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حرب المستضعفين
نبذة الناشر: منذ نهاية الحرب العالمية الثانية، ورثت الولايات المتحدة الإمبراطوريتين الاستعماريتين القديمتين الفرنسية والبريطانية، بكل ما فيهما من ثروات ومرتكزات وأخذت مكانهما على رأس المعسكر الإمبريالى المعادي لحركة التحرر في العالم، وشنت نيابة عن هذا المعسكر عملية قمع دولية في عدد كبير من بلدان العالم الثالث.
وجابهت حركات التحرر القوة العسكرية الأميركية الضخمة بحرب ثورية طويلة الأمد، سلاحها: الجماهير المعبأة، والإيمان بالنصر، والتنظيم الثوري، ودعم القوى السليمة والمؤيدة للتحرر في العالم.
ويدخل هذا الكتاب في إطار الأدبيات الغربية التي أفرزتها هزائم الأمريكيين في الحروب المحدودة، والرامية إلى تفسير هذه الظاهرة، وفهم سر استقواء المستضعفين على من كانوا يعتقدون أنفسهم أقوياء. كما يدخل في إطار المحاولات النظرية الهادفة إلى البحث عن حل يضمن إيقاف تدهور الإمبراطورية الأميركية، والحد من هزائمها في القارات الثلاث.
وجابهت حركات التحرر القوة العسكرية الأميركية الضخمة بحرب ثورية طويلة الأمد، سلاحها: الجماهير المعبأة، والإيمان بالنصر، والتنظيم الثوري، ودعم القوى السليمة والمؤيدة للتحرر في العالم.
ويدخل هذا الكتاب في إطار الأدبيات الغربية التي أفرزتها هزائم الأمريكيين في الحروب المحدودة، والرامية إلى تفسير هذه الظاهرة، وفهم سر استقواء المستضعفين على من كانوا يعتقدون أنفسهم أقوياء. كما يدخل في إطار المحاولات النظرية الهادفة إلى البحث عن حل يضمن إيقاف تدهور الإمبراطورية الأميركية، والحد من هزائمها في القارات الثلاث.
192 pages, Unknown Binding
First published January 1, 1965
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About the author
Robert Taber
5 books12 followersRobert Taber traveled to Cuba in the late 1950s as a CBS investigative journalist to cover the country’s burgeoning revolutionary movement.
He became an eyewitness to history as he marched from the Sierra Maestra to Havana with the ragtag revolutionaries, led by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, who forced Batista to flee the country..
He became an eyewitness to history as he marched from the Sierra Maestra to Havana with the ragtag revolutionaries, led by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, who forced Batista to flee the country..
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September 15, 2013
هذا الكتاب هو أحد أهم الكتب التي تتكلم عن حروب العصابات, و أشاد به عددٌ من أهم منظري الفكر الجهادي مثل أبي مصعب السوري..
هذا الكتاب يعرض نماذج للعديد من حروب العصابات في التاريخ الحديث سواء الناجح منها أو الفاشل...مع دراسة لظروف كل حرب فيها و تبيان أسباب النجاح أو الفشل
و لأن الكاتب أمريكي و كان يكتب الكتاب في الستينات في عز حرب فيتنام, و في خضم حركات التحرر الوطني و النضالات الثورية, فقد كان معاصراً لكل هذا مع تركيز على حرب فيتنام بالذات.
و أهم مثل لحرب العصابات هو مثل الكلب و البرغوث, , فالبرغوث يقفز بسرعة و ينتقل لأماكن مختلفة في جسد الكلب الذي يستهلك طاقته في محاولة إمساك البرغوث بلا فائدة إلى أن يصفي دمه و يسقط.
و يلفت الكاتب النظر لأهم المقومات التي تؤدي لنجاح الحركة الثورية التي هي أساس الكفاح المسلح المترجم في حرب العصابات, و هذه المقومات عامل مشترك في التجارب الناجحة, و غيابها عامل مشترك في التجارب الفاشلة..أهم هذه المقومات هو الدعم الشعبي و وجود قاعدة شعبية تعمل الحركة الثورية على اتساعها..و زعزعة ثقة الجماهير في مصداقية النظام و قوته و قدرته على حمايتهم و السيطرة عليهم..غير لجوء النظام للقمع و العنف بما يجعل الجماهير تنفر منه و تقف بجوار الثوار...بالإضافة لعوامل أخرى مثل اعتماد الثوار على أنفسهم في مواردهم , فالسلاح يحصلون عليه من الهجوم على قوات النظام...أما الاعتماد الكلي على السلاح القادم من وراء الحدود فهو يؤدي لتخلخل المقاومة إذا انقطع هذا المدد, كما حدث في الثورة الشيوعية في اليونان, و كما حدث في الثورة السورية في الثمانينيات حسب ما روى أبو مصعب السوري
بالإضافة لمايجنيه الثوار من إدارة المناطق التي يسيطرون عليها, بما يضمن لهم الإمدادات و في الوقت نفسه حرمان النظام من موارد كان يجبيها لنفسه
و من البديهي أن كل بلد له ظروفه الخاصة الجغرافية و السكانية و السياسية و التي تحدد طبيعة الصراع فيه و نمط الثورة, و من البديهي أيضاً أن الوضع الحالي في بلادنا لا يعني أننا في وضع حرب مسلحة ثورية....فحتى الآن ليس هذا الخيار متاحاً إلا في حالة دفع صائل , لا حرب هجومية و مواجهة شاملة...فهناك أكثر من سبب عقيدي و غير عقيدي يمنع هذا, لكن الكتاب سيظل مفيداً و هاماً و حافلاً بالأفكار حتى في حال إسقاطها على النضال السلمي...فمقومات النجاح واحدة و هي إنهاك النظام مع صنع و توسيع القاعدة الشعبية...فقط الوسائل هي التي تختلف
هذا الكتاب يعرض نماذج للعديد من حروب العصابات في التاريخ الحديث سواء الناجح منها أو الفاشل...مع دراسة لظروف كل حرب فيها و تبيان أسباب النجاح أو الفشل
و لأن الكاتب أمريكي و كان يكتب الكتاب في الستينات في عز حرب فيتنام, و في خضم حركات التحرر الوطني و النضالات الثورية, فقد كان معاصراً لكل هذا مع تركيز على حرب فيتنام بالذات.
