What do you think?
Rate this book
Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
MP3 CD Format Two leading authorities--an acclaimed historian and the outstanding battlefield commander and strategist of our time--collaborate on a landmark examination of war since 1945. Conflict is both a sweeping history of the evolution of warfare up to Putin's invasion of the Ukraine, and a penetrating analysis of what we must learn from the past--and anticipate in the future--in order to navigate an increasingly perilous world. In this deep and incisive study, General David Petraeus, who commanded the US-led coalitions in both Iraq, during the Surge, and Afghanistan and former CIA director, and the prize-winning historian Andrew Roberts, explore over 70 years of conflict, drawing significant lessons and insights from their fresh analysis of the past. Drawing on their different perspectives and areas of expertise, Petraeus and Roberts show how often critical mistakes have been repeated time and again, and the challenge, for statesmen and generals alike, of learning to adapt to various new weapon systems, theories and strategies. Among the conflicts examined are the Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the two Gulf Wars, the Balkan wars in the former Yugoslavia, and both the Soviet and Coalition wars in Afghanistan, as well as guerilla conflicts in Africa and South America. Conflict culminates with a bracing look at Putin's disastrous invasion of Ukraine, yet another case study in the tragic results when leaders refuse to learn from history, and an assessment of the nature of future warfare. Filled with sharp insight and the wisdom of experience, Conflict is not only a critical assessment of our recent past, but also an essential primer of modern warfare that provides crucial knowledge for waging battle today as well as for understanding what the decades ahead will bring.
1 pages, Audio CD
First published October 17, 2023
748 people are currently reading
2963 people want to read
About the author
David H. Petraeus
22 books49 followersDavid Howell Petraeus is an American former military officer and public official. He served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from September 6, 2011, until his resignation on November 9, 2012. Prior to his assuming the directorship of the CIA, Petraeus was a four-star general serving over 37 years in the United States Army. His last assignments in the Army were as commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) from July 4, 2010, to July 18, 2011. His other four-star assignments include serving as the 10th Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) from October 13, 2008, to June 30, 2010, and as Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) from February 10, 2007, to September 16, 2008. As commander of MNF-I, Petraeus oversaw all coalition forces in Iraq.
Petraeus has a B.S. degree from the United States Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1974 as a distinguished cadet (top 5% of his class). He was the General George C. Marshall Award winner as the top graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College class of 1983. He subsequently earned an M.P.A. in 1985 and a PhD degree in International Relations in 1987 from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He later served as Assistant Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy and also completed a fellowship at Georgetown University.
Petraeus has repeatedly stated that he has no plans to run for elected political office. On June 23, 2010, President Barack Obama nominated Petraeus to succeed General Stanley McChrystal as commanding general of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, technically a step down from his position as Commander of United States Central Command, which oversees the military efforts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt.
On June 30, 2011, Petraeus was unanimously confirmed as the next Director of the CIA by the U.S. Senate 94-0. Petraeus relinquished command of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan on July 18, 2011, and retired from the U.S. Army on August 31, 2011.[18] On November 9, 2012, General Petraeus resigned from his position as Director of the CIA, citing an extramarital affair that was reportedly discovered in the course of an FBI investigation.
Petraeus has a B.S. degree from the United States Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1974 as a distinguished cadet (top 5% of his class). He was the General George C. Marshall Award winner as the top graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College class of 1983. He subsequently earned an M.P.A. in 1985 and a PhD degree in International Relations in 1987 from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He later served as Assistant Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy and also completed a fellowship at Georgetown University.
Petraeus has repeatedly stated that he has no plans to run for elected political office. On June 23, 2010, President Barack Obama nominated Petraeus to succeed General Stanley McChrystal as commanding general of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, technically a step down from his position as Commander of United States Central Command, which oversees the military efforts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt.
On June 30, 2011, Petraeus was unanimously confirmed as the next Director of the CIA by the U.S. Senate 94-0. Petraeus relinquished command of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan on July 18, 2011, and retired from the U.S. Army on August 31, 2011.[18] On November 9, 2012, General Petraeus resigned from his position as Director of the CIA, citing an extramarital affair that was reportedly discovered in the course of an FBI investigation.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 176 reviews
April 27, 2024
“Strategic concepts have evolved faster since the Second World War than at any comparable period in history. A commander in that war was essentially using the same structure – corps, divisions, regiments, battalions – that Napoleon had employed in the early nineteenth century…Since then, however, warfare has evolved at a dizzying pace, particularly over the past two decades, and this book delineates how and why crucial changes have taken place – as well as the dramatic developments we can expect in the coming decades…”
- Andrew Roberts and David Petraeus, Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
There are no guarantees in life or reading, but Andrew Roberts’s and David Petraeus’s Conflict seemed like a sure thing. Its pedigree is impeccable. Roberts has a well-deserved reputation as a master biographer, having delivered big, engrossing tomes on Napoleon Bonaparte and Winston Churchill. Meanwhile, Petraeus is a retired general who – whatever else you think about him – reached the very apex of his profession. These two seemed perfectly matched to the subject matter, a survey of how warfare has evolved since the end of the Second World War, taking us right up to the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Alas, despite the alignment of these stars, Conflict came as a minor disappointment to me. It’s not a bad book, per se. It is entirely cromulent. It's a bit disjointed, but not unreadable or grammatically unsound. The authors are not trying to offend or insult anyone, at least not that I noticed. If I had to describe my feelings in one word, it would be “meh.” If it were a bodily movement, Conflict would be a shoulder shrug. Since I finished reading it, I haven’t thought about it once.
***
If nothing else, Conflict is ably constructed for ease of access. It is divided into nine chapters laid out by both chronology and geography. Some of the chapters are devoted to a single clash, while others contain rundowns of multiple wars. A tenth chapter at the end – which works better than the others – provides a series of conclusions about warfare heading into the future.
The scope is ambitious, and Roberts and Petraeus try to cover a lot. Some of their targets are obvious, such as America’s war in Vietnam. Other encounters are less well known, including a nice recap of the strange Falklands War.
Still, the authors try to encompass way too much in a book that is less than five-hundred pages in length. This leads to inconsistencies in terms of depth and detail. Oftentimes, this felt like an encyclopedia, with a lot of short entries that broadly tell you what happened, without getting into the why and the how. There is also a strong American-centric bias in terms of space given to particular topics. Granted, the United States has not been shy about starting or joining wars since 1945. Nonetheless, I would’ve appreciated a bit more time given to the less obvious, and less time given to the very obvious.
***
Most of Conflict is written like a typical third-person history. I’m guessing Roberts handled most of it, though this is unfortunately blander than his other work, which I have really enjoyed. When we get into America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, Roberts steps aside, and Petraeus takes over writing duties, delivering a first-person account of these debacles.
Given that he was a participant in both, Petraeus’s recounting is far from objective, and at times feels more than a little self-serving. That caveat aside, these two chapters might be the best part of the book. He does a really good job of condensing America’s longest wars into something that is digestible. Furthermore, unlike other chapters that tend to have only superficial observations, Petraeus actually demonstrates some acuity into how things went wrong, and how they might have gone better. It was interesting to read these sections close in time to Andrew Bacevich’s America’s War for the Greater Middle East, as the two former soldiers provide a point-counterpoint to the United States’s controversial, expensive, and deadly endeavors.
***
Conflict makes a lot of promises that it ultimately fails to keep. Partly this is due to some apparent confusion as to its purpose. The advertising copy promises a “deep and incisive” exploration of seventy years of combat, drawing “significant insights and lessons.” The authors themselves – on the other hand – state that their work is about “strategic leadership,” and even give their four key principles on transforming “even the most seriously disadvantageous situations for the better.” These are different concepts. The former is extremely broad, and can include tactics and technological advances. The latter is more specific, with its focus on extremely high-level command.
For the most part, this doesn’t really matter, because there are long stretches in Conflict where the authors seem to have forgotten that they had a point to make in the first place. Rather, as noted above, most of the book is given over to a whirlwind tour of numerous battlefields.
***
I don’t usually pay attention to the blurbs on a book’s cover, since they are mostly meaningless without their original context. Here, though, they caught my attention, mainly because they express opinions so utterly different than my own. Three generals, an admiral, and the late Henry Kissinger all fawn over Conflict’s analyses, one of them even comparing the book to Clausewitz’s famed On War.
This just boggles my mind. While entertaining at times, Conflict felt extremely superficial, full of banalities, gross simplifications, and over-generalizations. Take – for example – the four leadership tips that Roberts and Petraeus believe in so deeply. They consist of grasping the big picture, effective communication, overseeing implementation, and refining the aforementioned big picture. This is the kind of stringing-together of buzz words that you’d see in a corporate seminar. It’s also pretty meaningless. Oh, I have to grasp the big picture? Got it.
But you can take this all with a grain of salt. After all, I am not a general, an admiral, or the late Henry Kissinger.
***
Conflict is a bit hard to discuss, since it doesn’t make much of an impression. I tend to remember great books and terrible books. I get excited talking about great or terrible books. This isn’t great or terrible. It’s in the vast middle ground, pleasant enough to read, and entirely emotionally neutral. But I expected a lot more, given the names involved, and the possibilities they teased.
- Andrew Roberts and David Petraeus, Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
There are no guarantees in life or reading, but Andrew Roberts’s and David Petraeus’s Conflict seemed like a sure thing. Its pedigree is impeccable. Roberts has a well-deserved reputation as a master biographer, having delivered big, engrossing tomes on Napoleon Bonaparte and Winston Churchill. Meanwhile, Petraeus is a retired general who – whatever else you think about him – reached the very apex of his profession. These two seemed perfectly matched to the subject matter, a survey of how warfare has evolved since the end of the Second World War, taking us right up to the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Alas, despite the alignment of these stars, Conflict came as a minor disappointment to me. It’s not a bad book, per se. It is entirely cromulent. It's a bit disjointed, but not unreadable or grammatically unsound. The authors are not trying to offend or insult anyone, at least not that I noticed. If I had to describe my feelings in one word, it would be “meh.” If it were a bodily movement, Conflict would be a shoulder shrug. Since I finished reading it, I haven’t thought about it once.
***
If nothing else, Conflict is ably constructed for ease of access. It is divided into nine chapters laid out by both chronology and geography. Some of the chapters are devoted to a single clash, while others contain rundowns of multiple wars. A tenth chapter at the end – which works better than the others – provides a series of conclusions about warfare heading into the future.
The scope is ambitious, and Roberts and Petraeus try to cover a lot. Some of their targets are obvious, such as America’s war in Vietnam. Other encounters are less well known, including a nice recap of the strange Falklands War.
Still, the authors try to encompass way too much in a book that is less than five-hundred pages in length. This leads to inconsistencies in terms of depth and detail. Oftentimes, this felt like an encyclopedia, with a lot of short entries that broadly tell you what happened, without getting into the why and the how. There is also a strong American-centric bias in terms of space given to particular topics. Granted, the United States has not been shy about starting or joining wars since 1945. Nonetheless, I would’ve appreciated a bit more time given to the less obvious, and less time given to the very obvious.
***
Most of Conflict is written like a typical third-person history. I’m guessing Roberts handled most of it, though this is unfortunately blander than his other work, which I have really enjoyed. When we get into America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, Roberts steps aside, and Petraeus takes over writing duties, delivering a first-person account of these debacles.
