Bernard Fergusson’s “Beyond the Chindwin” is an account of the Wingate Expedition into Burma in 1943. Fergusson, commander of No.5 Column, relays the daunting adventure in a straightforward, well-written narrative which details the extraordinary efforts of a relatively small group of British soldiers in an obscure theater of World War II.
The Chindit operation of 1943, was meant to be a coordinated plan with the field army; however, the offensive operations into Burma were canceled. Major General Orde Wingate persuaded Field Marshal Wavell to allow him to proceed. Wingate hoped to disrupt Japanese occupation efforts, and prove the validity of his theories of long-range jungle penetration. Wavell acquiesced, and ordered Wingate to set out from India, on February 12, 1943, with his Chindits organized into eight columns. The group was to cross the Chindwin River, and sabotage the transportation infrastructure critical to the Nipponese occupation. The force succeeded in striking several railway bridges, chief of which was Fergusson’s attack on the Bonchuang Gorge. Shortly thereafter, conditions no longer were deemed favorable to support further operations within Burma. The Japanese harassed Wingate’s Columns, interdicted his supply drops, and intimidated the indigenous Burmese, whose support was crucial for the survival for the Chindits. Fergusson, himself wounded, came to realize that his troops had lost their combat effectiveness. The jungle environment proved baneful; his troops suffered from wounds, disease, exhaustion and shortages of food and water.
Wingate ordered Fergusson’s No.5 Column to withdraw. Fergusson considered various options, and finally decided to retrace his steps to the Irrawaddy River, on his return to Imphal. Alternatively, No.5 Column contemplated other options, including the possibility of a northward march to China. In time, the Japanese had elements of three divisions pursuing the Chindits. Forced to form into independently controlled, small units, Fergusson's troops, for the most part, successfully evaded enemy forces. The author's direct roue of retreat brought his force back to India by late April; others traveled a more circuitous route, and were not so lucky. Casualties were appalling; Fergusson's force lost 50% of its total strength, and in addition to his hip wound, Fergusson himself lost 25% of his total body weight during the operation.
Wingate’s theory seemed plausible to Wavell and Churchill: as presented, it held the promise of being both efficient and strategically sound. In reality, the results were disastrous. Overall,alone almost one third of Wingate's men died or ended up as POWs- a fate akin to death. Many of Wingate's force did not return to allied lines for weeks or months. Those that traveled the 400 mile route to China, rather than cross back into India returned as wraiths- and all for the result of blowing the Bonchuang Gorge, a small steel span of a railway bridge the Japanese, in Fergusson’s words “did not take long to repair” In addition, while it is undeniable that they “gathered some useful intelligence,” the Chindits managed to kill a scant few hundred enemy troops of the Japanese 15th Army, a force comprised of some 155,000 men.