What do you think?
Rate this book
Discours décisif
Né à Cordoue en 1126, mort à Marrakech en 1198, médecin, cadi, juriste, philosophe et commentateur, Averroès (Ibn Rushs) a laissé une œuvre capitale dans tous les domaines du savoir. Celui que l'on considère comme le plus grand philosophe aristotélicien du XIIè siècle est aussi le témoin d'une époque, celle de l'"Age d'or" de l'Occident musulman.
Le Discours décisif est sans nul doute le plus représentatif de l'homme, de l'époque et de l'oeuvre. Son sujet: la connexion existant entre la Révélation et la philosophie. Pour autant, le Discours décisif n'est ni un livre de philosophie ni un livre de théologie.
Il s'agit d'une fatwâ, c'est-à-dire d'un avis légal qui répond à une question formulée dans les termes et le registre de la juridiction religieuse. Son propos n'est pas de réconcilier la foi et la raison, mais de justifier l'interprétation philosophique du Coran et de montrer que l'activité philosophique est légalement obligatoire pour ceux qui sont aptes à s'y adonner. Il est aussi de revendiquer un statut social pour la philosophie, garanti par le pouvoir politique, et de plaider en même temps pour une séparation radicale entre philosophie et société. On aura compris que le Discours décisif reste d'actualité.
"Le monde moderne a besoin du Discours décisif non pas seulement pour affirmer abstraitement le droit à philosopher, mais pour argumenter juridiquement une idée toute différente : l'exercice de la raison est une obligation que la Loi révélée fait aux gens de raison; nul ne saurait interdire l'un sans enfreindre l'autre" (Alain de Libera).
Le Discours décisif est sans nul doute le plus représentatif de l'homme, de l'époque et de l'oeuvre. Son sujet: la connexion existant entre la Révélation et la philosophie. Pour autant, le Discours décisif n'est ni un livre de philosophie ni un livre de théologie.
Il s'agit d'une fatwâ, c'est-à-dire d'un avis légal qui répond à une question formulée dans les termes et le registre de la juridiction religieuse. Son propos n'est pas de réconcilier la foi et la raison, mais de justifier l'interprétation philosophique du Coran et de montrer que l'activité philosophique est légalement obligatoire pour ceux qui sont aptes à s'y adonner. Il est aussi de revendiquer un statut social pour la philosophie, garanti par le pouvoir politique, et de plaider en même temps pour une séparation radicale entre philosophie et société. On aura compris que le Discours décisif reste d'actualité.
"Le monde moderne a besoin du Discours décisif non pas seulement pour affirmer abstraitement le droit à philosopher, mais pour argumenter juridiquement une idée toute différente : l'exercice de la raison est une obligation que la Loi révélée fait aux gens de raison; nul ne saurait interdire l'un sans enfreindre l'autre" (Alain de Libera).
247 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1988
5 people are currently reading
461 people want to read
About the author
ibn Rushd
205 books275 followersArabic version: ابن رشد
Commentaries of well known Arab philosopher, jurist, and physician Averroës or Averrhoës, also ibn Rushd, of Spain on Aristotle exerted a strong influence on medieval Christian theology.
Abu'l-Walid Ibn Rushd, better as Averroes, stands as a towering figure in the history of Islamic as that of west European thought. In the Islamic world, he played a decisive role in the defense of Greeks against the onslaughts of the Ash'arite (Mutakallimun), led by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, and in the rehabilitation.
A common theme throughout his writings properly understood religion with no incompatibility. His contributions took many forms, ranging from his detailed, his defense against the attacks of those who condemned it as contrary to Islam and his construction of a form, cleansed as far as possible at the time of Neoplatonism.
After centuries of nearly total oblivion in west Europe, world recognition as early as the 13th century contributed to the rediscovery of the master. That instrumental discovery launched Scholasticism in Latin and the Renaissance of the 15th-century Europe in due course. Since the publication of [title:Averroes et l'averroisme] of Ernest Renan in 1852, notwithstanding very little attention to work of Averroes in English, French showed greater interest.
See more here.
Commentaries of well known Arab philosopher, jurist, and physician Averroës or Averrhoës, also ibn Rushd, of Spain on Aristotle exerted a strong influence on medieval Christian theology.
Abu'l-Walid Ibn Rushd, better as Averroes, stands as a towering figure in the history of Islamic as that of west European thought. In the Islamic world, he played a decisive role in the defense of Greeks against the onslaughts of the Ash'arite (Mutakallimun), led by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, and in the rehabilitation.
