Kicking the Kremlin: Russia's New Dissidents and the Battle to Topple Putin

by Marc Bennetts

As 2011 came to a close, in what was a watershed moment, 100,000 took to Moscow's freezing streets to protest the election victory of United Russia – Vladimir Putin's party – amid widespread allegations of corruption and vote-rigging. A few months later, Pussy Riot hit headlines around the world when they were arrested following their anti-Putin demonstration in a Russian Orthodox cathedral. The vicious battle for Russia's soul continues to this day.

In the first book to take the reader straight to the beating heart of the opposition movement, journalist and long-time Moscow resident Marc Bennetts introduces a new generation of Russian dissidents, united by their hatred of Putin and his bid to silence all political adversaries. We meet a bustling cast of urban youth working to expose the injustices of the regime and a disjointed bunch of dissenters – from 'It Girl' hipsters to 21st-century socialists. Featuring rare interviews with everyone from Pussy Riot and top protest leaders to Kremlin insiders, Bennetts' compelling narrative is an astonishing journey through Russia's new protest movements.

Genres: Russia, Nonfiction, Politics, History

320 pages, Paperback

First published February 1, 2014

About the author

Marc Bennetts is a British journalist based in Moscow, where he has lived for the past fifteen years. He has reported from Russia, Iran, and North Korea for the Guardian, The Times, the Observer and the New York Times, among other publications. He spent eighteen months as a reporter for Russia’s RIA Novosti news agency. His first book, Football Dynamo, examined Russian culture through the country’s national sport.

Reviews

[Carol · Rating 5 out of 5]

I just finished reading I’m Going To Ruin Their Lives: Inside Putin’s War on Russia’s Opposition by Marc Bennetts. Prior to reading it, I wondered why certain events happened in Russia. I wondered why Putin was still president. I wondered what was really going on in Russia.

Of course I knew that he used to be in the KGB but I that was about it. Now, I see that he has painted himself into a corner. He cannot leave office, if he did he must surely know that he will be punished for all the horrible changes that he has made. This is a very different culture with a very different history. Protests may start and no one may show up, it is very dangerous to express your true thoughts. You may be shot in the street, put in a faraway prison or be under house arrest. Some of the reports of the protestors' demise can give you the chills. Putin lies when he wants to manipulate the feelings of people towards his rule. At first he was a welcome break after the embarrassing Yelsin’s public drunkenness. Now how can Russia be free of him?

Now we learn how this country that could had so much lost the promise of freedom of speech. How were the protesters “taken care”? How did Putin cement his hold on Russia? How were elections handled? What happened when Putin decided to put a successor to himself? Did that successor have any power at all or did Putin control his successor too. What do you do when people are thinking of kicking you out of office? All these questions are answered in this book.
This is well document in the back of the book with the interviews that his information came from and all the websites that he referred to. Although the print was small, the report kept reading through several nights.

I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in Russia and/or political systems.

I received a finished copy of this book as a win from LibraryThing from the publishers in exchange for a fair book review. My thoughts and feelings in this review are totally my own.

[Martin Mostek · Rating 4 out of 5]

Updated edition of "Kicking the Kremlin" an account of Russian anti-Putin opposition groups and their struggle with Kremlin since heyday of protest movement six years ago. Well researched and reported book covers various opposition groups and figures and key events from heady days of white ribbon protest movement to growing persecution, Pussy Riot show-trial to Navalnyj attempts to run in election and his various trials on trumped up charges. That is where first edition ended. Updated book significantly got new title--words reportedly said by Putin about those who dared to rain on his parade when he returned for third presidential term to Kremlin. Added chapters cover growing darkness and uneasiness of life of political opposition in Russia since war in eastern Ukraine started and ends with murder of veteran opposition leader Boris Nemtsov and aftermath. Grim but recommended read.

