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The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities
Drawing on recently declassified material, from Ben-Gurion's war diaries to the minutes of secret meetings, the author reconstructs the real events surrounding the founding of Israel, exposing many of the historical beliefs as propaganda myths that have misguided Israeli policy to this day
277 pages, Paperback
First published August 12, 1987
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About the author
Simha Flapan
6 books11 followersSimha Flapan (Hebrew: שמחה פלפן) was an Israeli historian and politician.
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April 5, 2023
A CRITIQUE OF SEVEN ‘MYTHS’ ABOUT THE 1947-1948 WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
Author Simha Flapan wrote in the Introduction to this 1987 book, “Neither the Arabs… nor the Israelis … are able to cut through the web of myth and distortion that envelops their reasoning. This generalization, I am sorry to say, applies even to some Israelis in the forefront of the peace movement. Friends and colleagues … advised me not to present the subject of my research as a challenge to Israel’s long-held and highly potent myths… But concluded that such an approach would defeat the very purpose of this book… [I] decided to concentrate entirely on what I see as the crucial formative years in the shaping of Arab-Israeli relations: 1948 to 1952. The events of these four years… remain central to Israel’s self-perception.” (Pg. 3-4)
He states, “the historical parallel between the War of Independence and the [1982] Lebanon War raises many crucial questions for Israelis interested in peace and for Americans … who have Israel’s fundamental interests at heart. Was the policy of the Zionist leadership in 1948 and that of Israel’s subsequent leaders actually aimed at attaining a homogeneous Jewish state in the whole or most of Palestine? If this was the case, then the attempted destruction and further dispersal of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon appears to be a more advanced application of the same policy.” (Pg, 7)
He outlines, “Like most Israelis, I had always been under the influence of certain myths that had become accepted as historical truth… Let us look briefly at these myths---and the realities: Myth One: Zionist acceptance of the United Nations Resolution of … 1947, was a … compromise by which the Jewish community abandoned the concept of a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine and recognized the right of the Palestinians to their own state… My research suggests [this]… was actually only a tactical move… aimed first at thwarting the creation of a Palestinian Arab state… [and] to increase the territory assigned by the UN to the Jewish state.” (Pg. 8) “Myth Two: The Palestinian Arabs totally rejected partition and responded to the call of the mufti of Jerusalem to launch all-out war on the Jewish state, forcing the Jews to depend on a military solution… On the contrary… many Palestinian leaders and groups made efforts to reach a modus vivendi…” (Pg. 8-9)
“Myth Three: The flight of the Palestinians from the country… came in response to a call by the Arab leadership to leave temporarily, in order to return with the victorious Arab armies. They fled despite the efforts of the Jewish leadership to persuade them to stay. In fact, the flight was prompted by Israel’s political and military leaders… Myth Four: All of the Arab states, unified in their determination to destroy the newborn Jewish state, joined together … to invade Palestine and expel its Jewish inhabitants. My research indicates that the Arab states aimed... at preventing … the agreement between the Jewish provisional government and Abdallah[‘s] Greater Syria scheme. Myth Five: The Arab invasion of Palestine… made the 1948 war inevitable. The documents show that the … Arabs had agreed to a last-minute American proposal for a three-month truce on the condition that Israel temporarily postpone its Declaration of Independence.” (Pg. 9)
“Myth Six: The tiny… state of Israel faced the onslaught of the Arab armies as … a numerically inferior, poorly armed people in danger of being overrun by a military giant. The facts and figures … [show] that the war of self-defense lasted only four weeks, until the truce of June 11, when huge quantities of arms reached the country… Myth Seven: Israel’s hand has always been extended in peace, but since no Arab leaders have ever recognized Israel’s right to exist, there has never been anyone to talk to. On the contrary… Israel turned down successive proposals made by Arab states and by neutral mediators that might have brought about an accommodation.” (Pg. 9-10)
He says of Myth One, “acceptance of the UN Partition Resolution … was a tactical acceptance, a vital step in the right direction---a springboard for expansion when circumstances proved more judicious.” (Pg. 33)
He acknowledges, “There is no doubt that the majority of the Palestinian people opposed partition and struggled to make Palestine and independent Arab state. However, it is equally clear that they did not engage in total war with the Jews and that they gradually realized that partition was unavoidable and irreversible. The evidence is so overwhelming that the question arises how the myth of a Palestinian jihad against the Jews could survive for so long… The Palestinians, then, neither wanted not believed in war, and in the absence of official channels to express their opposition, they attempted to protect themselves against warfare by the only means at their disposal: local agreements with their Jewish neighbors against… hostile acts.” (Pg. 72-73)
Later, he adds, “The myth of monolithic Palestinian extremism … tends to blur the enormous difference between the Arab Revolt of 1936 to 1939 and the events of 1947 and 1948. In the 1930s the masses of the Palestinian people were engaged in a popular struggle that forced the political leadership to … establish the first Arab Higher Committee… The picture was completely different in 1947 and 1948. The political parties were deeply divided and shared no common platform. The masses did not exert any p-0ressure and were unwilling to engage in a jihad.” (Pg.77-78)
