Cursos de estética, Vol 1

Lectures on Aesthetics #1

by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Os Cursos de Estética podem ser considerados como o maior empreendimento de filosofia da arte dos tempos modernos. Neles convivem o fenômeno sensível da arte com o nível elevado da especulação filosófica, num leque amplo que abrange tanto reflexões sobre os fundamentos do belo como a relação entre arte e natureza ou entre a arte e os diferentes momentos históricos. Trazem também juízos concretos sobre obras as mais diversas, assim como digressões teóricas a respeito da estrutura das diferentes modalidades artísticas, desde a arquitetura até a poesia. A tradução, feita a partir do original alemão, toma como base a primeira edição, de 1835, e vem acompanhada de um glossário com os principais conceitos empregados por Hegel.

Genres: Philosophy, Art, Nonfiction, Classics, 19th Century, Theory, Germany

303 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1994

About the author

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was a German philosopher and one of the founding figures of German Idealism. Influenced by Kant's transcendental idealism and Rousseau's politics, Hegel formulated an elaborate system of historical development of ethics, government, and religion through the dialectical unfolding of the Absolute. Hegel was one of the most well-known historicist philosopher, and his thought presaged continental philosophy, including postmodernism. His system was inverted into a materialist ideology by Karl Marx, originally a member of the Young Hegelian faction.

Reviews

[Nathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

I took a course on this in my Junior year of university. We read volume 1 cover to cover and roughly 1/3-1/2 of volume 2. Needless to say, it was an incredibly difficult and rough class. However it was well worth it. This text served as a nice introduction to Hegel. We learned many of Hegel's basic and essential concepts, along with his method. In the fall semester of Senior year I took another course on Hegel, except this time on PhG Ch. IV and VI and some of SoL. The latter texts were much easier having had the aesthetics under my belt. However, it was not simply a matter of difficulty. Finding Hegel's main texts easier meant I could spend more time on it and get more out of it, without jumping through linguistic and methodological hoops. So if you are new to Hegel I recommend starting here.

[Jared]

This milestone is but a mirage. Alas, the 2nd volume beckons.

[TL · Rating 5 out of 5]

'...the word Aesthetics, taken literally, is not wholly satisfactory, since "Aesthetics" means, more precisely, the science of sensation, of feeling... [But] the science which is meant [by me] deals not with the beautiful as such but simply with the beauty of art... [Thus] the proper expression for our science is Philosophy of Art and, more definitely, Philosophy of Fine Art.' (1)

'In ordinary life we are of course accustomed to speak of a beautiful color, a beautiful sky, a beautiful river; likewise of beautiful flowers, beautiful animals, and even more of beautiful people...But we may assert... that the beauty of art is higher than nature.

The beauty of art is beauty born of the spirit and born again, and the higher the spirit and its productions stand above nature and its phenomena, the higher too is the beauty of art above that of nature. Indeed, considered formally [i.e., no matter what it says], even a useless notion that enters a man's head is higher than any product of nature, because in such a notion spirituality and freedom are always present.

Of course, considered in its content, the sun, for example, appears as an absolutely necessary factor [in the universe] while a false notion vanishes as accidental and transitory. But, taken by itself, a natural existent like the sun is indifferent, not free and self-conscious in itself; and if we treat it in its necessary connection with other things, then we are not treating it by itself, and therefore not as beautiful.' (2)

'But what is higher about the spirit and its artistic beauty is not something merely relative in comparison with nature. On the contrary, spirit is alone the true, comprehending everything in itself, so that everything beautiful is truly beautiful only as sharing in this higher sphere and generated by it.

In this sense the beauty of nature appears only as a reflection of the beauty that belongs to spirit, as an imperfect incomplete mode [of beauty], a mode which in its substance is contained in the spirit itself.

...a limitation to fine art arises very naturally, since... the realms of nature have not been classified and examined from the point of view of beauty. In [discussing] natural beauty we feel ourselves too much in a vague sphere, without a criterion and therefore such a classification would provide too little interest for us to undertake it.' (2-3)


'Beauty and art does indeed pervade all the business of life like a friendly genius and brightly adorns all our surroundings whether inner or outer, mitigating the seriousness of our circumstances and the complexities of the actual world, extinguishing idleness in an entertaining way, and, where there is nothing good to be done, filling the place of evil always better than evil itself.