[Dmitry · Rating 3 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Нас ни догнать, ни мечом обуздать нельзя
Ни одна стена нипочём, ведь мы — запрещённая организация
Каждый из нас обречён замечать изъян мироздания и расчёсывать
Мы — запрещённая организация
Братья без тайного рукопожатия, сочиняй устав, стукачок
Ведь мы — запрещённая организация

Во-первых, эта книга очень сильно похожа на книгу Protest in Putin's Russia by Mischa Gabowitsch. Настолько сильно эти две книги схожи, что возникает ощущение, что авторы этих книг использовали один и тот же шаблон. Во-вторых, возможно сходство этих книг объясняется не только одними и теми же выбранными темами, но и тем, что обе книги были написаны журналистами в типичном журналистском стиле. Это вовсе не является минусом, просто нужно учитывать, что эти две книги не являются политологическим анализом российской оппозиции или анализом протестных акций в России за время правления Путина. Обе книги выглядят, как большие развёрнутые статьи написанные журналистами о том, как выглядели, и кто организовывал протестные акции после примерно 2011 года. Для кого-то это может быть даже плюсом т.к. обе книги очень легко читать. Могут ли эти две книги, в таком случаи быть взаимозаменяемыми? Я думаю да. Забавно, кстати, но оба автора особо акцентируются на роли Навального в русском национализме, как будто хотят сказать, что это является отрицательной стороной Навального (отмечу, что Навальный выступал против нелегальной миграции, а не легальной). Но что по сути книги? Суть книги такова: познакомить читателя с тем как выглядели и как проходили основные антиправительственные акции, а также познакомить зарубежного читателя с основными действующими лицами этих самых антиправительственных акций (т.е. с такими людьми как Навальный, Чириковаи, Яшин, Удальцов пр.). Отмечу для россиян, которые в то время слушали и читали «Эхо Москвы» и «Новую газету», что ничего нового, что доселе не было известно и о чём бы не говорили тогда в этих СМИ в книге нет. Поэтому для просвещённой публики нет особого смысла в чтении этой книги (за редким исключением).

Таким редким исключением были дебаты, которые организовал Навальный и которые были закрыты, после того как стали чрезвычайно популярными. Честно сказать, я ничего об этих дебатах не помню, но факт их закрытия, ясно показывает, что в путинской России можно говорить обо всём, но ровно до того момента пока вы не становитесь известным. В этом случаи, Кремль насылает на вас всё, что только можно, начиная с титушек и заканчивая государственными органами, как например налоговой, которая обязательно найдёт нарушения по причине того, что в России закон действует сугубо выборочно.

In early 2006, along with Maria Gaidar, the young, dark-haired daughter of Yeltsin’s reformist prime minister Yegor Gaidar, Navalny began organizing political debates in clubs and cafés in central Moscow. The idea was simple: two people, one well known, one not so, preferably with opposing views, would get on stage and argue. Navalny moderated the debates, roaming the stage as he variously kept the peace and dropped inflammatory remarks. In a Russia where political discussion had been largely expunged from television and parliament, the project was a hit. Soon, there was standing room only. Magazines and newspapers started to write about the debates. Their success, Navalny says, unnerved the Kremlin.

И знаете, что мне вдруг пришло в связи с этим в голову? Путинская власть боится формирования политической культуры, а политические дебаты именно и являются составной часть политической культуры, которой никогда в России не было. Все политические шоу и дебаты в путинской России намеренно превращаются в клоунаду, чтобы создать ощущение, что только Путин говорит о серьёзных вещах (мол, все остальные – клоуны).

Далее. Я не согласен с автором, что товарищ Удальцов играл существенную роль в российской оппозиции. По моим наблюдениям Удальцов не представлял даже левых сторонников, а у демократов и либералов он скорее вызывал изжогу и непонимания, почему такого клоуна приглашают на антипутинские демонстрации, митинги и шествия. Впрочем, автор попытался найти и у Навального и у Удальцова отрицательные стороны, что для объективности может быть и правильно, но по факту, Удальцов не имел никакого влияния в среде оппозиции, а националистическая риторика Навального скорее шла ему в плюс, нежели в минус.