Of Myth Three, he argues, “the contention of the Palestinian Arab leadership appealed to the Arab masses to leave their homes in order to open the way for the invading armies, after which they would return to share in the victory, makes no sense at all. The Arab armies, coming long distances and operating in or from the Arab areas of Palestine, needed the help of the local population for food, fuel, water, transport, manpower, and information.” (Pg. 85)
He points out, “It is true, of course, that many Palestinians left of their own accord… Thousands… chose to immigrate to Arab areas rather than live in a Jewish state… But hundreds of thousands of others, intimidate and terrorized, fled in panic, and still others were driven out by the Jewish army… Jewish attacks on Arab centers … accounted for about 55 percent of those who left… only 5 percent left on orders from Arab bands. The remaining 11 percent … may refer to those who left voluntarily.” (Pg. 89) He asserts, the Jews… projected onto the Arabs the wrath and vengefulness that they felt toward the Nazis. This process was facilitated by propaganda that consistently depicted the Arabs as followers of Hitler.” (Pg. 98)
He says of Myth Six, “the gravest defect of all in the Arab war effort was the lack of a unified command structure… The Arab leaders were not blind to the dangers facing them in the invasion of Israel, and time proved to be against them. The IDF emerged stronger and better organized after every truce…. The Arab states invaded Israel not as united armies determined to defeat a common enemy, but as reluctant partners… It could not have been otherwise since the invasion was dictated as much by the aspirations of the Arab states to stop each other as by their undoubted hatred of the new Jewish state.” (Pg. 197)
Of Myth Seven, he states, “The Arab states needed some way to disengage themselves from their military commitment to the Palestinians and from the economic burden of the refugees themselves. They needed some kind of face-saving formula as well. Thus, the demand that Israel recognize the right of the refugees to repatriation and compensation became a sine qua non for negotiating the armistice treaties into peace agreements, and the Arab government felt no need to obstruct the self-organization of the refugees to press this demand.” (Pg. 217) He adds, “the Arab states were more important negotiating partners then the Palestinians… The Arabs were more flexible regarding refugees from the … areas designated for the Jewish state. While insisting that such refugees had the right to return, they agreed that those who did not wish to return should be awarded equitable financial compensation and allowed to settle in Arab countries.” (Pg. 224-225)
He concludes, “The Arabs were strongly inclined to acquiesce to the existence of a Jewish state… Israel, however, gave priority to its own economic, demographic, and military consolidation… The refusal to recognize the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and statehood proved over the years to be the main source of the turbulence, violence, and bloodshed that came to pass.” (Pg. 232)
This book will interest those sympathetic with the ‘Peace Now’ movement in Israel.
Author Simha Flapan wrote in the Introduction to this 1987 book, “Neither the Arabs… nor the Israelis … are able to cut through the web of myth and distortion that envelops their reasoning. This generalization, I am sorry to say, applies even to some Israelis in the forefront of the peace movement. Friends and colleagues … advised me not to present the subject of my research as a challenge to Israel’s long-held and highly potent myths… But concluded that such an approach would defeat the very purpose of this book… [I] decided to concentrate entirely on what I see as the crucial formative years in the shaping of Arab-Israeli relations: 1948 to 1952. The events of these four years… remain central to Israel’s self-perception.” (Pg. 3-4)
He states, “the historical parallel between the War of Independence and the [1982] Lebanon War raises many crucial questions for Israelis interested in peace and for Americans … who have Israel’s fundamental interests at heart. Was the policy of the Zionist leadership in 1948 and that of Israel’s subsequent leaders actually aimed at attaining a homogeneous Jewish state in the whole or most of Palestine? If this was the case, then the attempted destruction and further dispersal of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon appears to be a more advanced application of the same policy.” (Pg, 7)
He outlines, “Like most Israelis, I had always been under the influence of certain myths that had become accepted as historical truth… Let us look briefly at these myths---and the realities: Myth One: Zionist acceptance of the United Nations Resolution of … 1947, was a … compromise by which the Jewish community abandoned the concept of a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine and recognized the right of the Palestinians to their own state… My research suggests [this]… was actually only a tactical move… aimed first at thwarting the creation of a Palestinian Arab state… [and] to increase the territory assigned by the UN to the Jewish state.” (Pg. 8) “Myth Two: The Palestinian Arabs totally rejected partition and responded to the call of the mufti of Jerusalem to launch all-out war on the Jewish state, forcing the Jews to depend on a military solution… On the contrary… many Palestinian leaders and groups made efforts to reach a modus vivendi…” (Pg. 8-9)
“Myth Three: The flight of the Palestinians from the country… came in response to a call by the Arab leadership to leave temporarily, in order to return with the victorious Arab armies. They fled despite the efforts of the Jewish leadership to persuade them to stay. In fact, the flight was prompted by Israel’s political and military leaders… Myth Four: All of the Arab states, unified in their determination to destroy the newborn Jewish state, joined together … to invade Palestine and expel its Jewish inhabitants. My research indicates that the Arab states aimed... at preventing … the agreement between the Jewish provisional government and Abdallah[‘s] Greater Syria scheme. Myth Five: The Arab invasion of Palestine… made the 1948 war inevitable. The documents show that the … Arabs had agreed to a last-minute American proposal for a three-month truce on the condition that Israel temporarily postpone its Declaration of Independence.” (Pg. 9)