و أهم مثل لحرب العصابات هو مثل الكلب و البرغوث, , فالبرغوث يقفز بسرعة و ينتقل لأماكن مختلفة في جسد الكلب الذي يستهلك طاقته في محاولة إمساك البرغوث بلا فائدة إلى أن يصفي دمه و يسقط.
و يلفت الكاتب النظر لأهم المقومات التي تؤدي لنجاح الحركة الثورية التي هي أساس الكفاح المسلح المترجم في حرب العصابات, و هذه المقومات عامل مشترك في التجارب الناجحة, و غيابها عامل مشترك في التجارب الفاشلة..أهم هذه المقومات هو الدعم الشعبي و وجود قاعدة شعبية تعمل الحركة الثورية على اتساعها..و زعزعة ثقة الجماهير في مصداقية النظام و قوته و قدرته على حمايتهم و السيطرة عليهم..غير لجوء النظام للقمع و العنف بما يجعل الجماهير تنفر منه و تقف بجوار الثوار...بالإضافة لعوامل أخرى مثل اعتماد الثوار على أنفسهم في مواردهم , فالسلاح يحصلون عليه من الهجوم على قوات النظام...أما الاعتماد الكلي على السلاح القادم من وراء الحدود فهو يؤدي لتخلخل المقاومة إذا انقطع هذا المدد, كما حدث في الثورة الشيوعية في اليونان, و كما حدث في الثورة السورية في الثمانينيات حسب ما روى أبو مصعب السوري
بالإضافة لمايجنيه الثوار من إدارة المناطق التي يسيطرون عليها, بما يضمن لهم الإمدادات و في الوقت نفسه حرمان النظام من موارد كان يجبيها لنفسه
و من البديهي أن كل بلد له ظروفه الخاصة الجغرافية و السكانية و السياسية و التي تحدد طبيعة الصراع فيه و نمط الثورة, و من البديهي أيضاً أن الوضع الحالي في بلادنا لا يعني أننا في وضع حرب مسلحة ثورية....فحتى الآن ليس هذا الخيار متاحاً إلا في حالة دفع صائل , لا حرب هجومية و مواجهة شاملة...فهناك أكثر من سبب عقيدي و غير عقيدي يمنع هذا, لكن الكتاب سيظل مفيداً و هاماً و حافلاً بالأفكار حتى في حال إسقاطها على النضال السلمي...فمقومات النجاح واحدة و هي إنهاك النظام مع صنع و توسيع القاعدة الشعبية...فقط الوسائل هي التي تختلف
September 29, 2012
Taber's thorough examination of the (mainly Marxist) revolutions of the first half of the twentieth-century provided him the almost prophetic ability to foresee the United State's loss of the war in Vietnam as all but inevitable. He also correctly foresaw future troubles in South and Central America, though his details just missed the bullseye in the case of several countries. The most important tenant of this book, though, is not that revolutions are inevitable - they are - but that they can only be defeated by compromise, never by military might alone. In my own Master's Thesis on The Mau Mau War: Regional Rebellions and British Responses, 1950-55 (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999), I argued, along similar lines, that the British successfully waged a counter-insurgency campaign not by military force alone, but by conceding something to the population that the guerillas could not give: education. While Taber argues that the first concession to enable a successful suppression of guerilla activities is land reform, and that education only served to create revolutionary ambition in the lower middle class, the Mau Mau rebellion showed that the British colonial government used these two compromises in reverse order to great effect.
But I digress . . .
If you want to understand the anatomy of rebellion, along with the reason the United States fared so poorly in Vietnam, you must read this book. I have referred to this book often when trying to understand the morass that Afghanistan is now and promises to be in the future. I would love to see an update to this book, a re-visitation of its principle thesis. Apparently the military and the State Department learned something from Vietnam, but is it enough? Frankly, I don't like our chances.
But I digress . . .
If you want to understand the anatomy of rebellion, along with the reason the United States fared so poorly in Vietnam, you must read this book. I have referred to this book often when trying to understand the morass that Afghanistan is now and promises to be in the future. I would love to see an update to this book, a re-visitation of its principle thesis. Apparently the military and the State Department learned something from Vietnam, but is it enough? Frankly, I don't like our chances.
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July 23, 2021
I read this as part of my research for writing a book, although it's actually been on my TBR for far longer.
Definitely an interesting read, although a bit optimistic in terms of motives, and leaves something to be desired for what comes next after the guerrilla war has been won (of course, the entire book is about guerrilla warfare, not who steps into the power vacuum left by the victors once the opposition flees/dies/surrenders).
However, Taber makes many key points about warfare, revolution and counterrevolution (or counterinsurgency, it's all in a name). The most striking thing was that even though this was originally published in the mid-1960s, there are many truths that still ring through to today, particularly with the insurgency brewing within the United States and the alt-right insurgency. There are damning parallels, and now I'm chock full of conspiracy theories, so uh, thanks Taber.
Definitely an interesting read, although a bit optimistic in terms of motives, and leaves something to be desired for what comes next after the guerrilla war has been won (of course, the entire book is about guerrilla warfare, not who steps into the power vacuum left by the victors once the opposition flees/dies/surrenders).
However, Taber makes many key points about warfare, revolution and counterrevolution (or counterinsurgency, it's all in a name). The most striking thing was that even though this was originally published in the mid-1960s, there are many truths that still ring through to today, particularly with the insurgency brewing within the United States and the alt-right insurgency. There are damning parallels, and now I'm chock full of conspiracy theories, so uh, thanks Taber.
January 7, 2022
An interesting history from the height of the global guerilla movement with an extremely frustrating final chapter and some very bad predictions. The author is, first and foremost, an idealist. Strong shades of Trot to Neocon pipeline style ideology, especially shown in his claims that the Cuban revolution "failed", despite the enormous progress gained by Cuban peasants and workers. The book is at its best recounting the history and methods of various guerilla movements and analyzing them from a military and social angle. But the author's idealism fails him completely in his final chapter.
His assumption that the US and it's allies could not possibly sustain total genocidal war in Latin America was proven gravely wrong when the US crushed the revolutionary movements there with it's program of international fascism in Operation Condor. There were many failings and errors made by revolutionary groups and their allies but the author hugely underestimated the ability of the US to approve of total warfare methods against the Latin American population and it's ability to use it's control of global media to minimize the political damage. While the military regimes have gone and bourgeois democracy restored in most of Latin America, with only Nicaragua succeeding in its revolution during that wave, it has taken half a century to recover any of the momentum from the 60s. Only now in Bolivia and Venezuela do we have strongly organized revolutionary movements meeting the challenge of the class conflict in the area and harnassing class struggle for socialism.
While Taber sees the hints of future US strategy in his analysis of the Philippines response to the Huk rebellion, he fails to foresee the key role that would come to be played by US NGOs, both as a relief valve and busy box to tap off revolutionary energy and divert leadership, and also as an invaluable extension of the US intelligence apparatus.
I still recommend the book for some of its history but the idealism of the author must be taken into account, and a broader study of the field taken.
His assumption that the US and it's allies could not possibly sustain total genocidal war in Latin America was proven gravely wrong when the US crushed the revolutionary movements there with it's program of international fascism in Operation Condor. There were many failings and errors made by revolutionary groups and their allies but the author hugely underestimated the ability of the US to approve of total warfare methods against the Latin American population and it's ability to use it's control of global media to minimize the political damage. While the military regimes have gone and bourgeois democracy restored in most of Latin America, with only Nicaragua succeeding in its revolution during that wave, it has taken half a century to recover any of the momentum from the 60s. Only now in Bolivia and Venezuela do we have strongly organized revolutionary movements meeting the challenge of the class conflict in the area and harnassing class struggle for socialism.
While Taber sees the hints of future US strategy in his analysis of the Philippines response to the Huk rebellion, he fails to foresee the key role that would come to be played by US NGOs, both as a relief valve and busy box to tap off revolutionary energy and divert leadership, and also as an invaluable extension of the US intelligence apparatus.
I still recommend the book for some of its history but the idealism of the author must be taken into account, and a broader study of the field taken.
February 7, 2017
حرب المستضعفين
الكتاب يتناول الحديث عن حروب العصابات، فذكر الحروب الناجحة منها والفاشلة وبين أسباب النجاح والفشل .ذكر مبادئ حروب العصابات فهو كتاب تاريخي لدراسة الحروب .
الكتاب يتناول الحديث عن حروب العصابات، فذكر الحروب الناجحة منها والفاشلة وبين أسباب النجاح والفشل .ذكر مبادئ حروب العصابات فهو كتاب تاريخي لدراسة الحروب .
January 8, 2025
Definitely repetitive at certain points, but man this is breathtakingly timeless throughout. Should be prerequisite reading for every history class covering any time period after the 50s.
March 3, 2017
هذا الكتاب يقدِّم يمهدِ للطريقة الوحيدة التي يستطيعُ فيها المستضعفين في الأرض نيل مطالبهم ومستحقَّاتهم من الحكومات والأقليَّات سواء كانت عسكريَّة أم اقتصاديَّة حاكمة. ويفتح المجال لدراسة ظاهرت حرب العصابات التي اتبعتها كافة حركات التحرُّر الوطنيَّة والشعبيَّة والأيديولوجيَّة. يعرفُ الكتاب في بدايته الأحوال الاجتماعيَّة والاقتصاديَّة التي تدفع الشعوب لانتهاجِ هذا النهج الثوري ويعرِّف الاستراتيجيَّات التي قتوم عليها هذهِ الحرب ونقاطُ ضعفها وقوَّتها. ثمّ ينتقل الكاتب لسرد أمثلة تاريخيَّة حول حرب العصابات التي أطلق عليها اسم حرب المستضعفين منها الثورة الصينية ثمّ ينتقلُ إلى الحرب الفيتناميَّة الفرنسيَّة والحرب الفيتناميَّة الأمريكيَّة وحروب التحرر الوطنيَّة الإيرلنديَّة والمغربية والتونسية والجزائريَّة والقبرصيَّة وأسباب نجاحها. ثمَّ يعرضُ نماذج من حربِ عصابات فاشلة كالثورة الفلبين ماليزيا اليونان ويتطرَّق إلى أسباب الفشل ويعزوه بالعادة إلى انقطاع الثورة عن المخزن البشريِّ لها.
في المحصلة يعتبرُ تابر بأن حرب العصابات ليست حربًّا للسيطرة ولا تحتمل نصرًا عسكريًّا ولكن هي الوسيلة الوحيدة للحصول على مكاسب سياسيَّة عن طريق إنهاك جيش الدولة واقتصادها وخلق ثورة داخليَّة من خلال الانتكاسة الاقتصاديَّة.
وفي نهاية الكتاب قدَّم تابر كلمة جوهريَّة للولايات المتحدة الأمريكيَّة: إن من المتعذر إلغاء ثورة ولكن بالإمكان توجيهها وليس من الخطأ العمل على توجيهها في منحى يجعل أضرارها قليلة ما أمكن.
وهذا ما عملت عليه الولايات المتحدة الأمريكيَّة في ما بات يسمى ثورات الربيع العربي. التي ساهم تدخل الولايات الأمريكيَّة فيها بإفشالها كُليًّا.
يبقى القول بأنَّ تابر أوشك أن يجزم بأنَّ أي ثورة تقوم ستنهض في وجه الرأسمالية الإمبرالية الأمريكيَّة وأنه لا بدّ لها فيما بعد أن تنقلب حمراء شيوعيَّة على أساس توزيع القوى في عصره بين الاتحاد السوفيتي والرأسمالية الأمريكية. أمَّا اليوم فالثورات صارت تأخذُ في العالم الثالث طابعًا دينيًّا أشدُّ فتكًا من الطابع الاقتصادي أو السياسي لذلك غرقت أمريكا بعد خروجها من مستنقع فيتنام في العالم الإسلام واستنزفت مواردها بحروب عقديَّة بدءًا من الصومال انتهاء بالعراق ومازال هذا الاستنزافُ قائمًا.