If Navalny is grilled incessantly over his nationalist sympathies, then Udaltsov faces equally intense questioning on his attitudes to Stalin. And not without justification: this is, after all, a man who wore a Stalin T-shirt to his wedding in 2001. More seriously, Udaltsov had also consistently refused to condemn the Soviet dictator’s reign of terror unequivocally.
<…>
For many in the opposition movement, the prospect of Udaltsov coming to power is a terrifying one. (‘Udaltsov has the mentality of a ruthless dictator,’ one activist told me, off the record. ‘I really hope he doesn’t come out on top.’) It was an understandable fear. What was the sense in toppling Putin only to replace him with a man whose politics were potentially far more authoritarian?
<…>
But would enough people listen to this radical left-winger seeped in the tradition of socialist insurrection? Would hundreds of thousands of bankers, office workers and computer technicians really be willing to follow Udaltsov as he led them into a confrontation with baton-wielding riot police? Somehow, it seemed unlikely.

Автор правилен в своей оценке в отношении Удальцова, только непонятно зачем он столько внимания посвятил ему. Впрочем, возможно других спикеров просто не было или это попытка автора максимально объективно осветить картину тогдашних антипутинских протестов. В конце концов, автор целую главу посвящает Pussy Riot, которые имели ещё более слабую поддержку в оппозиционной среде, нежели Удальцов.

Трудно сказать насколько автор понял своих героев, о которых он пишет. К примеру, довольно странно звучат следующие слова автора.

Navalny was being increasingly compared with Yeltsin. Not, of course, with the President Yeltsin whose drunken antics had so embarrassed Russians in the 1990s, but with the younger, healthier Yeltsin, who had inspired millions in the final years of the Soviet Union. Both men were tall, fiery speakers with the common touch: like Navalny, Yeltsin had also battled against high-level corruption.

Не нужно обладать большими знаниями о постсоветской России, чтобы понимать, что Навальный ничем не походит на Ельцина, более того Навальный являлся антитезой Ельцину ибо никогда не был властью, в отличие от Ельцина, который пол жизни был советским чиновником. В этом смысле, писать такую чушь может лишь очень далёкий от России человек. В связи с этим возникает вопрос, что понял автор о современной России и хотел ли он вообще понять или просто записывал свои разговоры с оппозиционерами из России и цитировал зарубежные СМИ.

Или вот ещё один момент, который показывает, что автор так и не понял тот предмет, о котором пишет.

Public opinion surveys by the independent Moscow-based Levada Centre pollster indicated that the majority of Russians believed the Kremlin’s denials. ‘They are all volunteers,’ an elderly woman told me in central Moscow in late 2014, as we both watched a small group of opposition activists protest the war. ‘They’ve just gone to protect relatives from the fascists. Wouldn’t you do the same in their shoes?’

Всерьёз верить в то, что социологические опросы в авторитарной стране отражают действительность, довольно наивно. Это всё равно, что задать похожий вопрос советским гражданам по поводу того, что они думают о вводе войск в Чехословакию (1968) и в Венгрию (1956). Конечно, в России были люди, искренне верящие в пропаганду, как например одна девушка с которой я практиковал английск��й, которая имея высшее образование и зная два иностранных языка (английский и японский) верила в то, что говорил телевизор. Однако даже в этом случаи трудно понять, где реальное мнение человека, а где, как пел Nautilus Pompilius, «слова для улицы». В любом случаи, я бы с большим скепсисом относился бы к любым социологическим опросам проведённой в любой авторитарной или даже диктаторской стране (напомню, что открытые репрессии начались с подавления антипутинских выступления 2011-2012).

