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Civil War in China: The Political Struggle 1945-1949
Many books have tried to analyze the reasons for the Chinese communist success in China's 1945_1949 civil war, but Suzanne Pepper's seminal work was the first and remains the only comprehensive analysis of how the ruling Nationalists lost that war_not just militarily, but by alienating the civilian population through corruption and incompetence. Now available in a new edition, this authoritative investigation of Kuomintang failure and communist success explores the new research and archival resources available for assessing this pivotal period in contemporary Chinese history. Even more relevant today given the contemporary debates in Hong Kong and Taiwan over the terms of reunification with a communist-led national government in Beijing, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a nuanced understanding of twentieth-century Chinese politics.
508 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1978
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July 3, 2024
In this relatively old work which still holds up, Suzanne Pepper sought to answer a question that had been avoided by many historians of China up to that point: how did the Chinese Communist Party win the Civil War? There were many answers proposed to this: the old China Hands claimed that the KMT had been sabotaged, that China had been "lost" by the US for not supporting Chiang enough, while those sympathetic to the CCP had claimed that the Communists moderate land reform during the Civil War years enough to gain a support base among the peasantry and newly captured areas to win them the war.
Pepper rejects the former and qualifies the latter. It was not only the CCP which won the Civil War, but the KMT which lost it. The beginning of mass disillusionment with KMT rule came in the wake of the take-over of Japanese-held Chinese territory in the aftermath of the war. To secure KMT hold over areas before the Communists could get to them, the KMT allowed Japanese and collaborators to man their posts until the KMT could take-over functions from them, and also accepted military collaborators back into their ranks as anti-Communist crusaders (9-16). The KMT government was rife with blatant corruption obvious to the masses; corrupt officials were the ones heading corruption investigations, while independent investigations were not acted upon. In a notable case in Hunan, Kuomintang officials stole parts or entire vehicles from stockpiles meant to be handed over to the government (16-28). The KMT proved totally unable to manage the economy, even with bourgeois minds such as T. V. Soong's. Losing support from capitalists by auctioning off their property, the KMT was also unable to deal with unemployment or properly satisfy the demands of labor. Anti-inflationary exchange rates were total failures, not trusted by the public in the slightest (28-40). The KMT quickly lost all support from intellectuals and students in formerly occupied areas by mandating educational rehabilitation for a strata which thought itself at the head of the Anti-Japanese Resistance (36-40).
The KMT quickly lost political credibility by forcing the country into the Civil War and repressing the student anti-war movement. The December First Movement in Yunnan sparked off the national anti-war movement as the Nationalists killed 4 in repressive measures (44-52). Anti-American sentiment regarding the sexual assault of Shen Chong by American servicemen with no punishment sparked nationwide resentment towards the KMT and the U.S. (52-58). Noting the KMT's willingness to throw the nation into civil war as people starved, the "Anti-Hunger, Anti-Civil War Movement" marked the radicalization of KMT repression with Chiang Kai-shek's explicit endorsement (58-70). Students also protested America's rearmament of Japan and the KMT's acquiescence to it (71-78).
The failure of KMT economic policy led to a revival of the pre-war labor movement, particularly in Shanghai, as the KMT lost its control over the Chinese Labor Association amid the failure of repressive policy and concessions. Although the government attempted to organize unions into the loyalist General Labor Union, these efforts collapsed as economic recession and unemployment took its toll. Emergency reforms collapsed with no effect. This led to a resurgence of the Communist underground in Shanghai, with the formerly KMT labor leader Zhu Xuefan crossing the aisle to join the Communists (95-118). Public confidence in the KMT spiraled downwards as the Gold Yuan reform program, meant to address inflation, failed completely. The reforms went totally unimplemented outside of Shanghai, where Chiang Ching-kuo utilized aspects of his experiences in the Soviet Union to ensure their implementation. This led to Shanghai's economic isolation, and ensured the collapse of such efforts (118-126).