الكتاب جميل ولكن يعالجُ في معظمه ثورات شيوعيَّة ولم يكن منصفًا عندما عرَّج على ثورات التحرُّر العربي بالرغم من صبغتها الوطنيَّة إلا أن محرِّكها الأساسي كان إسلاميًّا.
في المحصلة يعتبرُ تابر بأن حرب العصابات ليست حربًّا للسيطرة ولا تحتمل نصرًا عسكريًّا ولكن هي الوسيلة الوحيدة للحصول على مكاسب سياسيَّة عن طريق إنهاك جيش الدولة واقتصادها وخلق ثورة داخليَّة من خلال الانتكاسة الاقتصاديَّة.
وفي نهاية الكتاب قدَّم تابر كلمة جوهريَّة للولايات المتحدة الأمريكيَّة: إن من المتعذر إلغاء ثورة ولكن بالإمكان توجيهها وليس من الخطأ العمل على توجيهها في منحى يجعل أضرارها قليلة ما أمكن.
وهذا ما عملت عليه الولايات المتحدة الأمريكيَّة في ما بات يسمى ثورات الربيع العربي. التي ساهم تدخل الولايات الأمريكيَّة فيها بإفشالها كُليًّا.
يبقى القول بأنَّ تابر أوشك أن يجزم بأنَّ أي ثورة تقوم ستنهض في وجه الرأسمالية الإمبرالية الأمريكيَّة وأنه لا بدّ لها فيما بعد أن تنقلب حمراء شيوعيَّة على أساس توزيع القوى في عصره بين الاتحاد السوفيتي والرأسمالية الأمريكية. أمَّا اليوم فالثورات صارت تأخذُ في العالم الثالث طابعًا دينيًّا أشدُّ فتكًا من الطابع الاقتصادي أو السياسي لذلك غرقت أمريكا بعد خروجها من مستنقع فيتنام في العالم الإسلام واستنزفت مواردها بحروب عقديَّة بدءًا من الصومال انتهاء بالعراق ومازال هذا الاستنزافُ قائمًا.
الكتاب جميل ولكن يعالجُ في معظمه ثورات شيوعيَّة ولم يكن منصفًا عندما عرَّج على ثورات التحرُّر العربي بالرغم من صبغتها الوطنيَّة إلا أن محرِّكها الأساسي كان إسلاميًّا.
April 3, 2021
At first, this seems like it's gonna suck. The first two chapters, theoretically heavy, seemed basic to me, and the author, not being a Marxist, made some mistakes - he never explains the class basis behind the guerrillas, how they can be defeated even in a rural setting, etc, and it seems at first like we're seeing yet another case of a 60s middle class "radical" getting high on the fumes of the time.
Not the case, as it turns out, for after the kinda weak first couple of chapters, the book gives you excellent explanations of how the guerrilla campaigns going on at the time went down.
Covering everything from the Cuban revolution which was an insurgency, to the Chinese civil war and the Indochinese wars, which started as guerrillas before moving to the direct terrain, to the urban guerrilla campaign of the IRA against the British in the Irish revolution, the Jewish insurgency against the British in Palestine or the terrorist campaign of the EOKA against the British (the Brits always did the same errors too lol), Taber gives you in few words, with no fluff whatsoever, no filler, what made several insurgencies win, and what made certain insurgencies lose.
The book is not perfect - like I said, Taber was not a Marxist, so at times the book is lacking on dialectics - proper class analysis, the understanding of the limits of guerrilla struggles (largely limited to national liberation and fighting a foreign occupier - Taber suggests but does not outright explain how a communist revolution, a truly communist revolution, cannot be done by guerrilla insurgency but by direct and strong insurrection). But it gives you all the info you need to understand it, if you are already a Marxist.
Highly recommended!
Not the case, as it turns out, for after the kinda weak first couple of chapters, the book gives you excellent explanations of how the guerrilla campaigns going on at the time went down.
Covering everything from the Cuban revolution which was an insurgency, to the Chinese civil war and the Indochinese wars, which started as guerrillas before moving to the direct terrain, to the urban guerrilla campaign of the IRA against the British in the Irish revolution, the Jewish insurgency against the British in Palestine or the terrorist campaign of the EOKA against the British (the Brits always did the same errors too lol), Taber gives you in few words, with no fluff whatsoever, no filler, what made several insurgencies win, and what made certain insurgencies lose.
The book is not perfect - like I said, Taber was not a Marxist, so at times the book is lacking on dialectics - proper class analysis, the understanding of the limits of guerrilla struggles (largely limited to national liberation and fighting a foreign occupier - Taber suggests but does not outright explain how a communist revolution, a truly communist revolution, cannot be done by guerrilla insurgency but by direct and strong insurrection). But it gives you all the info you need to understand it, if you are already a Marxist.
Highly recommended!
March 28, 2015
هذا الكتاب مهم ويحافض على راهنيته رغم اصداره سنة 1965. "حرب المستضعفين" يحلل حرب العصابات والحرب المضادة عبر مجموعة من التجارب الناجحة (كوبا، الصين، فيتنام، ايرلندا، شمال إفريقيا وقبرص) والفاشلة (الفلبين وماليزيا واليونان). كل تجربة توصف بإيجاز ويتم التركيز على التشابه في نمط حرب العصابات مع وضع الفوارق في الإعتبار. الراهنية تتمثل في تبني المجموعات الجهادية لحرب العصابات ( أشاد بالكتاب أبو مصعب السوري مثلا)، ونتمكن بذلك من إطار فهم للظاهرة بعيد عن الأطر التقليدية للتحليل (الدين، التهميش والفقر...)
إذا اردنا أن نتبنى موقفا نفعياً فقط عبر إسقاط حرب العصابات الموجهة ضد القوى الإمبريالية (تحرر وطني) على واقع العصابات الجهادية، فإننا نجد تطابقا مثيرا للإهتمام في عديد النقاط منها: عدم التمسك بالأرض عبر التحرك، التغذي من الإستعمال غير الشرعي للقوة من قبل السلطة، أهمية الحاضنة الشعبية وفرض القوانين في المناطق المسيطر عليها (رأينا ذلك من ثورة كاسترو إلى محاكم طالبان الليلية بداية من 2011).
يهتم الكتاب أيضا بفشل حرب العصابات والسبب الرئيسي ليس في المعدات أو القمع بل في "القطع على الدعم والإتصال الشعبيين".
يتحدث الكاتب عرضا عند تناول الانتفاضات في شمال إفريقيا على دور الدين في تكوين سردية تحررية من الإستعمار (مثلا مسألة "خناجر حزب الإستقلال" في المغرب)
إذا اردنا أن نتبنى موقفا نفعياً فقط عبر إسقاط حرب العصابات الموجهة ضد القوى الإمبريالية (تحرر وطني) على واقع العصابات الجهادية، فإننا نجد تطابقا مثيرا للإهتمام في عديد النقاط منها: عدم التمسك بالأرض عبر التحرك، التغذي من الإستعمال غير الشرعي للقوة من قبل السلطة، أهمية الحاضنة الشعبية وفرض القوانين في المناطق المسيطر عليها (رأينا ذلك من ثورة كاسترو إلى محاكم طالبان الليلية بداية من 2011).
يهتم الكتاب أيضا بفشل حرب العصابات والسبب الرئيسي ليس في المعدات أو القمع بل في "القطع على الدعم والإتصال الشعبيين".
يتحدث الكاتب عرضا عند تناول الانتفاضات في شمال إفريقيا على دور الدين في تكوين سردية تحررية من الإستعمار (مثلا مسألة "خناجر حزب الإستقلال" في المغرب)
February 3, 2016
Explores the history of revolutions and the strong association and role of guerrilla warfare in it. Identifies space, time and will as the 3 main components of a revolutionary war. While the analogy is that of flea beating the dog it also identifies that "To be successful, the guerrilla must be loved and admired. To attract followers, he must represent not merely success, but absolute virtue, so that his enemy will represent absolute evil."
November 19, 2013
يا ليت قومي يعلمون
September 30, 2018
First published in 1970. Taber was a CBS correspondent with many years covering revolutions in Asia, Latin America, elsewhere.
His analysis holds up well against, considering all of the rabid revisionism that gets recycled over and over. To understand the history of late-20th Century revolutions, it's not enough to pretend it was all about a failure of will and domestic conflicts, though those are certainly part of what happened, and in fact part of the guerrillas' expectations of what would happen during the later phases of the war, should their strategy succeed.
By the time Taber wrote this, guerrilla movements had succeed on multiple continents -- Cuba, China (Mao), Algeria, making it seem inevitable that the U.S. would lose Vietnam.
Taber draws some conclusions while describing in general the unique differences of each. He also explains why some guerrillas who lacked the same essential ingredients (e.g. Huks) failed.
"The guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough - this is the theory - the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws."
"Given their inferiority of resources, they can survive only by avoiding direct confrontation with a superior enemy; that is, battle on the enemy's terms."
The guerrilla's advantage is time -- the "imperialists" and "occupiers" have only so much political time before the costs of maintaining the occupation and sending waves of weaponry and other hardware become a drag on the economy, or cast a shadow on the next election. OTOH, for the guerrilla, especially early on, time is required to educate a base of support, build strength, strike strategically to build a cache of weapons. Until it eventually starts crippling the economy (and turning mass opinion against the regime), incite insurrection, make foreign investors withdraw and make the political, police and military bureaucracies necessary to prop up the regime too corrupt and unsustainable.
Every revolution is different. And not every resistance movement is a revolution.
I'd be surprised if The War of the Flea is not still required reading at the War Colleges. If so, I wonder what -- if any -- lessons are drawn for, say, the ongoing war in Afghanistan. It's not so much that there are striking parallels, but reading this book made me think how little public discourse there is today about the longest war in American history. We've blotted it out of our daily awareness, despite the enduring failure to make much progress. Each horrific market bombing might needle us here in the U.S. like an annoying flea-bite. But do we think about how it might come back to haunt us (again)?
I once talked with a guy who advised top generals for CENTCOM a few years ago. He says they could approach the occupation differently, but that it's currently a failure. It costs us $5 - 8 billion in AID and another $20 billion or so in military costs. He told me the problem is we funnel the money through corrupt central government, and little of it is distributed through the regional governments where it would be easier to distribute to farmers who we want to stop growing poppies for heroin.
The military (and US AID) is too focused on burning poppy fields, but hey only extinguish about 20% each year, which means the rest is sold at a higher prices, and all it does is turn those angry farmers into recruits for the Taliban and others, like drone strikes.
They aren't trying to build an alternative economic model. They could. Afghanistan is a rich country with emeralds, diamonds that could be extracted, sold and put into a Federal Reserve account to cover the expense, too. (Why do you think Taliban also trade in gems.) Is there an example of a place where this worked in the past. The War Colleges have to dust off the strategy for post WW II Germany and Japan, That would likely be the most successful way to transition from occupation to a successful, functioning government. I don't know enough about either to believe if that would work.
You can say that Cuba, China, other guerrilla movements are different, because they had an ideological agenda (although Castro and his movement were not Communists, he reminds us).
But with a common enemy, disparate groups of malcontents that otherwise would otherwise lack popular support and common cause...
Taber:
"If revolution is to be understood as a historical, social process, rather than an accident or a plot, then it will not do to consider guerrillas, terrorists, political assassins as deviants or agents somehow apart from the social fabric, irrelevant or only fortuitously relevant to the historical process. Guerrillas are OF the people, or they cannot survive, cannot even come into being. ... It may be argued that terrorist movements attract criminals and psychopaths. So they do. But criminality itself is a form of unconscious social protest, reflecting the distortions of an imperfect society..."
Empires don't last that don't learn.
