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The Devil's Wind: The Outbreak of the Indian Mutiny
In 1857 the Indian troops of the Bengal Army rose against their colonial masters.
They were quickly joined by tens of thousands of discontented civilians in what was to become the bloodiest insurrection in the history of the British Empire.
But what were the real causes of the Indian Mutiny?
Historians have usually explained it as part of a general protest against British rule in India.
But in this ground-breaking study, the leading military historian Saul David identifies the specific complaints of the soldiers as the real cause of the revolt.
All armies have grievances relating to conditions of service, particularly pay, career prospects and relations with officers. What set a colonial force like the Bengal Army apart is that it was a volunteer mercenary force officered by men of a different race and religion.
Its loyalty to its paymasters, therefore, was entirely dependent on the incentives for service outweighing the disincentives - and by 1857 that was no longer the case.
'The Devil's Wind: The Bengal Army and the Outbreak Of The Indian Mutiny' is the dramatic story of one of the most violent episodes in the history of the British Empire.
Saul David is Professor of War Studies at the University of Buckingham and the author of several critically acclaimed history books, including The Indian Mutiny: 1857 (short-listed for the Westminster Medal for Military Literature), Prince of Pleasure: The Prince of Wales and the Making of the Regency, Zulu: The Heroism and Tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879 (a Waterstones Military History Book of the Year) and, most recently, Victoria's Wars: The Rise of Empire.He has also written two best-selling historical novels set in the wars of the late 19th Century, Zulu Hart and Hart of Empire. An experienced broadcaster, he has presented and appeared in history programmes for all the major TV channels and is a regular contributor to Radio 4.
His books have been widely praised.
'A first-rate historian, now a masterly story-teller' (Bernard Cornwell on ZULU HART )
'Incisive and acute . . . thorough and occasionally revelatory, [David] always finds a telling phrase, an eye-catching detail or a human story' (Sunday Times on Victoria’s Wars: The Rise of Empire).
Endeavour Press is the UK's leading independent publisher of digital books.
They were quickly joined by tens of thousands of discontented civilians in what was to become the bloodiest insurrection in the history of the British Empire.
But what were the real causes of the Indian Mutiny?
Historians have usually explained it as part of a general protest against British rule in India.
But in this ground-breaking study, the leading military historian Saul David identifies the specific complaints of the soldiers as the real cause of the revolt.
All armies have grievances relating to conditions of service, particularly pay, career prospects and relations with officers. What set a colonial force like the Bengal Army apart is that it was a volunteer mercenary force officered by men of a different race and religion.
Its loyalty to its paymasters, therefore, was entirely dependent on the incentives for service outweighing the disincentives - and by 1857 that was no longer the case.
'The Devil's Wind: The Bengal Army and the Outbreak Of The Indian Mutiny' is the dramatic story of one of the most violent episodes in the history of the British Empire.
Saul David is Professor of War Studies at the University of Buckingham and the author of several critically acclaimed history books, including The Indian Mutiny: 1857 (short-listed for the Westminster Medal for Military Literature), Prince of Pleasure: The Prince of Wales and the Making of the Regency, Zulu: The Heroism and Tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879 (a Waterstones Military History Book of the Year) and, most recently, Victoria's Wars: The Rise of Empire.He has also written two best-selling historical novels set in the wars of the late 19th Century, Zulu Hart and Hart of Empire. An experienced broadcaster, he has presented and appeared in history programmes for all the major TV channels and is a regular contributor to Radio 4.
His books have been widely praised.
'A first-rate historian, now a masterly story-teller' (Bernard Cornwell on ZULU HART )
'Incisive and acute . . . thorough and occasionally revelatory, [David] always finds a telling phrase, an eye-catching detail or a human story' (Sunday Times on Victoria’s Wars: The Rise of Empire).
Endeavour Press is the UK's leading independent publisher of digital books.
