Winston Churchill believed passionately in the value of secret intelligence - in times of war, of course, but also in times of peace. As a young correspondent and soldier in Cuba and South Africa, he experienced its worth first hand. As wartime Prime Minister, he built a centralized intelligence community, responded daily to raw "Ultra" reports, created the Special Operations Executive to work behind enemy lines and, with Roosevelt, built the intelligence alliance that endures to this day. With detail about the secret world of agents and double agents this work traces Churchill's connections from his days as a member of the Cabinet that established the Secret Service to the war years, when his extensive network provided him with superior information. Both an account of the origins and inner workings of modern intelligence agencies and a study of Churchill and his role in their development, this volume is a contribution to the study of modern and military history and a key to understanding Churchill himself.
David Alexander Tetlow Stafford is projects director at Edinburgh University's Centre for the Study of the Two World Wars and Leverhulme Emeritus Professor in the University's School of History, Classics and Archaeology.
Stafford took his B.A. at Downing College, Cambridge in 1963. He then undertook postgraduate study at the University of London, taking an M.A. and finally his Ph.D. in history in 1968.
Beginning his career with government service, Stafford served in the British Diplomatic Service as a third secretary at the Foreign Office from 1967 to 1968, and then as second secretary in 1968. He then took up an appointment as research associate (1968–70) at the Centre of International Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
He then became assistant professor of history (1970–76) at Canada's University of Victoria in British Columbia. He was promoted to associate professor of history (1976–82) and finally professor of history (1982–84). He then became director of studies (1985–86) and executive director (1986–92) at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. From 1992 to 2000 Stafford became a visiting professor at Edinburgh University's Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, and then, from 2000, he became projects director at the Centre for the Study of the Two World Wars.
Stafford is particularly noted for his scholarly works concerning Winston Churchill and British intelligence, various aspects of the Second World War, and Twentieth Century intelligence and espionage with a focus on Britain. He now resides in Victoria, British Columbia, Canada.
He is a regular book reviewer, appearing in The Times (London), BBC History Magazine, The Spectator, The Times Literary Supplement, The New York Times, the Times Herald Tribune (Paris), and Saturday Night and the Globe and Mail (Toronto).
In 1941 Moscow received an urgent warning about Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR. Only five days before the attack, a Soviet agent working inside Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin reported that the assault could be expected at any moment. "You can tell your 'source' [...] to f*ck off", Stalin told his controller.'
Although primarily this study is about Winston Churchill's long and complicated relationship with the world of covert intelligence gathering, it gives some interesting insights into the attitudes of various officials, leaders and powers towards intelligence, and into how those attitudes changed and developed. It shows how major coups and disasters have resulted from the use and misuse of intelligence, such as the disastrous campaign at Gallipoli, undermined by bad intelligence. There are plenty of examples also of how intelligence itself has been used, for better or worse, for specific ends, particularly political ends.
But Churchill is at the heart of this study, and Stafford gives us a thorough picture of Churchill's love of cloak-and-dagger work, of how enamoured he was of intelligence gathering, but also how prepared he was to admit mistakes and to bow to the demands of the secret services. Stafford takes us right back to Churchill's days as a young war reporter in Cuba and his admiration for guerilla warfare which never left him. From this point Stafford makes clear the lines along which Churchill's approach developed, referring later moments to earlier in order to give consistency to his study.
Churchill's career has been dogged by misinterpretation, expecially in more recent decades. As a tour guide with a Churchill tour in my repertoire, I know how mythbusting is central to any proper evaluation of his life and career. Stafford takes time to pick up on and debunk myths concerning Churchill's misuse of intelligence for political ends which involved loss or destruction.
One such myth is that Churchill knew about the German plans to bomb Coventry and allowed it to happen rather than betray British intelligence gathering secrets. Another is the myth that Churchill allowed Francis Suttill to be briefed with misleading information and captured, leading to the winding up of the Prosper network in Paris. Stafford takes these and others and evaluates what would be needed in order for them to be true, before putting them up against the yardstick of reality.
Stafford's overall conclusion is, 'In some respects Churchill was the best and worst of men to handle intelligence'. His study shows how Churchill's romantic attitude to intelligence gathering and the world of the spy caused a deal of damage. But also Stafford shows clearly how much the world of covert intelligence gathering - and the civilian population - owes to him.
Stafford's is a nicely-balanced study, with clear portrayals and evaluations of people and situations. It contains a great deal of information, yet it's eminently readable, and gives very useful insight into the world of intelligence in the first half of the twentieth century.