The main source of critique against the KMT was the liberal intelligentsia, relatively free to express its views with its loyalty towards the Three Principles (136). The liberals demanded constitutional government, against the KMT-right, and civil liberties lacking under the Chiang regime (136-146). The liberals saw in the KMT's rule corruption and military mismanagement, with particular attentiveness to the rural areas (146-180). Liberals in the Chinese context were far to the left of their Western cousins, with a general commitment to an ambiguous socialism and democratic governance (181-188). The liberals sought to achieve this vision through a coalition government, and concentrated their doomed efforts on persuading the KMT to coalition with the CCP before the civil war got into full swing (188-195). The intelligentsia maintained a critical distance from the CCP, however, but praised aspects of Communist conduct in Manchuria and the principles of land reform (208-212). Liberals such as Hu Shi, critical of Soviet conduct in Manchuria, remained anti-communist and cast the CCP as Soviet puppets [how ironic this sounds knowing the events of the next two decades] (212-216). The liberals maintained a strong critique of democratic centralism, preferring a more liberal democratic system, pointing towards the success of the postwar British Labour Party as an example, recalling Harold Laski's influence on the Chinese liberals of the 1930s (216-218). By 1949, however, many liberals made peace with their misgivings and followed the conciliatory statements of Mao and Ren Bishi in trusting themselves to the new-democratic government (218-228).
Pepper deals with the issue of land reform at great length in the 7th chapter, "The Return to Land Reform," running almost 100 pages. The crux of Pepper's argument is that CCP land reform efforts during the Civil War were not necessarily radical or moderated overall, but instead depended upon the region and the local Party's implementation of the Center's guidelines. In the Northeast, for example, the Communists pursued an equalization effort which went beyond anti-tenancy agitation (233-244). The background for CCP policy during the Civil War was founded during WWII, in which the Party struggled to pursue a moderate policy against landlord whilst protecting middle peasants and holding the line against the Japanese. Mass struggle and redistribution did not occur on a significant level until the 1945-1946 period, which was spurred by a rectification movement which concentrated upon the feudal forces of the countryside. Pepper notes that, despite the "moderate" policy of the Center, guidelines distinguishing between "thorough" (acceptable) and "excessive" land reforms were vague, allowing the CCP to be flexible in its policy (244-277). 1946 to 1947 was a period of "radical land reform," which was facilitated by direct confiscation, land sales, patriotic "land contribution," and "equal redistribution." Party and military property was not exempt from this process, whilst the middle peasantry was protected and the mass line was institutionalized. This culminated in the famous "Outline Agrarian Law" (277-289). CCP policy in particular radicalized during the KMT Offensives of 1946-1947, in which the KMT backed landlords and rich peasants in brutally repressing the peasantry and those who had benefited from land reform, which drove the CCP into using land reform as a guerilla tactic and cut off more support from the KMT (297-307). The main focus of CCP policy in this period, however, remained on ensuring that "left adventurism" remained in check and the middle peasantry not alienated from the Party (312-327).
In the waning years of the Civil War, the CCP "returned to the cities." The city of "Kalgan" (now Zhangjiakou) was a experiment ground of sorts for the CCP, where it pursued conciliatory policy to both labor and capital, and pursued anti-inflationary policy alongside social reform. Pepper argues that this experience was crucial in formulating policy as the KMT retreated and the Communists began taking major cities in the 1948-1949 period (333-350). When the CCP returned to the major cities, labor policy was framed as an anti-leftist campaign, allowing the CCP to increase productivity, improve working conditions, maintain strict union discipline, and avoid alienating businesses (351-376).
The Communist take-over from the KMT proceeded much more smoothly than that of the KMT from the Japanese. Military discipline, although a problem, was contained through widely publicized "main laws" and "points for attention," while factories were protected by CCP union cells and efforts during military operations (386-394). The CCP successfully integrated KMT bureaucrats and experts, as well as KMT soldiers and officers, while students and intellectuals were welcomed into the party (although at arms length) despite the party's suspicious attitude towards them (410-420).
