating look at a poorly planned invasion and how it went wrong. How Napoleon ever attacked Europe until he met his Waterloo (ha) is beyond me. Perhaps being a brilliant strategist requires the right geography.