В заключении я хотел бы отметить тот эффект который производит книга. Книга показывает все перечисленные автором антипутинские мероприятия, как сугубо ничтожные, несерьёзные, и в каком-то смысле игрушечные, в сравнении с тем против кого они направлены. В этом смысле действительно возникают вопросы об их актуальности и правильном выборе стратегии. В какой-то момент мне показалось, что важным были не эти антипутинские митинги, а создание того что делал Ленин – идеологии и организации. Много лет спустя Навальный придёт к этой идеи создания организации и именно с этим и будет бороться путинская власть. Так что, возможно в те далёкие годы нужно было не столько организовывать митинги, а создавать партию, ячейки, вводить членские взносы (ибо политическая сила без финансирования не является серьёзным соперником) и идти по пути польской Солидарности и/или партии большевиков.

First, this book is very similar to Protest in Putin's Russia by Mischa Gabowitsch. So much are these two books similar that one gets the feeling that the authors of these books used the same template. Second, perhaps the similarity of these books is not only due to the same chosen topics but also because both books were written by journalists in a typical journalistic style. This is not a disadvantage at all; it is just that these two books are not a political science analysis of the Russian opposition or an analysis of the protests in Russia during Putin's rule. Both books look like large, detailed articles written by journalists about what the protests looked like and who organized them after about 2011. For some, this may even be a plus, as both books are very easy to read. Can these two books, in this case, be interchangeable? I think so. It's funny, by the way, but both authors emphasize Navalny's role in Russian nationalism as if they want to say that this is the negative side of Navalny (I should note that Navalny was against illegal migration, not legal migration). But what is the essence of the book? The essence of the book is as follows: to familiarize the reader with what the main anti-government actions looked like and how they took place, as well as to familiarize the foreign reader with the main actors of these very anti-government actions (i.e., people like Navalny, Chirikovai, Yashin, Udaltsov, etc.). For Russians who at that time listened to and read Ekho Moskvy and Novaya Gazeta, I would like to point out that there is nothing new in the book that was not known before and that was not talked about in these media at that time. Therefore, for the enlightened public, there is little point in reading this book (with a few exceptions).

One rare exception was the debate organized by Navalny, which was shut down after it became popular. To be honest, I don't remember anything about these debates, but the fact that they were shut down shows that in Putin's Russia, you can talk about anything, but only until you become famous. In this case, the Kremlin sends everything it can at you, starting with titushki and ending with state authorities, such as the tax authorities, which are bound to find violations due to the fact that in Russia the law is strictly selective.

In early 2006, along with Maria Gaidar, the young, dark-haired daughter of Yeltsin’s reformist prime minister Yegor Gaidar, Navalny began organizing political debates in clubs and cafés in central Moscow. The idea was simple: two people, one well known, one not so, preferably with opposing views, would get on stage and argue. Navalny moderated the debates, roaming the stage as he variously kept the peace and dropped inflammatory remarks. In a Russia where political discussion had been largely expunged from television and parliament, the project was a hit. Soon, there was standing room only. Magazines and newspapers started to write about the debates. Their success, Navalny says, unnerved the Kremlin.

And you know what suddenly occurred to me? Putin's government is afraid of creating a political culture, and political debates are an integral part of a political culture that has never existed in Russia. All political shows and debates in Putin's Russia are deliberately turned into clowning to create the impression that only Putin is talking about serious things (everyone else is a clown).

Further. I do not agree with the author that comrade Udaltsov played a significant role in the Russian opposition. According to my observations, Udaltsov did not even represent leftist supporters, and among democrats and liberals, he rather caused heartburn and incomprehension as to why such a clown was invited to anti-Putin demonstrations, rallies, and marches. However, the author tried to find negative aspects of both Navalny and Udaltsov, which may be correct for objectivity, but, in fact, Udaltsov had no influence among the opposition, and Navalny's nationalistic rhetoric was more to his advantage than to his disadvantage.

