In this monumental account and brilliant new analysis of the Napoleonic era in Europe, Frederick W. Kagan, distinguished historian and military policy expert, reveals the complex interaction of continental politics and war that dominated Europe in the early nineteenth century. Using hitherto untapped archival materials from Austria, Prussia, France, and Russia, Kagan tells the story of Napoleon and Europe that is vastly different from previous histories. He presents these crucial years from the perspective of all the major players of Europe, as well as countless others. With clear and lively prose, Kagan deftly guides the reader through the intriguing and complex web of international politics and war. The End of the Old Order is the first in a new and comprehensive series of studies of Napoleon and Europe.
Frederick Kagan's first volume of a projected four volume series covering Napoleon and Europe provides the reader with a detailed and well researched account of the events leading up to and the conclusion of Napoleon's 1805 campaign against the Third Coalition.
I was a bit worried after reading some other readers comments that this book was going to be a anti-Napoleon tirade, glad to say it wasn't as bad as that. In many cases where the audience does not have access to the material used in the research of a book we have to trust the author. It would seem that Mr Kagan has gone to some lengths in researching this book and provides numerous notes to support his research.
I may not have agreed with everything he said about Napoleon and his actions but I didn't feel that he was going over the top to destroy my vision of Napoleon as a great military commander. I sometimes felt he could have given Napoleon more credit then he did but the author always attempted to show why he made certain statements.
The book does provide a in-depth diplomatic, political and military account of the events leading up to the 1805 campaign with a lot more about the Ulm encirclement and combats after the Austrian surrender that I had not read about previously, including the Battle of Durnstein, relevant to me as I had just walked through that very small town on the Danube not aware of the battle fought there between French and Russian forces.
The author's account of the Battle of Austerlitz was detailed and he provided numerous maps to follow the various actions. He also provide notes comparing the numerous sources and issues raised within those sources. The book does not end with the close of fighting on that fateful day but follows the many political and diplomatic going-ons between the various leaders and nations.
Overall I enjoyed this book enough to say that I will be ordering the next volume in the series as soon as its published.
The End of the Old Order qualifies as a unique work of nonfiction. Numerous books on Napoleon have focused on his personality, strategies, and certain defining battles during his reign as France's emperor. But this book both expands and contracts the focus typically brought to bear when reading about Le Petit Caporal.
Author Frederick W. Kagan instead employs a laser like focus on the machinations before, during, and immediately after the War of the Third Coalition, giving equal (and at times more) focus to the generals and diplomats making key decisions during the stretch from 1801 to 1805.
There is little in the way of biography when it comes to Napoleon or any of the End of the Old Order's key figures; it instead unfolds via the day by day decisions made by foreign policy officials and battlefield commanders. While one can expect to read a lot about the French marshals fighting Napoleon's battles-Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, Auguste de Marmont, Michael Ney, Jean Lannes, Louis-Nicola Davout and especially Jean-de Dieu Soult figure prominently-there is little in the way of background information provided on each one of them. Their decisions within the context of European geopolitics as they were in 1801-1805, however, are explained about as thoroughly as possible.
To his credit, author Frederick W. Kagan manages to devote plenty of paragraph space to the role French diplomats like Charles-Maurice Talleyrand and Joachim Murat played during these critical years for Europe. The emphasis on military strategy is well-matched by analysis of the political side of the early nineteenth century equation as.
And yet the obviously unavoidable presence of French leadership does not crowd out discussion of the strategies utilized by Russian generals Pyotr Bagration and Mikhail Kutozov as well as Austrian generals Franz von Weyrother and Prince Johann Liechtenstein. A borderline starring role is given to diplomatic leaders Christian von Haugwitz (Prussia's diplomatic leader doing a delicate balancing act to avoid angering either Napoleon or the allies), Ludwig Cobenzl (Austria), and Adam Czartoryskii (Russia). Each of these military and foreign policy movers and shakers alone could have an entire book devoted to their careers.
The battles during the War of the Third Coalition do not comprise the book's main thrust. In fact, the Battles of Ulm, Durnstein, and Austerlitz are the only three battles looked at in detail. Yet Kagan must have spent quite awhile compiling the details of each, as strategy and movements are drilled down into on a minute level. It would help if readers at least had a map of Europe nearby (especially a two century old European map), as the sections on battles are full of city names and the portions on jockeying for territory are chock full of territories which no longer exist in the same form.
The discord among the allies play a major role in the story. If anything can be zeroed in on as a key finding, this dysfunctionality would be it.
Czar Alexander I's decisions and the motivations behind them are key in figuring out if the coalition can hold together against the Grand Armee's might. The distrust between Prussia, Austria, and Russia (essentially the countries in the coalition actually willing to provide ground troops in the fight against Napoleon) comes about in no small part from the former countries' lack of confidence in Alexander's commitment to standing behind them if the going became tough.
Furthermore, Frederick William's determination to stand behind Prussia's policy of neutrality makes it much more difficult for the allies to gather the forces necessary to achieve victory. On the Austrian side, personal intrigue hampered efforts by Emperor Francis to coordinate strategy with Archduke Charles and Karl Mack. These difficulties-combined with the fact that the polyglot coalition forces (many of whose troops were fighting together for the first time) were facing off against a seasoned Grand Armee with ample camaraderie and sense of common purpose-doomed the allied side. Each detail of these difficulties is laid out with expert craftsmanship in this book.
The failure of the allies to overcome Napoleon was solidified when the Treaties of Pressburg and Schonbrunn brought things to an end for all intents and purposes. This left Napoleon in his strongest position to date and severely weakened the only countries that were able to provide a check on any ambitions he might have held.
This book is an awesome piece of writing. Anyone looking for a fresh take on the Napoleonic Wars that presents a nuanced picture instead of mere fawning over Napoleon's brilliance need not look any further. The End of the Older Order does not take readers' intelligence for granted, and it leaves them with a multi-faceted understanding of how the first major war Napoleon faced as emperor unfolded. It is an imminently recommendable book.
The first work in what will be a four-volume history of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, this book examines the background and outcomes of the 1805 campaign in which Napoleon defeated the Second Coalition. I would have to say that The End of the Old Order is more of a political and diplomatic, rather than military, history, as the various manoeuvrings within and between the various governments take up most of the text and are examined in minute - indeed occasionally excruciating - detail. When combat occurs, it is described operationally, rather than tactically. So while the reader is given an excellent portrait as to why the war takes place, one doesn't really get a handle on how early 19th century wars were fought. Kagan also goes out of his way, when ever he can, to debunk conclusions reached by earlier modern Napoleonic historians, like Chandler and Duffy, which becomes a little tiresome. Nonetheless, the text proceeds in a brisk style, and I feel that Kagan tries his hardest not to take sides and is not overly worshipful of Napoleon's military prowess. The maps are barely adequate; in that sense the book isn't nearly as good as Chandler's magisterial The Campaigns of Napoleon. Still, overall, I feel that I learned a lot from this work about the general strategic situation in Europe in 1801-1805 from all the parties' points of view, and I would read the other volumes when they are published.
Napoleon’s greatest victory came in 1805 when he first outmanovered and forced much of the Austrian army to surrender at Ulm and then a couple of months later triumphed against a combined Russian and Austrian army at Austerlitz. In theory at least Napoleon had been outnumbered; France faced Britain, Austria and Russia and while Britain did not contribute much beyond finances to the continental war Austria and Russia should still have had sufficient force. That it was not to be is usually put down to Napoleon's brilliance. Frederick W. Kagan in ‘The End of the Old Order’ however, although accepting some of this genius points to allied mistakes and the Grand Armee’s greater preparation. Kagan seeks to rebalance the traditional view by putting these events into context and showing where Napoleon made mistakes as well as how he overcame them.
Pros Explaining the diplomacy and background Good at working through commanders options Takes into account most possible factors
Cons Quite academic (as it doesn't have individual accounts to provide colour). Where are the other books!
While the main draw of this book is likely to be as an account of the battle of Austerlitz it should be made clear that this is taken by Kagan as very much the end point of a long process. A process that is longer even than the campaign. The subtitle Napoleon and Europe 1801-1805 is a good indication of where this book’s priorities lie. Of course 1805 gets the lion's share of the attention, however much of the book is actually about the lead up to the campaign; which does not start until page 330 (of 664). This first half of the book is further broken down into the first quarter on the context and diplomacy of the period from 1801 and the second quarter on the goals and the planning. It is this first half that really sets The End of the Old Order apart. Kagan is incisive in his analysis of the diplomatic options and possibilities, the missteps and coups. This brilliantly sets out the wider context in which the campaign was fought which shows why it was fought the way it was.
Once we get to the campaign itself Kagan keeps his eye firmly on the bigger picture in addition to the operational and tactical movements. For example one eye is kept on how Prussia reacted and whether different decisions by its King Frederick Wilhelm could have made a difference. More directly on the armies Kagan includes the impact of logistics, of lines of march, of being able to close off the other side’s options, and the impact of preparation and weariness. Indeed about the only thing that is missed is that little is provided on how the armies fought once they were actually in battle and differences between them.
One of the most interesting aspects is the way Kagan considers the options of both sides commanders. He works through what they knew at important decision points and how and why they reacted the way they did. This is often done in quite a lot of detail - particularly where Kagan is at odds with other accounts he clearly argues his case. In the process he goes in for quite a lot of mythbusting on Napoleon. Particularly on how far in advance Napoleon planned compellingly showing that Napoleon made numerous mistakes but was simply better than the allies at reacting and covering his missteps. He did not plan from one phase of the campaign to the next very well, and often provided unclear instructions to subordinates.
For the most part this is an operational and strategic level of history. And as such it is provided at Napoleon’s eye view, and that of his counterparts leading the opposition either strategically; Tsar Alexander and Emperor Francis, or their leading Generals Mack and Kutuzov. And for much of the book there are no worms’ eye accounts providing the view from the soldiers who fought. That said there are the odd exceptions - mostly once we get to Austerlitz itself when we get quotes from more junior officers such as French Colonel Pozet proclaiming “...if we make one step backward we will be lost. …”(p599). But that is very much the exception, which does make this quite an academic book without quite the human interest many books that bring in soldiers' accounts provide. Taking it up a level also helps to reduce the tension and make it a less compelling narrative than it could be.
Perhaps as a result of this I found the battle of Austerlitz itself to be one of the less compelling parts of the book. The account of the battle is set out well but it feels somewhat clinical. I am also not totally convinced by the way Kagan splits it up into several different engagements. While I agree with him that this is how it worked in practice for narrative purposes it makes it feel a bit disjointed and hard to follow.
As an aside the frontispiece lists 4 volumes of this work of which this is the first. It was published in 2006. Two decades later none of those other volumes have appeared. This is quite a shame as I have read few books on the Napoleonic wars that marry the big picture strategic and diplomatic aspects with the military operations quite so well and having this done for the rest of the wars would no doubt be enlightening.
The End of the Old Order is good on maps which are provided for almost every stage of the campaign as well as for plans. Mostly these are very good. However, there are some of them that are not quite as clear as they could be; particularly for Austerlitz itself where the plan feels very empty and it can be difficult to find features mentioned in the text - again as with the account broken into two makes it difficult to judge the whole.
All in all an excellent account of a well known campaign. As it is most notable for its treatment of the big picture ‘The End of the Old Order’ deserves a wider audience than just the military history fanatics. The international relations aspects should make it of interest to those interested in politics and diplomacy too.
Amazing account of Napoleon's War against the Third Coalition in late summer and autumn of 1805, intricately tying together considerations of grand strategic, strategic, operational, and even tactical level events and implications in the campaign that ended at Austerlitz.
An excellent and detailed analysis of the events leading up to the war of 1805 and the impacts on Europe. The book has upended much of my previous beliefs that the French had a very detailed plan from the outset and that the Allies were forced to dance to Napoleon’s tune.
Using numerous archival sources, particularly Russian, and providing a detailed political background, the author has made an important contribution to the scholarship of the era.
A must read if you are interested in clearing up the myths about 1805 and Austerlitz.
Lots of New perspectives and info not available in other books that deal with this period of the NW. The description of the battle tactics is a bit meh but Scott Bowden's book is there to remedy that. The grand strategy and strategy is pretty well told though. Overall really glad I read it and I feel I've been given much interesting and refreshingly new lenses through which to view that period.
Finally got around to finishing this. Really liked the detailed setup of the political relationships during the buildup phase. Also liked how this guy clearly has beef with a couple of other specific historians.
Detailed, thoroughly researched, analytical, in-depth -- this work is a political and military study of Napoleon's negotiations and conflicts with the major European powers in the first few years of the 19th century. The culmination is a study of the land war with Austria and Russia in the second half of 1805 culminating in Napoleon's majestic victory at Austerlitz. The strengths of this long book are the treatments of the interplay between diplomacy, politics, and military actions of each of the major participants in the 1805 war. The author provides insightful analysis and critiques of the actions and avoids the traps of delving too much in the minutiae of military maneuvers.
A little long but definitely worth the read. For all of those military aficionado's who want to understand how Europe became so divided in the 19th century, this book will answer your questions.