"Yet another book about Churchill?" this book remarks in its opening sentence. At least author David Stafford isn't shy about adding to the mountain of Churchill books already out there - and he has a robust answer to his rhetorical question. He aims to provide a view into Churchill's creation, cultivation and relationship with the secret services, aspects that have not received close attention due both to the many other things commentaries on Churchill focus on as well as the practical issue that much of interest in this field is classified and only revealed to the public decades after the fact. This book takes new material afforded by UK government declassification of its private archives (albeit only up to 1995, this book is rather old I realised after reading it!) and tells a familiar story - Churchill's adult life - but with a unique focus on his most secret dealings.
There is so much of interest in Churchill's relation with the secret services that it is difficult to know where to begin. After introductory chapters covering his escapades in Boer-war Africa and Cuba, we see how Churchill "actively helped build Britain's secret service. MI5 and MI6 had been born [and] the Official Secrets Act governed discussions of national security". The story of the Enigma code breakers at Bletchley park is told but with a twist: rather than focus on the technical prowess of a Turing, say, we instead focus on the strategic uses to which Churchill put the deciphered intercepts. Throughout the book Churchill's passion for his 'Golden Eggs' of intelligence is stressed, emphasising the importance murky realm for Britain's wartime leader.
The picture sketched of Churchill and these nuggets of information is complex and nuanced: on the one hand he clearly understands the subtly of intelligence analysis (as, presumably, does the author). In one episode, we hear about how Churchill rebuked Captain Reginal 'Blinker' Hall, director of naval intelligence, for his credulousness: "'The function of the Intelligence Division', he chided, 'is not merely to collect and pass on the Munchausen tales of spies and untrustworthy agents, but carefully to sift and scrutinise the intelligence they receive, and in putting it forward to indicate the degree of probability which attaches to it'". Yet on the other hand the great man, through his addiction to receiving raw intelligence reports, committed clear errors, such as misunderstanding the import of tank number estimates in North Africa - illustrating how he "had made the error of attempting to be his own intelligence officer". Mostly, the author is laudatory of Churchill's keen understanding of how intelligence should be a means to serve policy and not be an end in itself, even if Churchill's interest in the details of raw intelligence could get him in trouble.
Stafford doesn't shy away from the unseemly nature of the secret services and Churchil's relationship with them. This is particularly true in his commentary on the 'spy fever' that gripped the nation in 1914: in Churchill's own words "Sharp eyes followed everybody's movements long ears awaited every incautious expression in the streets, in the public conveyances, on the railways, in the theatre, in the restaurant or tavern ...". Churchill, in other words, promoted something like a police state and advocated policies that led directly to the interment of German civilians in the UK without trial. This state of affairs lasted to beyond the end of the Second World War.
The book also doesn't shy away from strong criticism of Churchill, a ready remedy to the fawning hero-view that has existed of the statesman all my lifetime. But this is an evidenced, proportionate criticism, not the anachronistic hectoring of any historical figure people in 2020 can be guilty of. Aside from his over-fondness for trying to be his own intelligence officer, we hear about his "blindest spot ... the Far East" and nursed totally wrong views of Japan's intentions and strengths (particularly with regards Singapore). In another episode, we are told abut the failure in the desert theatre of "Churchill's beloved 'Tiger' tanks ... [which] arrived badly equipped for desert war and were still not ready by the time Battleaza began". We are also treated to descriptions of his political difficulties, but all framed from the intriguing angle of secret service. Lastly, the author makes clear Churchill's often dangerous penchant for swashbuckling types - who he loved to meet and be regaled with stories, but who were often viewed by his colleagues as charlatans.
Stafford's book is, as I mentioned above, out of date so to the expert there may be more recently released material that is lacking. To those who don't have an in-depth knowledge of the area, this book offers an extremely enjoyable canter 'biography with a difference' of Churchill. You will learn a huge amount about the formation of three of the secret services we still live with (MI5, MI6 and GCHQ) as well as some we do not (principally the Special Operations Executive, SOE, is a fascinating part of this story and was totally unknown to me prior to reading). Newer books likely offer valuable updates as more material becomes declassified; and more focussed books will offer a more coherent view of specific agencies or events, such as books on the SOE (Unearthing Churchill's Secret Army: The Official List of SOE Casualties and Their Stories or Guardians of Churchill's Secret Army: Men of the Intelligence Corps in the Special Operations Executive), Bletchley Park (Bletchley Park's Secret Source: Churchill's Wrens and the Y Service in World War II) and others. But for a pretty comprehensive overview of the whole, replete with plenty of wonderful insight into Churchill's character and a health dose of Churchillian wit ("Give me the facts ... and I will twist them the way I want to suit my argument") this book is a great option.
A book with a lot of specifics and details regarding the development of the British secret service from the beginning of WW I through the early 1950's. Winston Churchill was a key player in all of this, so the work follows Churchill from the 1880's into the early 1950's.