If Navalny is grilled incessantly over his nationalist sympathies, then Udaltsov faces equally intense questioning on his attitudes to Stalin. And not without justification: this is, after all, a man who wore a Stalin T-shirt to his wedding in 2001. More seriously, Udaltsov had also consistently refused to condemn the Soviet dictator’s reign of terror unequivocally.
<…>
For many in the opposition movement, the prospect of Udaltsov coming to power is a terrifying one. (‘Udaltsov has the mentality of a ruthless dictator,’ one activist told me, off the record. ‘I really hope he doesn’t come out on top.’) It was an understandable fear. What was the sense in toppling Putin only to replace him with a man whose politics were potentially far more authoritarian?
<…>
But would enough people listen to this radical left-winger seeped in the tradition of socialist insurrection? Would hundreds of thousands of bankers, office workers and computer technicians really be willing to follow Udaltsov as he led them into a confrontation with baton-wielding riot police? Somehow, it seemed unlikely.

The author is correct in his assessment of Udaltsov, but it is not clear why he devoted so much attention to him. However, perhaps there were simply no other speakers or it is the author's attempt to cover the picture of the anti-Putin protests of that time as objectively as possible. After all, the author devotes an entire chapter to Pussy Riot, who had even weaker support in the opposition than Udaltsov.

It is difficult to say how much the author understood the characters he was writing about. For example, the following words of the author sound rather strange.

Navalny was being increasingly compared with Yeltsin. Not, of course, with the President Yeltsin whose drunken antics had so embarrassed Russians in the 1990s, but with the younger, healthier Yeltsin, who had inspired millions in the final years of the Soviet Union. Both men were tall, fiery speakers with the common touch: like Navalny, Yeltsin had also battled against high-level corruption.

You don't need a great knowledge of post-Soviet Russia to realize that Navalny is nothing like Yeltsin. Moreover, Navalny was the antithesis of Yeltsin because he was never in power, unlike Yeltsin, who was a Soviet official for half his life. In this sense, only a very distant person from Russia can write such nonsense. This raises the question of what the author understood about modern Russia and whether he wanted to understand it at all, or whether he simply recorded his conversations with oppositionists from Russia and quoted foreign media.

Here is another point that shows that the author never understood the subject he was writing about.

Public opinion surveys by the independent Moscow-based Levada Centre pollster indicated that the majority of Russians believed the Kremlin’s denials. ‘They are all volunteers,’ an elderly woman told me in central Moscow in late 2014, as we both watched a small group of opposition activists protest the war. ‘They’ve just gone to protect relatives from the fascists. Wouldn’t you do the same in their shoes?’

It is rather naive to seriously believe that opinion polls in an authoritarian country reflect reality. It would be like asking Soviet citizens the same question about what they thought about the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia (1968) and Hungary (1956). Of course, there were people in Russia who sincerely believed in propaganda, such as one girl with whom I practiced English, who had a higher education (and knew two foreign languages - English and Japanese), and who believed in what the TV was saying. However, even in this case, it is difficult to understand where the real opinion of a person is and where, as Nautilus Pompilius sang, “words for the street”. In any case, I would be very skeptical of any sociological polls conducted in any authoritarian or even dictatorial country (recall that open repression began with the suppression of anti-Putin speeches 2011-2012).

In conclusion, I would like to note the effect of the book. The book shows all the anti-Putin activities listed by the author as purely insignificant, frivolous, and, in a sense toy-like in comparison with the people they are directed against. In this sense, questions do arise about their relevance and the right choice of strategy. At some point, it seemed to me that what was important was not these anti-Putin rallies but the creation of what Lenin did - ideology and organization. Many years later, Navalny came up with the idea of creating an organization, and that's what Putin's government would fight against. So, perhaps in those distant years, it was necessary not so much to organize rallies but to create a party and cells, introduce membership fees (for a political force without funding is not a serious contender), and go the way of Polish Solidarity and/or the Bolshevik Party.

[Joseph Busa · Rating 3 out of 5]

Liked this book but couldn't help thinking that Bennetts' portrays the West as a "grass is greener" political society. Also, as an over 50's man, several times I was left thinking that Mr Bennetts has little interest in the political views of my generation. There were too many references to "grey haired so and so's" who seem to have views that have as much relevance to modern political thought, as Noah's ark has to world history. But then, as a grey haired so and so, I suppose that I'm bound to think that.