His analysis holds up well against, considering all of the rabid revisionism that gets recycled over and over. To understand the history of late-20th Century revolutions, it's not enough to pretend it was all about a failure of will and domestic conflicts, though those are certainly part of what happened, and in fact part of the guerrillas' expectations of what would happen during the later phases of the war, should their strategy succeed.
By the time Taber wrote this, guerrilla movements had succeed on multiple continents -- Cuba, China (Mao), Algeria, making it seem inevitable that the U.S. would lose Vietnam.
Taber draws some conclusions while describing in general the unique differences of each. He also explains why some guerrillas who lacked the same essential ingredients (e.g. Huks) failed.
"The guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough - this is the theory - the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws."
"Given their inferiority of resources, they can survive only by avoiding direct confrontation with a superior enemy; that is, battle on the enemy's terms."
The guerrilla's advantage is time -- the "imperialists" and "occupiers" have only so much political time before the costs of maintaining the occupation and sending waves of weaponry and other hardware become a drag on the economy, or cast a shadow on the next election. OTOH, for the guerrilla, especially early on, time is required to educate a base of support, build strength, strike strategically to build a cache of weapons. Until it eventually starts crippling the economy (and turning mass opinion against the regime), incite insurrection, make foreign investors withdraw and make the political, police and military bureaucracies necessary to prop up the regime too corrupt and unsustainable.
Every revolution is different. And not every resistance movement is a revolution.
I'd be surprised if The War of the Flea is not still required reading at the War Colleges. If so, I wonder what -- if any -- lessons are drawn for, say, the ongoing war in Afghanistan. It's not so much that there are striking parallels, but reading this book made me think how little public discourse there is today about the longest war in American history. We've blotted it out of our daily awareness, despite the enduring failure to make much progress. Each horrific market bombing might needle us here in the U.S. like an annoying flea-bite. But do we think about how it might come back to haunt us (again)?
I once talked with a guy who advised top generals for CENTCOM a few years ago. He says they could approach the occupation differently, but that it's currently a failure. It costs us $5 - 8 billion in AID and another $20 billion or so in military costs. He told me the problem is we funnel the money through corrupt central government, and little of it is distributed through the regional governments where it would be easier to distribute to farmers who we want to stop growing poppies for heroin.
The military (and US AID) is too focused on burning poppy fields, but hey only extinguish about 20% each year, which means the rest is sold at a higher prices, and all it does is turn those angry farmers into recruits for the Taliban and others, like drone strikes.
They aren't trying to build an alternative economic model. They could. Afghanistan is a rich country with emeralds, diamonds that could be extracted, sold and put into a Federal Reserve account to cover the expense, too. (Why do you think Taliban also trade in gems.) Is there an example of a place where this worked in the past. The War Colleges have to dust off the strategy for post WW II Germany and Japan, That would likely be the most successful way to transition from occupation to a successful, functioning government. I don't know enough about either to believe if that would work.
You can say that Cuba, China, other guerrilla movements are different, because they had an ideological agenda (although Castro and his movement were not Communists, he reminds us).
But with a common enemy, disparate groups of malcontents that otherwise would otherwise lack popular support and common cause...
Taber:
"If revolution is to be understood as a historical, social process, rather than an accident or a plot, then it will not do to consider guerrillas, terrorists, political assassins as deviants or agents somehow apart from the social fabric, irrelevant or only fortuitously relevant to the historical process. Guerrillas are OF the people, or they cannot survive, cannot even come into being. ... It may be argued that terrorist movements attract criminals and psychopaths. So they do. But criminality itself is a form of unconscious social protest, reflecting the distortions of an imperfect society..."
Empires don't last that don't learn.
January 20, 2014
حرب العصابات
أمل الشعوب المستضعفة ضد الحكومات العسكرية
و تعتبر تطور للثورات
كتاب رائع يتناول أبرز مبادئ حروب العصابات
أفضل جزء فيه هو تحليل الثورة الكوبية و حرب العصابات فى كوبا
و تفاصيلها و مبادئها
أمل الشعوب المستضعفة ضد الحكومات العسكرية
و تعتبر تطور للثورات
كتاب رائع يتناول أبرز مبادئ حروب العصابات
أفضل جزء فيه هو تحليل الثورة الكوبية و حرب العصابات فى كوبا
و تفاصيلها و مبادئها
September 17, 2014
هذا الكتاب لابد أن يُدرّس في الصفوف الجهاديّة
September 11, 2025
I’ve always been fascinated by stories of underground resistance, ragtag commandos, and guerrilla fighters—especially those who operate on the margins of power and empire. While I’ve read memoirs and histories that focus on specific movements, this is the first time I’ve encountered a book that dissects guerrilla warfare as a whole—its definitions, origins, formation, tactics, aims, strengths, and weaknesses.
Published in 1965, right in the thick of the Vietnam War, War of the Flea provides a clear-eyed analysis of the guerrilla method, and it does so without any dramatics or patriotic puffery. Robert Taber lets the facts speak for themselves, and what they say is captivating. He doesn’t just chronicle events—he interprets patterns. He outlines how guerrilla movements emerge, why they succeed or fail, and what they ultimately reveal about the societies they fight within (or against).
Given its timing, the book dedicates significant space to Vietnam, and Taber’s predictions about the U.S. role in that conflict—and in future global insurgencies—are almost haunting in their accuracy. He writes with the cold logic of a journalist and strategist, not a revolutionary. And yet, through his observations, a truth emerges that’s difficult to ignore: the United States, for all its self-image as a beacon of liberty, behaves like an imperial power with an imperial agenda.
That’s a hard pill to swallow. But Taber doesn’t ask the reader to choke on ideology—he simply presents the historical record and steps aside.
One of the most striking sections of the book explores what a guerrilla war inside the United States might look like. While purely hypothetical, his scenario underscores how America’s size and industrialization would make such a movement uniquely difficult—and uniquely dangerous.
What stuck with me most, though, is the core metaphor: the “war of the flea.” A flea cannot kill a dog, but it can make the dog’s life miserable—so miserable that, eventually, the dog lies down. Exhaustion becomes defeat. Victory doesn’t come by overpowering, but by outlasting.