A common theme throughout his writings properly understood religion with no incompatibility. His contributions took many forms, ranging from his detailed, his defense against the attacks of those who condemned it as contrary to Islam and his construction of a form, cleansed as far as possible at the time of Neoplatonism.
After centuries of nearly total oblivion in west Europe, world recognition as early as the 13th century contributed to the rediscovery of the master. That instrumental discovery launched Scholasticism in Latin and the Renaissance of the 15th-century Europe in due course. Since the publication of [title:Averroes et l'averroisme] of Ernest Renan in 1852, notwithstanding very little attention to work of Averroes in English, French showed greater interest.
See more here.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
January 3, 2011
Review:
September 2006
On Philosophical Tools
This is an extraordinary work. Averroes is here presenting a 'legal' case against the art of Kalam (speculative theology) with the Islamic Jurists sitting in Judgment. But, and this is important, this argument is not against religion per se. Now, the Latin West was very aware of the Aristotelian writings of Averroes but unaware of his other writings. The Christians knew his Commentaries and even of his controversy with Ghazali. But they were largely unaware of his works that attempt to 'harmonize' philosophy and revelation (i.e., religious law). The 'Decisive Treatise' is among the most important of these. Here Averroes is at pains to show that not only isn't philosophy forbidden by the Koran; it is in fact commanded - but only for some!
Humanity is divided into three groups by Averroes. There are the common people (the 'people of rhetoric'), people of uncommon discernment (the 'people of dialectic'), and philosophers (the 'people of demonstration'). It is a pyramid, with the ordinary people at the base and the falasifa (i.e., Islamic philosophers) at the summit. But this is no celebration of diversity, the ideal that hovers over these pages is Ijma - consensus. Averroes is charging the 'people of dialectic' with the ruin of consensus. What ruins consensus? Interpretation. The 'people of interpretation' (both Falasifa and Theologians) must keep the vagaries of interpretation from the people. In this the Islamic Theologians have, according to our author, failed miserably. The Falasifa are let off with a slap.
Now, to introduce a schema not entirely foreign to the text, one could say that in the medieval Islamic landscape there are basically three institutions: Law, Theology, Philosophy. What Averroes intends to do is forbid access to theological and philosophical speculation (i.e., interpretation) to the people. Okay, but why involve the Islamic Jurists? Because the Theologians have proven incapable of keeping their interpretational arguments from the people. This has two consequences -the ruin of consensus, and the rise of unbelief- and they are both bad. The Jurists are interjected into these interpretational arguments in order to keep these disputes from the common people. The Jurists, guided by the falasifa, are to decide what can and cannot be publicly said. One is tempted to say that this in effect leaves the falasifa as the only competent interpreter.
But it seems it would be a mistake to say that Averroes intends to do away with the Islamic Theologians. There are things in the Koran about which demonstrative certainty is impossible, thus there must be discussion of the (merely) possible - this is the legitimate realm of dialectics. It is only the overriding importance of Ijma (consensus) in the Islamic context that makes the Jurists more 'important' than the Theologians. The theologians discuss possibilities that should only be heard by a few; the Law (i.e., the Koran) however, is for all. But this last objection can be aimed at the falasifa too. The people are only capable of hearing the Law through rhetorical imagery, not speculative interpretation. Thus the theoretical (whether demonstrative or dialectical) can never be a matter of consensus.
So, if Law is for all and interpretation is not why should the Jurists consent to the leadership of the Falasifa? -Two reasons. First, the people are not One. The Law (i.e., Koran) is intended for all but It relates to each type differently. Secondly, there are passages in the Koran Itself about which there is 'legitimate' dispute. Speculation, whether of philosophy or Kalam, is required and thus not to be silenced if it is hidden from the people. Again, the Law (Koran) is One, and It has one intention. It intends "only to teach true science and true practice." But this Intention manifests itself in various ways. For this the finesse and moderation of philosophy -the first well beyond the ability of the Jurists, the latter well beyond the ability of the theologians- is required.
Averroes concludes his 'case' by noting that more could be said - and then he doesn't say it. In this manner Averroes demonstrates the restraint of philosophy vis-à-vis the Islamic Theologians.