Yet... these [pleasing artistic] forms themselves nevertheless seem to fall outside the true ends and aims of life. Even if artistic creations are not detrimental to these serious purposes, if indeed they sometimes even seem to further them, at least by keeping evil away, still, art belongs rather to the indulgence and relaxation of the spirit whereas substantial interests require its exertion... on this view, art appears as a superfluity...

If art is regarded as a means, then there always remains in the form of the means a disadvantageous aspect, namely that even if art subordinates itself to more serious aims in fact, and produces more serious effects, the means that it uses for this purpose is deception. The beautiful [Schöne] has its being in pure appearance [Schein].

But an inherently true end and aim, as is easily recognized, must not be achieved by deception, and even if here and there it may be furthered by this means, this should be only in a limited way; and even in that case deception will be unable to count as the right means. For the means should correspond to the dignity of the end, and not pure appearance and deception but only the truth can create the truth, just as science too has to treat the true interests of the spirit in accordance with the true mode of actuality and the true mode of envisaging it. [the 'problem of art's deception' is advanced further below: p.8]

...secondly, it is still more likely to seem that even if fine art in general is a proper object of philosophical reflection, it is yet no appropriate topic for strictly scientific treatment. For the beauty of art presents itself to sense, feeling, intuition, imagination; it has a different sphere from thought, and the apprehension of its activity and its products demands an organ other than scientific thinking.

Further, it is precisely the freedom of production and configurations that we enjoy in the beauty of art. In the production as well as in the perception of works of art, it seems as if we escape from every fetter of rule and regularity. In place of the strictness of conformity to law, and the dark inwardness of thought, we seek peace and enlivenment in the forms of art; we exchange the shadow realm of the Idea for bright and vigorous reality.

Finally, the source of works of art is the free activity of fancy which in its imaginations is itself more free than nature is. Art has at its command not only the whole wealth of natural formations in their manifold and variegated appearance; but in addition the creative imagination has power to launch out beyond them inexhaustibly in productions of its own. In face of this immeasurable fullness of fancy and its free products, it looks as if thought must lose courage to bring them completely before itself, to criticize them, and arrange them under its universal formulae.' (3-5)

[Yet fine art can be treated scientifically:]

'As regards the worthiness of art to be treated scientifically, it is of course the case that art can be used as a fleeting play, affording recreation and entertainment, decorating our surroundings, giving pleasantness to the externals of our life, and making other objects stand out by artistic adornment. Thus regarded, art is indeed not independent, not free, but ancillary.

But what we want to consider is art which is free alike in its end and its means. The fact that art in general can serve other ends and be in that case a mere passing amusement is something which it shares equally with thought. For, on the one hand, science may indeed be used as an intellectual servant for finite ends and accidental means, and it then acquires its character not from itself but from other objects and circumstances. Yet, on the other hand, it also cuts itself free from this servitude in order to raise itself, in full independence, to the truth in which it fulfills itself independently and conformably with its own ends alone.

[KEY PARAGRAPH!!!:]
Now, in this its freedom alone is fine art truly art, and it only fulfils its supreme task when it has placed itself in the same sphere as religion and philosophy, and when it is simply one way of bringing to our minds and expressing the Divine, the deepest interests of mankind, and the most comprehensive truths of the spirit. In works of art the nations have deposited their richest inner intuitions and ideas, and art is often the key, and in many nations the sole key, to understanding their philosophy and religion. Art shares this vocation with religion and philosophy, but in a special way, namely by displaying even the [highest] reality sensuously, bringing it thereby nearer to the senses, to feeling, and to nature's mode of appearance.

[Hegel's brilliance shining:]
What is thus displayed is the depth of a suprasensuous world which thought pierces and sets up at first as a beyond in contrast with immediate consciousness and present feeling; it is freedom of intellectual reflection which rescues itself from the here and now, called sensuous reality and finitude. But this breach, to which the spirit proceeds, it is also able to heal.

*[Spirit] generates out of itself works of fine art as the first reconciling middle term between pure thought and what is merely external, sensuous, and transient, between nature and finite reality and the infinite freedom of conceptual thinking.*' (7-8)

[Returning to the problematic of art's deceptiveness:]
'So far as concerns the unworthiness of the element of art in general, namely its pure appearance and deception, this objection would of course have its justification if pure appearance could be claimed as something wrong. But APPEARANCE ITSELF IS ESSENTIAL TO ESSENCE. TRUTH WOULD NOT BE TRUTH IF IT DID NOT SHOW ITSELF AND APPEAR, IF IT WERE NOT TRUTH FOR SOMEONE AND FOR ITSELF, AS WELL AS FOR THE SPIRIT IN GENERAL TOO. [Cf. Nietzsche and Heidegger]

Consequently, not pure appearance in general, but only the special kind of appearance in which art gives reality to what is inherently true can be the subject of reproof. If in this connection the pure appearance in which art brings its conceptions into existence is to be described as "deception", this reproof first acquires its meaning in comparison with the phenomena of the external world and its immediate materiality, as well as in relation to our own world of feeling, i.e., the inner world of sense. To both these worlds, in our life of experience, our own phenomenal life, we are accustomed to ascribe the value and name of actuality, reality, and truth, in contrast to art which lacks such reality and truth.

But it is precisely this whole sphere of the empirical inner and outer world which is not the world of genuine actuality; on the contrary, we must call it, in a stricter sense than we call art, a pure appearance and a harsher deception. ONLY BEYOND THE IMMEDIACY OF FEELING AND EXTERNAL OBJECTS IS GENUINE ACTUALITY TO BE FOUND. For the truly actual is only that which has being in and for itself, the substance of nature and spirit, which indeed gives itself presence and existence, but in this existence remains in and for itself and only so is truly actual.

[KEY:]
It is precisely the dominion of these universal powers which art emphasizes and reveals. In the ordinary external and internal world essentiality does indeed appear too, but in the form of a chaos of accidents, afflicted by the immediacy of the sensuous and by the capriciousness of situations, events, characters, etc. ART LIBERATES THE TRUE CONTENT OF PHENOMENA FROM THE PURE APPEARANCE AND DECEPTION OF THIS BAD, TRANSITORY WORLD, AND GIVES THEM A HIGHER ACTUALITY, BORN OF THE SPIRIT. Thus, far from being mere pure appearance, a higher reality and truer existence is to be ascribed to the phenomena of art in comparison with [those of] ordinary reality.

[cf. Heidegger:]
NEITHER CAN THE REPRESENTATIONS OF ART BE CALLED A DECEPTIVE APPEARANCE IN COMPARISON WITH THE TRUER REPRESENTATIONS OF HISTORIOGRAPHY. For the latter has not even immediate existence but only the spiritual pure appearance thereof as the element of its portrayals, and its content remains burdened with the entire contingency of ordinary life and its events, complications, and individualities, whereas THE WORK OF ART BRINGS BEFORE US THE ETERNAL POWERS THAT GOVERN HISTORY WITHOUT THIS APPENDAGE OF THE IMMEDIATE SENSUOUS PRESENT AND ITS UNSTABLE APPEARANCE.' (8-9)

'...*of course the form of appearance acquired by a topic in the sphere of thinking is the truest reality; but in comparison with the appearance of immediate existence and of historiography, the pure appearance of art has the advantage that it points through and beyond itself, and itself hints at something spiritual of which it is to give us an idea, whereas immediate appearance does not present itself as deceptive but rather as the real and the true, although the truth is in fact contaminated and concealed by the immediacy of sense. THE HARD SHELL OF NATURE AND THE ORDINARY WORLD MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SPIRIT TO PENETRATE THROUGH THEM TO THE IDEA THAN WORKS OF ART DO.