[Jes · Rating 5 out of 5]

A well written and thorough look at the struggles faced by political opposition and protesters in Putin's Russia. The book is an engaging and engrossing overview of the social and political climate imposed by Putin and his allies. While many will be familiar with the larger events, the full picture painted once the finer details are filled in exposes a worrying state of corruption in a country on the brink of dictatorship.

[VladimirPutain · Rating 1 out of 5]

How dare you write such rubbish about our great country

[Jordan Balid · Rating 2 out of 5]

it's a good book i got a basic idea of what's going on with a russia..and people are actually having disagreements with putin..his rise to power.
how the protest has been silenced by kremlin.
judiciary has been questionable, rigged elections..
pussy riots and arresting activists and people who are opposing..and the whole idea of Orange revolution...

clearly a thought breaking book to read..

[Nick · Rating 2 out of 5]

It tries to portray nuance but stumbles into ineffectual writing. The author needs to put their ego in check somewhat. Like many Western authors dealing with Eastern European issues, the patronising style gets old fast.

[Elexndra · Rating 4 out of 5]

borrowed from Library...... very interesting read

[Gretchen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Crazy interesting

[Leah · Rating 2 out of 5]

On one hand, this book provides a decent narrative of (mostly) Moscow-centered protests and some of the opposition leaders from Putin's ascent to power through 2013. For those unfamiliar with the events and key actors, it is a decent overview.

However, I find it hard to trust some assertions and judgements by the author given that the book contains misleading information about some of the leaders Bennetts profiles. For example, Evgenia Chirikova is introduced in a rather sexist manner. She is first described as a "young mother," and "a petite blonde with a fondness for tank tops," who moved to Khimki with her "businessman husband." Nowhere in the book, where Bennetts continuously refers to her as "a young mother" (which was true), does the author allow that Chirikova is a trained engineer who ran a company with said "businessman husband."

Bennetts is also really critical of many of the leaders he profiles, which is sometimes warranted and other times not. Of course, all people are flawed, but he seems unable to describe many of the characters as dynamic people who learn and change over time. Many of them may not have had as much access to information or started out as politically-savvy or worldly as others, but many of these same people have evolved and learned through their work and have abandoned previous, commonly-held yet harmful beliefs. Discussion of the progression of these leaders would have been fascinating and would have allowed not only for a more nuanced, but more realistic description. Instead, it is lacking.

Hand in hand with the criticism Bennetts offers, which, again is not always unwarranted, is a sense of the author's ego. He seems to take pleasure in his narration of conversations where he, as narrator, comments to the reader that the person he is talking to is overstating themselves, when it seems pretty clear the person would know that and is rather speaking in hyperbole. I find this rather unnecessary, especially when he is profiling people who, though imperfect, are having a significant impact and are quite courageous and relatively free-thinking. Petty cut-downs aren't really amusing.

As someone who is familiar with Russia's protest movement, I was bothered by the tone and some of the misleading content in this book. That said, it provides a fair overview for those who are unfamiliar. I would be eager, however, to see more work on the same topic by others.

[Emily Matta · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kicking the Kremlin is a study of Russia’s contemporary political opposition to President Putin and spans from the 1990s to 2014. Bennetts begins with President Vladimir Putin’s unlikely rise from obscure KGB officer to Prime Minister under Boris Yeltsin, and quickly to President of the Russian Federation. He also details Putin’s consolidation of power and the nationalization of private media. When he reached the term limit, Dmitri Medvedev became president and Putin became the prime minister, continuing to wield excessive power. Medvedev extended the presidential term from four years to six years and supported Putin for president once again after his own term was up. The Russian constitution does not explicitly state that a candidate is barred from running again as long as the terms are not consecutive. Putin’s reelection, through blatantly fraudulent elections spurred protests and a marked rise in political opposition movements.

Bennetts argues that, although political opposition exists, they are too divided to significantly influence the political sphere. Considerable government-instituted constraints also exist that prevent groups from organizing, meeting, protesting, and registering as political parties. State-controlled media demonizes opposition groups and denies alternate candidates time on the television. It has also limited dissidents’ opportunity to make their views known. Books, articles, and blogs have become the primary tools for which dissidents can gain a following. Although still regulated, the internet and written sources are the only viable option for spreading news or organizing protests.

Bennetts also poses a thought-provoking question. Who might take Putin’s place? Even if a political oppositionist group did manage to take power, there is a possibility that he/she could be as or possibly more extreme than Putin. Some of the most prominent opposition groups are extremist in their own rights.

[Emily · Rating 4 out of 5]

What a wonderful and relevant book! My husband is Polish so, naturally, he and his family have nothing nice to say about Russia but I had no idea how bad the conditions still are there. I was particularly struck by the complete lack of justice and accountability within the criminal "justice" system.

The author is a journalist and the writing is well-organized and very readable. I especially appreciate the care that he took to continue to remind the readers about the role of the important players throughout the book. It can be easy to lose track with so many foreign names but he was diligent about adding just a few distinctive words when reintroducing someone. He also did not pull any punches. It is clear that the author does not harbor kind feelings toward Putin, but he nevertheless gave a critical portrayal of the dissidents and opposition movement. He explained what they bring to the table while also providing cautionary details that indicate there is still no good answer to the question, "If not Putin, who?"

Oleg Kashin, a protest figure and journalist, is quoted at the end with, "Everything will be exactly the same as it is now and was a year ago and hundred years ago. And, if there is a difference between "then" and "now" and "tomorrow", then it is purely cosmetic." There doesn't seem to be much hope for revolutionary change in Russia but I am grateful for having read this book that I now have context as I watch them hopefully take steps in the right direction.

Disclaimer: I received this book for free in a GoodReads giveaway. I was not compensated for this review and all opinions are my own.

[Shannon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really well written, thorough without being over-done.

[Gergely · Rating 4 out of 5]

A grippingly written and well researched analysis of the increasingly marginalized and meagre opposition that exists in Putin's Russia - not all of it socially liberal and democratic - and how his rule has turned overtly authoritarian since especially his re-election as President in 2012. It's hard to leave this book without ominous expectations for the future.

Although he touches upon it, I would have been interested to hear more from the author on how he thinks Putin and the people around him see themselves and their mission, but this is a very readable insight and anyone interested in Russia’s future should read this book.

[Allen · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you have not been keeping close watch on Russian politics for the past several years, this book will catch you up to the end of 2015. It is a relatively quick read and does a good job of the details.

I only noticed a couple of errors related to Ukraine, one being that the Crimeans voted overwhelmingly to join Russia, which is Russian propaganda and the other that implies Right Sector was responsible for the deaths of pro-Russian protesters in Odessa in spring of 2014, which is also Russian propaganda.

[victor harris · Rating 4 out of 5]

Based on interviews with many of the participants of protest groups in the new Russia, it exposes Putin and his cronies for the totalitarian monsters they really are. Putin controls the media and works hand in hand with the Orthodox Church to manipulate the presentation of events in Russia and to crush dissent; often with draconian Stalin-style tactics.

[Richard · Rating 5 out of 5]

A brilliant, unflinching view into Putin's corrupt and vicious battle against the Russian opposition, the one thing that he rightfully believes could make his reign of terror go the way of Saddam Hussein and Moamar Khadaffi.

[Matthew · Rating 5 out of 5]

A phenomenal read if you want to understand why Vladimir Putin rose to power, how he has stayed there for so long, and who the main characters opposing him are.

[Matti Paasio · Rating 5 out of 5]

"It's a very difficult moment to pinpoint.... But when the emotional connection with the people is gone, it's gone forever."

[Nina Kossman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Highly recommended for anyone interested in understanding the role of Putin in current Russian politics.

[GreyAtlas · Rating 3 out of 5]

Didn't add anything new to the conversation but not a terrible read.

[Jim · Rating 4 out of 5]

Wasn't really crazy about the writing style, but really learned a lot.