But this review is not under any such constraint; thus I add a few points. Interpretation is only dangerous if it becomes generally known. The speculations of the philosophers are not a problem because they and they alone know how to hide. One is tempted to ask whether this is 'proven' or 'falsified' by the fact that elements of the Averroistic position are taken up in the Medieval Latin West (e.g., Siger, Marsilius, Dante) that eventually come to 'fruition' in Machiavelli and then the Enlightenment. It is not simply a mistake to consider Averroes the great-grandfather of the European Enlightenment. But the Latins did not know the whole Averroes. Thus the heirs of this misunderstanding did not realize that the Enlightenment that Averroes foresaw was never meant to be Universal. The line of descent that one can draw from the Latin radical Averroists to the Enlightenment ends by making it a point of both honor and theory to say everything to everyone. -Averroes would have been appalled.
As to the controversy between Averroes and Ghazali one can briefly say that Averroes is an inverse Ghazali; the latter demands the censure of philosophy while the former demands the censure of Kalam. In both cases consensus is not to be disturbed. Thus the argument between them is this: how is speculative mania to precede in a History in which consensus must remain undisturbed? Averroes chose the Jurists because Ghazali's choice -theological speculation- led to dissension in the community. Unfortunately, the 'secularists' in the Latin West (in the line of Radical Averrosm) will, after severing all ties to theology, take to their own brand of 'speculation'. Thus Ideology replaced Revelation and philosophy goes from pillar to post. ...Perhaps there will soon be a genuine philosopher calling for an 'alliance' with religion? And why not? There are, after all, ultimately only two things of which we have been speaking: philosophy and the tools of philosophy (i.e., theology and the political).
What theoretical speculation intends is the Truth; what the Law (understood as Nomos) intends is consensus. However, Science and Philosophy are cumulative, speculation cannot be stopped. There is no 'consensus' in theoretical matters. But Revelation (Law) -whether Jewish, Christian or Islamic- routinely claims to be at an end. Thus just as speculation (philosophical mania) and religious Law could not sync up - one wonders how long the 'honeymoon' between philosophy and secular 'enlightened' law will last. The Laws (whether religious or secular) will always have the forbidden. But philosophical mania forbids itself nothing... Even though Averroes is at pains to argue that philosophers possess theoretical virtue while the jurists possess practical virtue and thus can be reconciled we must note that this would only be true if theoretical and practical virtue were themselves reconcilable. But this could only be true if mania and moderation were reconcilable...
So, "whenever demonstration leads to something different from the apparent sense of the Law, that apparent sense admits of interpretation..." In other words, one finesses (or creates) the 'reconciliation'. But Creativity was the Ideal of the theologians (i.e., Divine Creativity) just as creativity is today an idol of 'enlightened' modernity. But for the medieval Aristotelians creativity (making) is opposed to knowing, and thus something of a bête noire. Creativity is a sign that something has gone wrong. Thus when Averroes, who all along in this text had insisted upon the tripartite division of humanity (the rhetorical, dialectical, demonstrative), at the very end creates a fourth type (for the Jurists) between the 'low level' of the traditionalists and the 'turbulence' of the theologians we are perhaps made aware of the ad hoc nature of this 'alliance' between Philosophy and Jurists.
Of this 'solution' we can say that the Law (Koran) is divided in two (surface and hidden) but humanity is divided in three. There are two interpretive classes (Demonstrative, Dialectical) and two classes that deal with the apparent/surface (Dialectical, Rhetorical) and the dialectical participates in both. Dialectic is neither demonstrative theory nor simple faith but a mixture of both. All the doctrinal problems that arise are due to the dialectical class. One closes this book wondering how the invention of a 'fourth type' of humanity -another mixture- would solve anything. After all, as Averroes says, demonstrative "interpretation ought not to be declared to those adept in dialectic, not to mention the multitude." Thus we should perhaps not mention that any alliance with philosophy (whether consisting of theologians or politicos) is an alliance in name only.
The major fault line in this alliance is best exposed by considering the fact that sound interpretation is not the same as true interpretation. The Jurists are concerned with behavior and results while the philosophers are concerned with a Truth that the Jurists (or our modern politicos) cannot possibly understand. It is in the end this lack of understanding -"and that will be grasped after the slightest examination by anyone who is cognizant of the condition of demonstration"- that dooms all philosophical alliances...
This brief essay by Averroes is magnificent; it pulls back the curtain, however briefly, on something that is rarely seen. Look away if you can. The Islamic Translation Series and C. E. Butterworth have our thanks.
September 2006
On Philosophical Tools
This is an extraordinary work. Averroes is here presenting a 'legal' case against the art of Kalam (speculative theology) with the Islamic Jurists sitting in Judgment. But, and this is important, this argument is not against religion per se. Now, the Latin West was very aware of the Aristotelian writings of Averroes but unaware of his other writings. The Christians knew his Commentaries and even of his controversy with Ghazali. But they were largely unaware of his works that attempt to 'harmonize' philosophy and revelation (i.e., religious law). The 'Decisive Treatise' is among the most important of these. Here Averroes is at pains to show that not only isn't philosophy forbidden by the Koran; it is in fact commanded - but only for some!
Humanity is divided into three groups by Averroes. There are the common people (the 'people of rhetoric'), people of uncommon discernment (the 'people of dialectic'), and philosophers (the 'people of demonstration'). It is a pyramid, with the ordinary people at the base and the falasifa (i.e., Islamic philosophers) at the summit. But this is no celebration of diversity, the ideal that hovers over these pages is Ijma - consensus. Averroes is charging the 'people of dialectic' with the ruin of consensus. What ruins consensus? Interpretation. The 'people of interpretation' (both Falasifa and Theologians) must keep the vagaries of interpretation from the people. In this the Islamic Theologians have, according to our author, failed miserably. The Falasifa are let off with a slap.
Now, to introduce a schema not entirely foreign to the text, one could say that in the medieval Islamic landscape there are basically three institutions: Law, Theology, Philosophy. What Averroes intends to do is forbid access to theological and philosophical speculation (i.e., interpretation) to the people. Okay, but why involve the Islamic Jurists? Because the Theologians have proven incapable of keeping their interpretational arguments from the people. This has two consequences -the ruin of consensus, and the rise of unbelief- and they are both bad. The Jurists are interjected into these interpretational arguments in order to keep these disputes from the common people. The Jurists, guided by the falasifa, are to decide what can and cannot be publicly said. One is tempted to say that this in effect leaves the falasifa as the only competent interpreter.
But it seems it would be a mistake to say that Averroes intends to do away with the Islamic Theologians. There are things in the Koran about which demonstrative certainty is impossible, thus there must be discussion of the (merely) possible - this is the legitimate realm of dialectics. It is only the overriding importance of Ijma (consensus) in the Islamic context that makes the Jurists more 'important' than the Theologians. The theologians discuss possibilities that should only be heard by a few; the Law (i.e., the Koran) however, is for all. But this last objection can be aimed at the falasifa too. The people are only capable of hearing the Law through rhetorical imagery, not speculative interpretation. Thus the theoretical (whether demonstrative or dialectical) can never be a matter of consensus.
So, if Law is for all and interpretation is not why should the Jurists consent to the leadership of the Falasifa? -Two reasons. First, the people are not One. The Law (i.e., Koran) is intended for all but It relates to each type differently. Secondly, there are passages in the Koran Itself about which there is 'legitimate' dispute. Speculation, whether of philosophy or Kalam, is required and thus not to be silenced if it is hidden from the people. Again, the Law (Koran) is One, and It has one intention. It intends "only to teach true science and true practice." But this Intention manifests itself in various ways. For this the finesse and moderation of philosophy -the first well beyond the ability of the Jurists, the latter well beyond the ability of the theologians- is required.
Averroes concludes his 'case' by noting that more could be said - and then he doesn't say it. In this manner Averroes demonstrates the restraint of philosophy vis-à-vis the Islamic Theologians.
But this review is not under any such constraint; thus I add a few points. Interpretation is only dangerous if it becomes generally known. The speculations of the philosophers are not a problem because they and they alone know how to hide. One is tempted to ask whether this is 'proven' or 'falsified' by the fact that elements of the Averroistic position are taken up in the Medieval Latin West (e.g., Siger, Marsilius, Dante) that eventually come to 'fruition' in Machiavelli and then the Enlightenment. It is not simply a mistake to consider Averroes the great-grandfather of the European Enlightenment. But the Latins did not know the whole Averroes. Thus the heirs of this misunderstanding did not realize that the Enlightenment that Averroes foresaw was never meant to be Universal. The line of descent that one can draw from the Latin radical Averroists to the Enlightenment ends by making it a point of both honor and theory to say everything to everyone. -Averroes would have been appalled.
