Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances a partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.
Traditional findings about legislative process in the U.S. emphasized the floor of Congress, which means debate and vote after passage of committee. However, this book emphasized when senior members of the majority party determine which bills will be considered on the floor and which will not. The authors point out as the evidence Reed's rule introduced in 1890, which strengthen the power of senior members in the majority party in the legislative procedure, and the plunge of the roll rate of the majority party, which means how majority party are rolled, and so on. Especially, the difference between the roll rate before Reed's rule and after is clear and convincing.