The only thing that really holds Pepper back is her repetition. The reader sometimes gets bogged down in the action of this or that KMT official or this event in Manchuria, etc., and the odd heading system which makes it difficult to differentiate between 1st and 2nd headings and 3rd and 4th headings does not make taking notes very easy. There is something very admirable about a scholarly historical work published in 1978 which still holds up nearly five decades later. Pepper's work here is truly something to marvel at.
Pepper rejects the former and qualifies the latter. It was not only the CCP which won the Civil War, but the KMT which lost it. The beginning of mass disillusionment with KMT rule came in the wake of the take-over of Japanese-held Chinese territory in the aftermath of the war. To secure KMT hold over areas before the Communists could get to them, the KMT allowed Japanese and collaborators to man their posts until the KMT could take-over functions from them, and also accepted military collaborators back into their ranks as anti-Communist crusaders (9-16). The KMT government was rife with blatant corruption obvious to the masses; corrupt officials were the ones heading corruption investigations, while independent investigations were not acted upon. In a notable case in Hunan, Kuomintang officials stole parts or entire vehicles from stockpiles meant to be handed over to the government (16-28). The KMT proved totally unable to manage the economy, even with bourgeois minds such as T. V. Soong's. Losing support from capitalists by auctioning off their property, the KMT was also unable to deal with unemployment or properly satisfy the demands of labor. Anti-inflationary exchange rates were total failures, not trusted by the public in the slightest (28-40). The KMT quickly lost all support from intellectuals and students in formerly occupied areas by mandating educational rehabilitation for a strata which thought itself at the head of the Anti-Japanese Resistance (36-40).
The KMT quickly lost political credibility by forcing the country into the Civil War and repressing the student anti-war movement. The December First Movement in Yunnan sparked off the national anti-war movement as the Nationalists killed 4 in repressive measures (44-52). Anti-American sentiment regarding the sexual assault of Shen Chong by American servicemen with no punishment sparked nationwide resentment towards the KMT and the U.S. (52-58). Noting the KMT's willingness to throw the nation into civil war as people starved, the "Anti-Hunger, Anti-Civil War Movement" marked the radicalization of KMT repression with Chiang Kai-shek's explicit endorsement (58-70). Students also protested America's rearmament of Japan and the KMT's acquiescence to it (71-78).
The failure of KMT economic policy led to a revival of the pre-war labor movement, particularly in Shanghai, as the KMT lost its control over the Chinese Labor Association amid the failure of repressive policy and concessions. Although the government attempted to organize unions into the loyalist General Labor Union, these efforts collapsed as economic recession and unemployment took its toll. Emergency reforms collapsed with no effect. This led to a resurgence of the Communist underground in Shanghai, with the formerly KMT labor leader Zhu Xuefan crossing the aisle to join the Communists (95-118). Public confidence in the KMT spiraled downwards as the Gold Yuan reform program, meant to address inflation, failed completely. The reforms went totally unimplemented outside of Shanghai, where Chiang Ching-kuo utilized aspects of his experiences in the Soviet Union to ensure their implementation. This led to Shanghai's economic isolation, and ensured the collapse of such efforts (118-126).
The main source of critique against the KMT was the liberal intelligentsia, relatively free to express its views with its loyalty towards the Three Principles (136). The liberals demanded constitutional government, against the KMT-right, and civil liberties lacking under the Chiang regime (136-146). The liberals saw in the KMT's rule corruption and military mismanagement, with particular attentiveness to the rural areas (146-180). Liberals in the Chinese context were far to the left of their Western cousins, with a general commitment to an ambiguous socialism and democratic governance (181-188). The liberals sought to achieve this vision through a coalition government, and concentrated their doomed efforts on persuading the KMT to coalition with the CCP before the civil war got into full swing (188-195). The intelligentsia maintained a critical distance from the CCP, however, but praised aspects of Communist conduct in Manchuria and the principles of land reform (208-212). Liberals such as Hu Shi, critical of Soviet conduct in Manchuria, remained anti-communist and cast the CCP as Soviet puppets [how ironic this sounds knowing the events of the next two decades] (212-216). The liberals maintained a strong critique of democratic centralism, preferring a more liberal democratic system, pointing towards the success of the postwar British Labour Party as an example, recalling Harold Laski's influence on the Chinese liberals of the 1930s (216-218). By 1949, however, many liberals made peace with their misgivings and followed the conciliatory statements of Mao and Ren Bishi in trusting themselves to the new-democratic government (218-228).
