This is a remarkable, engaging and highly memorable piece of fiction, and I can't recommend it highly enough. In the introduction to my edition, and with his typically piercing and acidic insight, Max Hastings comments that, “It is a childish delusion to suppose that 1914-18's fighting men experienced worse things than their forebears had known. They did not…What changed in the First World War was simply that cultured citizen soldiers, disdaining the stoicism displayed since time immemorial by warriors, most of whom were anyway illiterate, chronicled the conflict into which they were plunged with an unprecedented lyricism. Moreover, the absence of significant strategic movement on the Western Front generated a sense of military futility which afterwards extended, understandably but irrationally, and especially among later generations rather than among contemporary participants, to the merits of the Allied cause.” If any single group was singled out for this literary ire, then it was the Generals: from “Butcher” Haig to Blackadder's General Melchett, the military leaders of 1914-18 are dismissed as cruel and incompetent, a unique brand of malicious fool who condemned millions of men to squalid and pointless deaths in the muddy battlefields of Western Europe. With so many layers of historical and cultural preconception, it is remarkable that Forester singles out the First World War General, personified in the fictional Curzon, as a character to be understood and even sympathised with. Forester himself said that he thought this was his best book, and I am somewhat inclined to agree.
He begins by establishing Curzon’s undoubted physical courage and tactical competence as he, like so many who were to ascend to generalship as the war progressed, began it as a regimental officer. Surviving the initial slaughter of Britain's relatively small professional army, Curzon returns home wounded, decorated, promoted, and with his reputation much burnished. In a memorable passage, the new Hector is accosted in his club by grey-haired warriors from previous conflicts: “From every corner of the Club men came crowding to hear his news and to ask him questions, or merely to look at the man newly returned from a European war. They were grey-headed old men, most of them, and they eyed him with envy. With anxiety, too; they had been gathering their information from the all-too-meagre communiqués and from the all-too-extensive casualty lists. They feared to know the worst at the same time as they asked, and they raised their voices in quavering questions about this unit and that, and to every question, Curzon could only give a painful answer. There was not a unit in the Expeditionary Force which had not poured out its best blood at Mons or at Le Cateau or at Ypres. For a long time, Curzon dealt out death and despair among those old men; it was fortunate that he did not feel the awkwardness which a more sensitive man might have felt. After all, casualties were a perfectly natural subject for a military man to discuss. It was need for his lunch which caused him in the end to break off the conversation, and even at lunch he was not free from interruption.” Curzon is not self-consciously insensitive or unfeeling; rather, he is from a time, class and profession that cultivated and prized stoicism, emotional restraint and a detached and rational approach to the question of casualties and loss. His practical need for lunch is of more immediate concern than the already appalling casualty figures from France and Belgium.
With these preliminaries established, Forester points out that Curzon “was destined for the command of four divisions, for the control of something like a hundred thousand men in battle - as many as Wellington or Marlborough ever commanded.” With the best will in the world, Curzon and his contemporaries could not be considered as military geniuses of the calibre of a Wellington or a Marlborough. Rather, they are constituent parts of a military apparatus on a scale never previously imagined, and leveraging a degree of technological advancement that was previously inconceivable. And above all, they are competent, but ultimately ordinary, professional soldiers.
What such men were able to contribute to the leadership of their divisions, corps, and armies was relentless courage, discipline, dedication, imperturbability, and an aggressive instinct to attack. Furthermore, they held the unshakeable assumption that these qualities were all that was needed to win through. In another memorable passage, Curzon and his peers respond to the failure of the 1915 offensive: “In some ways it was like the debate of a group of savages as to how to extract a screw from a piece of wood. Accustomed only to nails, they had made one effort to pull out the screw by main force, and now that it had failed they were devising methods of applying more force still, of obtaining more efficient pincers, of using levers and fulcrums so that more men could bring their strength to bear. They could hardly be blamed for not guessing that by rotating the screw it would come out after the exertion of far less effort; it would be a notion so different from anything they had ever encountered that they would laugh at the man who suggested it.” The result, Forester notes ominously, was the plan for the battle of the Somme.
Remarkably, in response to the unprecedented bloodshed of 1916, Forester paints a picture of the men who oversaw it that is both human and understandable. How, we ask, could they have reasonably done otherwise? Forester writes that, “The generals round the table were not men who were easily discouraged - men of that sort did not last long in command in France. Now that the first shock of disappointment had been faced, they were prepared to make a fresh effort, and to go on making those efforts as long as their strength lasted…The men who were wanted were men without fear of responsibility, men of ceaseless energy and of iron will, who could be relied upon to carry out their part in a plan of battle as far as flesh and blood - their own and their men’s - would permit. Men without imagination were necessary to execute a military policy devoid of imagination, devised by a man without imagination…When brute force was to be systematically applied, only men who could fit into the system without allowance having to be made for them were wanted.”
Fittingly, Curzon is gravely wounded during the Spring Offensive in 1918, riding forward with undaunted courage, with an unblinking determination to meet his doom in the face of a seemingly unrecoverable disaster. This means that he misses the Hundred Days Offensive and the end of the war, and so is blissfully shielded from having any of his previous military preconceptions challenged.
In the end, Forester has given us the portrait of a man who is decidedly human and flawed, but who retains many admirable qualities. Curzon’s unthinking physical courage, iron discipline, and determination to drive on whatever the cost are praiseworthy in an individual soldier, or even in a regimental officer. In a general commanding a hundred thousand souls in an industrial war, however, they are terrifying. In The General, CS Forester has written a discomforting and thought-provoking piece of fiction, and it is one that I will remember and continue to chew over for a long time.