“Myth Six: The tiny… state of Israel faced the onslaught of the Arab armies as … a numerically inferior, poorly armed people in danger of being overrun by a military giant. The facts and figures … [show] that the war of self-defense lasted only four weeks, until the truce of June 11, when huge quantities of arms reached the country… Myth Seven: Israel’s hand has always been extended in peace, but since no Arab leaders have ever recognized Israel’s right to exist, there has never been anyone to talk to. On the contrary… Israel turned down successive proposals made by Arab states and by neutral mediators that might have brought about an accommodation.” (Pg. 9-10)
He says of Myth One, “acceptance of the UN Partition Resolution … was a tactical acceptance, a vital step in the right direction---a springboard for expansion when circumstances proved more judicious.” (Pg. 33)
He acknowledges, “There is no doubt that the majority of the Palestinian people opposed partition and struggled to make Palestine and independent Arab state. However, it is equally clear that they did not engage in total war with the Jews and that they gradually realized that partition was unavoidable and irreversible. The evidence is so overwhelming that the question arises how the myth of a Palestinian jihad against the Jews could survive for so long… The Palestinians, then, neither wanted not believed in war, and in the absence of official channels to express their opposition, they attempted to protect themselves against warfare by the only means at their disposal: local agreements with their Jewish neighbors against… hostile acts.” (Pg. 72-73)
Later, he adds, “The myth of monolithic Palestinian extremism … tends to blur the enormous difference between the Arab Revolt of 1936 to 1939 and the events of 1947 and 1948. In the 1930s the masses of the Palestinian people were engaged in a popular struggle that forced the political leadership to … establish the first Arab Higher Committee… The picture was completely different in 1947 and 1948. The political parties were deeply divided and shared no common platform. The masses did not exert any p-0ressure and were unwilling to engage in a jihad.” (Pg.77-78)
Of Myth Three, he argues, “the contention of the Palestinian Arab leadership appealed to the Arab masses to leave their homes in order to open the way for the invading armies, after which they would return to share in the victory, makes no sense at all. The Arab armies, coming long distances and operating in or from the Arab areas of Palestine, needed the help of the local population for food, fuel, water, transport, manpower, and information.” (Pg. 85)
He points out, “It is true, of course, that many Palestinians left of their own accord… Thousands… chose to immigrate to Arab areas rather than live in a Jewish state… But hundreds of thousands of others, intimidate and terrorized, fled in panic, and still others were driven out by the Jewish army… Jewish attacks on Arab centers … accounted for about 55 percent of those who left… only 5 percent left on orders from Arab bands. The remaining 11 percent … may refer to those who left voluntarily.” (Pg. 89) He asserts, the Jews… projected onto the Arabs the wrath and vengefulness that they felt toward the Nazis. This process was facilitated by propaganda that consistently depicted the Arabs as followers of Hitler.” (Pg. 98)
He says of Myth Six, “the gravest defect of all in the Arab war effort was the lack of a unified command structure… The Arab leaders were not blind to the dangers facing them in the invasion of Israel, and time proved to be against them. The IDF emerged stronger and better organized after every truce…. The Arab states invaded Israel not as united armies determined to defeat a common enemy, but as reluctant partners… It could not have been otherwise since the invasion was dictated as much by the aspirations of the Arab states to stop each other as by their undoubted hatred of the new Jewish state.” (Pg. 197)
Of Myth Seven, he states, “The Arab states needed some way to disengage themselves from their military commitment to the Palestinians and from the economic burden of the refugees themselves. They needed some kind of face-saving formula as well. Thus, the demand that Israel recognize the right of the refugees to repatriation and compensation became a sine qua non for negotiating the armistice treaties into peace agreements, and the Arab government felt no need to obstruct the self-organization of the refugees to press this demand.” (Pg. 217) He adds, “the Arab states were more important negotiating partners then the Palestinians… The Arabs were more flexible regarding refugees from the … areas designated for the Jewish state. While insisting that such refugees had the right to return, they agreed that those who did not wish to return should be awarded equitable financial compensation and allowed to settle in Arab countries.” (Pg. 224-225)
He concludes, “The Arabs were strongly inclined to acquiesce to the existence of a Jewish state… Israel, however, gave priority to its own economic, demographic, and military consolidation… The refusal to recognize the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and statehood proved over the years to be the main source of the turbulence, violence, and bloodshed that came to pass.” (Pg. 232)
This book will interest those sympathetic with the ‘Peace Now’ movement in Israel.
August 17, 2021
When reading this book it is imperative that the reader recognises when it was written. Challenges some major Zionist arguments. Brave and astute scholarship.
July 27, 2022
Since we'll be in Israel in the fall, it seemed a good idea to read some books on Israel. There are several rows at the library and this one looked good.