Pepper deals with the issue of land reform at great length in the 7th chapter, "The Return to Land Reform," running almost 100 pages. The crux of Pepper's argument is that CCP land reform efforts during the Civil War were not necessarily radical or moderated overall, but instead depended upon the region and the local Party's implementation of the Center's guidelines. In the Northeast, for example, the Communists pursued an equalization effort which went beyond anti-tenancy agitation (233-244). The background for CCP policy during the Civil War was founded during WWII, in which the Party struggled to pursue a moderate policy against landlord whilst protecting middle peasants and holding the line against the Japanese. Mass struggle and redistribution did not occur on a significant level until the 1945-1946 period, which was spurred by a rectification movement which concentrated upon the feudal forces of the countryside. Pepper notes that, despite the "moderate" policy of the Center, guidelines distinguishing between "thorough" (acceptable) and "excessive" land reforms were vague, allowing the CCP to be flexible in its policy (244-277). 1946 to 1947 was a period of "radical land reform," which was facilitated by direct confiscation, land sales, patriotic "land contribution," and "equal redistribution." Party and military property was not exempt from this process, whilst the middle peasantry was protected and the mass line was institutionalized. This culminated in the famous "Outline Agrarian Law" (277-289). CCP policy in particular radicalized during the KMT Offensives of 1946-1947, in which the KMT backed landlords and rich peasants in brutally repressing the peasantry and those who had benefited from land reform, which drove the CCP into using land reform as a guerilla tactic and cut off more support from the KMT (297-307). The main focus of CCP policy in this period, however, remained on ensuring that "left adventurism" remained in check and the middle peasantry not alienated from the Party (312-327).
In the waning years of the Civil War, the CCP "returned to the cities." The city of "Kalgan" (now Zhangjiakou) was a experiment ground of sorts for the CCP, where it pursued conciliatory policy to both labor and capital, and pursued anti-inflationary policy alongside social reform. Pepper argues that this experience was crucial in formulating policy as the KMT retreated and the Communists began taking major cities in the 1948-1949 period (333-350). When the CCP returned to the major cities, labor policy was framed as an anti-leftist campaign, allowing the CCP to increase productivity, improve working conditions, maintain strict union discipline, and avoid alienating businesses (351-376).
The Communist take-over from the KMT proceeded much more smoothly than that of the KMT from the Japanese. Military discipline, although a problem, was contained through widely publicized "main laws" and "points for attention," while factories were protected by CCP union cells and efforts during military operations (386-394). The CCP successfully integrated KMT bureaucrats and experts, as well as KMT soldiers and officers, while students and intellectuals were welcomed into the party (although at arms length) despite the party's suspicious attitude towards them (410-420).
The only thing that really holds Pepper back is her repetition. The reader sometimes gets bogged down in the action of this or that KMT official or this event in Manchuria, etc., and the odd heading system which makes it difficult to differentiate between 1st and 2nd headings and 3rd and 4th headings does not make taking notes very easy. There is something very admirable about a scholarly historical work published in 1978 which still holds up nearly five decades later. Pepper's work here is truly something to marvel at.
April 11, 2017
This is a core book when researching the Chinese civil war. It not only gives an in-depth historical analysis of both the CCP and KMT, but also gives extensive background information on both political parties. More so, the structure of the book is comprised of the main themes in the civil war and as such is very helpful when creating an argument for an essay or review and aids in making it a very easy and enjoyable read.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews