The Role Ethics of Stoicism in Ordinary Life offers an original interpretation of Epictetus’s ethics and how he bases his ethics on an appeal to our roles in life. Epictetus believes that every individual is the bearer of many roles from sibling to citizen and that individuals are morally good if they fulfill the obligations associated with these roles. To understand Epictetus’s account of roles, scholars have often mistakenly looked backwards to Cicero’s earlier and more schematic account of roles. However, for Cicero, roles are merely a tool in the service of the virtue of decorum where decorum is one of the four canonical virtues—prudence, justice, greatness of spirit, and decorum. In contrast, Epictetus sets those virtues aside and offers roles as a complete ethical theory that does the work of those canonical virtues.
This book elucidates the unique features of Epictetus’s role based ethics. First, individuals have many roles and these roles are substantial enough that they may conflict. Second, although Epictetus is often taken to have only a sparse theory of appropriate action (or “duty” in older translations), Brian E. Johnson examines the criteria by which appropriate action is measured in order to demonstrate that Epictetus does have an account of appropriate action and that it is grounded in his account of roles. Finally, Epictetus downplays the Stoic ideal of the sage and replaces that figure with role-bound individuals who are supposed to inspire each of us to meet the challenges of our own roles. Instead of looking to sages, who have a perfect knowledge and action that we must imitate, Epictetus’s new ethical heroes are those we do not imitate in terms of knowledge or action, but simply in the way they approach the challenges of their roles.
The analysis found in The Role Ethics of Epictetus will be of great value both to students and scholars of ancient philosophy, ethics and moral philosophy, history, classics, and theology, and to the educated reader who admires Epictetus.
This book was suggested to me by a thoughtful redditor after I complained about the Stoic doctrine of kataleptic knowledge. It took me 11 months and 2 aborted attempts to finish the book and I'm really glad that I finally muscled my way to the end. Early in the book the author explains what his ideas are and how he is going to back it up. Then for 7 chapters, he patiently builds his case. Then in a shockingly huge chapter 8 he explains why Epictetus is different from Cicero (or I should probably say Panaetius); this is where I fell off the turnip truck both times. I have to admit that Johnson's explanation of De Officiis is much more enjoyable than reading Cicero, still it was a slog for me. But once that's done, the final chapter is tiny, fun and exceedingly clear; it wrapped up all of the points that he promised he'd make and puts them into a nice package. So my advice is: 1) take your time at the beginning, everything he says is pretty important, 2) don't be too ashamed if Cicero feels muddy and skim over the boring bits while respecting the (obvious) chapter outline, and 3) savor the final chapter! It's worth it!
A doctoral thesis stretched out into a book. Good thesis, long winded book. I really liked approaching Virtue ethics through the lens of Role ethics, and this book did help my practice.
As a lay person, I did find this interesting, and it gave me a new perspective on reading Epictetus. I certainly did not appreciate how he had used roles as a major part of his ethical treatises. The author also challenged me with some provocative suggestions not just as to the innovations of Epictetus, but that he may have diverged significantly from the traditional stoics by recognizing that you don't have to be a sage (perfect) to do good or practice virtue. However, this may be particular to this philosopher and not the expert consensus. I am not fit to judge this.
This brings up the important point that this is an academic book, with a particular thesis. Much of it is centered around contrasting how Epictetus uses roles differently than Cicero. While this might be interesting, it isn't germane to the practice of stoicism in modernity. It simply adds nuance to reading these classics for a lay person such as myself.