It is a book that puts the formative days of Israel under a very hot light, glaring, in fact. It is not exactly against the birth of Israel but it certainly puts the Israelis in a poor light. The author breaks down the various 'myths.' The main one being that in the beginning the Jews wanted to get much more land than the UN's plan, with as few Arabs as possible.
The book is well written although at times it is hard to keep track of everyone on both the Arad and Israeli side. He lists a lot of names.
Here are some interesting items...
- Between 192 and 1936, the Jewish population of Palestine grew from about 86,000 (11% of total) to 400,000 (30%).
- Opponents from the Israeli political left and right, along with the religious parties, all pointed out that the proposed Jewish state would occupy only 5 million dunams (about 2,000 square miles, or only 17 percent of the total are of Palestine, and would exclude Jerusalem. It's population would include 313,000 Jews and 300,000 Arabs. "Is this the Jewish state?"
- The Zionist leadership was sufficiently pragmatic to understand the impracticality of a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine, with a population of 1,300,000 Arabs and 650,000 Jews.
- Between 600,000 and 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were evicted or fled from areas that were allocated to the Jewish state or occupied by Jewish forces during the fighting and later integrated into Israeli land.
- There was a massacre of Arabs in the town of Dir Yassin.
- "This could not be a serious war. There was no concentration of forces, no accumulation of ammunition and equipment. There was no reconnaissance, no intelligence, no plans. Yet we were actually on the battlefield." -- Gamal Abdel Nasser
The author had moved to Palestine about 1920 so he had lived there before all hell broke l0ose. Does this give him a different perspective? In any case, it's an interesting book.
I'll be getting a tourist book next!!!
It is a book that puts the formative days of Israel under a very hot light, glaring, in fact. It is not exactly against the birth of Israel but it certainly puts the Israelis in a poor light. The author breaks down the various 'myths.' The main one being that in the beginning the Jews wanted to get much more land than the UN's plan, with as few Arabs as possible.
The book is well written although at times it is hard to keep track of everyone on both the Arad and Israeli side. He lists a lot of names.
Here are some interesting items...
- Between 192 and 1936, the Jewish population of Palestine grew from about 86,000 (11% of total) to 400,000 (30%).
- Opponents from the Israeli political left and right, along with the religious parties, all pointed out that the proposed Jewish state would occupy only 5 million dunams (about 2,000 square miles, or only 17 percent of the total are of Palestine, and would exclude Jerusalem. It's population would include 313,000 Jews and 300,000 Arabs. "Is this the Jewish state?"
- The Zionist leadership was sufficiently pragmatic to understand the impracticality of a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine, with a population of 1,300,000 Arabs and 650,000 Jews.
- Between 600,000 and 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were evicted or fled from areas that were allocated to the Jewish state or occupied by Jewish forces during the fighting and later integrated into Israeli land.
- There was a massacre of Arabs in the town of Dir Yassin.
- "This could not be a serious war. There was no concentration of forces, no accumulation of ammunition and equipment. There was no reconnaissance, no intelligence, no plans. Yet we were actually on the battlefield." -- Gamal Abdel Nasser
The author had moved to Palestine about 1920 so he had lived there before all hell broke l0ose. Does this give him a different perspective? In any case, it's an interesting book.
I'll be getting a tourist book next!!!
August 3, 2019
A must read for everyone interested in Arab-Israel conflict. Simha has done a lot of research and hardwork for the better understanding of the conflict. Clearly reveals who is on which side and where they should be. Even in present time people of Palestine are suffering from the ideologies of few. It is wonderful how an ideology can effect the status quo for decades or even centuries.
May 22, 2019
One of its kind.
August 29, 2025
For those that have read extensively on Israel, especially the new historians, there isn’t tons in here that’s net new. However, once you appreciate this was written in the 1980s and this was the first history to shatter the mythology surrounding the “birth of Israel”.
The biggest takeaway I got from the book is that none of this was inevitable. There were many off-ramps in 1947, 1948 and innumerable times since then. But when you see the daily pictures coming out of Gaza as I write this in the midst of the slaughter in 2025, you can draw a straight line from the policies and general perspectives of the labor zionists and the revisionists. It is ironic that Ben Gurion and Begin despised each other and disagreed on everything other than the concept of greater Israel.
Every country is founded on its set of myths and those myths often evolve over time, and I think that’s totally fine. I have a problem with it when said myths are used as justification for using American made bombs, dropped out of American made F16s bought with American earned tax dollars to kill kids. Flappan sets up the narrative by laying out 6 generally accepted myths surrounding the founding of the state of Israel. He then debunks each of these myths with extremely detailed support, primary source quotes from letters, speeches, diaries etc.