- GenresHistory
487 pages, Kindle Edition
First published July 23, 2013
63 people are currently reading
101 people want to read
About the author
Saul David
53 books175 followersSAUL DAVID was born in Monmouth in 1966 and educated at Ampleforth College and Edinburgh and Glasgow Universities (History MA and PhD).
An expert in the wars of the Victorian period, he began writing his first history book when he was twenty-five and has since completed eight more. They include: The Homicidal Earl: The Life of Lord Cardigan (1997), a critically-acclaimed biography of the man who led the Charge of the Light Brigade; The Indian Mutiny:1857 (2002), shortlisted for the Westminster Medal for Military Literature; Zulu: The Heroism and Tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879 (2004), a Waterstone's Military History Book of the Year; and the bestselling Victoria's Wars: The Rise of Empire (2006). In 2007 he signed a three book deal with Hodder & Stoughton to write a series of historical novels set in the late Victorian period. The first, Zulu Hart, was published on 5 March 2009 to critical acclaim with The Times describing it as a 'rattling good yarn' with 'a compelling, sexy hero who could give Cornwell's Sharpe a run for his money'. He is currently writing a history of the British Army.
An expert in the wars of the Victorian period, he began writing his first history book when he was twenty-five and has since completed eight more. They include: The Homicidal Earl: The Life of Lord Cardigan (1997), a critically-acclaimed biography of the man who led the Charge of the Light Brigade; The Indian Mutiny:1857 (2002), shortlisted for the Westminster Medal for Military Literature; Zulu: The Heroism and Tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879 (2004), a Waterstone's Military History Book of the Year; and the bestselling Victoria's Wars: The Rise of Empire (2006). In 2007 he signed a three book deal with Hodder & Stoughton to write a series of historical novels set in the late Victorian period. The first, Zulu Hart, was published on 5 March 2009 to critical acclaim with The Times describing it as a 'rattling good yarn' with 'a compelling, sexy hero who could give Cornwell's Sharpe a run for his money'. He is currently writing a history of the British Army.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
March 22, 2020
There is much to admire in this book. The author has obviously researched his topic deeply. There is an extensive introduction which discusses the recent scholarly literature on the Great Mutiny.
This is not a book for a casual read about the Indian Mutiny. You will need to read past the midpoint of the book to arrive at the first discussion of the ostensible cause of the mutiny - the introduction of the new Enfield service rifle with its greased cartridge. The author’s thesis is that the mutiny was primarily due to service factors in the East India Company’s mercenary army, including how the Bengal Army was recruited, stagnant pay, unsuitable uniforms for local conditions, and the lack of opportunity for native soldiers to rise in the military hierarchy. This was aggravated by the demilitarization of northern India, which reducing opportunities for mercenary soldiers, the growing distance between native troops and their European commanders, and the frequent long detachment of the experienced and the senior officers from their regiments, which left the native regiments to be managed by company-grade officers or less experienced field-grade officers.
One of the difficulties that I had with the book was that the author frequently used statistics to support his arguments. Unfortunately, they were presented verbally, which reduced the readability and lessened the impact. For example, we are given:
"In May 1857, 26 of the 74 regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry were commanded by officers who had been present for less than three of the previous 20 years, (80) five by officers who had been present for more than three and less than five, (81) and nine by officers who had been present for more than five but less than ten. (82) In other words, forty (54.1 per cent) of the 74 regiments were commanded by officers who had been present for less than half the previous 20 years."
This would have been better presented as a graph or table. There were many instances of that in the book.
One of the things I particularly liked was the author’s discussions of other significant mutinies to support his thesis, including the Highland regiments mutinies in the 1700’s, the French mutinies of 1790-91 and 1830, the mutinies of the Austrian Italian regiments in 1848, the Russian army in 1916-17 and the western front mutinies of 1917-18. Oddly, he did not discuss the Spithead and Nore mutinies.
This is not a book for a casual read about the Indian Mutiny. You will need to read past the midpoint of the book to arrive at the first discussion of the ostensible cause of the mutiny - the introduction of the new Enfield service rifle with its greased cartridge. The author’s thesis is that the mutiny was primarily due to service factors in the East India Company’s mercenary army, including how the Bengal Army was recruited, stagnant pay, unsuitable uniforms for local conditions, and the lack of opportunity for native soldiers to rise in the military hierarchy. This was aggravated by the demilitarization of northern India, which reducing opportunities for mercenary soldiers, the growing distance between native troops and their European commanders, and the frequent long detachment of the experienced and the senior officers from their regiments, which left the native regiments to be managed by company-grade officers or less experienced field-grade officers.
One of the difficulties that I had with the book was that the author frequently used statistics to support his arguments. Unfortunately, they were presented verbally, which reduced the readability and lessened the impact. For example, we are given:
"In May 1857, 26 of the 74 regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry were commanded by officers who had been present for less than three of the previous 20 years, (80) five by officers who had been present for more than three and less than five, (81) and nine by officers who had been present for more than five but less than ten. (82) In other words, forty (54.1 per cent) of the 74 regiments were commanded by officers who had been present for less than half the previous 20 years."
This would have been better presented as a graph or table. There were many instances of that in the book.
One of the things I particularly liked was the author’s discussions of other significant mutinies to support his thesis, including the Highland regiments mutinies in the 1700’s, the French mutinies of 1790-91 and 1830, the mutinies of the Austrian Italian regiments in 1848, the Russian army in 1916-17 and the western front mutinies of 1917-18. Oddly, he did not discuss the Spithead and Nore mutinies.
May 31, 2015
Perceptive analysis but at times too detailed....
November 23, 2025
This, or especially, the first half, feels like a dissertation paper on the origins of the Indian Mutiny. It is full of close arguing, and written out facts, figures, and references on the subject. Some of this feels repetitious, not only in itself, but in reference to the introduction, which has an extensive description of the recent historiography of the subject, describing the various positions taken and when.
It is so closely argued, that it can be hard to discern just what David's position on it all is.
While the introduction and the first half can by dizzying enough to make out the point, it is stated enough to get a grasp, and the second half is much smoother while he demonstrates his conclusions with an account of the opening stages of the Mutiny.
The main position he does have is that "professional" concerns dominated all the others in causing the mutiny. Not religion, or caste, but more prosaic problems such as the fact that the cost of living had about doubled in India over the previous half-century, but military pay had stayed flat. In fact, it had recently gone down a bit, as some forms of supplemental pay had been cut as there were no more parts of India proper to pacify.
David also shows how problems of discipline were endemic to the British forces there. Officers generally had punishments of men taken out of their hands, and the far away courts were likely to nullify most complaints on appeal. Most British officers did not see maintaining their units as their primary duty, and were off elsewhere, socializing, and never fostering any respect with their men. It is the picture of a dysfunctional organization, and he points out repeated warnings from various parties about all this, but reform never comes.
He also characterizes the overall goals in a mercenary light. Mutinying units generally stayed together, and he supposes that this is a reflection of the class' historical occupation as soldiers, and looking for a better paymaster to graft themselves onto.
I have deep suspicions about this conclusion. His account shows there was some form of coordinated plot with various people in some contact with each other trying to coordinate the timing of what became a large mutiny. He also points towards some of the leaders (or their direct descendants) recently disenfranchised by the British, were more than just who the mutinying leaders attached themselves to. Instead, the initial seeds came from their courts, and this was overall a political move to kick the British out of India by using the dissatisfaction brewing in the units managed by the East India Company to suborn the entire structure, and use it themselves. The entire cartridge controversy falls on top of this already-existing plot, and immediately seized on to rile up the rank-and-file into actual mutiny.
Overall, it's a disappointing book, but one with a lot of good information. As he gives all the background figures, you get never organized enough discussions of previous mutinies in India. While they are used for some compare and contrast, you don't get a sense of what any of the events were like. The description of the actual Mutiny is also combined with a lot of motion of various units prepared to revolt, but various factors, including random chance, keep it from getting out of hand until August at Rajput.
