“Fascinating…Williams tells the story of La Guardia and Roosevelt with insight and elegance." —Edward Glaeser, New York Times Book Review
City of Ambition is a brilliant history of the New Deal and its role in the making of modern New York City. The story of a remarkable collaboration between Franklin Roosevelt and Fiorello La Guardia, this is a case study in creative political leadership in the midst of a devastating depression. Roosevelt and La Guardia were an odd couple: patrician president and immigrant mayor, fireside chat and tabloid cartoon, pragmatic Democrat and reform Republican. But together, as leaders of America’s two largest governments in the depths of the Great Depression, they fashioned a route to recovery for the nation and the master plan for a great city.
Roosevelt and his “Brain Trust”—shrewd, energetic advisors such as Harold Ickes and Harry Hopkins—sought to fight the Depression by channeling federal resources through America’s cities and counties. La Guardia had replaced Tammany Hall cronies with policy experts, such as the imperious Robert Moses, who were committed to a strong public sector. The two leaders worked closely together. La Guardia had a direct line of communication with FDR and his staff, often visiting Washington carrying piles of blueprints. Roosevelt relied on the mayor as his link to the nation’s cities and their needs. The combination was potent. La Guardia’s Gotham became a laboratory for New Deal reform. Roosevelt’s New Deal transformed city initiatives into major programs such as the Works Progress Administration, which changed the physical face of the United States. Together they built parks, bridges, and schools; put the unemployed to work; and strengthened the Progressive vision of government as serving the public purpose.
Today everyone knows the FDR Drive as a main route to La Guardia Airport. The intersection of steel and concrete speaks to a pair of dynamic leaders whose collaboration lifted a city and a nation. Here is their story.
Mason B. Williams is a historian specializing in urban politics with degrees from Columbia University and Princeton University. He lives in Charlottesville, Virginia.
Pretty miserable ending- FDR dead, LaGuardia dead (after undergoing a century of humiliation), dreams of the New Deal dead, all progressive electoral power split up due to fighting against communists…. It was nice while it lasted!
This book has been on my bookshelf for a long time and I am really glad I finally read it! I learned so much, more than I expected, not just about FDR and LaGuardia (LGA) but about how federal and local governments transformed via the Great Depression, New Deal, WWII and post-war political forces.
The biggest takeaway from this book, for me, was understanding where the hell “progressive” came from and what it originally meant/represented. Progressivesa at the time fought to break up monopolies on essential goods (like utilities), provide basic healthcare to communities (via community health centers, hospitals, maternity wards, etc.), and use federal investment in local and state public infrastructure and community projects to create public wealth. It was a cross-party movement (LGA - a Republican - and FDR - a Democrat - were both committed to the progressive movement), cross-region movement (LGA worked hard to build city-farm relationships with the Midwest) that almost nearly led to a serious third party (stymied of course by FDR’s re-election strategies). Their ideas, policies, and means of expanding government to in turn raise the bar of what the average constituent expected from local AND federal governments is rad as hell!!! I loved learning about it.
I appreciated that this book didn’t spend a lot of time going through FDR and LGA’s biographies. It was covered in the first chapter and then got to business very quickly.
I also LOVED that it went into detail about Tammany hall, how the government staff went from district club handouts to experts under the “efficiency” model that progressives touted. All of that has big implications for how constituencies realigned during this period, which I found quite fascinating. I loved learning about how housewives and “consumers” were empowered as a constituency under New Deal policies. There’s so much!
I REALLY appreciated the time the author spent going through how the conservative backlash to New Deal programs emerged. The author spent a good chunk of time unraveling the thread between the New Deal turning the government into the employer of last resort and conservatives critiquing into into a voting turnout machine (unlike what progressives critiqued Tammany Hall of, though obviously New Deal jobs were not based of nepotism or corruption….). While conservatives’ arguments weren’t anything I haven’t heard before (preventing government from competing with private industry, reducing the deficit, generally lowering people’s expectations of what the government would guarantee them), contemporary progressives do not spend any time mentioning that backlash. As a result, they don’t spend much time discussing how to proactively avoid or deal with a similar backlash. Those questions are critical and should be proactively considered, because the conservative backlash to the New Deal (in combination with WWII) planted seeds that sprouted into the military industrial complex and the quasi-public and fully private institutions that define much our current politics. Kind of important things if you ask me!
I did not love that it spent so much time on electoral returns though I do understand it was a means to an end. The author does a really effective job of describing how the electorate dramatically realigned from the 1930s into the 1950s, to underline how transformative this time period was.
I didn’t love that the author mentioned socialists and communists only in relation to elections and (in a surface-level regard to) unionism. The author didn’t go into (adequate) detail around each group’s constituencies (and how they evolved over time), the political differences within NY’s local context, and the effect and/or relationships they had on/with LGA and FDR.
All in all I’d recommend the book. I learned much more than I expected to, had a great time underlining and annotating the hell out of this book, and would recommend it to people who were interested in history of the American left, urban ideologies and governance/early iterations of municipalismo, the evolving roles of different levels of governments, and conservative backlash to progressive government programs.
This is a thorough look at the relationship between LaGuardia and FDR and how the New Deal shaped New York. The success of the program was as much a result of these two personalities getting along (one a Republican, one a Democrat) and having the same progressive world view as the fact that NYC (thanks to LaGuardia and Robert Moses among others) had plans in place to take advantage of New Deal programs.
It is a good look at NYC politics in the 20th century as it slowly turned from Tammany to recreate the system (although not always successfully). It also describes the devastating effect of the Depression due in part to the lack of controls on the market and banks.
The reader will see how complicated all the programs were to institute as various factors in the country and city worked for and against one another.
The book continues through the end of World War II as the city and the country prepare for the new world.
from the NYT - 7/21/13 ... Williams quotes Roosevelt saying that La Guardia “comes to Washington and tells me a sad story. The tears run down my cheeks and the tears run down his cheeks and the next thing I know, he has wangled another $50 million out of me.”
I look forward to reading this, having spent years in NYC and having worked for an organization LaGuardia founded in 1941.
This book was heavy on statistics, voting patterns, and financing of programs from the local to federal level. If that’s your thing, I think you’ll find this more entertaining than most such books. It was a bit too much for me, and I occasionally zoned out. It was a splash of cold water in my face after having read the too-snappy “Supreme City” by Donald L. Miller, which covered the 1920s with aplomb (though occasionally veering into too much showbiz or looking at the era from too many vantages), while this soberly lays out what worked and didn’t work during Mayor Jimmy Walker’s reign, and how Fiorello LaGuardia was a left-leaning Republican pragmatist who instituted great change to the city government through efficiency and a sense of purpose.
One of the things that ironically worked well during Tammany Hall’s dominance of Manhattan is that cronies were placed in jobs in which they were under qualified, and therefore got things done because they had little knowledge of regulations and also did not want to expose their own deficiencies.
The Depression came late to Manhattan, hitting the city around 1930-31, while many of the Midwestern industrial cities had entered recessions as early as 1927, and farmers had struggled throughout the decade. One reason is because of New York’s diversified economy. Another reason is that New York’s social services were usually funded by charity or patronage, so if there was a great need to be met, there were fundraisers or advocates who could secure funding. So although workers were falling on hard times in New York, there was a safety net in place, though often only barely mitigated by local government.
LaGuardia believed that the central economic problem behind the Depression was that all of the advances in technology in the previous 50 years had not gone back to workers’ wages, but had further enriched the few titans of industry. Roosevelt only followed this logic so far, admitting that the common people did need to be able to afford to spend money on food and luxuries in order for the economy to keep growing. Roosevelt also believed that there were too many people in the cities, and that there should be programs to help relocate them in rural areas, which would have ended up making them subsistence farmers. LaGuardia saw how the general public was being manipulated by industry when farmers were being subsidized to making surplus crops with declining value, while people in cities were going hungry. LaGuardia had wanted to tackle these issues as a U.S. Representative, but after losing a re-election bid, he found another calling. He quickly developed a reputation as a leader who could affect significant change in a timely manner. He overhauled the city government employment process by replacing the written test with a multiple choice, to leave less discretion to those doing the hiring, lest they install cronies or show any kind of prejudice.
When FDR became president, LaGuardia was able to access funds and implement programs faster than most other mayors because he was already minded toward what needed funding, who needed hiring, and where could they be put to work with the least resistance from local politicians. LaGuardia became instrumental to FDR in this respect, as he was able to promote to other cities or to FDR’s detractors the good that could come from the PWA, CWA, WPA, NRA, etc. LaGuardia, perhaps even more publicity savvy than FDR, often had a direct line to FDR, Harry Hopkins, Harold Ickes, and others in the administration, and he, in turn, could be called upon to promote their programs. He managed to make New York City an unofficial “49th state” with the WPA, succeeding in cutting out the state of New York as the middleman. Many of his projects served to move the public out of the streets, encouraging recreation in parks or dedicated rec centers, and encouraging business to go back indoors as part of street beautification processes. LaGuardia was also mindful of how local implementation of government programs and funding was reinforcing racial inequities in many parts of the country, and he encouraged jobs to be assigned to the people most qualified for them, enabling African Americans to work in their chosen professions rather than resorting to jobs beneath their education such as cab driving.
LaGuardia was one of the last progressive Republicans, and the New Deal reorganized much of the Democratic party’s ideals. In some ways, LaGuardia may have been more of a socialist than FDR, who had to stay mindful of his rural and southern constituency, who could be quite vocal about the spending per capita that often went to cities, particularly with the WPA. Both parties were in such transition that there was frequent talk, circa 1940, of the need for a third party, which may have suited LaGuardia quite well. He often rankled his own party with his cozy relationship with FDR, and other Republicans (Wilkie, Dewey) leapfrogged over him in party leadership as the 1940s began. One reason was that LaGuardia was an early, highly vocal critic of Hitler when many Americans were not yet ready to think seriously about Europe. Another reason is that his coalition of business, progressives, minorities, and unions broke up as the war ended.
LaGuardia never got onto FDR’s Cabinet, but he was named the first director of the Office of Civilian Defense. It was thought that his great organizational powers would be put to excellent use in coordinating the general population for war preparedness, but he became ineffectual as he became fixated on air defense of cities. However, he was almost able to implement a health care system that would have looked very similar to the Affordable Care Act of today. FDR once called Winston Churchill a “British LaGuardia” due to his pugnacious demeanor and organizational mind; when the war ended, LaGuardia too was somewhat discarded by the people he had helped so much, as the political landscape reorganized when the political parties sorted themselves out. However, LaGuardia is now considered among the best mayors in American history, and even at the time he was given a huge sendoff by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, of which he was president for TEN years (the second longest presided 3 years).
Throws you into the deep end of Depression and WWII era New York City politics. Also outlines the possibilities of a particular moment of federal/municipal collaboration in American history, and the abilities of two adept and charismatic (in their distinct ways) leaders to take advantage of circumstances in which the success of one depended on the success of the other (more true of La Guardia needing FDR, though).
From page 244: "Roosevelt and La Guardia did possess outstanding personal qualities ... [but] Roosevelt and La Guardia acquired charisma because events rendered them capable of accomplishing governmental feats that seemed beyond the ability of ordinary mortals."
Many appreciated details on the vacuum left by Tammany's decline – the emergence of new political possibilities and present NYC Democratic voting coalitions –, La Guardia's grand plans for how New Yorkers should interact with government (much larger in scope than anything Zohran campaigned on), and little moments of mutual fondness between him and the president.
This book covers a lot of ground. The author does well to go over everything and to make it understandable, but sometimes there's just too much to talk about. I would find my attention drifting away at times as it went into detail about some politician who was significant during the period, but who isn't all that interesting to read about right now.
It is a bit dense at times, especially when it comes to explaining all the different policies from FDR's and LaGuardia's governments in the 1930s. The detail was useful for understanding what was happening, but it was a lot to digest. Though I think part of the problem was that, like I said, this book covers a lot of ground. You can only fit so much in a 500-page book, and that's hard when you have to cover the 1930s, FRD's presidency, the New Deal, WWII, and the fallout from all those things.
Page 45 -- La Guardia erupts when Governor Nathan Miller declares that NY State ought not help its people. Page 179 -- Only three counties in USA missed out on PWA. Sounds wrong. Page 183 -- PWA built the Chicago Loop. Wrong. A north-south subway. Page 187. -- Cost-cutting after two good housing projects, Williamsburgh and Harlem. Page 236 -- Jewish ownership of businesses in the city. Page 324 -- After Pearl Harbor, La Guardia driving around Washington amplifying "Calm! Calm! Calm." Page 356 -- La Guardia writes a letter of advice to FDR and signs it Con Amore, Fiorello. Page 379 -- decreasing value of urban land. Page 379 -- the inauguration of HIP, the Health Insurance Plan of Greater NY for municipal employees.
Very dry read unfortunately. The author presents a huge amount of economic background to compliment the political landscape of NY city and its place in a growing urban setting in post WW1 United States. Had this book had more of a cultural, social and historical focus this could have been an outstanding book. New York has a staggering amount of diversity, history -post 1900 and development that made he city what it was during the 20th century. The relationship of LaGuardia and FDR was perhaps a better focus for one section of the book only.
Like a lot of the better books about American politics, this is both very boring (on US political history post-WW1, pre-New Deal) and very interesting (on the construction of a welfare state, its truncation by Congress already in the late 30s and its postwar remoulding into state-sponsored suburbanisation, and on the failure on the part of principled liberal-leftists like the book's subject to break the two-party system).
Interesting look at Mayor LaGuardia and President Roosevelt's relationship during the 1930s and '40s, and how it affected New York City viz a viz funding of various New Deal programs.
Mason Williams, a recent history Ph.D., writes a very good political/regional history of the New Deal. The book is clearly a Ph.D. thesis fleshed out to book length - note the big font and double-spaced pages, which make the book seem longer than it really is - but a lot of interesting information and clear writing is packed into this relatively short narrative. (Some theses are more readable than others, I suppose.) Williams has done a good job of taking a narrative that might appeal mainly to political scholars, and writing it in a manner that remains accessible, and even entertaining, for the layman. It's an educational book, but it's also fun to read. In this respect, "City of Ambition" suggests to young historians how they might write a book that is scholarly, yet still has mass-market potential.
Williams compares the political ascents of FDR and Fiorello LaGuardia, and shows how a conservative Democratic president and a progressive Republican mayor forged a major political partnership during the New Deal. Williams provides insight into the former nature of American political parties - loose coalitions, rather than ideologically homogenous blocs - and sheds light on the NYC politics of nearly 100 years ago. One quibble I have is Williams's way of citing his sources. He'll put a footnote at the end of each paragraph; the footnote will then list all the sources for that paragraph. With all the sources lumped together, it's hard to tell which quote came from which document. But this is a scholarly issue, not one that will trouble the general public. Williams has done his research. Read the book and enjoy it.
I feel bad giving this book a negative review, but I found that my attention kept drifting while reading it. It's a little difficulty for me to put why that was into words, but it seems to boil down to the book's main theme getting quite muddled. The opening material, sketches of FDR and La Guardia, is pretty interesting, and I enjoyed the book during this part, but when the author starts running through a detailed history of the politics of New York state in the interwar years, it's just not very gripping. I would suggest the author either needs to take a higher level overview of this material or dive in even deeper and really fill out the history; as it is, the level of detail has the reader see a lot of characters come and go without making much of an impact, and it turns into kind of a muddle. It also stirs the dreaded "Why am I reading this" feeling - I can't help but feel that a lot of the pages in the book could be condensed down to "La Guardia was in the political wilderness for a few years" without following the fruitless narrative thread about what the ultimately meaningless mayors and governors of New York were doing at the time.
For all that, though, I don't think this is really a bad book - it's just one I didn't personally enjoy, and because of that it's a bit tough to recommend; if your local library has it, I'd try the first hundred pages (I made it to 125).
A dry academic text about municipal planning and government's role in improving the economic well being of a city but pivoted with the lively personality of Fiorello LaGuardia and the historical lion that is FDR as their relationship affected Gotham City. Well written but you may just want to read this for school.