1. Zionists accepted the UN Partition Plan and intended to pursue peace.
2. Arabs rejected the Partition Plan and initiated the war.
3. Palestinians fled voluntarily, hoping to return after the fighting.
4. All Arab states united with the goal of expelling Jews from Palestine.
5. The Arab invasion made war inevitable.
6. Israel faced imminent destruction at the hands of overwhelmingly stronger Arab armies.
7. Israel always sought peace, but Arab leaders never responded to peace overtures.
The biggest takeaway I got from the book is that none of this was inevitable. There were many off-ramps in 1947, 1948 and innumerable times since then. But when you see the daily pictures coming out of Gaza as I write this in the midst of the slaughter in 2025, you can draw a straight line from the policies and general perspectives of the labor zionists and the revisionists. It is ironic that Ben Gurion and Begin despised each other and disagreed on everything other than the concept of greater Israel.
Every country is founded on its set of myths and those myths often evolve over time, and I think that’s totally fine. I have a problem with it when said myths are used as justification for using American made bombs, dropped out of American made F16s bought with American earned tax dollars to kill kids. Flappan sets up the narrative by laying out 6 generally accepted myths surrounding the founding of the state of Israel. He then debunks each of these myths with extremely detailed support, primary source quotes from letters, speeches, diaries etc.
1. Zionists accepted the UN Partition Plan and intended to pursue peace.
2. Arabs rejected the Partition Plan and initiated the war.
3. Palestinians fled voluntarily, hoping to return after the fighting.
4. All Arab states united with the goal of expelling Jews from Palestine.
5. The Arab invasion made war inevitable.
6. Israel faced imminent destruction at the hands of overwhelmingly stronger Arab armies.
7. Israel always sought peace, but Arab leaders never responded to peace overtures.
November 26, 2022
All states have foundational myths. Mythhood does not necessarily denote falsehood, but most states definitely have myths that are propagandistic. As an Australian, the myth of Ned Kelly, the outback bushranger, is not necessarily untrue, but it reflects the ethos of Australian culture. Whereas, up until the 'History Wars', the myth surrounding the creation of the Australian state ignored the dispossession and protracted genocide carried out against the Indigenous population. Myths deserve a reassessment, especially those that do not accord goodwill to a certain group of people. For instance, Turkey simply cannot accept that an Armenian genocide occurred, because it would mar the creation of the Turkish republic. Those who dare question and reevaluate myths are brave people. Questioning myths is not an act of treason or self-hatred. Replacing hateful myths with humanist foundational stories is a good thing. Australia's identity, reflected through its stories and myths, revels in its multicultural and diverse nature.
Simha Flapan is not unique in questioning myths in general, but specifically to Israel, from what I can gather, was one of the first - it occurred prior to the explosion of the New Historians who sought to question the foundational myths of Israel. Flapan in his own words is a Zionist and someone who saw the necessity of creating a Jewish state. I wholeheartedly agree, as the Jews have a historical connection to the land and faced vile discrimination in Europe. It is dubious to say that all living Jews can trace their ethnic lineage all the way back to Judea, but that doesn't matter -they have a cultural and religious connection to that area. Flapan is far less critical than say, Shlomo Sand; Flapan with this book does not aim to discredit the validity of a Jewish state. Rather, Flapan deconstructs several foundational myths that Israel still to this day perpetuates, which aim to excuse and cover up the protracted expulsion and ethnic cleansing of Israel of its Arab-Palestinian population.
It took my own country, Australia, over two hundred years to come to terms with its problematic creation. Some smart guy once said that the creation of states requires mass violence and discrimination. No one in Australia now points to Indigenous violence against British colonialists as a reason to discriminate against Australian Aborigines. I can only hope, with time, that Israel can come to terms with what was 'necessary' to create a Jewish state. Symbolic gestures, such as an apology, are powerful, but they must be met with actual change.
I would highly recommend this book to people who are interested in the Israel-Palestine issue from a perspective that is critical of the consequences of Zionism. I would also recommend it to people who are interested in discussions regarding mythhood in regards to state-creation.
Simha Flapan is not unique in questioning myths in general, but specifically to Israel, from what I can gather, was one of the first - it occurred prior to the explosion of the New Historians who sought to question the foundational myths of Israel. Flapan in his own words is a Zionist and someone who saw the necessity of creating a Jewish state. I wholeheartedly agree, as the Jews have a historical connection to the land and faced vile discrimination in Europe. It is dubious to say that all living Jews can trace their ethnic lineage all the way back to Judea, but that doesn't matter -they have a cultural and religious connection to that area. Flapan is far less critical than say, Shlomo Sand; Flapan with this book does not aim to discredit the validity of a Jewish state. Rather, Flapan deconstructs several foundational myths that Israel still to this day perpetuates, which aim to excuse and cover up the protracted expulsion and ethnic cleansing of Israel of its Arab-Palestinian population.
It took my own country, Australia, over two hundred years to come to terms with its problematic creation. Some smart guy once said that the creation of states requires mass violence and discrimination. No one in Australia now points to Indigenous violence against British colonialists as a reason to discriminate against Australian Aborigines. I can only hope, with time, that Israel can come to terms with what was 'necessary' to create a Jewish state. Symbolic gestures, such as an apology, are powerful, but they must be met with actual change.