I read the Endeavour Press Kindle edition, and it has the same problems as their version of Saul David's The Homicidal Earl. The problems are not as pronounced here, but certainly OCR conversion problems exist. The biggest one is that N.I. (Native Infantry) is variously rendered N.I., N.1., and occasionally N.J. Instead of words breaking where they were probably hyphenated in the original, they are joined together when they should be hyphenated ('fortyfive'). But the overall incidence is lower, but there's one place where the text breaks up into odd characters for half a word. Like with the previous book, I don't know if the later Sharpe Books edition is improved, or exactly the same.
It is so closely argued, that it can be hard to discern just what David's position on it all is.
While the introduction and the first half can by dizzying enough to make out the point, it is stated enough to get a grasp, and the second half is much smoother while he demonstrates his conclusions with an account of the opening stages of the Mutiny.
The main position he does have is that "professional" concerns dominated all the others in causing the mutiny. Not religion, or caste, but more prosaic problems such as the fact that the cost of living had about doubled in India over the previous half-century, but military pay had stayed flat. In fact, it had recently gone down a bit, as some forms of supplemental pay had been cut as there were no more parts of India proper to pacify.
David also shows how problems of discipline were endemic to the British forces there. Officers generally had punishments of men taken out of their hands, and the far away courts were likely to nullify most complaints on appeal. Most British officers did not see maintaining their units as their primary duty, and were off elsewhere, socializing, and never fostering any respect with their men. It is the picture of a dysfunctional organization, and he points out repeated warnings from various parties about all this, but reform never comes.
He also characterizes the overall goals in a mercenary light. Mutinying units generally stayed together, and he supposes that this is a reflection of the class' historical occupation as soldiers, and looking for a better paymaster to graft themselves onto.
I have deep suspicions about this conclusion. His account shows there was some form of coordinated plot with various people in some contact with each other trying to coordinate the timing of what became a large mutiny. He also points towards some of the leaders (or their direct descendants) recently disenfranchised by the British, were more than just who the mutinying leaders attached themselves to. Instead, the initial seeds came from their courts, and this was overall a political move to kick the British out of India by using the dissatisfaction brewing in the units managed by the East India Company to suborn the entire structure, and use it themselves. The entire cartridge controversy falls on top of this already-existing plot, and immediately seized on to rile up the rank-and-file into actual mutiny.
Overall, it's a disappointing book, but one with a lot of good information. As he gives all the background figures, you get never organized enough discussions of previous mutinies in India. While they are used for some compare and contrast, you don't get a sense of what any of the events were like. The description of the actual Mutiny is also combined with a lot of motion of various units prepared to revolt, but various factors, including random chance, keep it from getting out of hand until August at Rajput.
I read the Endeavour Press Kindle edition, and it has the same problems as their version of Saul David's The Homicidal Earl. The problems are not as pronounced here, but certainly OCR conversion problems exist. The biggest one is that N.I. (Native Infantry) is variously rendered N.I., N.1., and occasionally N.J. Instead of words breaking where they were probably hyphenated in the original, they are joined together when they should be hyphenated ('fortyfive'). But the overall incidence is lower, but there's one place where the text breaks up into odd characters for half a word. Like with the previous book, I don't know if the later Sharpe Books edition is improved, or exactly the same.
December 10, 2019
A thoroughly researched and foot-noted argument that the primary causes of the 1857 rebellion were over professional military complaints, rather than the loudly touted issue of the greased cartridges for the Enfield rifle. The argument is undermined somewhat by the inefficient method of presentation - using tables would have saved a lot of time and made the information much easier to read - and by what seems like a sloppy conversion job to Kindle: there are a lot of errors in the text with incorrect letters or words being split up, such as "rum our" every time the author wrote "rumour".
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews