En su ensayo Has de cambiar tu vida Peter Sloterdijk presentaba el ejercicio como dimensión determinante de la condición humana. En este nuevo libro considera desde esa nueva perspectiva tanto la ciencia como la práctica del científico.
Peter Sloterdijk entiende la ciencia como modo y manera de dar vida al propio científico mediante sistemas de ejercicio generadores de ciencia. Tal proceder se instaura con los informes de Platón sobre su maestro ateniense: Sócrates sufría por sostener un fuerte monólogo interior consigo mismo, que le obligaba a veces a detenerse, simplemente, en algún sitio. La Academia originaria fue un centro de ejercicio en el que los seres humanos aprendían técnicas para apartarse del mundo. Incluso las universidades de hoy han hecho alguna aportación en ese ámbito. También ellas están dentro de la tradición de esos «albergues de ausencias» platónicos; también ellas establecen el nexo entre la condición del pensar y la localización del pensar, nexo que posibilita antes que nada el ejercicio de la ciencia.
Peter Sloterdijk is a German philosopher, cultural theorist, television host and columnist. He is a professor of philosophy and media theory at the University of Art and Design Karlsruhe.
Peter Sloterdijk studied philosophy, Germanistics and history at the University of Munich. In 1975 he received his Ph.D. from the University of Hamburg. Since 1980 he has published many philosophical works, including the Critique of Cynical Reason. In 2001 he was named president of the State Academy of Design, part of the Center for Art and Media in Karlsruhe. In 2002 he began to co-host Das Philosophische Quartett, a show on the German ZDF television channel devoted to discussing key issues affecting present-day society.
The Kritik der Zynischen Vernunft (Critique of Cynical Reason), published by Suhrkamp in 1983, became the best-selling philosophical book in the German language since the Second World War and launched Sloterdijk's career as an author.
The trilogy Spheres is the philosopher's magnum opus. The first volume was published in 1998, the second in 1999, and the last in 2004.
In the Foreword, Creston Davis says Sloterdijk is "so controversial" and "has the most provocative and daring temperament of theorists writing in the world today". Maybe for Europe, I guess. I'll try to figure it out. But, true, his "Critique of Cynical Reason" was a best seller.
The book is a good, funny at times, ironic and concise introduction to the Western Philosophy's main authors; some still consider it [Western Philosophy] a “history of Plato’s footnotes”. A book written in a very peculiar way.
As for the "most daring and provocative of theorists", I'll leave that to Slavoj Žižek, whose outreach is wider than Sloterdijk's, especially in the USA.
Interesting perspective into the single unifying thread in western thinking since the Greeks. The bios theoretikos is a theoretical life available only to those individuals willing to forego life, and to exist in a type of suspended animation for the sake of approaching objectivity in thought as closely as possible. This type of epoche, (the term is borrowwed from Husserl) has been the defining characteristic in academia since the loss of political power faced by the individual since Plato's time. The reversal, in the spirit of the romantic loser, was to set forth a space apart, a sort of pure space for thought, untainted by the empirical content of practical involvement in the outside world. The crux is that epoche itself has always been a kind of practice which was undertaken to prepare an individual for theoretical life. This so-called angel of theory has been attacked by 10 figures in the last 200 years, and seems to finally have been assassinated. The reason: Subjectivist philosophies of position. The conclusion, is that we need a critique of embedded reason to see whether current philosophical trends in avowing thrownness, and finitude with respect to position have the final say.
- author recontextualizes Cicero's contemplative attitude as a reaction to his forced retirement from Republican politics and an attempt to transplant Greek liberal philosophy onto Roman soil. This is primarily useful because I had been influenced by Cicero's contemplative idealism in the past, but now I see it as a way of coping with political and professional failure.
- the practical aspects of contemplative insight aren't really addressed. The author prefers to focus on modern epistemic challenges to the contemplative life. I think an inclusion of modern zen and pragmatic Buddhist praxes, and neurological studies based on that, would greatly strengthen claims for the value of contemplation, and also show a way to integrate them with the active life. So I don't agree with his conclusion that we need to respond to modern epistemic undermining of the contemplative life. We can simply add the eastern modes of contemplation instead.
- the notion of purity/epoche/scepticism in Husserl is simply equanimity in practice. He labels it coolness. He says it's like a customer who strolls around a market not buying into anything. But by the end of his life Husserl is advocating for a grounded, earthed, embedded kind of wisdom and reason. The practice of wisdom must be grounded in the real world but not attached to contingent circumstances, then.
Written in a heady and sometimes manic and rapid intellectual way, the author speaks as if highly caffeinated. It's entertaining and a little impractical.
I was expecting, due to translation, a book on wisdom practice rather than theory of contemplation. But it was worth a read for its introduction to Husserl and critique of Cicero.