I would highly recommend this book to people who are interested in the Israel-Palestine issue from a perspective that is critical of the consequences of Zionism. I would also recommend it to people who are interested in discussions regarding mythhood in regards to state-creation.
September 13, 2025
A very good book dismantling myths - still touted as facts today - surrounding the establishment of the Jewish apartheid regime.
Published two decades before Ilan Pappes magnificent The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, the term ethnic cleansing was really not yet in vogue, so it's not surprising that the phrase doesn't appear anywhere in Flapan's book. It still cover the same mechanisms somewhat, but Pappe's book goes into more detail, especially concerning Plan Dalet.
On the very last page Flapan writes a paragraph that is just as relevant today as the Jewish apartheid regime is carrying out a genocide in Gaza:
One thing I found curious is that Flapan doesn't really delve into the ideological underpinnings of the Zionist campaign of ethnic cleansing. The Zionist resistance to the establishment of a Palestinian state is described in realist terms, but misses the importance of Zionist ideology.
Moshe Machover, a Jewish academic born in Tel Aviv who later emigrated to the UK, is far more frank in his review of this book in Race & Class where he asks the question why the Zionist leadership "were ready to go to such great lengths to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state and to promote the alternative Hashemite option":
Machover points out that the root cause is the Zionist ideology.
I would go even further than Machover and say that Zionism to its core is a racist ideology with Jewish supremacy as its only logical result. Expecting that a state built on Jewish supremacy can be democratic is as absurd as expecting that the Boer states in southern Africa would be democratic.
Machover also points out some curiosities for those of us who don't speak Hebrew:
So, a very good bok, but incomplete.
Published two decades before Ilan Pappes magnificent The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, the term ethnic cleansing was really not yet in vogue, so it's not surprising that the phrase doesn't appear anywhere in Flapan's book. It still cover the same mechanisms somewhat, but Pappe's book goes into more detail, especially concerning Plan Dalet.
On the very last page Flapan writes a paragraph that is just as relevant today as the Jewish apartheid regime is carrying out a genocide in Gaza:
The collective revenge of an army for the murder of one of its citizens is no more righteous or admirable than the individual revenge of a desperate youth for the murder of one of his people. It is only propaganda and distorted vision that labels one "terrorism" and the other "national defense". (p. 243)
One thing I found curious is that Flapan doesn't really delve into the ideological underpinnings of the Zionist campaign of ethnic cleansing. The Zionist resistance to the establishment of a Palestinian state is described in realist terms, but misses the importance of Zionist ideology.
Moshe Machover, a Jewish academic born in Tel Aviv who later emigrated to the UK, is far more frank in his review of this book in Race & Class where he asks the question why the Zionist leadership "were ready to go to such great lengths to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state and to promote the alternative Hashemite option":
Since Flapan never quite spells out a clear-cut answer to this important question, I feel duty-bound to do it for him. Zionist opposition to the creation of a sovereign Palestinian Arab state, however small and emasculated, is not based on short-term military considerations but on long-term historical ones, which concern the very nature of the Zionist claim over Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel, aka Palestine). This claim is absolutely exclusive and cannot be reconciled with the recognition of Palestinian Arab national rights over, or even in, the Holy Land.
For unavoidable reasons of realpolitik Zionists may agree to concede sovereignty over some part of Palestine to an external power, such as Jordan. Such a concession is, however, purely pragmatic and temporary, and therefore in principle reversible. Israel always reserves the right to ‘liberate’ such conceded territories as the need or the ability to do so arises. But to allow the establishment within Palestine of a sovereign national entity of the indigenous people, that would undermine the whole self-justification and legitimation of the Zionist enterprise. A concession of this kind would be historically irreversible. [...]
It is, of course, not surprising that Flapan never completely exposes the deep roots of Zionist policy. After all, he remained a Zionist — albeit a heterodox one, tormented by doubts — to his dying day.
Moshe Machover, "Book Review", Race & Class, Volume 30, April-June, Number 4, p. 87-91
Machover points out that the root cause is the Zionist ideology.
Personally, I think that Flapan’s basic thesis is untenable. I cannot see how Zionism, a colonisatory project, could possibly achieve its aims without violating the individual and national rights of the indigenous people of Palestine. I do not believe in the possibility of benign colonialism.
I would go even further than Machover and say that Zionism to its core is a racist ideology with Jewish supremacy as its only logical result. Expecting that a state built on Jewish supremacy can be democratic is as absurd as expecting that the Boer states in southern Africa would be democratic.
Machover also points out some curiosities for those of us who don't speak Hebrew:
In translating Hebrew words he sometimes tones down their harshness, perhaps unconsciously. Thus on page 114 he refers to the committee set up by Ben-Gurion to coordinate the eviction of the Palestinians as the ‘Committee for Removal and Expulsion’. The Hebrew word that he translates as ‘removal’ is ‘aqirah, which actually means uprooting, not simply removal.
So, a very good bok, but incomplete.
