Many instances of contrasting, simultaneous emotions are not humorous. This is one of the reasons, perhaps the most obvious, why benign violation is not constitutive of humor, although the theory reveals an observable pattern in humor. To date, the only cited practical use of the theory has been psychological distance. For example, McGraw mentions that The Onion considered psychological distance in humor about 9/11. But that creative concern has nothing to do with the essence of humor. It is something that can be observed without a larger theory that also claims to describe the essence of all humor, or even to be instructively useful in humor creation in other ways. The theory does neither of those further things. The theory doesn't identify what is constitutive of humor itself. And if it teaches or prescribes various types of benign violation for writers or comedians, it merely attaches a label to those things which are normally created or worked out without such a theory.
Counterexamples to the theory are numerous. It would have to explain, for example, why it doesn't apply to a general attitude toward a situation about which a person is ambivalent, such as a job that they dislike. This seems to fit "benign violation" perfectly. In this case, there is not necessarily an excess of feeling "not OK" -- too much violation-- which would make such ambivalences not humorous.
But there must be a reason, then, why those cases of "benign violation" are not funny, while others are. There are specific kinds of benign violation that create humor, not all benign violations, even those with an equal balance of feeling OK and not OK. That is what, in fact, makes the theory both a bad descriptive theory (for humor's essence), and also not a very important prescriptive/compositional theory. To use the theory effectively (prescriptively), one must at least know what kinds of benign violations are funny and which ones are not. There really is, however, an idea that describes the essence of all humor. All humor either represents self-deception directly, or else alludes to it indirectly. But it has to be a blameworthy self-deception, and this may even comprise all the ways that prevent it from becoming too serious. For instance, a tragic character is often self-deceived. But since we pity them, it is hard for us to ridicule them. But this is not because tragedy has an excess of violation or "feeling not OK," on the contrary our attitude toward the tragic character could even be more positive than negative.
What really makes tragedy mostly unfunny, is not that it is sad or violent, but that it is serious, and provokes more reflection than either comedy or humor. A comedy by Shakespeare may have serious moments. But can you point to the serious element in the humorous moments, or where they exist at the same time and in the same respect? Never. Humorous self-deception, similarly, cannot be defined as a limitation of violation, though it must have that property. Humorous self-deception is, more importantly, blameworthy, and on an average or small scale that distinguishes it from tragedy. This idea will always be funny and it is also the essence, ultimately, of everything that is humorous. Eventually, academe and scholarship, and so on, will have to concede this.
If one considers those types of benign violation that actually are humorous, interestingly, in every case this turns out to be because self-deception is involved. For example, in the so-called "Seinfeld strategy" mentioned by Peter McGraw, Seinfeld criticizes things like . But what is actually funny is not the very fact that something is truly benign, and is being transformed into a violation -- though that is what is being done. What is funny here is that a customer -- and a seller -- both expect something to be convenient and functional in every way, and this turns out not to be true, literally. It is not a complete exaggeration.
Another kind of benign violation that is humorous for another reason, not the fact that it is benign violation, is the vast category of every kind of humorous assault or act of ridicule, whether deserved or not (for instance, if they suffered a prattfall or were pushed and then ridiculed), and every kind of politically or sexually inappropriate insult. The humor in all these things is never the benign violation that also describes the situation, but always something else. So for example an insult may fail as humor because it is far too insulting, but to tone down the level of malice and insult doesn't constitute the humor, it just observing a negative condition, a condition of what must not be present. Toning down the insult and its violation removes what is preventing the insult from being inherently funny, which it is because it points to a sense of self-deception in the one who is being insulted.
Benign violation is too general to be specifically a theory of humor, not only not describing the essence, but not even very effective as prescriptive or instructive, either. It does not apply meaningfully in all cases, and does not apply always in the same way, these are indications that the theory is a hoax.
Do we perhaps give Simon and Schuster the benefit of the doubt? A press could be attracted to such a hoax, maybe not because they're incompetent, but because they are clever. They might know that deep down people want to be fooled and duped -- really because that is funny and they want to laugh at themselves. But I doubt this, rather, this is incompetence.