In the wake of 9/11, America and its people have experienced a sense of vulnerability unprecedented in the nation's recent history. Buffeted by challenges from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the financial crisis, from Washington dysfunction to the rise of China and the dawn of the era of cyber warfare, two very different presidents and their advisors have struggled to cope with a relentless array of new threats.
You may think you know the story. But in National Insecurity , David Rothkopf offers an entirely new perspective into the hidden struggles, the surprising triumphs, and the shocking failures of those charged with leading the United States through one of the most difficult periods in its history. Thanks to his extraordinary access, Rothkopf provides fresh insights drawing on more than one hundred exclusive interviews with the key players who shaped this era.
At its core, National Insecurity is the gripping story of a superpower in crisis, seeking to adapt to a rapidly changing world, sometimes showing inspiring resilience—but often undone by the human flaws of those at the top, the mismanagement of its own system, the temptation to concentrate too much power within the hands of too few in the White House itself, and an unwillingness to draw the right lessons from the recent past. Nonetheless, within that story are unmistakable clues to a way forward that can help restore American leadership.
David Rothkopf is the internationally acclaimed author of Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They are Making (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, March 2008), now available in over two dozen editions worldwide, and Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power (PublicAffairs, 2005), hailed by The New York Times as "the definitive history of the National Security Council." His next book, on the tug of war between public and private power worldwide and its consequences, is due out from Farrar Straus & Giroux late this year.
Rothkopf is President and CEO of Garten Rothkopf, an international advisory firm specializing in transformational trends especially those associated with energy choice and climate change, emerging markets and global risk. He is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where he chairs the Carnegie Economic Strategy Roundtable. He was formerly chief executive of Intellibridge Corporation, managing director of Kissinger Associates and U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Policy.
Rothkopf has also taught international affairs and national security studies at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, has lectured widely and is the author of over 150 articles for leading publications worldwide.
An extension of his 2005 oral history of the NSC, published, moreorless, on the eve of the start of the 2016 presidential campaign, so it has a streak of optimism that is sad to read in in 2020.
*This is incomplete but I wanted to post something since I found this book really good.*
I am a happy subscriber to Foreign Policy magazine - the flagship publication of Foreign Policy Group which this author is the CEO of - because it publishes leading scholars, academics, and thinkers, from the world of international relations and foreign policy in a non-partisan way. The published works are always nuanced, provocative, and serious. Those three adjectives also describe this book well. For people engaged - probably all of the prospective readers of this book - most of the issues and phenomenon that the author summarizes and discusses will be familiar: 9/11, the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, Russia aggression, the pivot to the East (read: China), and all of the consequences and lead up to the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. Rothkopf previously published a book in 2005 studying the first Bush 43 term. I have not read that book but I mention to set the context for why the author begins with Bush's second term here.
Rothkopf begins by dissecting Bush 43.2 (second term) and he writes relatively sympathetic words actually. Rothkopf highlights that Bush was great regarding AIDS in SubSaharan Africa, for example. Bush changed his entire team and grew as a president. The infighting that was a highlight of Bush 43.1 between DefSec Rumsfeld, VEEP Cheney, and SecState Powell made way for a more cohesive group with President Bush becoming more confident and being a leader.
Rothkopf is critical of the Obama Administration first term and the first two years of his second term, too. Rothkopf paints that usual picture of the Obama Era which is one where Obama is insular with specific people and one that is obsessed with meetings and talking about stuff but hardly ever taking massive risks. The one lasting criticism of Obama here is that he hasn't showed the obvious growth in his second term that was evident in Bush 43.
It looks like Obama's White House made decisions regarding matters that are seemingly the purview of the State Department and SecState Hillary Clinton was not happy about this. In fact, out of the entire Obama Admin, Secretary Clinton comes across as the most hawkish but also the person most engaged with pushing countries to become more democratic and with a focus on women's equality. President Obama ruled out of the White House, more than many other recent Admins.
The best parts of this book are borne from Rothkopf's experience as a manager and a CEO. His focus on bloated government, overarching and contradictory jurisdictions, and leadership. Leadership matters. It's the little and seemingly mundane governmental tools and relationships that matters more than the lofty media-driven real politick. Relationships matter. Trust matters. We have lost how important this all means. The other best part has to do with the insider interviews and knowledge that Rothkopf was able to include. Rothkopf is able to write with authority do to this closeness.