March 23, 2025
Flapan' book is a very good scholarly book on the namesake of this work. I just have three points to make:
1) I think it's very innovative how Flapan makes the connection between Plan D and the Israeli/Zionist-Jordanian/Hashemite Collusion. Often the 2 are studied is isolation, with zero attempt to connect the 2. Yet, they both happened during, or were conceived of during the build-up to, the war/exodus itself
2) Flapan contributes a terrific study on the Palestinian Exodus of 1947-'49, which was excepted and peer-reviewed. In his study, Flapan concluded that there was neither a declared Zionist Policy of Expulsion nor a singular or unitary Arab policy to have Palestinian Arabs leave their homes. His conclusion is rather qualified on the former however. While Flapan finds very evidence of the claim that there was a singular Arab policy that commanded Palestinians to leave their homes, he finds significant evidence of the former. The fact is, while he finds that there is no evidence of a widely distributed policy paper commanded Jewish fighters to expel Palestinians, he finds that it appears to have been evidence to keep the population of Palestinians in Israel to at most 15%, which is consistent with the post-war demographic reality of Israel, immediately after the war ended. He finds swathes of evidence to show that Ben-Gurion was in support, at least tacitly, of a policy of expulsion and largely he points to there having been an ideological drive to expel the Palestinians.
Peculiar to Flapan's study is that he appears obtuse on the question of Policy. He clearly points to there being ideological and political support for such a policy and he finds that it appears that the logic of events are consistent with a policy of expulsion. But because, according to him, there was so evidence of soldiers being handed specific documents to expel from the very top, this is evidence of there having been no policy. I'm not saying Flapan is being apologetic, but rather I think how he defines policy is overly narrow and perhaps somewhat pedantic, in terms of how he engages with the question, although he certainly does not come across as pedantic himself.
3. Another point is that while Flapan clearly attempts to be as fair-minded as possible (and I think he is, at least, for the most part), it's clear that his background as a minority leftist zionist politician during the mandate period colors his views somewhat. On one hand, he makes it clear that "transfer," a euphemism or ethnic cleansing or expulsion or forcible population transfer, was inherent to, or at least present, in zionist political thought from the very beginning, yet he contends that Zionists were too socialist (at least those in charge) to enact any sort of policy, even though he makes a clear case for an ideologically drive expulsion. There's an inherent contradiction, I believe, in Flapan's reasoning.
Overall, I think this is a terrific book (especially when read in conjunction with Flapan's first volume, "Zionism and the Palestinians, 1917-1947," which, although somewhat heavily outdated in parts, is a great book to read, and is heavily put up-to-date thanks to the information in this volume. This book also is a great historical artifact in how it conveys the impact of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the Sabra and Shatila massacre onto 'New Historians, such as Flapan along with scholars such as the Preeminent Historian/Political-Scientist Walid Khalidi and Scholar Noam Chomsky. For further reading, readers are suggested to read the republished and updated peer-reviewed study "Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine" by Walid Khalidi and the peer-reviewed study " PLAN DALET IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ZIONISM" by Jaap C. Bosma. For two accessible books that work off or convey the same understanding of Plan Dalet, readers are suggested to read "The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951" by Ilan Pappe, "NAKBA AND SURVIVAL" by Adel Manna, and "Before Their Diaspora" by Walid Khalidi (see latest edition). For readers interested in a deeper understanding of Israeli/Zionist-Jordanian/Hashemite Collusion, readers are suggested to read both versions of "Collusion Across the Jordan" by Avi Shlaim (unabridged and abridged) along with 3 volumes by Yoav Gelber (read "Jewish-Transjordanian Relations 1921-1948" (see latest edition) followed by Palestine 1948 (it should be noted to readers that a) they ought to find the latest/updated/2nd edition to this book and b) this book is a very poor quality book in many ways a better alternative is "1948" by Benny Morris or "Dear Palestine" by Shay Hazkani, "The War for Palestine" (2nd edition) edited by Avi Shlaim and Eugene Rogan) followed by "Israeli-Jordanian Dialogue, 1948-1953" (also a poor rebuttal to Shlaim's book)) and "The Road to Jerusalem" by Benny Morris. For more extensive coverage of the Palestinian Exodus and its immediate or long-term aftermath, readers are encouraged to read 3 volumes by Benny Morris ("Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, Revisited," followed by "1948 and After" (2nd edition) followed by "Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956") and 2 volumes edited by Walid Khalidi ("From Haven to Conquest" (which contains an introduction authored by Walid Khalidi, but readers should also read "Palestine Reborn" for the updated edition to the essay and the other essays which cover what has happened since the exodus) and "All That Remains") and also the latest edition to "The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine" by Ilan Pappe. For an authoritative account of the Sabra and Shatila is "Sabra and Shatila" by Preeminent Historian Bayān Nuwayhiḍ Ḥūt. For an authoritative account of US-Israeli relations, read "The Fateful Triangle" by Noam Chomsky (see latest edition). On the issue of 'transfer' itself, readers are suggested to read 2 authoritative volumes by Nur-Eldeen Masalha ("Expulsion of the Palestinians" and "A Land Without a People")
1) I think it's very innovative how Flapan makes the connection between Plan D and the Israeli/Zionist-Jordanian/Hashemite Collusion. Often the 2 are studied is isolation, with zero attempt to connect the 2. Yet, they both happened during, or were conceived of during the build-up to, the war/exodus itself
2) Flapan contributes a terrific study on the Palestinian Exodus of 1947-'49, which was excepted and peer-reviewed. In his study, Flapan concluded that there was neither a declared Zionist Policy of Expulsion nor a singular or unitary Arab policy to have Palestinian Arabs leave their homes. His conclusion is rather qualified on the former however. While Flapan finds very evidence of the claim that there was a singular Arab policy that commanded Palestinians to leave their homes, he finds significant evidence of the former. The fact is, while he finds that there is no evidence of a widely distributed policy paper commanded Jewish fighters to expel Palestinians, he finds that it appears to have been evidence to keep the population of Palestinians in Israel to at most 15%, which is consistent with the post-war demographic reality of Israel, immediately after the war ended. He finds swathes of evidence to show that Ben-Gurion was in support, at least tacitly, of a policy of expulsion and largely he points to there having been an ideological drive to expel the Palestinians.
Peculiar to Flapan's study is that he appears obtuse on the question of Policy. He clearly points to there being ideological and political support for such a policy and he finds that it appears that the logic of events are consistent with a policy of expulsion. But because, according to him, there was so evidence of soldiers being handed specific documents to expel from the very top, this is evidence of there having been no policy. I'm not saying Flapan is being apologetic, but rather I think how he defines policy is overly narrow and perhaps somewhat pedantic, in terms of how he engages with the question, although he certainly does not come across as pedantic himself.
3. Another point is that while Flapan clearly attempts to be as fair-minded as possible (and I think he is, at least, for the most part), it's clear that his background as a minority leftist zionist politician during the mandate period colors his views somewhat. On one hand, he makes it clear that "transfer," a euphemism or ethnic cleansing or expulsion or forcible population transfer, was inherent to, or at least present, in zionist political thought from the very beginning, yet he contends that Zionists were too socialist (at least those in charge) to enact any sort of policy, even though he makes a clear case for an ideologically drive expulsion. There's an inherent contradiction, I believe, in Flapan's reasoning.
Overall, I think this is a terrific book (especially when read in conjunction with Flapan's first volume, "Zionism and the Palestinians, 1917-1947," which, although somewhat heavily outdated in parts, is a great book to read, and is heavily put up-to-date thanks to the information in this volume. This book also is a great historical artifact in how it conveys the impact of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the Sabra and Shatila massacre onto 'New Historians, such as Flapan along with scholars such as the Preeminent Historian/Political-Scientist Walid Khalidi and Scholar Noam Chomsky. For further reading, readers are suggested to read the republished and updated peer-reviewed study "Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine" by Walid Khalidi and the peer-reviewed study " PLAN DALET IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ZIONISM" by Jaap C. Bosma. For two accessible books that work off or convey the same understanding of Plan Dalet, readers are suggested to read "The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951" by Ilan Pappe, "NAKBA AND SURVIVAL" by Adel Manna, and "Before Their Diaspora" by Walid Khalidi (see latest edition). For readers interested in a deeper understanding of Israeli/Zionist-Jordanian/Hashemite Collusion, readers are suggested to read both versions of "Collusion Across the Jordan" by Avi Shlaim (unabridged and abridged) along with 3 volumes by Yoav Gelber (read "Jewish-Transjordanian Relations 1921-1948" (see latest edition) followed by Palestine 1948 (it should be noted to readers that a) they ought to find the latest/updated/2nd edition to this book and b) this book is a very poor quality book in many ways a better alternative is "1948" by Benny Morris or "Dear Palestine" by Shay Hazkani, "The War for Palestine" (2nd edition) edited by Avi Shlaim and Eugene Rogan) followed by "Israeli-Jordanian Dialogue, 1948-1953" (also a poor rebuttal to Shlaim's book)) and "The Road to Jerusalem" by Benny Morris. For more extensive coverage of the Palestinian Exodus and its immediate or long-term aftermath, readers are encouraged to read 3 volumes by Benny Morris ("Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, Revisited," followed by "1948 and After" (2nd edition) followed by "Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956") and 2 volumes edited by Walid Khalidi ("From Haven to Conquest" (which contains an introduction authored by Walid Khalidi, but readers should also read "Palestine Reborn" for the updated edition to the essay and the other essays which cover what has happened since the exodus) and "All That Remains") and also the latest edition to "The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine" by Ilan Pappe. For an authoritative account of the Sabra and Shatila is "Sabra and Shatila" by Preeminent Historian Bayān Nuwayhiḍ Ḥūt. For an authoritative account of US-Israeli relations, read "The Fateful Triangle" by Noam Chomsky (see latest edition). On the issue of 'transfer' itself, readers are suggested to read 2 authoritative volumes by Nur-Eldeen Masalha ("Expulsion of the Palestinians" and "A Land Without a People")
June 8, 2025
An excellent introduction to debunking the myths of hasbara (Israeli propaganda). Highly recommended for anyone starting out.
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