Given that he was a participant in both, Petraeus’s recounting is far from objective, and at times feels more than a little self-serving. That caveat aside, these two chapters might be the best part of the book. He does a really good job of condensing America’s longest wars into something that is digestible. Furthermore, unlike other chapters that tend to have only superficial observations, Petraeus actually demonstrates some acuity into how things went wrong, and how they might have gone better. It was interesting to read these sections close in time to Andrew Bacevich’s America’s War for the Greater Middle East, as the two former soldiers provide a point-counterpoint to the United States’s controversial, expensive, and deadly endeavors.
***
Conflict makes a lot of promises that it ultimately fails to keep. Partly this is due to some apparent confusion as to its purpose. The advertising copy promises a “deep and incisive” exploration of seventy years of combat, drawing “significant insights and lessons.” The authors themselves – on the other hand – state that their work is about “strategic leadership,” and even give their four key principles on transforming “even the most seriously disadvantageous situations for the better.” These are different concepts. The former is extremely broad, and can include tactics and technological advances. The latter is more specific, with its focus on extremely high-level command.
For the most part, this doesn’t really matter, because there are long stretches in Conflict where the authors seem to have forgotten that they had a point to make in the first place. Rather, as noted above, most of the book is given over to a whirlwind tour of numerous battlefields.
***
I don’t usually pay attention to the blurbs on a book’s cover, since they are mostly meaningless without their original context. Here, though, they caught my attention, mainly because they express opinions so utterly different than my own. Three generals, an admiral, and the late Henry Kissinger all fawn over Conflict’s analyses, one of them even comparing the book to Clausewitz’s famed On War.
This just boggles my mind. While entertaining at times, Conflict felt extremely superficial, full of banalities, gross simplifications, and over-generalizations. Take – for example – the four leadership tips that Roberts and Petraeus believe in so deeply. They consist of grasping the big picture, effective communication, overseeing implementation, and refining the aforementioned big picture. This is the kind of stringing-together of buzz words that you’d see in a corporate seminar. It’s also pretty meaningless. Oh, I have to grasp the big picture? Got it.
But you can take this all with a grain of salt. After all, I am not a general, an admiral, or the late Henry Kissinger.
***
Conflict is a bit hard to discuss, since it doesn’t make much of an impression. I tend to remember great books and terrible books. I get excited talking about great or terrible books. This isn’t great or terrible. It’s in the vast middle ground, pleasant enough to read, and entirely emotionally neutral. But I expected a lot more, given the names involved, and the possibilities they teased.
December 30, 2025
This is a strange, tricky and sometimes disturbing account of military developments since WO II.
Strange, because it really is not one coherent story the writers tell, but several lose ones, knitted together on the umbrella of 'The Evolution of Warfare' in a failed attempt to make it look like a comprehensive study.
Tricky, because it's very nearsighted on just actual conflicts and the way they were conducted, but hardly ever questions the 'why', with what reasons a war was fought in the first place.
And last but not least, sometimes disturbing, because both writers have an very simple minded patriotic view of world history and politics.
As you might expect of a book written partialy by an American General, this is not going to be a balanced account of Military Conflict since 1945. Already in the first chapter the writers cut short any discussion about the start of the Cold war by putting all the blame for that on one person, Joseph Stalin. And although Stalin's paranoia and ruthlessness did play a very big part in creating the Cold war athmosphere, it is somewhat shortsighted to neglect the role the western powers played in feeding that paranoia.
The fact that GB and France in Munich in 1938 prefered the option of Hitler destroying the Soviet Union, instead of accepting Stalin's offer to fight Nazi Germany together, is largerly overlooked by these two biased writers, trumpeting US role in preserving the World Peace for all. Not to mention Truman's haste to dump unnecesary nuclair bombs on Japan just to show Stalin how powerfull the US was at that moment.
The premisse of the first half of this book: Americans are good, Communist are bad. In the second half of the book the realm of Bad guys is broadend to Out of control (Sadam Hussein) or drugtrafficking dictators (Noriega) and of course Islamic fanatics, but basically that's what the book tries to tell, Americans are the good guys battling the bad guys.
However, only how these battles were fought are under critical scrutiny. The book almost never challenges the intentions of the call for arms, only it's execution. Even American actions in Vietnam are redemped in some way. At least the 'Cord' counter insurgency program in the later half of the War and the Bombing campaign towards the end get credit for what they where trying to achieve.
And there are also goods marks for American action in Nigaragua, Panama and Grenada. The book makes even Ronald Reagan and George Bush de Second look good in times of crisis.
And that's where the book get's disturbing sometimes. When the focus shifs to much to the good, heroic intentions of Americans as defenders of democratic values, helping out in the World. Kipling would have been proud of this reevaluation of 'The White Man's Burden'. Although in this case it's usually the poor blacks who risk their lives as military fodder. But that's a completely different matter of course.
Petraeus somewhat redeems himself with his very critical account of the War in Afghanistan and the second War on Iraq. Wars in which he himself was personally involved, and which makes a lot of what he writes a kind of reckoning with the Powers he was dealing with. Especialy Rumsfeld en Wolowitz get a torough dressing down for there descision making, or lack of it. In both cases of wars the critique however is again more in the poor political or organisational execution, then in questioning what they where doing there in the first place.
Nevertheless, he leaves no doubt about the absolute mess the Americans left in both countries. And that is indeed something, coming from a higher US military man.
In the end the book left me diaspointed. There is something to be said for a renewed look a importance of military logic in this day and age. Especialy in the light of a new World Order which is emerging, one where the cold part of 'The Cold War' suddenly looks like a nostalgic memory of simpelere times. But without something of a moral, political and historical perspective of these kind of military developments, you're left with the basic question: 'Do we have to go to war in the first place?' Because sometimes we do, and sometimes we don't. But failing to answer these question, this book misses the point for me. But again that's probably expected from a book co-writen by a decorated American General.
Strange, because it really is not one coherent story the writers tell, but several lose ones, knitted together on the umbrella of 'The Evolution of Warfare' in a failed attempt to make it look like a comprehensive study.
Tricky, because it's very nearsighted on just actual conflicts and the way they were conducted, but hardly ever questions the 'why', with what reasons a war was fought in the first place.
And last but not least, sometimes disturbing, because both writers have an very simple minded patriotic view of world history and politics.
As you might expect of a book written partialy by an American General, this is not going to be a balanced account of Military Conflict since 1945. Already in the first chapter the writers cut short any discussion about the start of the Cold war by putting all the blame for that on one person, Joseph Stalin. And although Stalin's paranoia and ruthlessness did play a very big part in creating the Cold war athmosphere, it is somewhat shortsighted to neglect the role the western powers played in feeding that paranoia.
The fact that GB and France in Munich in 1938 prefered the option of Hitler destroying the Soviet Union, instead of accepting Stalin's offer to fight Nazi Germany together, is largerly overlooked by these two biased writers, trumpeting US role in preserving the World Peace for all. Not to mention Truman's haste to dump unnecesary nuclair bombs on Japan just to show Stalin how powerfull the US was at that moment.
The premisse of the first half of this book: Americans are good, Communist are bad. In the second half of the book the realm of Bad guys is broadend to Out of control (Sadam Hussein) or drugtrafficking dictators (Noriega) and of course Islamic fanatics, but basically that's what the book tries to tell, Americans are the good guys battling the bad guys.
However, only how these battles were fought are under critical scrutiny. The book almost never challenges the intentions of the call for arms, only it's execution. Even American actions in Vietnam are redemped in some way. At least the 'Cord' counter insurgency program in the later half of the War and the Bombing campaign towards the end get credit for what they where trying to achieve.
And there are also goods marks for American action in Nigaragua, Panama and Grenada. The book makes even Ronald Reagan and George Bush de Second look good in times of crisis.
And that's where the book get's disturbing sometimes. When the focus shifs to much to the good, heroic intentions of Americans as defenders of democratic values, helping out in the World. Kipling would have been proud of this reevaluation of 'The White Man's Burden'. Although in this case it's usually the poor blacks who risk their lives as military fodder. But that's a completely different matter of course.
Petraeus somewhat redeems himself with his very critical account of the War in Afghanistan and the second War on Iraq. Wars in which he himself was personally involved, and which makes a lot of what he writes a kind of reckoning with the Powers he was dealing with. Especialy Rumsfeld en Wolowitz get a torough dressing down for there descision making, or lack of it. In both cases of wars the critique however is again more in the poor political or organisational execution, then in questioning what they where doing there in the first place.
Nevertheless, he leaves no doubt about the absolute mess the Americans left in both countries. And that is indeed something, coming from a higher US military man.
In the end the book left me diaspointed. There is something to be said for a renewed look a importance of military logic in this day and age. Especialy in the light of a new World Order which is emerging, one where the cold part of 'The Cold War' suddenly looks like a nostalgic memory of simpelere times. But without something of a moral, political and historical perspective of these kind of military developments, you're left with the basic question: 'Do we have to go to war in the first place?' Because sometimes we do, and sometimes we don't. But failing to answer these question, this book misses the point for me. But again that's probably expected from a book co-writen by a decorated American General.
October 30, 2023
"I don't know what she sees in him".
This is two books, grafted together. The seam is even more obvious if you listen to the audiobook version, as Petraeus takes over reading at the jointure.
One of these books, written by a big name historian writing ever-so-slightly outside of his comfort zone is... fine. It lacks the detailed insight of a Michael Howard, the maverick originality of a Van Creveld or the kind of persistance of vision you get from someone with an academic axe to grind. It has the kind of competence you might expect from someone wanting to be able to say "I literally wrote the book on Conflict". Much of it feels single sourced, often to secondary sources. There are some interesting observations about leadership, though there seems a decent change those are owed to Petraeus given his other writings.
And then there's the other book, brimming with insightful first hand commentary about Iraq and Afghanistan (hardly surprising, considering, but all the same) and then some really insightful commentary about the Russo-Ukraine War and the implications for Western grand strategy.
One can't help but wondering why this punchy, thought provoking semi-memoir has been grafted onto a pretty work-a-day historical survey. The text seems to wonder as well, with some call backs about Putin's leadership thrown in at the end as if to give the sense of a through-line. It really feels as though Petraeus' girlfriends should have sat him down and said "dump that loser. You don't need him. Have more confidence in yourself."
This is two books, grafted together. The seam is even more obvious if you listen to the audiobook version, as Petraeus takes over reading at the jointure.
One of these books, written by a big name historian writing ever-so-slightly outside of his comfort zone is... fine. It lacks the detailed insight of a Michael Howard, the maverick originality of a Van Creveld or the kind of persistance of vision you get from someone with an academic axe to grind. It has the kind of competence you might expect from someone wanting to be able to say "I literally wrote the book on Conflict". Much of it feels single sourced, often to secondary sources. There are some interesting observations about leadership, though there seems a decent change those are owed to Petraeus given his other writings.
And then there's the other book, brimming with insightful first hand commentary about Iraq and Afghanistan (hardly surprising, considering, but all the same) and then some really insightful commentary about the Russo-Ukraine War and the implications for Western grand strategy.
One can't help but wondering why this punchy, thought provoking semi-memoir has been grafted onto a pretty work-a-day historical survey. The text seems to wonder as well, with some call backs about Putin's leadership thrown in at the end as if to give the sense of a through-line. It really feels as though Petraeus' girlfriends should have sat him down and said "dump that loser. You don't need him. Have more confidence in yourself."
June 15, 2025
Atacurile-surpriză deschid atât de frecvent războaiele pentru că pot oferi un avantaj imediat, deși pe termen scurt, asupra inamicului.
Totuși atacurile-surpriză au și capcane. În special, acestea au tendința de a șoca inamicul și de a-l determina șă reacționexe mai rapid decât ar face-o în cazul unei evoluții lente a conflictului. De asemenea dacă se bucură de un succes timpuriu, este nevoie de întăriri adecvate și este posibil ca acest sprijin să nu poate fi desfășurat din cauza necesității de a păstra elementul-surpriză. Un ultim dezavantaj este că nu lasă nici o îndoială asupra identității agresorului.
Exemple: au fost folosite de nord-coreeni împotriva Coreei de Sud, în 1950; de israelieni în Războiul de Șase Zile, din 1967; de arabi în Războiul de Yom Kippur, din 1973; de argentinieni împotriva insulelor Falkland, în 1982; și de irakieni împotriva Kuwaitului, în 1990.
Departe de a fi o degradare a formei normale de război în care armatele se confruntă în câmp deschis, războiul de gherilă, sau insurgența, a fost, de fapt, standardul aproape de-a lungul întregii istorii. Prin urmare, cuvintele folosite pentru a-l descrie, cum ar fi "netradițional" sau "neconvențional", sunt eronate. De nenumărate ori, de la luptele tribale din preistorie pâna la războiul împotriva terorii, tabăra care nu rezista pe un câmp de luptă deschis trebuia să recurgă la lupte de gherilă, dacă avea suficient sprijin de la populația locală.
Exemple: insurecția comunistă malaysiană, din 1948-1960; Războiul din Algeria, din 1954-1962; Franța în Indochina, în 1945-1954 și războaiele americane din Vietnam, Afghanistan și Irak.
Războiul a ilustrat adevărul recurent că dictaturile pot să poarte un război mult mai costisitor atât în termeni de vieți pierdute, cât și de bani decât cele purtate de omologii lor în democrații, unde liderii pot fi înlăturați de la putere când opinia publică se întoarce împotriva râzboiului.
Exemple: atacurile Chinei în valuri umane în Coreea, valurile umane trimise de iranieni în timpul r��zboiului dintre Iran și Irak și invazia Ucrainei de către Rusia.
Recomand
Totuși atacurile-surpriză au și capcane. În special, acestea au tendința de a șoca inamicul și de a-l determina șă reacționexe mai rapid decât ar face-o în cazul unei evoluții lente a conflictului. De asemenea dacă se bucură de un succes timpuriu, este nevoie de întăriri adecvate și este posibil ca acest sprijin să nu poate fi desfășurat din cauza necesității de a păstra elementul-surpriză. Un ultim dezavantaj este că nu lasă nici o îndoială asupra identității agresorului.
Exemple: au fost folosite de nord-coreeni împotriva Coreei de Sud, în 1950; de israelieni în Războiul de Șase Zile, din 1967; de arabi în Războiul de Yom Kippur, din 1973; de argentinieni împotriva insulelor Falkland, în 1982; și de irakieni împotriva Kuwaitului, în 1990.
Departe de a fi o degradare a formei normale de război în care armatele se confruntă în câmp deschis, războiul de gherilă, sau insurgența, a fost, de fapt, standardul aproape de-a lungul întregii istorii. Prin urmare, cuvintele folosite pentru a-l descrie, cum ar fi "netradițional" sau "neconvențional", sunt eronate. De nenumărate ori, de la luptele tribale din preistorie pâna la războiul împotriva terorii, tabăra care nu rezista pe un câmp de luptă deschis trebuia să recurgă la lupte de gherilă, dacă avea suficient sprijin de la populația locală.
Exemple: insurecția comunistă malaysiană, din 1948-1960; Războiul din Algeria, din 1954-1962; Franța în Indochina, în 1945-1954 și războaiele americane din Vietnam, Afghanistan și Irak.
Războiul a ilustrat adevărul recurent că dictaturile pot să poarte un război mult mai costisitor atât în termeni de vieți pierdute, cât și de bani decât cele purtate de omologii lor în democrații, unde liderii pot fi înlăturați de la putere când opinia publică se întoarce împotriva râzboiului.
Exemple: atacurile Chinei în valuri umane în Coreea, valurile umane trimise de iranieni în timpul r��zboiului dintre Iran și Irak și invazia Ucrainei de către Rusia.
Recomand
December 8, 2023
A fantastic book on the evolution of warfare from WW2 to Ukraine. A must read for those interested in studying conflicts, history of war and how these may evolve in the years to come.
Has interesting details, but avoids being bogged down in minutia. Well written and flows well. Each chapter is long enough to get the point across without laboring it, or dumbing it down.
A warm recommendation.
Has interesting details, but avoids being bogged down in minutia. Well written and flows well. Each chapter is long enough to get the point across without laboring it, or dumbing it down.
A warm recommendation.
October 25, 2023
This is a joint effort by a significant and brilliant “war fighting” general and a distinguished military historian and biographer (and member of the House of Lords). Their intent is to chronicle major wars since the end of WW2 with a view towards assessing what made these wars distinctive and how they contributed to the evolution of military theory and practice since 1945. As a result, the book comprises a series of chapters/cases, with each focusing on a distinctive conflict. Sometimes the chapters are related and speak to parts of a broader episode (Iraq/Afghanistan).
What could happen? This seems like a “dream team” of two stars who are thoroughly knowledgeable of the material, both by study and experience. The threat, of course, is “too many cooks …”. One does not get to the position of either of the authors by being shy and retiring, but the perspectives of the soldier/scholar and senior academics will likely differ sharply on some points. The facts of these conflicts are well known and so there are few exposes. How well will the analysis mesh?
I built my expectations around the contributions that would come through the joint perspectives of the two very different authors as they apply (effectively) the central organizing framework used in the book for evaluating the quality (or lack of quality) of various military efforts. The framework was developed by Petraeus while at Harvard and it provides the organizing lens for the chapters. The framework concerns strategic leadership. First, Strategic leaders need to successfully grasp their environment - the context for their action - and craft an effective approach to respond to the environment. Strategic leaders must also effectively communicate their strategic approach to the rest of their organizations and more broadly to other key actors involved in the overall effort - stakeholders. Strategic leaders must analso oversee the effective implementation of their strategies - how their big strategic ideas get translated into effective action over some course of time. Finally, leaders need to learn from their experiences and the results of employing a strategy such that it can be refined and made more effective. As a framework for strategic leadership, this is good, if fairly standard. It tends to focus on particular commanders, although the authors do make clear that they are concerned with how the implementation and learning from the strategy are organized. Different leaders in a situation can also change over time. This framework is followed through with consistently and help the book gain and maintain a position towards its subject cases that readers should find valuable.
The early chapters cover well known history and do so effectively. Especially important early on is the development of strategies for wars of decolonization, of which Vietnam and Algeria are two big elephants in the room. The analysis is clear and insightful. I particular like how the authors make comparisons across the post-WW2 period, such as between the US exit from Vietnam versus the US exit from Afghanistan. The chapters on the various wars involving Israel and its Arab neighbors are also extremely well done, especially given recent developments in Gaza. Since the historical record on these cases is clear, how the authors compare and contrast cases is a big source of value for readers.
The Afghan and second Iraq wars are where Petraeus’ insight shines and is almost of sufficient heft to be its own volume, although it works well here The penultimate chapter on the Russo-Ukraine is effective, although the book apparently went to press before the most recent offensive by Ukraine.
The last chapter is a comprehensive tour of possible developments in future wars based on the most recent developments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and especially Ukraine. It has a clear focus on how technology will likely continue to change warfare. This “progress” view is interesting, although the authors also note how wars can occasionally retrogress relative to recent wars (Russia in the war with Ukraine - although Ukraine is breaking new ground in responding to Russia.)
It would have been good if the authors could have worked through their application of the strategic framework in detail for each chapter - to provide examples for using the framework as a tool. That is not a fatal flow, however, and the authors did utilize the framework at multiple points. Overall, this is a first rate book that shows the benefits of joint authorship of distinguished partners.
Stay tuned.
What could happen? This seems like a “dream team” of two stars who are thoroughly knowledgeable of the material, both by study and experience. The threat, of course, is “too many cooks …”. One does not get to the position of either of the authors by being shy and retiring, but the perspectives of the soldier/scholar and senior academics will likely differ sharply on some points. The facts of these conflicts are well known and so there are few exposes. How well will the analysis mesh?
I built my expectations around the contributions that would come through the joint perspectives of the two very different authors as they apply (effectively) the central organizing framework used in the book for evaluating the quality (or lack of quality) of various military efforts. The framework was developed by Petraeus while at Harvard and it provides the organizing lens for the chapters. The framework concerns strategic leadership. First, Strategic leaders need to successfully grasp their environment - the context for their action - and craft an effective approach to respond to the environment. Strategic leaders must also effectively communicate their strategic approach to the rest of their organizations and more broadly to other key actors involved in the overall effort - stakeholders. Strategic leaders must analso oversee the effective implementation of their strategies - how their big strategic ideas get translated into effective action over some course of time. Finally, leaders need to learn from their experiences and the results of employing a strategy such that it can be refined and made more effective. As a framework for strategic leadership, this is good, if fairly standard. It tends to focus on particular commanders, although the authors do make clear that they are concerned with how the implementation and learning from the strategy are organized. Different leaders in a situation can also change over time. This framework is followed through with consistently and help the book gain and maintain a position towards its subject cases that readers should find valuable.
The early chapters cover well known history and do so effectively. Especially important early on is the development of strategies for wars of decolonization, of which Vietnam and Algeria are two big elephants in the room. The analysis is clear and insightful. I particular like how the authors make comparisons across the post-WW2 period, such as between the US exit from Vietnam versus the US exit from Afghanistan. The chapters on the various wars involving Israel and its Arab neighbors are also extremely well done, especially given recent developments in Gaza. Since the historical record on these cases is clear, how the authors compare and contrast cases is a big source of value for readers.
The Afghan and second Iraq wars are where Petraeus’ insight shines and is almost of sufficient heft to be its own volume, although it works well here The penultimate chapter on the Russo-Ukraine is effective, although the book apparently went to press before the most recent offensive by Ukraine.
The last chapter is a comprehensive tour of possible developments in future wars based on the most recent developments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and especially Ukraine. It has a clear focus on how technology will likely continue to change warfare. This “progress” view is interesting, although the authors also note how wars can occasionally retrogress relative to recent wars (Russia in the war with Ukraine - although Ukraine is breaking new ground in responding to Russia.)
It would have been good if the authors could have worked through their application of the strategic framework in detail for each chapter - to provide examples for using the framework as a tool. That is not a fatal flow, however, and the authors did utilize the framework at multiple points. Overall, this is a first rate book that shows the benefits of joint authorship of distinguished partners.
Stay tuned.
January 9, 2024
This is a captivating book that delves into the history of warfare in the aftermath of World War II. Divided into two distinct sections, the first half, written by a military historian, offers insights into historical conflicts. The second half, written by US General Petraeus, focuses on recent wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine.
Robert's segment covers a wide array of historical conflicts, exploring the Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Balkans, the Soviet-Afghan War, and various Latin American conflicts. I enjoyed this section the most, it's both insightful to understand the historical backdrop and how military thinking evolved over conflicts alongside the Twentieth Century. While technological progress forced a persistent acceleration in change, these lessons are still important to understand today's military challenges.
In the second part, General Petraeus delivers a detailed examination of recent wars, culminating in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. While his analysis is sharp and succinct, it breaks to the first half of the book and reflects a noticeable ideological alignment. I think the fact that this book wasn't jointly written but split in two distinctive sections is a missed opportunity to bridge academia with the practitioner.