While reading this disappointing book, I kept thinking I had slipped into some alternate universe where foreign affairs was written like a Vanity Fair insider account of the making of Ishtar or Pulp Fiction. Rothkopf does make clear that this should not be considered a sequel to his mostly excellent history of the National Security Council, “Running the World”. I should have stopped when I had the chance. His first book was a fascinating review of how the NSC has evolved under different administrations. His analysis was worthwhile and his judgment measured; my only reservation was his subtle, but difficult to ignore personal comments that reminded readers that he was part of the foreign policy establishment. In this book there is no attempt at restraint. I’ve read countless books on foreign affairs and national security and seen Harvard Professor Joseph Nye referred to as Joe or Ambassador Nicholas Burns as Nick. There are myriad further examples. The implication is clear: I, David Rothkopf, am intimately connected with the foreign policy elite, and not afraid to name-drop. Frankly, this quickly wears thin.
The breezy page-turning style seems to fly through the Bush and Obama administrations—I mean this as a negative. Writing recent history is admittedly difficult. For most people interested in this book, the events are likely still fresh. His earlier book had the benefit of decades of distillation.
These negatives unfortunately overshadow some interesting points. Namely his analysis that Bush in his second term deserves much more credit than he is currently given and the continuing issues with Obama’s development and execution of foreign policy. The last few chapters feel like a different book altogether. He returns to a more deliberative voice and there is much value to his assessment of the policy process and how it could work.
This is a very clear-eyed analysis of the US's National Security Council apparatus under the Bush & Obama administrations. It takes a very even-handed approach and is critical of both administrations. Rothkopf discusses in considerable detail how Cheney and Rumsfeld hijacked the foreign policy agenda post-9/11 to the detriment of US interests. He offers a much more positive review of the Bush administration's performance once Rumsfeld was jettisoned and Condeleeza Rice moved over to Secretary of State.
He is, at least, equally critical of the Obama administration for allowing the political operative team of Axelrod, Jarrett & Briggs to overly influence the policy objectives of the Obama administration. Just as the Bush team went too far in the use of the military, Rothkopf believes that Obama went too far in his reluctance to use force to any degree and discusses the consequences of that failure.
Above all, the book challenges assumptions such as the government's focus on fighting yesterdays battles rather than being ready to face new challenges. He believes that we have focused for too long on 9/11 and not adjusted our thinking for the changing world that we live in. He is critical of the government for having undervalued technology and science pointing out that our politicians are not at all conversant in the intricacies of either.
Overall this is a wonderfully lucid, objective, insightful analysis of the Bush & Obama years from which there is much to be learned.
David Rothkopf’s latest is a sweeping assessment of the most prominent US national security issues that have plagued the Bush II and Obama administrations, ranging from the dual front war in the Middle East, to the rise of the Chinese economic powerhouse, to the Russian military incursions in eastern European Georgia and Ukraine. The expanse of the book is a significant achievement, though one might also note it being a detractor, as each chapter, while immersive and well researched, takes more of a “scratch the surface” approach.
Still, the book utilizes a plethora of candid interviews between Rothkopf and numerous current and former top-level figures of the White House, CIA, and NSC. These interviews give voice to the policies undertaken by each White House administration and helps humanize an executive branch that few middle class Americans can probably relate to or understand. In all, National Insecurity brings to light most major political and economic challenges facing the United States in 2015 as it prepares for the upcoming election season of its 3rd president in what has become a tumultuous 21st century.
Interesting review of the US's reactions after 9/11 and how the fear of the unknown has precipitated some drastic, read Iraq war, mistakes and greatly increased our expenses in both defense and with intelligence services. The author gives Bush's second term a high grade in diplomatic efforts and in his initial efforts with the impending financial collapse!
He also is very critical of the reticence of Obama in moving militarily as various foreign crisis unfolded. My perception is that President Obama was and is properly cautious in committing any further military solutions. But the author gives some strong logic in his assessment of both Bush and Obama's policies.
This isn't as good as his previous book Running the World but it's still a valuable book on the NSC under the second term of Bush and the first six years of the Obama administration. There's several key mistakes and oversights in the book (AQIM is not "al-Qaida in Mali" and he seems to have missed out on key roles played by some agencies, especially Treasury and, to a lesser extent, NCTC). The book is also faced with challenges his previous book didn't such as lack of declassified information and a more limited historical perspective. However, the book does a good job summarizing recent memoirs and interviews with current and recent senior administration officials.
Interesting primer for an incoming administration. Mr. Rothkopf's final chapter-A Challenge for the Next President, identifies several issues which the new president should consider to when adapting the National Security Council to best support his needs. A president relying solely on his sheer brillance and intellect may be insufficient to successfully manage the most complex organization in the world.
This book was not what I expected, having read Rothkopf in Foreign Policy. It was not as readable or light and appealing. But it was extremely thorough in its analysis of the current problems within the NSC, and the author's access is pretty remarkable. Worth the long slog of a read for those truly interested in our nation's decision making institution, but honestly the last chapter was the only real must-read.