[Art's weaknesses; Art ultimately inferior to religion, which itself is inferior to philosophy, the highest stage of spirit]
'But while on the one hand we give this high position to art, it is on the other hand just as necessary to remember that neither in content nor in form is art the highest and absolute mode of bringing to our minds the true interests of the spirit. For PRECISELY ON ACCOUNT OF ITS FORM, ART IS LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC CONTENT. ONLY ONE SPHERE AND STAGE OF TRUTH IS CAPABLE OF BEING REPRESENTED IN THE ELEMENT OF ART. In order to be a genuine content for art, SUCH TRUTH MUST IN VIRTUE OF ITS OWN SPECIFIC CHARACTER BE ABLE TO GO FORTH INTO [THE SPHERE OF] SENSE AND REMAIN ADEQUATE TO ITSELF THERE. THIS IS THE CASE WITH THE GODS OF GREECE.' (9)


'On the other hand, there is a deeper comprehension of truth which is no longer so akin and friendly to sense as to be capable of appropriate adoption and expression in this medium. The Christian view of truth is of this kind, and above all, the spirit of our world today, or, more particularly, of our religion and the development of our reason, appears as beyond the stage at which art is the supreme mode of our knowledge of the Absolute.

The peculiar nature of artistic production and of works of art no longer fills our highest need. We have got beyond venerating works of art as divine and worshipping them. The impression they make is of a more reflective kind, and what they arouse in us needs a higher touchstone and a different test. Thought and reflection have spread their wings above fine art.

...it is certainly the case that art no longer affords that satisfaction of spiritual needs which earlier ages and nations sought in it, and found in it alone... The beautiful days of Greek art, like the golden age of the later Middle Ages, are gone. The development of reflection in our life today has made it a need of ours, in relation both to our will and judgement, to cling to general considerations and to regulate the particular by them, with the result that universal forms, laws, duties, rights, maxims, prevail as determining reasons and are the chief regulator. '

'Consequently THE CONDITIONS OF OUR PRESENT TIME ARE NOT FAVORABLE TO ART... OUR WHOLE SPIRITUAL CULTURE IS OF SUCH A KIND THAT [THE ARTIST] HIMSELF STANDS WITHIN THE WORLD OF REFLECTION AND ITS RELATIONS, AND COULD NOT BY ANY ACT OF WILL AND DECISION ABSTRACT HIMSELF FROM IT; NOR COULD HE BY SPECIAL EDUCATION OR REMOVAL FROM THE RELATIONS OF LIFE CONTRIVE AND ORGANIZE A SPECIAL SOLITUDE TO REPLACE WHAT HE HAS LOST.


In all these respects ART, CONSIDERED IN ITS HIGHEST VOCATION, IS AND REMAINS FOR US A THING OF THE PAST. THEREBY IT HAS LOST FOR US GENUINE TRUTH AND LIFE, AND HAS RATHER BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO OUR IDEAS INSTEAD OF MAINTAINING ITS EARLIER NECESSITY IN REALITY AND OCCUPYING ITS HIGHER PLACE.

WHAT IS NOW AROUSED IN US BY WORKS OF ART IS NOT JUST IMMEDIATE ENJOYMENT BUT OUR JUDGMENT ALSO, SINCE WE SUBJECT TO OUR INTELLECTUAL CONSIDERATION (i) THE CONTENT OF ART, AND (ii) THE WORK OF ART'S MEANS OF PRESENTATION, AND THE APPROPRIATENESS OR INAPPROPRIATENESS OF BOTH TO ONE ANOTHER.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART IS THEREFORE A GREATER NEED IN OUR DAY THAN IT WAS IN DAYS WHEN ART BY ITSELF AS ART YIELDED FULL SATISFACTION. ART INVITES US TO INTELLECTUAL CONSIDERATION, AND THAT NOT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CREATING ART AGAIN, BUT FOR KNOWING PHILOSOPHICALLY WHAT ART IS. ' (10-11)


["the beautiful is characterized as the pure appearance of the Idea to sense":]
'We called the beautiful the Idea of the beautiful. This means that the beautiful itself must be grasped as Idea, in particular as Idea in a determinate form, i.e., as Ideal. Now the Idea as such is nothing but the Concept, the real existence of the Concept, and the unity of the two. For the Concept as such is not yet the Idea... it is only when it is present in its real existence and placed in unity therewith that the Concept is the Idea.

Yet this unity ought not to be represented as a mere neutralization of Concept and Reality, as if both lost their peculiar and special qualities... On the contrary, in this unity the Concept is predominant. For, in accordance with its own nature, it is this identity implicitly already, and therefore generates reality out of itself as its own; therefore, since this reality is its own self-development, it sacrifices nothing of itself in it, but therein simply realizes itself, the Concept, and therefore remains one with itself in its objectivity. This unity of Concept and Reality is the abstract definition of the Idea.

... the Idea is completely concrete in itself, a totality of characteristics, and beautiful only as immediately one with the objectivity adequate to itself.

...Everything existent has truth only insofar as it is an existence of the Idea. For the Idea alone is genuinely actual. Appearance is not true simply because it has an inner or outer existence, or because it is reality as such, but only because this reality corresponds with the Concept. Only in that event has existence actuality and truth. And truth not at all in the subjective sense that there is an accordance between some existent and my ideas, but in the objective meaning that the ego or an external object, an action, an event, a situation in its reality is itself a realization of the Concept.

[KEY. ADORNO'S ISSUE:]
If this identity is not established, then the existent is only an appearance in which, not the total Concept, but only one abstract side of it is objectified; and that side, if it establishes itself in itself independently against the totality and unity, may fade away in opposition to the true Concept....

The Idea should realize itself externally and win a specific and present existence as the objectivity of nature and spirit. The true as such exists also. Now when truth in this its external existence is present to consciousness immediately, and when the Concept remains immediately in unity with its external appearance, the Idea is not only true but beautiful. Therefore the beautiful is characterized as the pure appearance of the Idea to sense. ' (106-111)

[Unknown · Rating 5 out of 5]

On the other hand however, art seems to proceed from a higher impulse and to satisfy higher needs,—at times the highest and absolute needs . . .

The genuine, immortal works of art remain enjoyable by all ages and nation . . . It could of course be said that what is really excellent must be excellent for all time.
__________
. . . they are simply deceived, poor limited creatures, without the faculty and ability to apprehend and reach the loftiness of my standpoint.

__________
If Western Philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, Aesthetics is a series of footnotes to Hegel.

The comprehensive work on Aesthetics. Titanic, expansive, and systematic.
__________
The beauty of art is higher than nature.

However all this may be, it is certainly the case that art no longer affords the satisfaction of spiritual needs which earlier ages and nations sought in it, and found in it alone.

For connoisseurship, and this is its defective side, may stick at acquaintance with purely external aspects, the technical, historical, etc., and perhaps have little notion of the true nature of the work of art, or even know nothing of it at all.

In this way the sensuous aspect of art is spiritualized, since the sprit appears in art as sensuous.

It must be a spiritual activity which yet contains at the same time the element of sensuousness and immediacy.

Almost anyone can get up to a certain point in an art, but to get beyond this point, where art proper only now begins, an inborn, higher talent for art is indispensable.

The aim of art must therefore lie in something still other than the purely mechanical imitation of what is there, which in every case can bring to birth only technical tricks, not works, of art.

Art lifts him with gentle hands out of and above imprisonment in nature.

He lifts himself to eternal ideas, to a realm of thought and freedom.

For other ends, like instruction, purification, bettering, financial gain, struggling for fame and honour, have nothing to do with the work of art as such, and do not determine its nature.

The first point here is the demand that the content which is to come into artistic representation should be in itself qualified for such representation.

First, art begins when the Idea, still in its indeterminacy and obscurity, or in bad and untrue determinacy, is made the content of artistic shapes. Being indeterminate, it does not yet possess in itself that individuality which the Ideal demands; its abstraction and one-sidedness leave its shape externally defective and arbitrary. The first form of art is therefore rather a mere search for portrayal than a capacity for true presentation; the Idea has not found the form even in itself and therefore remains struggling and striving after it. We may call this form, in general terms, the symbolic form of art.

An unknown block of stone may symbolise the Divine, but it does not represent it. Its natural shape has no connection with the Divine and is therefore external to it and not an embodiment of it. When shaping begins, the shapes produced are symbols, perhaps, but in themselves are fantastic and monstrous. [Note]

In this way romantic art is the self-transcendence of art but within its own sphere and in the form of art itself.

Inwardness celebrates its triumph over the external and manifests its victory in and on the external itself, whereby what is apparent to the senses alone sinks into worthlessness.

But, looked at more closely, the true is nevertheless distinct from the beautiful.

Truth in that case is to be gained only by the subjugation of subjectivity.

The beautiful, on the other hand, is in itself infinite and free.

the sphere of the beautiful is withdrawn from the relativity of finite affairs and raised into the absolute realm of the Idea and its truth.

For men have more serious interests and aims which enter in through the unfolding and deepening of spirit and in which men must remain in harmony with themselves. The higher art will be that which has as its task the representation of this higher content.

The ideal individual must be self-contained.

The individual should not be deprived of his right to align himself of his own free will with this or that class. Aptitude, talent, skill and education alone have to lead to a decision in this matter and to decide it . . . First, the individual with his spiritual qualities must already have actually overstepped the natural barrier and its power which his wishes and aims are meant to surmount, or otherwise his demand is over again just a folly.

But in art what should move us is only the inherently genuine ‘pathos’.

Still, by making this demand, we must attack many productions, especially of more modern art.

The important thing is an inherently specific essential ‘pathos’ in a rich and full breast whose inner individual world is penetrated by the ‘pathos’ in such a way that this penetration, and not the ‘pathos’ alone as such, is represented.

As a means for this putting oneself outside and beyond, there remains nothing over in that case except withdrawal into the inner world of feelings which the individual does not leave, and now in this unreality regards himself as a sapient being who just looks longingly to heaven and therefore thinks he may disdain everything on earth.

But in no art should this definiteness go astray into the prose of actual nature and its direct imitation . . .

Similarly, many a man seeks in vain in the most beautiful love-songs for his own feelings and therefore declares that the description is false, just as others, whose knowledge of love is drawn from romances alone, do not now suppose themselves to be actually in love until they encounter in and around themselves the very same feelings and situations [as those described in the romances].

Consequently genius does burst forth in youth, as was the case with Goethe and Schiller, but only middle or old age can bring to perfection the genuine maturity of the work of art.

On the other hand, neither can inspiration be summoned by a spiritual intention to produce. A man who simply resolves to be inspired in order to write a poem, paint a picture, or compose a tune, without already carrying in himself some theme as a living stimulus and must just hunt around here and there for some material, then, no matter what his talent, cannot, on the strength of this mere intention, form a beautiful conception or produce a solid work of art. Neither a purely sensuous stimulus nor mere will and decision procures genuine inspiration, and to make use of such means proves only that the heart and the imagination have not yet fastened on any true interest. But if the artistic urge is of the right kind, this interest has already in advance been concentrated on a specific object and theme and kept firmly to it.

His aspiration remains a more objective joy in the topic of his comparisons and therefore is more contemplative. With a free heart he looks about him in order to see in everything surrounding him, in everything he knows and loves, an image of what his sense and spirit are preoccupied with and of what engrosses him to the full.

The individual has not merely immersed himself directly in his specific situation, feeling, or passion, but that as a high and noble being he is superior to them and can cut himself free from them. Passion restricts and chains the soul within, narrows it, and concentrates it within limits, and therefore makes it inarticulate, talking in single syllables, or raging and blustering in vagueness and extravagance. But greatness of mind, force of spirit, lifts itself above such restrictedness and, in beautiful and tranquil peace, hovers above the specific ‘pathos’ by which it is moved.

Through the eye we look into a man’s soul, just as his spiritual character is expressed by his whole demeanour in general.

Of a similar kind is the witty French saying: ‘God made men in his own image, but man has returned the compliment by making God in the image of man.’

It must be withdrawn from all finitude, everything transient, all preoccupation with what is purely sensuous.

Schiller’s famous saying: “Since the gods were then more human, men were more godlike.”

Absolute truth is on a higher level than the appearance of beauty which cannot be detached from the soil of the sensuous and apparent.

[Lucas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hegel’s most distinctive feature as a philosopher—and what makes him the philosopher par excellence—is his deep reservoir of knowledge regarding history: of culture, of science, of philosophy, and as such. This feature comes out remarkably clearly here, and makes it apparent why Hegel’s aesthetics have long been the most well-received aspect of his philosophical system.

[Keelan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Standard for students studying the philosophy of art.

[Differengenera · Rating 4 out of 5]

I came to this hoping for an aesthetic system sufficiently proto-Marxist to show me a way past regarding texts as ineffable systems for the exchange of meaning with no last instance without getting too structuralist, specifically in a way that would help me model what modernity does to literature in more philosophical terms. I set out to read Hegel and Sartre's aesthetic writings when I was writing my thesis because I knew that they were dense and probably had plenty of models I could make use of, but for various reasons this was impossible by the time I had to submit.

When there was nothing of the kind on offer here I was relieved, in finding that this wasn't the missing ingredient that would have squared everything I was trying to do in my research, but also disappointed that I didn't have anything I could bring forward into something else. Hegel has very conservative taste in art and is of the opinion that art peaked in antiquity, specifically in Greece, with marble statues and tragic theatre which perfectly express the juvenile, pre-Christian stage of mind that human civilisation had at that stage reached.

Hegel is writing from nineteenth century Germany at romanticism's high point, at once appreciating Goethe's talent but also on some level appalled by his works' inwardness and subjectivism (that will over the next century metastisise into the European avant-gardes) and it is this that encourages him to take against that which is disproportionate, overly subjective and irrational in cultural expression, recommending instead more harmony, joyousness and rationality in line with the requirements of the over-riding abstract idea or concept of a particular epoch.

I'm sure there are scholars or critics who have made use of this system (for which I am giving this book four stars) for more radical ends, expanding the idea of the concept in modernity beyond Hegel's proscrpition, Lukács being the primary example, but this is a hermeneutics fundamentally hostile to contemporaneity he singles out Shakespeare's tragedies and discordant music as for criticism and as a social account it's not very deep either, his explanation for Dutch realism depends on the joyousness of the Dutch national character.

The triumph of Hegel's system is his capacity to subsume contingency within the logic of mind so the only way to make sense of anything is to regard it as unfolding as part of something larger, but in the realm of aesthetics, we're back on the level of contingency and Hegel is no better than Marx at speaking to the residuals.

[Sefa Demir]

Bu kitap, Hegel'in verdiği derslerin daha sonraları derlenip toparlanmış halinden oluşmaktadır.

İlk başta Hegel'in felsefesinin ana özelliğinden biraz bahsedeyim. Diyalektik rasyonalizm, Hegel’in felsefesinin yapı taşıdır. Hegel’e göre hakikat ve varlık iki karşıt unsurdur, yani tez ve anti tezi oluştururlar. Hakikat olarak idealar tek başlarına var olsalar bile varlıkla (olgusal olanla) birleşip sentezi yani insan tinini(akıl) oluşturmadan tek başınalıkları bir şey ifade etmez. Hegel'i diğer rasyonalist filozoflardan ayıran özellik burada ortaya çıkar. Hakikat, varlıkla bir olup beşeri düzeyde tini oluşturduktan sonra zamansallaşır. Dolaysıyla zamansallaşan hiçbir düşüncenin ya da kavramın değişmez bir geçerliliği yoktur. Ama yine de ideal olan mutlak, tabii gerçeklikten daha gerçektir, çünkü beşeri varlıkla birleşip insan tinini oluştursa bile içinde hakikati barındırır.

''... evrensel sanat gereksinimi, insanın içsel ve dışsal dünyayı, içerisinde kendi özünü yeniden tanıdığı bir nesne olarak, kendi tinsel bilincine yükseltme yönündeki akılsal gereksinimidir.''

Hegel'in estetik kavramı ''güzel''in idealinden oluşur. Bir sanat eseri, ideal olanı barındırmadığı müddetçe salt doğa taklididir ve salt doğa taklidi, içinde duyusal ögeler barındırsa da ideal güzellik olmaktan uzaktır. Çünkü Hegel'e göre sanat eseri yapmamızdaki amaç yukarıda alıntıladığım gibi akılsal gereksinimlerimizden ortaya çıkar. Yani salt doğanın tinsel bir amaçlılığı olmadığı için ideal güzelliği de var olamaz

''Bu duyusal şekiller ve sesler, sanatta, sırf kendileri ve kendi dolayımsız şekilleri adına değil, ama bu şekil içerisinde daha yüksek tinsel ilgilere doyum sağlama amacıyla ortaya çıkarlar, çünkü onlar tindeki bir sesi ve bir yankıyı bilincin bütün derinliklerinden dışarıya çağırma gücüne sahiptirler. Bu şekilde sanatın duyusal yönü tinselleşmiştir, çünkü tin sanatta duyusal kılınmış olarak ortaya çıkar.''

Hegel'e göre sanat üretiminde tinsel ve duyusal yönler, tıpkı düşünsel idealizmindeki diyalektik ilişkide olduğu gibi bir arada olmalıdır. Ama sanatta tinsel olan, saf bir şekilde var olmaz, çünkü kendini düşünce gibi içsel değil duyusal bir şekilde dışsal olarak ortaya koyar.

[Shahriar Shahrabi · Rating 4 out of 5]

ok, I loved reading this. BUT, it felt at times like a survey of how deep Hegel can go up his own bum. The answer is pretty deep!
Let's get the bad parts out of the way. At times Hegel is casually racist, this is a very west centric work. More often than not, especially in the examples he provides to build his case, he is straight out objectively wrong! And while it is entertaining to observe his mental gymnastics to try to philosophically justify why our noses have 2 holes, you do wonder hundreds of pages in a book that is typesetted with no margins and what feels like font size 2, what life choices lead you here. Ah, and Hegel fails to explain very simple concepts in simple and comprehensive ways. So why did I love reading this?
Whether you agree or disagree with Hegel on specific points, you still end up thinking ALOT about the various aspects of the arts. And I really enjoyed that. Nevermind that despite the specifics I disagreed with, as a whole, Hegel is on to something. It is impressive how he understands some nuances of art and art making as a none artist.
This is a west centric work, but as far as the western (northern european post humanist nationalist view) is concerned, it is a well informed one. You get a nice summary of that time frame's understanding of the past, the present and future. I actually understood Wagner's obsession with German heroes a lot better, after Hegel reading Hegel's comparison of the artistic handling of subjects in France as opposed to Germany.
All in all, if you are obsessed with aesthetics, and can look past the overly complicated prose, then you will enjoy this!

[Isabela]

adorei o curso, mas li isso em um dia e to com vontade de chorar (eu sei que devia ter estudado antes, mas sou uma mulher contemporânea que herdou da era moderna o império das paixões, da interioridade absoluta. impuz minha subjetividade sobre a efetividade real e flexionei a ética até que condizesse ao meu impulso)

[Roberto Yoed · Rating 4 out of 5]

Just as the previous Hegel's books, this is a step by step but in this case of the creation of art.

Despite the horrendous spectre of the "idea" haunting all the chapters, there are beautiful thoughts in some of the paragraphs.

[Graham Blanks · Rating 3 out of 5]

What is blud yapping about? Probably above my pay grade

[Jackson Snyder · Rating 3 out of 5]

Super cool but unfortunately dense. Hegel makes very little sense to me but when he does it’s just amazing and so real. Loved the parts about sculpture. Hopefully I will re read this one day.

[Matteo Ponzi · Rating 5 out of 5]

I for one have no doubt that he is right about all of it.

[Josh McLemore · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm not a huge fan of Hegel, at all, but I really do like his views on the history of art and aesthetics overall. A very very difficult read though, as it is Hegel, have to read everything a couple of times before you can grasp his concepts.

[Peter]

My dissertation is on Hegel's "Lectures on Aesthetics." It's very interesting, moving from concrete example to historical analysis to philosophical speculation seamlessly. Hegel has been called "the father of art history" by Gombrich.

[Lorena Francisca · Rating 5 out of 5]

Estoy leyendo el volumen 6 de este gran libro: "EL sistema de las artes particulares".

[Sophie · Rating 5 out of 5]

Une bouffée d'oxygène dans la pensée philosophique plutôt clairvoyante ici!

[Alexander Asay · Rating 4 out of 5]

UGA: Early Modern Philosophy