That metaphor feels chillingly relevant today.
As I read, I couldn’t help but draw comparisons to the MAGA-fueled authoritarian movement currently gnawing at the foundations of American democracy. Like a guerrilla campaign, it doesn’t launch a frontal assault—it weakens institutions through persistent, calculated jabs. It’s a cold civil conflict waged across school boards, courtrooms, statehouses, and cable news segments. Each act may seem small, but together they sap the strength of the body politic. The goal isn’t to win through might—it’s to wear us down until we stop fighting.
War of the Flea doesn’t make for light reading, but it is essential. It’s a lens that reveals the shape of conflicts we often miss, and the tactics of power—both overt and insidious—that shape our world. Whether you’re a student of history, a political skeptic, or someone trying to understand the chaotic web of modern resistance and repression, this book is a vital, razor-sharp read.
Published in 1965, right in the thick of the Vietnam War, War of the Flea provides a clear-eyed analysis of the guerrilla method, and it does so without any dramatics or patriotic puffery. Robert Taber lets the facts speak for themselves, and what they say is captivating. He doesn’t just chronicle events—he interprets patterns. He outlines how guerrilla movements emerge, why they succeed or fail, and what they ultimately reveal about the societies they fight within (or against).
Given its timing, the book dedicates significant space to Vietnam, and Taber’s predictions about the U.S. role in that conflict—and in future global insurgencies—are almost haunting in their accuracy. He writes with the cold logic of a journalist and strategist, not a revolutionary. And yet, through his observations, a truth emerges that’s difficult to ignore: the United States, for all its self-image as a beacon of liberty, behaves like an imperial power with an imperial agenda.
That’s a hard pill to swallow. But Taber doesn’t ask the reader to choke on ideology—he simply presents the historical record and steps aside.
One of the most striking sections of the book explores what a guerrilla war inside the United States might look like. While purely hypothetical, his scenario underscores how America’s size and industrialization would make such a movement uniquely difficult—and uniquely dangerous.
What stuck with me most, though, is the core metaphor: the “war of the flea.” A flea cannot kill a dog, but it can make the dog’s life miserable—so miserable that, eventually, the dog lies down. Exhaustion becomes defeat. Victory doesn’t come by overpowering, but by outlasting.
That metaphor feels chillingly relevant today.
As I read, I couldn’t help but draw comparisons to the MAGA-fueled authoritarian movement currently gnawing at the foundations of American democracy. Like a guerrilla campaign, it doesn’t launch a frontal assault—it weakens institutions through persistent, calculated jabs. It’s a cold civil conflict waged across school boards, courtrooms, statehouses, and cable news segments. Each act may seem small, but together they sap the strength of the body politic. The goal isn’t to win through might—it’s to wear us down until we stop fighting.
War of the Flea doesn’t make for light reading, but it is essential. It’s a lens that reveals the shape of conflicts we often miss, and the tactics of power—both overt and insidious—that shape our world. Whether you’re a student of history, a political skeptic, or someone trying to understand the chaotic web of modern resistance and repression, this book is a vital, razor-sharp read.
August 2, 2022
Often, and even if I don’t especially like a book, I’ll choose a future read based on something that interests me from the book—be it its style, the era in which it was written, the publisher, the subject matter, or often even just a random tidbit. I recently read I Hotel, and for all its flaws it did a stupendous job of increasing my “to-be-read” pile.
That is the inspiring and true story of how I chose to read War of the Flea.
Written in 1965, right about the time the U.S. was getting mired in the Viet Nam war (despite blaring signs telling us to stay the hell away from this loser), War of the Flea is a lucid analysis showing how the means and methods used by guerillas (the flea) strategically exploit the differing needs of existing governments (the dog). Through examples, primarily Cuba but also Ireland, Cyprus, and more, the book explains how even a tiny group of rebels can destabilize and (potentially) overthrow established rule. And counterinsurgency methods, at least the methods employed through the ‘60s, aren’t equipped to handle the nimble flea.
How the lessons in this book relate to today, with considerations of things like globalization, advanced surveillance, WhatsApp, drone warfare, etc., I don’t really know. But, say, at the very least it was pretty obvious we were never going to “win” in Afghanistan. That's $2+ trillion we could have used for fixing bridges and roads. Not as sexy as war, but probably more useful.
War of the Flea is also a fascinating read vis-a-vis all this drumbeat talk of an impending U.S. civil war. The ground does seem fertile and in many ways it seems the insurrection train has already left the station. But what would the fighting really be for? What would the end game be? Do the red states really want to occupy California? I doubt it. I suggest to all of my fellow fleas, we should cool it on tweeting stupid mean things to each other. Shot each other, if we must, playing Fortnite. Let’s go back to the steam-releasing (and quaint!) chauvinism of simply rooting for, and playfully badmouthing, football teams.
Patriots Suck!
That is the inspiring and true story of how I chose to read War of the Flea.
Written in 1965, right about the time the U.S. was getting mired in the Viet Nam war (despite blaring signs telling us to stay the hell away from this loser), War of the Flea is a lucid analysis showing how the means and methods used by guerillas (the flea) strategically exploit the differing needs of existing governments (the dog). Through examples, primarily Cuba but also Ireland, Cyprus, and more, the book explains how even a tiny group of rebels can destabilize and (potentially) overthrow established rule. And counterinsurgency methods, at least the methods employed through the ‘60s, aren’t equipped to handle the nimble flea.
How the lessons in this book relate to today, with considerations of things like globalization, advanced surveillance, WhatsApp, drone warfare, etc., I don’t really know. But, say, at the very least it was pretty obvious we were never going to “win” in Afghanistan. That's $2+ trillion we could have used for fixing bridges and roads. Not as sexy as war, but probably more useful.