The title is at the same time accurate and misleading, since the original tends more to the eschatological mystique, and while I was intrigued by the hint of critical approach to the so-called "myth of genius", which, maybe, is the crux of Sloterdijk's endeavor to shatter the ivory towers of philosophy and scientific reflexivity in general, I found the text, originally a lecture, just as esoteric (meaning self-centered) and removed from the praxis of thought as the isolationist reality it attacks.
Pensadores da tradição ocidental faziam filosofia com um distanciamento da vida cotidiana. Em sua meditação interior, tal como Sócrates, se voltavam a questões além deste mundo. Sloterdijk explora a morte aparente, essa ausência mundana no pensar dos filósofos da tradição, assim como seu declínio, a morte do pensar que renuncia a vida cotidiana, que acarretou na perda da neutralidade na produção de conhecimento.
One of the most distracted books I have ever read 😅 He hypes it up like he's going to talk about philosophy as a practice like the way that athletes and musicians have to practice, but he fully doesn't 😅 he talks about how he's going to discuss the conditions to be reached which enable the ability to practice philosophy, but he only names one -- Husserl's 'epoché' 😅 But ultimately I still got a TON out of this book and I really liked it.
Another fascinating idea and a direct continuation of his You Must Change your Life. There, besides describing a different anthropology in which people are defined not by their thoughts and beliefs but by their practices and habits, he also focused on people who live extraordinary lives. Traditionally, this is something that ends up in a complete re-orientation through which the old self is killed for a new one to be reborn, it is not something mild and partial. In this book he focuses on one specific discipline, that of the theoretician or the philosopher. His point will be that these practices naturally involve a distancing from ordinary life, which, at least in the past, was extreme and approached death itself. It required bracketing your own self, not taking positions and living in suspended animation. We can see even now that at least in the scientific self-image (but not in philosophy of science) the researcher is supposed to observe the phenomena and remove personal experiences or opinions from the study, leaving the objects to speak for themselves. It is a sort of temporary death of the thinker for something else to emerge. The difference however is that in most cases this does not really require any preparation or change from the subject, it is happening while simultaneously living an ordinary boring life. The techniques are there but the extreme form of life they produced is not. In one respect this is good because as he mentioned in the other book the impulse for this flirt with death is a metaphysical chimera or -in this book- a loser romanticism that made these extraordinary thinkers withdraw from life. Also, the idea of the wise neutral observer who achieves a privileged vantage point is not accepted anymore. But on the other hand, something was lost. These people felt a heroic passion and lived for what they did. Now we only get glimpses of that. His hope is that “that there must be a third option between death and the common lot.”
But that was the concise version of course, so... Sloterdijk starts with two examples, one of Husserl’s ‘epoch’ which is complicated but is meant to be something close to this temporary killing of the self, described quite enthusiastically and romantically in some of his letters, along with his later confession that without his philosophy he would have trouble living in this world, and Socrates who was known to stay in a place still for hours absorbed by thoughts, taken over by them. He gave the impression that he was transferred in another place where thoughts had their own structure, one necessarily following another and himself observing them, which perhaps inspired Plato to create the academy, a place where this transfer to the other world could be done in peace.
The next question is how this practice came to be. Sloterdjik sees it as a genealogy that can be potentially exposed as illegitimate but I don’t think that matters. He offers four explanations, probably meant to work together but only one is examined in detail. One potential reason is that the written word creates a distance from experience and reading it creates a second distance too that reinforces the observer aspect. The second is that forcing energetic children to sit down and listen resembles the later life of the scholar who is absolved from practical, energetic vocations, staying sedentary their whole life and observing. The third one is that some people are just born this way. In the humors theory the melancholic ones are partial to a pervasive low-level alienation and exhibit a sadness without reason, as if something important is missing from this world. Aristotle even said that all brilliant men had been melancholic.
But the more interesting one, though perhaps a bit exaggerated, is that it started with Plato due to the political situation in Athens. Plato only experienced a degraded form of democracy under warfare where demagogues persuaded the masses towards self destruction. The loss of politics led him to move to a different field where winning is possible, that of wisdom (it's difficult to not think of Nietzsche's priests here). The polis no longer inspired people to achieve posterity by dying for her but a similar immortality can be achieved by connecting to something eternal. Socrates asked to thank Asclepius which is taken as gratitude for curing him from the greatest disease, life itself, since his soul is finally taken to the other place he had already spent so much time already. What Plato created can be taken as a loser Romanticism that assumes a privileged distant status and it is naturally anti-democratic (or maybe better, elitistic). To abandon this privileged, outsider, observer status is to kill philosophy itself.
It is an exotic reading but in combination with temperament, the idea that some people are attracted to finding consolation in theory because the active life is too difficult seems plausible. In any case, Sloterdjik continues by tracing how the theoretical mindset transformed through history. The first stop is Cicero who argues in favor of philosophy, again during times of change, when Julius Caesar dissolved the republic, similarly to Plato. During Christianity, the theoretician attributes were absorbed by the saint. In Renaissance, there is a fascinating myth by Giordano Bruno who tells us about Actaeon observing Diana who turns him into a deer for its hounds to devour him. This demonstrates how wisdom always has something self-destructive; it turns one to what they see, killing the old self in the process and becoming rare and heroic. The dogs are his thoughts. The transformation of the self through the activity of thinking is still here but it also shows a change from meditative contemplation to activity and specifically suffering for the sake of an idea. A more extreme example of this is Fichte for which the philosopher is already dead because he only lives through the Idea that guides him, he has no will or life of his own. But clearly he is active, he is not just contemplative as before, he is more alive than any other person. It is a sort of fundamentalism, fighting for an idea. And finally, Paul Valery who created Teste, a man who demonstrates the primacy of theory by having no character, no opinions, personal fulfillment aims, always living in the realm of the possible, pure potentiality without commitment to anything.
The common themes are, one, the radical secession a new form of life that is a move to the realm of the improbable, two, the existence of an inner observer under various names (from a part of psyche in Plato to the transcendental subject) who can see clearly because of its distance and, three, an exchange of one's insignificant subjectivity for something greater. But as I mentioned these are very rare now. We do get some glimpses but they are usually from poets. The institutionalization of scholarship risks making our relationship with the world artificial. Finally, I mentioned that the privileged observer is no longer accepted, here is his list of his ten ‘killers’:
The first were the young Hegelians and Marx who went for democracy, practical life, politics and mobilization instead of contemplation. The second, Nietzsche with perspectivism and lack of transcendence. The third, Lukacs who viewed academics with their pacifism and neutrality as the establishment that should be renounced for Marxism. Fourth, is Heidegger who first attacked the contemplative rationality, only returning to it later. Five, is the nuclear attacks which showed that physics are not neutral and have consequences and responsibility. Six, existentialism which infected contemplative reason with militant attitudes. Seven, is sociology of sciences showing how academic success just adheres to established norms. Kuhn and Foucault also belong here with their paradigms and discourses. Eight, feminism showing cultural effects again. Nine, neurosciences showing that apathy and distinctions between logic and reason don't hold. Ten, Latour saying that experts need to be seen not as representing external truths but as part of politics, just continued with different means.
Peter Sloterdijk, quien en la condición de filósofo alemán, y llevando sobre sus lomos como dice llevar los pronunciamientos de Nietzsche, ha dado un giro y una sacudida en el mundo de la filosofía. Bien es conocido por texto como Tienes que cambiar tu vida, donde pone de manifiesto la práctica como condición humana. Crítica de la razón cínica como bien lo plantea: “el cinismo en el proceso real y relativamente general de lo social y espiritual, de tal manera que la esencia cínica o química no viene de los individuos -esto sería una travesura psicologista-, sino que se ofrece a los individuos, crece en ellos y se desarrolla a través de ellos, es decir, con su fuerza, por encima de ellos.“ “El hombre actual tiene a su alcance la máxima «saber es poder» pero no sabe cómo darle utilidad”. Excelente textos.
Muerte aparente en el pensar de Sloterdijk, quien probablemente es uno de los filósofos alemanes más controvertido de la actualidad, al poner de manifiesto sus interpretaciones idiosincrásicas, a veces algo arriesgadas, de los fenómenos contemporáneas no solo en la tradición filosófica para repensarla, sino también en la continuidad de los ritos y parábolas, observa lo cambiante de la ciencia y las acciones del científico desde una nueva perspectiva sobre el pensamiento y la actuación de los humanos, propone al científico a volver a la vida consciente de la práctica, a ese campo accesible y a las acciones del científico como ejemplo. Esto se ha perdido en gran manera en la ciencia. En el libro apuesta a cuatro consideraciones: Primero, La ciencia como antropotécnica ejercitante en general, perfilando objetiva e históricamente el tema. Teniendo como figuras a Edmund Husserl y a Sócrates. Segundo, El múltiple condicionamiento del ser humano de epojé. Tercero, La configuración o autogeneración del ser humano desinteresado “sólo los muertos gozan del privilegio de contemplar «autópticamente», algo así como cara a cara, las verdades del más allá. ” Cuarto, La ambivalencia inherente a la cultura racionalista moderna desde que se desconecto de su larga fase de impulso metafísico.
En una ocasión, siendo entrevistado, se le hizo la pregunta ¿Hemos Pedido la capacidad de pensar? Y su respuesta fue: No es capacidad como tal. Pero no se dan las circunstancias vitales que nos permiten retirarnos y tomar distancia. Para Husserl y su fenomenología había que salir del tiempo impetuoso de la vida, el dispositivo más elemental era siempre dar un paso atrás. Ese acto te permite convertirte en observador. Sin una cierta distancia, sin una cierta desimplicación la actitud teórica es imposible. La vida actual no invita a pensar.
This was a bit of a slog, a lot of the language seems to be overly complex and could have been simplified. In essence: read more, think more, take what you need, discard what you don't and think carefully before you act.