Robert's segment covers a wide array of historical conflicts, exploring the Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Balkans, the Soviet-Afghan War, and various Latin American conflicts. I enjoyed this section the most, it's both insightful to understand the historical backdrop and how military thinking evolved over conflicts alongside the Twentieth Century. While technological progress forced a persistent acceleration in change, these lessons are still important to understand today's military challenges.
In the second part, General Petraeus delivers a detailed examination of recent wars, culminating in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. While his analysis is sharp and succinct, it breaks to the first half of the book and reflects a noticeable ideological alignment. I think the fact that this book wasn't jointly written but split in two distinctive sections is a missed opportunity to bridge academia with the practitioner.
August 15, 2025
I doubt the average human gives much thought to war beyond what they see on TV. In American media, war is commonly portrayed as chaotic and immoral--a stark contrast to the portrayal of U.S. servicemembers, whose actions and intentions are almost universally lauded. But there is much more to this age old human habit than that. Sun Tzu's legendary book "The Art of War" and Clausewitz' less-legendary-but-still-epochal "On War" prove that strategy is not just an essential component of war, but also a difficult one to master. Bad strategies--such as those seen executed by Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian War or America's alleged strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan--are almost always incompatible with victory. To drive this point home, Gen. Petraeus and Andrew Roberts wrote "Conflict," a history and analysis of modern war that emphasizes the essential role of good leadership in executing strategy.
Petraeus and Roberts state that there are four major tasks a wartime leader must master: "Firstly, they need comprehensively to grasp the overall strategic situation in a conflict and craft the appropriate strategic approach -- in essence, to get the big ideas right. Secondly, they must communicate those big ideas, the strategy, effectively throughout the breadth and depth of their organization and to all other stakeholders. Thirdly, they need to oversee the implementation of the big ideas, driving the execution of the campaign plan relentlessly and determinedly. Lastly, they have to determine how the big ideas need to be refined, adapted and augmented, so that they can perform the first three tasks again and again and again." In other words, a good leader must understand, communicate, execute, and refine their strategy.
To illustrate their point, they study ten periods of conflict and prove how the leaders in each period either secured victory or defeat based upon their commitment to these four tasks. These include conflicts such as the Chinese Civil War, Korean War, Israeli War of Independence, Malayan Emergency, Algeria, Vietnam, Six Day War, Soviet-Afghan War, Falklands War, Iran-Iraq War, U.S. invasion of Grenada and Panama, Gulf War, War in Afghanistan & GWOT, Iraq War, Russo-Ukrainian War, and a survey of how wars of the future might continue to evolve. The analysis is brilliant and the lessons are crystal clear. It is obvious that Gen. Petraeus, warts and all, is a gifted intellectual. To pair him with Andrew Roberts--a favorite author of mine--sweetens the deal yet further.
I especially appreciate the latter half of the book, which focused on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. Given Gen. Petraeus' personal experience in the first two, the depth of detail and analysis was superb. Each felt a bit like a post mortem and that provided to me a healthy dose of closure given my own family's experience with those wars.
If you're interested in strategy or war in general, don't pass this up. The lessons here, especially the four tasks listed above, are essential for any strategic leader, not just generals and politicians.
Petraeus and Roberts state that there are four major tasks a wartime leader must master: "Firstly, they need comprehensively to grasp the overall strategic situation in a conflict and craft the appropriate strategic approach -- in essence, to get the big ideas right. Secondly, they must communicate those big ideas, the strategy, effectively throughout the breadth and depth of their organization and to all other stakeholders. Thirdly, they need to oversee the implementation of the big ideas, driving the execution of the campaign plan relentlessly and determinedly. Lastly, they have to determine how the big ideas need to be refined, adapted and augmented, so that they can perform the first three tasks again and again and again." In other words, a good leader must understand, communicate, execute, and refine their strategy.
To illustrate their point, they study ten periods of conflict and prove how the leaders in each period either secured victory or defeat based upon their commitment to these four tasks. These include conflicts such as the Chinese Civil War, Korean War, Israeli War of Independence, Malayan Emergency, Algeria, Vietnam, Six Day War, Soviet-Afghan War, Falklands War, Iran-Iraq War, U.S. invasion of Grenada and Panama, Gulf War, War in Afghanistan & GWOT, Iraq War, Russo-Ukrainian War, and a survey of how wars of the future might continue to evolve. The analysis is brilliant and the lessons are crystal clear. It is obvious that Gen. Petraeus, warts and all, is a gifted intellectual. To pair him with Andrew Roberts--a favorite author of mine--sweetens the deal yet further.
I especially appreciate the latter half of the book, which focused on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. Given Gen. Petraeus' personal experience in the first two, the depth of detail and analysis was superb. Each felt a bit like a post mortem and that provided to me a healthy dose of closure given my own family's experience with those wars.
If you're interested in strategy or war in general, don't pass this up. The lessons here, especially the four tasks listed above, are essential for any strategic leader, not just generals and politicians.
April 16, 2024
The first real world historic event I can recall from my childhood is a Pathe News report (yes, before television we watched 'newsreels' at the movies) of the Berlin Blockade. As a nine-year old I followed newspaper accounts of our forces advance towards the Yalu River and the resulting cataclysm when Chinese intervention punished MacArthur's hubris. For the fall of Dienbienphu we had Life magazine and of course the Vietnam War was a television nightly news staple. So I literally grew up with the conflicts recounted in this book and they proceeded throughout my lifetime - the book ends with an account of the first year of the Ukraine conflict. Our joint authors, a distinguished British historian and America's most successful (unfortunately that's not saying a lot) general officer, have created a fascinating though uneven book. (Delighted they seem to have agreed to call the season betwixt summer and winter 'autumn' however), held together by a definition of strategic success. I agree with one of their judgements I'd not seen expressed before, that the Vietnam War can actually be placed on the positive side of the ledge because postponing the Communist triumph from 1954 to 1975 saved much of Asia (especially Indonesia) from much worse. The book concludes with speculations on how drones, precision weapons, and AI will continue to affect warfare.
January 3, 2026
The four tasks of strategic leaders, according to the authors, make for a handy lens to filter the battle and campaign analyses that compose the majority of the book. Getting the big ideas right, communicating the big ideas effectively, overseeing implementation, and refining and adapting aligns closely with the Troop Leading Procedures I have had drilled into my head with the National Guard. I think the merits of this lens bears out for situations beyond the military setting so deftly portrayed here, too.
The narrative is fairly balanced, though clearly American, in its portrayal of the differing sides and generals as well. The analysis of The Seven Day War, the British success in insurgent Malaya, and Gen. Petraeus’ recounting of the failure of nation-building in the Middle East is especially good.
The Vietnam War sections did skimp on the context of My Lai and how the press coverage riled the nation. But the criticism of Westmoreland and contrast with Abrams makes more sense for the purpose of the book, of course. I had never heard of The Phoenix Program before, as well. And ‘Four Hours in My Lai’ paid little credence to that, so evens-stevens, I suppose.
So many lovely quotes, too! My faves being, ‘Security is the first ten or ninety percent,’ and, ‘Tanks are like dinner jackets…’
The narrative is fairly balanced, though clearly American, in its portrayal of the differing sides and generals as well. The analysis of The Seven Day War, the British success in insurgent Malaya, and Gen. Petraeus’ recounting of the failure of nation-building in the Middle East is especially good.
The Vietnam War sections did skimp on the context of My Lai and how the press coverage riled the nation. But the criticism of Westmoreland and contrast with Abrams makes more sense for the purpose of the book, of course. I had never heard of The Phoenix Program before, as well. And ‘Four Hours in My Lai’ paid little credence to that, so evens-stevens, I suppose.
So many lovely quotes, too! My faves being, ‘Security is the first ten or ninety percent,’ and, ‘Tanks are like dinner jackets…’
February 29, 2024
(Audiobook) (3.5 stars) This work looks to define conflict/warfare and how it has evolved since World War II. Much of the analysis does not trend positive, as nations that engage in warfare oftentimes tend to forget about the strategic objectives and the main focus. Whether from hubris, ego, poor internal and external assessments and lack of imagination/understanding, many a military campaign finds itself going sideways. Even when the initial operations/conflicts succeed, the post-war stage can somehow find itself undermining the strategic objectives from before.
It is interesting that Petraeus narrates the counterinsurgency wars he was most directly involved with in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some degree of self-adulation is apparent in his analysis. One might say that Iraq executed a more successful counter-insurgency strategy vs Afghanistan for the US, but even after the US withdraw in Iraq, the lack of stability hurt Iraq and gave rise to ISIS. Wars are not easy, no matter who is fighting and with what instruments.
This is a unique analysis of warfare since 1945, and incorporates actions from World War II to the recent conflict in Ukraine. Overall solid analysis and historical facts. Curious to see how the definitions of warfare and instruments of war will evolve in the future. Worth one read, but maybe not for the shelf long-term.
It is interesting that Petraeus narrates the counterinsurgency wars he was most directly involved with in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some degree of self-adulation is apparent in his analysis. One might say that Iraq executed a more successful counter-insurgency strategy vs Afghanistan for the US, but even after the US withdraw in Iraq, the lack of stability hurt Iraq and gave rise to ISIS. Wars are not easy, no matter who is fighting and with what instruments.
This is a unique analysis of warfare since 1945, and incorporates actions from World War II to the recent conflict in Ukraine. Overall solid analysis and historical facts. Curious to see how the definitions of warfare and instruments of war will evolve in the future. Worth one read, but maybe not for the shelf long-term.
March 29, 2024
This book covers 70 years of conflicts that introduced a significant change in warfighting concepts, weaponry, or strategy including the Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the two Gulf Wars, the Balkan wars in the former Yugoslavia, and the Soviet-Afghan War, and the US's Global War on Terror focusing on the counterinsurgency fight. The final conflict examined is Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine.
The historical presentation is useful in its own right, but the real value for military practitioners are the provided insights into modern warfare. Each of these reveals how conflict is evolving enabling a look into future conflicts.
As an aside, I thought this book had the fairest, non-hero worshipping view of GEN Douglas MacArthur I have yet read. However, GEN Petraseus' personal views on counterinsurgency fighting were transparent in his analysis of that type of conflict.
The historical presentation is useful in its own right, but the real value for military practitioners are the provided insights into modern warfare. Each of these reveals how conflict is evolving enabling a look into future conflicts.
As an aside, I thought this book had the fairest, non-hero worshipping view of GEN Douglas MacArthur I have yet read. However, GEN Petraseus' personal views on counterinsurgency fighting were transparent in his analysis of that type of conflict.
April 27, 2024
This look at selected conflicts between 1945 and now examines what it takes to succeed in war and the lessons that have been learnt (And all too often forgotten). Surprisingly it is the human factors (motivation, leadership and morale) that drive victory, not technological advances, although these are often discussed especially in the last chapter which looks at future trends, often using the current war in Ukraine as a guide.
Sadly one of the main conclusions of this study is that while, in Winston Churchill's words 'Jaw jaw is far better than war war', sometimes there arises a dictator who doesn't listen to 'Jaw jaw', and in those cases the money spent on deterrence suddenly becomes money well spent.
Sadly one of the main conclusions of this study is that while, in Winston Churchill's words 'Jaw jaw is far better than war war', sometimes there arises a dictator who doesn't listen to 'Jaw jaw', and in those cases the money spent on deterrence suddenly becomes money well spent.
February 3, 2025
The first half was very enjoyable, good history into post-WWII American conflicts. Second half felt more opinionated than factual, especially about the recent Russian Ukraine war. Much of the information seemed biased only because there was no information to be found about the Russian side, mostly speculation.
Was planning to read another book by Roberts, but I am going to push it down in my list for now.
Was planning to read another book by Roberts, but I am going to push it down in my list for now.
March 24, 2024
This book provides an excellent overview of wars fought from 1945 to early Ukraine battles. Details include the historical perspective of the conflict, military tactics of both sides, and political objectives.
March 6, 2025
The minute David takes over it sucks
January 2, 2024
The meaning of the word evolution in its most basic form is 'the gradual development of something’. Herein lies the problem: the scale and scope of the evolution of warfare cannot be effectively captured within a selective commentary on conflicts from 1945 to the ongoing Ukraine conflict. However, what the authors do achieve is a commentary on selective conflicts from a U.S. perspective.
The book is divided into ten sections titled as below:-
• The death of the dream of Peace, 1945-53
• Wars of decolonization, 1947- 1975
• America’s War in Vietnam, 1964-1975
• From Sinai to Port Stanley, 1967 – 1982
• Cold War denouement, 1979 – 1993
• The New World Disorder, 1991-99
• The war in Afghanistan, 2001-2021
• The Iraq War, 2003-2011
• Vladimir Putin’s Existential War against Ukraine, 2022 –
• The Wars of the Future
The authors argue that strategic leaders need to do four tasks correctly. “Firstly, they need comprehensively to grasp the overall strategic situation in a conflict and craft the appropriate strategic approach—in essence, to get the big ideas right. Secondly, they must communicate those big ideas, the strategy, effectively throughout the breadth and depth of their organisation and to all other stakeholders. Thirdly, they need to oversee the implementation of the big ideas, driving the execution of the campaign plan relentlessly and determinedly. Lastly, they have to determine how the big ideas need to be refined, adapted, and augmented so that they can perform the first three tasks again and again and again. The statesmen and soldiers who perform these four tasks properly are the exemplars.” In most of the chapters, Roberts and Petraeus try to assess the military and political leadership against the four tasks outlined above.
The authors work to outline the genesis of the Cold War and examine the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War. Joseph Stalin is the prime villain, and so is his limitless desire to expand communist influence, which had to be challenged by both ideological and strategic responses. This is far too simplistic a narrative and conveniently overlooks the fissures in the world in 1945; however, it fits the standard American discourse of the great ideological fight led by Western powers for the survival of the world. On China, the authors argue that Mao got his strategic leadership right while Chiang Kai-Shek squandered the numerous advantages that were on his side. The authors deride MacArthur’s leadership during the Korean War and highlight the sound leadership of Ridgway. The Korean War highlighted the growing prevalence of the idea of a negotiated peace and that an adversary may not be vanquished at the end of a long-drawn battle. The Korean War also changed warfare in several significant ways, proving that limited wars could be fought under the so-called doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and introducing the United States to many of the problems that it was to face in the future in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
Delving into the demise of the colonial powers, the authors argue that the rapid disappearance of European empires over one generation in the mid-twentieth century had significant ramifications for the evolution of conflict. The typical face of war since 1945 took the form not so much of traditional state-on-state conflict as of insurgency and guerrilla warfare, especially in the era of decolonisation when the British fought in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and Aden, and the French in Indo-China and Algeria. They discuss Kashmir, the Israeli War of Independence, the British in the Malayan and Borneo insurgencies, the Dhofar rebellion, and the French in Indo-China and Algeria. Through the commentary on these insurgencies, the authors repeatedly try to measure strategic leadership and their approaches to handling insurgencies. Petraeus’s penchant for counter-insurgency strategies and their pertinence in these conflagrations is also an omnipresent theme.
Gen. Petraeus writes in insipid prose three long chapters on the U.S. wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. On Vietnam, he argues that the failure to understand the true nature of the war and the enemy led to the failure to craft a correct strategy before war weariness in the United States undermined the ability to continue the war. It took far too long in Vietnam for the appropriate emphasis on the security and well-being of the population to be established. The authors argue that Vietnam was a complete and repetitive failure of strategic leadership. The nature of the war was never understood. On Iraq, Petraeus highlights that, as Winston Churchill had postulated, policymakers must never assume that the conduct and aftermath of war will be easy. The U.S. stepped into the war with fuzzy ideas of a post-war Iraq with no plan for transition from the disbanded ruling Bath dispensation to a democratically elected government. They also had no understanding of the delicate balance of ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and political elements that had kept Iraq from disintegrating. Over time, experiential learning and consequent reactionary measures by the U.S. threw Iraq into a full-blown insurgency. The U.S. learned at considerable human expense that “shock and awe based on high-tech forces is not a substitute for troop numbers in counter-insurgency operations or for the proper employment of those troops.”
In Afghanistan, the authors identify a failure of resourcing as the war in Iraq took centre stage even as “the Bush administration’s goals in Afghanistan expanded.” The failure of the United States in Afghanistan had multiple causes and more than its share of fathers. The most critical failure, as is usually the case in lost wars, was one of policy and strategy. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States was not able to provide the security required for any initiative to succeed. However, it was heartening to note that Petraeus is very critical in his account of the War in Afghanistan and the Second War in Iraq. He scathingly critiques the political leaders at the time, especially Rumsfeld and Bremer, who are chastised for their decision-making, or lack thereof. In both wars, the critique, however, is again more in the poor political or organisational execution than in questioning the nature of the intervention. Eventually, Petraeus does concede that U.S. intervention devastated both nations. Considering the book’s partisan posture on most issues, this aspect is praiseworthy, especially when coming from a man of his stature. To his credit, he concedes the U.S. did lose the war in Afghanistan. He also admits in the subtext of some of his arguments that the U.S. presence in the Greater Middle East has largely been destabilising, fomenting insurgencies by damaging the fragile social fabric. He quips in retrospect that “every army of liberation has a half-life before it becomes an army of occupation.”
The account of the ongoing war in Ukraine is well-written. The authors highlight how Zelensky has proved to be a strategic leader of substance, way beyond the skewed assessment of the Russians that he and Ukraine would fold over almost instantaneously. The authors compare Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s leadership with Churchill’s enigmatic leadership during the Second World War. Amongst the organisational, technological, and strategic reasons for the consistently underperforming Russian Army, the authors specifically highlight, “the vast over-estimation of Russian capabilities along with the gross underestimation of Ukrainian capability; the lack of unity of command; a campaign design so ambitious that it exceeded the ability of the theatre commanders to follow it; failure to achieve combined-arms effects; wholly inadequate training; the employment of massed twentieth-century style armoured formations inadequately supported by other arms; the lack of a professional non-commissioned officer corps, with, instead, a top-down command system that does not promote initiative at lower levels.” However, they steer clear of predicting the outcome of the war and limit their analysis to the events and their consequences.
Based on their commentary on the conflicts from 1945, Petraeus and Roberts pontificate on trends that could shape the war of the future. Some of the domains they highlight are hybrid warfare, robotics and artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons, open-source intelligence, disinformation, drones, sensors and electronic jammers, and cyber warfare. The aim of this chapter is to assess trends in warfighting and examine their possible trajectories. The book concludes strongly and emphatically on principles including the risk of superpower isolationism, the criticality of an army that learns fastest, and leaders remaining involved from developing an idea to validating its implementation. They argue that war is a human endeavour and investment, understanding, and communication on the part of strategic leaders and individual soldiers can often overcome vast disparities in technology. They also highlight that wars will not be short, and the volume of ordnance required in long wars will be the Achilles heel of most nations. The authors underline how leaders have failed in assessing the nature of the war, as Clausewitz had emphasised “The first, supreme, most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." The authors “accentuate the critical need to deter war whenever possible, keeping in mind that deterrence is a function of two factors: a potential adversary’s assessment of our capabilities on the one hand and our willingness to employ those capabilities on the other.”
As a U.S.-centric commentary on major conflicts since 1945, the book is well written, but as a book on the evolution of warfare, the scope and scale of the examination are limited. Resultantly, the scrutiny of the explanations for the U.S. entering each of these wars is not fleshed out adequately. The authors also do not sufficiently outline the viewpoints of the opposing parties in each of the conflicts. Petraeus also seems to carry the baggage of hyper-patriotism and command in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He writes with the latent desire to convince the reader of his methods and how they made a difference in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In doing so, he often overlooks the underlying fact that, irrespective of what happened on the ground, in the end, both nations were devastated as a result of untimely U.S. interventions. His writing is also plagued with lower-level tactical details and is in sharp contrast with Robert’s lucid, balanced authorship as a seasoned historian. Consequently, the book appears to be written in two halves, with contrasting styles hastily put together at the seam. The evolution of warfare cannot be divorced from the geopolitics of the time, and disappointingly, the authors do not adequately set the geopolitical context for the conflicts. Each of these wars had huge human costs, which are mentioned only in passing, more to justify U.S. intervention than as a consequence of such intervention.
Amongst the aspects that are well written are the examination of the ongoing Ukraine conflict, conveying the U.S. party line on major conflicts, repository of places and characters in notable conflicts since 1945, and a fine selection of quotes attributed to authors and scholars of repute. The bibliography is substantial and serves as a good starting point for further reading.
Overall, if you desire a primer on wars from 1945 with a pro-U.S. leaning, then go for it; however, it is far from a comprehensive treatise on the evolution of warfare from 1945 to the present.
The book is divided into ten sections titled as below:-
• The death of the dream of Peace, 1945-53
• Wars of decolonization, 1947- 1975
• America’s War in Vietnam, 1964-1975
• From Sinai to Port Stanley, 1967 – 1982
• Cold War denouement, 1979 – 1993
• The New World Disorder, 1991-99
• The war in Afghanistan, 2001-2021
• The Iraq War, 2003-2011
• Vladimir Putin’s Existential War against Ukraine, 2022 –
• The Wars of the Future
The authors argue that strategic leaders need to do four tasks correctly. “Firstly, they need comprehensively to grasp the overall strategic situation in a conflict and craft the appropriate strategic approach—in essence, to get the big ideas right. Secondly, they must communicate those big ideas, the strategy, effectively throughout the breadth and depth of their organisation and to all other stakeholders. Thirdly, they need to oversee the implementation of the big ideas, driving the execution of the campaign plan relentlessly and determinedly. Lastly, they have to determine how the big ideas need to be refined, adapted, and augmented so that they can perform the first three tasks again and again and again. The statesmen and soldiers who perform these four tasks properly are the exemplars.” In most of the chapters, Roberts and Petraeus try to assess the military and political leadership against the four tasks outlined above.
