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403 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1987
"Sukarno did not suffer, but the PKI, which the dictator had use as one important pillar of his Bonapartist project, was physically and politically eliminated by Generals closely identified with the Pentagon." — "I suppose what made me angry was the fact, irrelevant to all but myself, that I have never found Sukarno to be a particularly inspiring political leader. His rhetoric was stale, his vision severely limited, and his achievements few. Nehru had fathered the concept of nonalignment, Nasser had nationalized the Suez canal, Nkrumah had dreamt of African unity, Mao Zedong and Fidel Castro had led successful revolutions and Ho Chi Minh was in the process of completing another."
"But what had the degenerate mystagogue of Jakarta ever achieved, apart of a futile and thoughtless confrontation with Malaysia, which had ended in a disaster?"
"For months afterwards I was dejected by the news from Indonesia. It had raised the first real doubts in my mind about Chinese policies. The PKI had been extremely close to Peking. The advise they had received from Peng Chen and other Chinese leaders was that the alliance with Sukarno must be the cornerstone of their policy because of Sukarno's anti-imperialist stance. The pro-Moscow parties were not too embarrassed by the turn of events since it was an opportunity to criticize the supposedly 'leftist errors' of the PKI, which the East German daily Neues Deutschand did in its issue of 24 October 1965 while extending the fullest possible support to Sukarno. The Chinese leaders had been denouncing Moscow repeatedly for advancing the 'absurd and revisionist thesis' that it was possible to have a state that was neither fish nor fowl, neither socialist nor bourgeois. They had heaped scorn and abuse on Soviet analysts for even suggesting that in the Third World it was perfectly permissible for local communists to enter into alliances with their rulers, provided the latter were anti-imperialist. The PKI leaders had been guilty of all these errors and the mass murders of at least 250,000 communists was the clearest indication of the linkages between theory and practice. The political blunders of the PKI had led to the loss of lies on a sensational scale. What would be Peking's response? We waited anxiously and eagerly for some clarification, but Peking remained silent. No explanation."