War of the Flea is also a fascinating read vis-a-vis all this drumbeat talk of an impending U.S. civil war. The ground does seem fertile and in many ways it seems the insurrection train has already left the station. But what would the fighting really be for? What would the end game be? Do the red states really want to occupy California? I doubt it. I suggest to all of my fellow fleas, we should cool it on tweeting stupid mean things to each other. Shot each other, if we must, playing Fortnite. Let’s go back to the steam-releasing (and quaint!) chauvinism of simply rooting for, and playfully badmouthing, football teams.
Patriots Suck!
November 4, 2024
4.5/5:
fantastic introductory read!
of course it is important to keep in mind that it is quite an old work, and that it’s author sometimes lacks critical approach in some cases.
however, this is generally written very well. Cuban case is described very lively, considering that Taber himself took part in that war. Vietnam examples delve into deeper details, showcasing the features of guerrilla warfare Taber outlined in into chapters — good flow. here he introduces fact and numbers that help readers understand the situation even 60 years after.
next chapters are somewhat redundant and are either not developed in such a detail as the previous ones, or are oversaturated with numbers and facts. but nevertheless interesting.
the whole book reads almost like a nice fiction writing (sorry) and is quite engaging.
it would be useful to read material on counterinsurgency after this book.
overall, highly recommend.
fantastic introductory read!
of course it is important to keep in mind that it is quite an old work, and that it’s author sometimes lacks critical approach in some cases.
however, this is generally written very well. Cuban case is described very lively, considering that Taber himself took part in that war. Vietnam examples delve into deeper details, showcasing the features of guerrilla warfare Taber outlined in into chapters — good flow. here he introduces fact and numbers that help readers understand the situation even 60 years after.
next chapters are somewhat redundant and are either not developed in such a detail as the previous ones, or are oversaturated with numbers and facts. but nevertheless interesting.
the whole book reads almost like a nice fiction writing (sorry) and is quite engaging.
it would be useful to read material on counterinsurgency after this book.
overall, highly recommend.
August 21, 2025
It does exactly what it claims: this book is a study of guerrilla warfare, written by the rare Yankee who not only witnessed it firsthand, but also did so from the guerrilla’s perspective. A degree of bias should be expected, as with all such accounts, but that does not make the discussion any less rigorous.
The author offers a thorough discourse on multiple insurgencies, including the wars in Indochina and Vietnam, the Cypriot EOKA campaign, the Cuban Revolution, and the Algerian struggle against French rule, among others.
What left the deepest impression on me was the recurring lesson that the mandate and consent of the people is what ultimately makes or breaks a government. With it, even a small and seemingly insignificant guerrilla force can topple a regime within a few years. Without it, the most powerful and technologically advanced empires in history have repeatedly been humbled for decades by rural citizens armed with little more than determination and local support.
The author offers a thorough discourse on multiple insurgencies, including the wars in Indochina and Vietnam, the Cypriot EOKA campaign, the Cuban Revolution, and the Algerian struggle against French rule, among others.
What left the deepest impression on me was the recurring lesson that the mandate and consent of the people is what ultimately makes or breaks a government. With it, even a small and seemingly insignificant guerrilla force can topple a regime within a few years. Without it, the most powerful and technologically advanced empires in history have repeatedly been humbled for decades by rural citizens armed with little more than determination and local support.
June 24, 2024
It is important to remember that this slim volume was first published in 1965 as the United States teetered on the precipice of deepening its commitment in Vietnam. In that respect it can be considered a valuable and in some ways prescient read. But it is also dated. Bard O’Neill’s Introduction to this 2002 edition does a good job of explaining the book’s place in what has since become a sophisticated and increasingly refined body of scholarship examining insurgency, guerrilla war, revolutionary warfare, and terrorism. The Introduction to any future edition should also consider the book’s importance in light of the US experience in post-2001 Afghanistan and post-2003 Iraq.
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March 27, 2022Good read, especially given the book was published during the Vietnam war. My take away is that governments removed from those they serve; governments which forego governance in favor of rule are ultimately most vulnerable to the incessant biting of the flea. The flea may be ever present but, as with the dog, proper hygiene will keep its pestering manageable as one can conclude given the fact the author's prognosis for the flea's eventual successes in South America have not come to fruition in the ½ century+ since he opined on the course of history.
July 25, 2018
I've read all the "classics" on counterinsurgency, from FM3-24 to Gallula and Kilcullen. Similarly, I've read my Mao and Che and Marighella and Ulrike. For simplicity, clarity, and insight, none of their works match War of the Flea. If you're a practitioner, a policy-maker, or just an observer, there is no better work to read on the subject of insurgencies and guerrilla war than this book.
May 30, 2024
Pretty good case study at previous cases of revolution. Most of what is said is still relevant, but with the more detailed parts of conflicts being studied it does not apply. For instance Vietnam being an ongoing conflict at the time. Moreover some of the theories did end up being proven wrong, but with anything theory it must be tested and that doesn't necessarily mean it being correct. Overall, well written and interesting read.
May 19, 2025
An incredible look at guerrilla warfare from a more global perspective. This book was originally published in the mid 1960s, and at the point the author had already predicted the outcome of the US-Vietnam war. The author's case studies and first had experience also provide excellent insight. He makes a strong case for his thesis that guerrilla warfare is political warfare and that guerrilla warfare cannot be successful without the support of the population.
October 13, 2020
It's an interesting take on the guerrilla's mindset and tactics. The War of the Flea, is different from Mao and Che's Guerrilla Warfare manuals, by describing the noncombat propaganda philosophy of an insurgency. If you're interested in asymmetric warfare don't pass this one up.
February 24, 2021
It is the classic study of guerrilla warefare.
October 14, 2021
Great overview of guerilla warfare theory. A big picture look at guerilla movements and why they succeeded or failed.
May 18, 2023
This is required reading for anyone who wants to discuss "revolution." A great political and tactical breakdown of what works for a revolution and what fails.
February 13, 2024
لا يمكن استعباد شعب إذا كان يعارض ذلك
July 11, 2024
Good information for understanding the world. You can find current examples if you look.
November 15, 2024
Certainly dated, and biased, this is a still a book worth rereading from time to time. There us valuable insight for any serious student of guerilla warfare or counter-insurgency operations.
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