The authors work to outline the genesis of the Cold War and examine the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War. Joseph Stalin is the prime villain, and so is his limitless desire to expand communist influence, which had to be challenged by both ideological and strategic responses. This is far too simplistic a narrative and conveniently overlooks the fissures in the world in 1945; however, it fits the standard American discourse of the great ideological fight led by Western powers for the survival of the world. On China, the authors argue that Mao got his strategic leadership right while Chiang Kai-Shek squandered the numerous advantages that were on his side. The authors deride MacArthur’s leadership during the Korean War and highlight the sound leadership of Ridgway. The Korean War highlighted the growing prevalence of the idea of a negotiated peace and that an adversary may not be vanquished at the end of a long-drawn battle. The Korean War also changed warfare in several significant ways, proving that limited wars could be fought under the so-called doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and introducing the United States to many of the problems that it was to face in the future in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
Delving into the demise of the colonial powers, the authors argue that the rapid disappearance of European empires over one generation in the mid-twentieth century had significant ramifications for the evolution of conflict. The typical face of war since 1945 took the form not so much of traditional state-on-state conflict as of insurgency and guerrilla warfare, especially in the era of decolonisation when the British fought in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and Aden, and the French in Indo-China and Algeria. They discuss Kashmir, the Israeli War of Independence, the British in the Malayan and Borneo insurgencies, the Dhofar rebellion, and the French in Indo-China and Algeria. Through the commentary on these insurgencies, the authors repeatedly try to measure strategic leadership and their approaches to handling insurgencies. Petraeus’s penchant for counter-insurgency strategies and their pertinence in these conflagrations is also an omnipresent theme.
Gen. Petraeus writes in insipid prose three long chapters on the U.S. wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. On Vietnam, he argues that the failure to understand the true nature of the war and the enemy led to the failure to craft a correct strategy before war weariness in the United States undermined the ability to continue the war. It took far too long in Vietnam for the appropriate emphasis on the security and well-being of the population to be established. The authors argue that Vietnam was a complete and repetitive failure of strategic leadership. The nature of the war was never understood. On Iraq, Petraeus highlights that, as Winston Churchill had postulated, policymakers must never assume that the conduct and aftermath of war will be easy. The U.S. stepped into the war with fuzzy ideas of a post-war Iraq with no plan for transition from the disbanded ruling Bath dispensation to a democratically elected government. They also had no understanding of the delicate balance of ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and political elements that had kept Iraq from disintegrating. Over time, experiential learning and consequent reactionary measures by the U.S. threw Iraq into a full-blown insurgency. The U.S. learned at considerable human expense that “shock and awe based on high-tech forces is not a substitute for troop numbers in counter-insurgency operations or for the proper employment of those troops.”
In Afghanistan, the authors identify a failure of resourcing as the war in Iraq took centre stage even as “the Bush administration’s goals in Afghanistan expanded.” The failure of the United States in Afghanistan had multiple causes and more than its share of fathers. The most critical failure, as is usually the case in lost wars, was one of policy and strategy. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States was not able to provide the security required for any initiative to succeed. However, it was heartening to note that Petraeus is very critical in his account of the War in Afghanistan and the Second War in Iraq. He scathingly critiques the political leaders at the time, especially Rumsfeld and Bremer, who are chastised for their decision-making, or lack thereof. In both wars, the critique, however, is again more in the poor political or organisational execution than in questioning the nature of the intervention. Eventually, Petraeus does concede that U.S. intervention devastated both nations. Considering the book’s partisan posture on most issues, this aspect is praiseworthy, especially when coming from a man of his stature. To his credit, he concedes the U.S. did lose the war in Afghanistan. He also admits in the subtext of some of his arguments that the U.S. presence in the Greater Middle East has largely been destabilising, fomenting insurgencies by damaging the fragile social fabric. He quips in retrospect that “every army of liberation has a half-life before it becomes an army of occupation.”
The account of the ongoing war in Ukraine is well-written. The authors highlight how Zelensky has proved to be a strategic leader of substance, way beyond the skewed assessment of the Russians that he and Ukraine would fold over almost instantaneously. The authors compare Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s leadership with Churchill’s enigmatic leadership during the Second World War. Amongst the organisational, technological, and strategic reasons for the consistently underperforming Russian Army, the authors specifically highlight, “the vast over-estimation of Russian capabilities along with the gross underestimation of Ukrainian capability; the lack of unity of command; a campaign design so ambitious that it exceeded the ability of the theatre commanders to follow it; failure to achieve combined-arms effects; wholly inadequate training; the employment of massed twentieth-century style armoured formations inadequately supported by other arms; the lack of a professional non-commissioned officer corps, with, instead, a top-down command system that does not promote initiative at lower levels.” However, they steer clear of predicting the outcome of the war and limit their analysis to the events and their consequences.
Based on their commentary on the conflicts from 1945, Petraeus and Roberts pontificate on trends that could shape the war of the future. Some of the domains they highlight are hybrid warfare, robotics and artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons, open-source intelligence, disinformation, drones, sensors and electronic jammers, and cyber warfare. The aim of this chapter is to assess trends in warfighting and examine their possible trajectories. The book concludes strongly and emphatically on principles including the risk of superpower isolationism, the criticality of an army that learns fastest, and leaders remaining involved from developing an idea to validating its implementation. They argue that war is a human endeavour and investment, understanding, and communication on the part of strategic leaders and individual soldiers can often overcome vast disparities in technology. They also highlight that wars will not be short, and the volume of ordnance required in long wars will be the Achilles heel of most nations. The authors underline how leaders have failed in assessing the nature of the war, as Clausewitz had emphasised “The first, supreme, most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." The authors “accentuate the critical need to deter war whenever possible, keeping in mind that deterrence is a function of two factors: a potential adversary’s assessment of our capabilities on the one hand and our willingness to employ those capabilities on the other.”
As a U.S.-centric commentary on major conflicts since 1945, the book is well written, but as a book on the evolution of warfare, the scope and scale of the examination are limited. Resultantly, the scrutiny of the explanations for the U.S. entering each of these wars is not fleshed out adequately. The authors also do not sufficiently outline the viewpoints of the opposing parties in each of the conflicts. Petraeus also seems to carry the baggage of hyper-patriotism and command in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He writes with the latent desire to convince the reader of his methods and how they made a difference in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In doing so, he often overlooks the underlying fact that, irrespective of what happened on the ground, in the end, both nations were devastated as a result of untimely U.S. interventions. His writing is also plagued with lower-level tactical details and is in sharp contrast with Robert’s lucid, balanced authorship as a seasoned historian. Consequently, the book appears to be written in two halves, with contrasting styles hastily put together at the seam. The evolution of warfare cannot be divorced from the geopolitics of the time, and disappointingly, the authors do not adequately set the geopolitical context for the conflicts. Each of these wars had huge human costs, which are mentioned only in passing, more to justify U.S. intervention than as a consequence of such intervention.
Amongst the aspects that are well written are the examination of the ongoing Ukraine conflict, conveying the U.S. party line on major conflicts, repository of places and characters in notable conflicts since 1945, and a fine selection of quotes attributed to authors and scholars of repute. The bibliography is substantial and serves as a good starting point for further reading.
Overall, if you desire a primer on wars from 1945 with a pro-U.S. leaning, then go for it; however, it is far from a comprehensive treatise on the evolution of warfare from 1945 to the present.
March 19, 2024
A comprehensive and enlightening tour through post-WWII conflicts right up to Ukraine, illustrating how war has evolved and persisted. While at times, the book fell into the habit of providing overviews of one conflict after another, on the whole, it did a solid job of showing how militaries have adapted or failed to adapt to insurgencies, technological changes, and more.
March 16, 2024
This book started out great and there some really good drill downs and then came the chapters on Afghanistan and Iraq. I found them self serving and in some instances superficial.
July 30, 2025
Krig, elendighet, 30 grader og sol, blir ikke bedre sommer lesestoff enn dette!
Boken har et tydelig amerikansk perspektiv over seg, noe man jo kan forvente av en pensjonert amerikansk general.
En spennende og engasjerende bok som tar for seg *de viktigste krigene helt frem til Ukraina-Russland. Her får man innblikk i hvordan krigføring har utviklet seg, og hva man har lært av de «vellykkede» og «mislykkede» krigene.
Spesielt de to siste kapitlene om Ukraina konflikten og fremtidens kriger var veldig spennende!
Anbefaler å bruke kartene bakerste i boken underveis i lesingen!
Boken har et tydelig amerikansk perspektiv over seg, noe man jo kan forvente av en pensjonert amerikansk general.
En spennende og engasjerende bok som tar for seg *de viktigste krigene helt frem til Ukraina-Russland. Her får man innblikk i hvordan krigføring har utviklet seg, og hva man har lært av de «vellykkede» og «mislykkede» krigene.
Spesielt de to siste kapitlene om Ukraina konflikten og fremtidens kriger var veldig spennende!
Anbefaler å bruke kartene bakerste i boken underveis i lesingen!
June 21, 2024
An interesting rundown of different conflicts that have occurred since WWII. I don't think that the framework which Patraeus and Roberts developed really holds much water. I felt like it was a bit too armchair quarterback for me.
I did enjoy how they spoke of many different conflicts that don't usually get much coverage. Also, the last chapter with predicting which various technologies/strategies would be impactful was insightful given Patraeus' background.
Overall, I'd only recommend it to those that have an interest in the history of warfare.
I did enjoy how they spoke of many different conflicts that don't usually get much coverage. Also, the last chapter with predicting which various technologies/strategies would be impactful was insightful given Patraeus' background.
Overall, I'd only recommend it to those that have an interest in the history of warfare.
March 24, 2024
I read somewhere that the next war is fought like the previous one but I think warfare is going through another transformation. The success of drones, especially in Ukraine, may be taking the infantry person out of the picture.
Sadly, the book points out that there has not been a year without a war since the end of WWII. Are we humans that bad and that aggressive?
Roberts narrates the first half and, in the second half, Petraeus tells us about his experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq along with his perceptions of the fighting in Ukraine. The book does a good job pounding home the four key strategic aspects required of leadership. I think this is true whether its war you are leading or a business.
You’ll read how warfare has evolved and, while I think we’re on the cusp of radical changes, you’ll read how its deployed in Ukraine. Informative, but long and not particularly readable.
Three stars based on the information provided.
Sadly, the book points out that there has not been a year without a war since the end of WWII. Are we humans that bad and that aggressive?
Roberts narrates the first half and, in the second half, Petraeus tells us about his experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq along with his perceptions of the fighting in Ukraine. The book does a good job pounding home the four key strategic aspects required of leadership. I think this is true whether its war you are leading or a business.
You’ll read how warfare has evolved and, while I think we’re on the cusp of radical changes, you’ll read how its deployed in Ukraine. Informative, but long and not particularly readable.
Three stars based on the information provided.
April 4, 2024
A really great read for anyone looking for an up to date view of recent warfare evolution.
December 13, 2023
Not an easy read, but an important one. Applies the lessons of history to recent conflicts and exposes the decision making process behind them. Success and failure examined in an even-handed approach. This should be required reading at military academies, staff colleges, and for legislative members.
January 9, 2024
This is a comprehensive and thought-provoking analysis of modern warfare. This book delves into the evolution of warfare and provides valuable insights into the conflicts that have shaped the world since the end of World War II. One of the strengths of this book is its extensive research. Petraeus and Roberts draw on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including firsthand accounts, official documents, and academic studies. This meticulous approach allows them to provide a detailed and nuanced analysis of each conflict they examine, from the Korean War to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The authors also do an excellent job of contextualizing each conflict within the broader historical and geopolitical context. They highlight the political, economic, and social factors that contributed to the outbreak of each conflict, providing readers with a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics at play. Furthermore, the book offers a balanced perspective on each conflict, avoiding overly simplistic narratives. Petraeus and Roberts present multiple viewpoints and analyze the motivations and strategies of various actors involved. This approach adds depth and complexity to their analysis, making it a valuable resource for scholars and policymakers alike. Additionally, the book is exceptionally well-written and accessible to a wide audience. Despite dealing with complex geopolitical issues, the authors manage to explain concepts and events in a clear and engaging manner. This makes "Conflict" an enjoyable read, even for those without a deep background in military history. However, one potential drawback of the book is its focus on Western perspectives. While it provides a comprehensive analysis of conflicts involving Western powers, it is less exhaustive in its coverage of conflicts in the Global South or those driven by non-state actors. This limitation, though understandable given the authors' backgrounds, may leave some readers wanting a more inclusive analysis. Overall, "Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine" is an exceptional book that offers a comprehensive and insightful analysis of modern warfare. Petraeus and Roberts' meticulous research, balanced perspective, and accessible writing style make this book a must-read for anyone interested in understanding the complex dynamics of global conflicts.
November 1, 2023
If you are interested in warfare, politics, or current events this should be a must-read. Two experts have teamed up to write this book. They examine how war has changed since WWII and what it means for the future.
October 13, 2024
Innanzitutto, occorre porre una premessa importante. Nonostante il nome, "L'arte della guerra contemporanea" non è un trattato militare, quanto piuttosto una storia bellica dal 1945 ad oggi.
In questo, il libro riesce completamente nel suo scopo, trattando i conflitti più rilevanti degli ultimi 80 anni. Da guerre convenzionali come la Corea fino alle "piccole guerre", con un dettaglio particolare su Iraq e Afghanistan grazie ai contributi personali del generale Petraeus.
Le uniche critiche che posso muovere a questo testo sono due e precisamente:
-Un'analisi talvolta insufficiente.
I concetti militari trattati non sono particolarmente complessi e servono piuttosto a fornire una base teorica. È una scelta sensata ed è un testo particolarmente adatto per i novizi, ma potrebbe insoddisfare i più esigenti.
-Una visione piuttosto faziosa.
Spesso gli errori occidentali vengono trascurati, mentre le responsabilità di Paesi "ostili" sono evidenziate, a volte forse pure eccessivamente. È comprensibile poiché il testo è stato (anche) scritto da un generale USA, ma tale modus operandi tende a ridurre l'imparzialità della ricerca.
In questo, il libro riesce completamente nel suo scopo, trattando i conflitti più rilevanti degli ultimi 80 anni. Da guerre convenzionali come la Corea fino alle "piccole guerre", con un dettaglio particolare su Iraq e Afghanistan grazie ai contributi personali del generale Petraeus.
Le uniche critiche che posso muovere a questo testo sono due e precisamente:
-Un'analisi talvolta insufficiente.
I concetti militari trattati non sono particolarmente complessi e servono piuttosto a fornire una base teorica. È una scelta sensata ed è un testo particolarmente adatto per i novizi, ma potrebbe insoddisfare i più esigenti.
-Una visione piuttosto faziosa.
Spesso gli errori occidentali vengono trascurati, mentre le responsabilità di Paesi "ostili" sono evidenziate, a volte forse pure eccessivamente. È comprensibile poiché il testo è stato (anche) scritto da un generale USA, ma tale modus operandi tende a ridurre l'imparzialità della ricerca.
December 16, 2024
So many great thoughts and analysis in this book; should be on the CGSC and war college mandatory reading lists. Obviously I’m a bit biased having worked under the author in various army units, but the book is clearly well written and researched. Hopefully this team writes another book in the future. The below are maybe half of the highlights I made in my copy of the book:
- Carl von Clausewitz described warfare as politics by other means, and just as politics did not end in 1945, neither has warfare. P2.
- The 20th century was the most brutal of all the many centuries of human existence; it is estimated that more people had actually perished violently in the first half of the 20th century than in all the previous centuries put together. P2.
- As for the 21st, within a month of the invasion of Ukraine, Russia had lost twice as many military personnel killed as the United States had in 20 years in Iraq…. P2. PJK: obviously the different political systems can withstand differing levels of casualties.
- With military strategy and tactics evolving hugely since 1945, where each conflict teaches lessons for the next and multifarious ways that we show in the following chapters, what can explain Russia's decision to fight a throwback war reminiscent of the Great Patriotic War… p3.
- … the first task of a strategic leader is to get the big ideas right; second task of a strategic leader highlights the importance of effectively communicating the big ideas to subordinate, and the third is to oversee their effective implementation. P14, 19. PJK: great list of strategic leader key tasks.
- Having been stopped from expanding any further in Europe and denied any role in the pacification of Japan, Stalin turned to Asia to advance the proletarian revolution. He believed after the communist victory in China that he could prod and harry the capitalist West without provoking too heavy a backlash. P23. PJK: it’s obvious now but never thought about the USSR being excluded from the occupation of Japan… but then they really didn’t apply forces against Japan until very late 1945.
- It also sometimes takes charismatic generals built on the giant scale - as MacArthur undoubtedly was, for all his faults - to conceive and pull off such an ambitious operation as Chromite, at which lesser figures might have balked. In the Second World War, set himself almost impossible tasks and deadlines, and accomplished them, highly conscious that history was watching him. P26. PJK: great insight.
- In his crucial assessment of the likelihood of Chinese and Russian intervention, however, MacArthur had completely miscalculated. Personal relations between the president and his theater commander, strong at wake island, collapsed not because of any perceived rudeness in MacArthur's part, but because he had got a vital aspect of the war entirely wrong. Personal relations between the military and politicians can be good, bad or indifferent, but nothing makes up for the difference between victory and, as in this case, near defeat. P30.
- Generals often have to undertake political roles as part of their jobs in theater, but in democratic countries they should never interfere directly in their own countries politics. Although Clausewitz was correct to say that war is politics by other means, general's ought to confine themselves to the politics of the place where they are fighting rather than back home. P34. PJK: I saw this in Afghanistan how generals have to play political roles.
- Just as in the First World War, when the line of trenches stretching from Switzerland to the English Channel made large outflanking maneuvering and possible, the Korean War settled down to an attritional slogging match which lasted for two more years, p35.
- In her book what terrorists want, Louise Richardson has identified the three R's that inspire terrorists…. revenge… renown… provoke a reaction…..… and in many places add religion. P39. PJK: need to read this book! Great assessment of terrorist intentions.
- As Kissinger observed in early 1967… “Our military tend to expect to fight this war as they have studied at Ft. Leavenworth” – home of the US Army Command & General Staff College – “ while the other side is not doing anything of the kind. The Vietcong is using political and psychological criteria where we are apply some very traditional military criteria.” P79-80.
- Military operations in a counter-insurgency campaign must strive, first and foremost, to achieve security in the area of focus. Security is the foundation that makes all else possible; without it, nothing else is attainable. P82.
- The American soldiers deployed in 1965 had trained and prepared together and were sent to Vietnam as units – a huge advantage over the situation in the years ahead, when the units would remain but their soldiers would be replaced individually, with their commanders rotating every six months. P100.
- Yom Kippur was a reminder that deterrence works only when it threatens overwhelming punishment. But Israel’s security policy was subjected to budgetary and geographical restraints. P144.
- A recurring theme of this book is that money spent on deterrence is seldom wasted, especially when considered against the costs incurred when the deterrence fails. P158.
- when discussing Russia’s 2022 attack of Ukraine… “A twentieth century invasion”, commented the historian Niall Ferguson, “has been checked by a twenty-first century defense.” P364.
- Carl von Clausewitz described warfare as politics by other means, and just as politics did not end in 1945, neither has warfare. P2.
- The 20th century was the most brutal of all the many centuries of human existence; it is estimated that more people had actually perished violently in the first half of the 20th century than in all the previous centuries put together. P2.
- As for the 21st, within a month of the invasion of Ukraine, Russia had lost twice as many military personnel killed as the United States had in 20 years in Iraq…. P2. PJK: obviously the different political systems can withstand differing levels of casualties.
- With military strategy and tactics evolving hugely since 1945, where each conflict teaches lessons for the next and multifarious ways that we show in the following chapters, what can explain Russia's decision to fight a throwback war reminiscent of the Great Patriotic War… p3.
- … the first task of a strategic leader is to get the big ideas right; second task of a strategic leader highlights the importance of effectively communicating the big ideas to subordinate, and the third is to oversee their effective implementation. P14, 19. PJK: great list of strategic leader key tasks.
- Having been stopped from expanding any further in Europe and denied any role in the pacification of Japan, Stalin turned to Asia to advance the proletarian revolution. He believed after the communist victory in China that he could prod and harry the capitalist West without provoking too heavy a backlash. P23. PJK: it’s obvious now but never thought about the USSR being excluded from the occupation of Japan… but then they really didn’t apply forces against Japan until very late 1945.
- It also sometimes takes charismatic generals built on the giant scale - as MacArthur undoubtedly was, for all his faults - to conceive and pull off such an ambitious operation as Chromite, at which lesser figures might have balked. In the Second World War, set himself almost impossible tasks and deadlines, and accomplished them, highly conscious that history was watching him. P26. PJK: great insight.
- In his crucial assessment of the likelihood of Chinese and Russian intervention, however, MacArthur had completely miscalculated. Personal relations between the president and his theater commander, strong at wake island, collapsed not because of any perceived rudeness in MacArthur's part, but because he had got a vital aspect of the war entirely wrong. Personal relations between the military and politicians can be good, bad or indifferent, but nothing makes up for the difference between victory and, as in this case, near defeat. P30.
- Generals often have to undertake political roles as part of their jobs in theater, but in democratic countries they should never interfere directly in their own countries politics. Although Clausewitz was correct to say that war is politics by other means, general's ought to confine themselves to the politics of the place where they are fighting rather than back home. P34. PJK: I saw this in Afghanistan how generals have to play political roles.
- Just as in the First World War, when the line of trenches stretching from Switzerland to the English Channel made large outflanking maneuvering and possible, the Korean War settled down to an attritional slogging match which lasted for two more years, p35.
- In her book what terrorists want, Louise Richardson has identified the three R's that inspire terrorists…. revenge… renown… provoke a reaction…..… and in many places add religion. P39. PJK: need to read this book! Great assessment of terrorist intentions.
- As Kissinger observed in early 1967… “Our military tend to expect to fight this war as they have studied at Ft. Leavenworth” – home of the US Army Command & General Staff College – “ while the other side is not doing anything of the kind. The Vietcong is using political and psychological criteria where we are apply some very traditional military criteria.” P79-80.
- Military operations in a counter-insurgency campaign must strive, first and foremost, to achieve security in the area of focus. Security is the foundation that makes all else possible; without it, nothing else is attainable. P82.
- The American soldiers deployed in 1965 had trained and prepared together and were sent to Vietnam as units – a huge advantage over the situation in the years ahead, when the units would remain but their soldiers would be replaced individually, with their commanders rotating every six months. P100.
- Yom Kippur was a reminder that deterrence works only when it threatens overwhelming punishment. But Israel’s security policy was subjected to budgetary and geographical restraints. P144.
- A recurring theme of this book is that money spent on deterrence is seldom wasted, especially when considered against the costs incurred when the deterrence fails. P158.
- when discussing Russia’s 2022 attack of Ukraine… “A twentieth century invasion”, commented the historian Niall Ferguson, “has been checked by a twenty-first century defense.” P364.
November 2, 2025
I have finished reading “Conflict: A Military History of the Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine and Gaza” by General David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts.
The main argument this book puts is that while the promise of a peaceful Post War world was soon proven to be a false one, warfare definitely did, in many ways, evolve. However, while it did, many of the fundamentals have stayed the same.
The post 1945 environment heralded the beginning of the Nuclear age, when Nuclear weapons were seen by some to herald the potential destruction of mankind and by others as the potential destruction of war in itself. In reality, what it did do was make Nuclear powers more warry of confronting each other directly and rechannelled much of their force projections into proxy wars and other arenas. Warfare evolved between the new goalposts set by Nuclear (and Thermonuclear) Weapons.
Much of the post-colonial and independence related struggles often took the form of irregular conflicts, such as those where guerilla war was a main feature. Breathtaking hubris mixed with imperialist mindsets led to many of the colonial powers refusing to learn the basic rules of counterinsurgency.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, due to one of the authors having first-hand experience in both conflicts (clue; it is the one with the title “General”), there are extra long chapters on the American-led wars in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2001 and the 2003 Iraq War. You cannot fault the level of detail and amount of useful insights written here. I would say though, as a point of constructive criticism that it does make the book feel a bit uneven in those places. But as I said, one of the author’s identity is a dead give away and therefore a fair warning to readers.
What are the vital constants in successfully fighting in conflicts? Strong leadership is as important now as it was in ancient times, perhaps more so given how multi-layered warfare is now. It is imperative for the successful waging of war that a leader has a firm grasp on the strategic picture and is able to make the ideas for forward action fit that picture. It is also important in a democracy that both the political and military leaders have a mutual understanding about this, something which historically has not always happened. The militaries of nations also have to be adaptable to change when it is needed. This is likely vital for coming year as information and AI driven warfare intensifies. Two warnings by the authors also seem especially prescient. Developing trends in warfare means that the line between war and peace is likely to continue to blur. Data driven targeting and the longer ranges of weapons probably means that fewer places will be unreachable from the devastation of war.
I would say that this book is on the whole an interesting journey through recent developments in modern war, albeit with an American-centric focus. For the most part this is a historical recounting with military observations from an expert’s perspective in between. In terms of putting the reader into the mindset of troops on the ground and the decision makers, this book cannot be faulted. There are times on the parts about predicting the current course of Conflict and what has to be taken to account in it, where I felt that this book pulled it’s punches.
A concluding chapter was heavy on detail about AI and in war but had a lot less to say on Disinformation. That may be because disinformation is strongly linked to wear professional soldiers are usually forbidden to tread: Politics. I would say that there is a strong case to make that the rise of disinformation is inseparable from the rise in Populist politics of both Left and Right. The potential wider implications of this are out of the comfort zone for military historians and retired Generals but are nonetheless potentially dangerous to be ignored. Disinformation uproots ordinary people from reality this presents a huge front where the fog of war emerges. If a population cannot tell what objective reality is, how can they have any idea what the strategic picture actually is? If they cannot tell that, then how can threats be defended against when people do not believe they exist in the first place?
Who knows? The authors could make another new edition of this book in the near future, then dare to be an adaptable army and conquer more successfully.
The main argument this book puts is that while the promise of a peaceful Post War world was soon proven to be a false one, warfare definitely did, in many ways, evolve. However, while it did, many of the fundamentals have stayed the same.
The post 1945 environment heralded the beginning of the Nuclear age, when Nuclear weapons were seen by some to herald the potential destruction of mankind and by others as the potential destruction of war in itself. In reality, what it did do was make Nuclear powers more warry of confronting each other directly and rechannelled much of their force projections into proxy wars and other arenas. Warfare evolved between the new goalposts set by Nuclear (and Thermonuclear) Weapons.
Much of the post-colonial and independence related struggles often took the form of irregular conflicts, such as those where guerilla war was a main feature. Breathtaking hubris mixed with imperialist mindsets led to many of the colonial powers refusing to learn the basic rules of counterinsurgency.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, due to one of the authors having first-hand experience in both conflicts (clue; it is the one with the title “General”), there are extra long chapters on the American-led wars in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2001 and the 2003 Iraq War. You cannot fault the level of detail and amount of useful insights written here. I would say though, as a point of constructive criticism that it does make the book feel a bit uneven in those places. But as I said, one of the author’s identity is a dead give away and therefore a fair warning to readers.
What are the vital constants in successfully fighting in conflicts? Strong leadership is as important now as it was in ancient times, perhaps more so given how multi-layered warfare is now. It is imperative for the successful waging of war that a leader has a firm grasp on the strategic picture and is able to make the ideas for forward action fit that picture. It is also important in a democracy that both the political and military leaders have a mutual understanding about this, something which historically has not always happened. The militaries of nations also have to be adaptable to change when it is needed. This is likely vital for coming year as information and AI driven warfare intensifies. Two warnings by the authors also seem especially prescient. Developing trends in warfare means that the line between war and peace is likely to continue to blur. Data driven targeting and the longer ranges of weapons probably means that fewer places will be unreachable from the devastation of war.
I would say that this book is on the whole an interesting journey through recent developments in modern war, albeit with an American-centric focus. For the most part this is a historical recounting with military observations from an expert’s perspective in between. In terms of putting the reader into the mindset of troops on the ground and the decision makers, this book cannot be faulted. There are times on the parts about predicting the current course of Conflict and what has to be taken to account in it, where I felt that this book pulled it’s punches.
A concluding chapter was heavy on detail about AI and in war but had a lot less to say on Disinformation. That may be because disinformation is strongly linked to wear professional soldiers are usually forbidden to tread: Politics. I would say that there is a strong case to make that the rise of disinformation is inseparable from the rise in Populist politics of both Left and Right. The potential wider implications of this are out of the comfort zone for military historians and retired Generals but are nonetheless potentially dangerous to be ignored. Disinformation uproots ordinary people from reality this presents a huge front where the fog of war emerges. If a population cannot tell what objective reality is, how can they have any idea what the strategic picture actually is? If they cannot tell that, then how can threats be defended against when people do not believe they exist in the first place?
Who knows? The authors could make another new edition of this book in the near future, then dare to be an adaptable army and conquer more successfully.
June 16, 2024
A Book Geared only to Novices
The below is a review of the audiobook edition of this work
Any review of this book would have to start out by stating who this book seems to be geared to. That is the novice. Any reader who has any experience or knowledge on the subject over and above that would gain very little from this book. This is a shame considering that it is written by General David Petraeus, an ex-General, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, top graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College (for his class), assistant professor of International Relations at Georgetown University and Senior Kissinger Fellow at Yale’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. This reader, as one of those with above novice knowledge of the subject (and definitely not a specialist) was very disappointed.
There are a number of reasons for this. One is that the book is the book covers the subject from only the highest and most broadest terms, with little in-depth examination, at least in detail, of the technologies, strategies, etc. and how they have evolved. There is nothing really new in this book that has not already been said, many times, in other books. This is a particular shame considering the author’s military experience. This, in this reviewer’s opinion, is the most serious problem of the book.
However, it has a number of other problems. One is that it attempts to cover far too much in terms of “conflict”. Just covering conventional air, naval and land warfare would have more than filled any book’s plate. Unfortunately the book also attempts to cover counter-insurgency, cyber, and just about any other form of “conflict” under the sun. As a result it’s coverage of each is weak.
Another problem is that the book is reads like an official US government document in that it provides little criticism of US military strategy or policy, despite the fact that this has been a major problem during the post war period. Related to this, the book sounds like an official US document release in that it paints many things in the most simple of terms. For example, US support of the anti-Serbian coalition in the early 1990s, during the Balkan War of that time, was primarily to prevent ethnic cleansing and that US policy motivating the second Iraq war was primarily to establish a democratic regime, pro-Western regime in the region. The book is filled with these “official” US goals of these wars when discussing nearly all the covered conventional and counter-insurgency conflicts. The book, as a result, sound to a very large degree as an official US government public relations piece.
On the positive side, the book does provide an additional “from within” insight into some of the reasons that the second Iraq war’s post occupation failed (i.e., Bremmer’s dissolution of the Iraqi Army, not enough resources provided by the Washington, etc.). None of this is anything new but it adds more evidence to the record.
Secondly, the book’s conclusion on the future of warfare does a very good job at presenting how the General views military technology as advancing into the future. This, however, very closely follows official Defense Department proclamations on the subject. In addition, there is not very much original that General Petraeus offers that is not presented in other books on that subject (i.e.. Payne’s “I, warbot: The Dawn of Artificially Intelligent Conflict”, Waiting’s “The Arms of the Future”, Freedman’s “Lessons from Ukraine” [this last book does a far better at analyzing the current Russo-Ukrainian war for “lessons learned” than General Patreaus’s book].
Lastly, the audiobook is fairly well read. Never monotonous, monotone and also having the appropriate tone albeit still not a spectacular performance.
In short, a book that would be only of some value to those knowing practically anything on the war (three to four stars for that audience) but practically of no value to anyone in possession of any knowledge over and above that (one to, at the very most, two stars for that readership).
The below is a review of the audiobook edition of this work
Any review of this book would have to start out by stating who this book seems to be geared to. That is the novice. Any reader who has any experience or knowledge on the subject over and above that would gain very little from this book. This is a shame considering that it is written by General David Petraeus, an ex-General, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, top graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College (for his class), assistant professor of International Relations at Georgetown University and Senior Kissinger Fellow at Yale’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. This reader, as one of those with above novice knowledge of the subject (and definitely not a specialist) was very disappointed.
There are a number of reasons for this. One is that the book is the book covers the subject from only the highest and most broadest terms, with little in-depth examination, at least in detail, of the technologies, strategies, etc. and how they have evolved. There is nothing really new in this book that has not already been said, many times, in other books. This is a particular shame considering the author’s military experience. This, in this reviewer’s opinion, is the most serious problem of the book.
However, it has a number of other problems. One is that it attempts to cover far too much in terms of “conflict”. Just covering conventional air, naval and land warfare would have more than filled any book’s plate. Unfortunately the book also attempts to cover counter-insurgency, cyber, and just about any other form of “conflict” under the sun. As a result it’s coverage of each is weak.
Another problem is that the book is reads like an official US government document in that it provides little criticism of US military strategy or policy, despite the fact that this has been a major problem during the post war period. Related to this, the book sounds like an official US document release in that it paints many things in the most simple of terms. For example, US support of the anti-Serbian coalition in the early 1990s, during the Balkan War of that time, was primarily to prevent ethnic cleansing and that US policy motivating the second Iraq war was primarily to establish a democratic regime, pro-Western regime in the region. The book is filled with these “official” US goals of these wars when discussing nearly all the covered conventional and counter-insurgency conflicts. The book, as a result, sound to a very large degree as an official US government public relations piece.
On the positive side, the book does provide an additional “from within” insight into some of the reasons that the second Iraq war’s post occupation failed (i.e., Bremmer’s dissolution of the Iraqi Army, not enough resources provided by the Washington, etc.). None of this is anything new but it adds more evidence to the record.
Secondly, the book’s conclusion on the future of warfare does a very good job at presenting how the General views military technology as advancing into the future. This, however, very closely follows official Defense Department proclamations on the subject. In addition, there is not very much original that General Petraeus offers that is not presented in other books on that subject (i.e.. Payne’s “I, warbot: The Dawn of Artificially Intelligent Conflict”, Waiting’s “The Arms of the Future”, Freedman’s “Lessons from Ukraine” [this last book does a far better at analyzing the current Russo-Ukrainian war for “lessons learned” than General Patreaus’s book].
Lastly, the audiobook is fairly well read. Never monotonous, monotone and also having the appropriate tone albeit still not a spectacular performance.
In short, a book that would be only of some value to those knowing practically anything on the war (three to four stars for that audience) but practically of no value to anyone in possession of any knowledge over and above that (one to, at the very most, two stars for that readership).
Displaying 1 - 30 of 176 reviews