As to the controversy between Averroes and Ghazali one can briefly say that Averroes is an inverse Ghazali; the latter demands the censure of philosophy while the former demands the censure of Kalam. In both cases consensus is not to be disturbed. Thus the argument between them is this: how is speculative mania to precede in a History in which consensus must remain undisturbed? Averroes chose the Jurists because Ghazali's choice -theological speculation- led to dissension in the community. Unfortunately, the 'secularists' in the Latin West (in the line of Radical Averrosm) will, after severing all ties to theology, take to their own brand of 'speculation'. Thus Ideology replaced Revelation and philosophy goes from pillar to post. ...Perhaps there will soon be a genuine philosopher calling for an 'alliance' with religion? And why not? There are, after all, ultimately only two things of which we have been speaking: philosophy and the tools of philosophy (i.e., theology and the political).
What theoretical speculation intends is the Truth; what the Law (understood as Nomos) intends is consensus. However, Science and Philosophy are cumulative, speculation cannot be stopped. There is no 'consensus' in theoretical matters. But Revelation (Law) -whether Jewish, Christian or Islamic- routinely claims to be at an end. Thus just as speculation (philosophical mania) and religious Law could not sync up - one wonders how long the 'honeymoon' between philosophy and secular 'enlightened' law will last. The Laws (whether religious or secular) will always have the forbidden. But philosophical mania forbids itself nothing... Even though Averroes is at pains to argue that philosophers possess theoretical virtue while the jurists possess practical virtue and thus can be reconciled we must note that this would only be true if theoretical and practical virtue were themselves reconcilable. But this could only be true if mania and moderation were reconcilable...
So, "whenever demonstration leads to something different from the apparent sense of the Law, that apparent sense admits of interpretation..." In other words, one finesses (or creates) the 'reconciliation'. But Creativity was the Ideal of the theologians (i.e., Divine Creativity) just as creativity is today an idol of 'enlightened' modernity. But for the medieval Aristotelians creativity (making) is opposed to knowing, and thus something of a bête noire. Creativity is a sign that something has gone wrong. Thus when Averroes, who all along in this text had insisted upon the tripartite division of humanity (the rhetorical, dialectical, demonstrative), at the very end creates a fourth type (for the Jurists) between the 'low level' of the traditionalists and the 'turbulence' of the theologians we are perhaps made aware of the ad hoc nature of this 'alliance' between Philosophy and Jurists.
Of this 'solution' we can say that the Law (Koran) is divided in two (surface and hidden) but humanity is divided in three. There are two interpretive classes (Demonstrative, Dialectical) and two classes that deal with the apparent/surface (Dialectical, Rhetorical) and the dialectical participates in both. Dialectic is neither demonstrative theory nor simple faith but a mixture of both. All the doctrinal problems that arise are due to the dialectical class. One closes this book wondering how the invention of a 'fourth type' of humanity -another mixture- would solve anything. After all, as Averroes says, demonstrative "interpretation ought not to be declared to those adept in dialectic, not to mention the multitude." Thus we should perhaps not mention that any alliance with philosophy (whether consisting of theologians or politicos) is an alliance in name only.
The major fault line in this alliance is best exposed by considering the fact that sound interpretation is not the same as true interpretation. The Jurists are concerned with behavior and results while the philosophers are concerned with a Truth that the Jurists (or our modern politicos) cannot possibly understand. It is in the end this lack of understanding -"and that will be grasped after the slightest examination by anyone who is cognizant of the condition of demonstration"- that dooms all philosophical alliances...
This brief essay by Averroes is magnificent; it pulls back the curtain, however briefly, on something that is rarely seen. Look away if you can. The Islamic Translation Series and C. E. Butterworth have our thanks.
February 4, 2014
Le discours décisif de Ibn Rushd, autrement connu sous le nom d'Averroès, est un texte juridique qui pose quels sont les relations entre l'Islam et la philosophie, si elles ne concordent pas. Averroès a vécu comme cadi au douzième siècle dans les terres musulmanes de l'Espagne et de l'Afrique du nord, sorte d'autorité judiciaire. Tombé après sa mort dans l'oubli au sein du monde musulman, il a connu par contre une grande fortune en France et dans le reste de l'Europe chrétienne au siècle suivant, lorsque les controverses sur l'éternité du monde battaient leur plein, si bien que les thèses défendues par Averroès ont peu a peu été déformée avec le temps par les différents disputeurs, au point que l'andalou a pu être pris pour un précurseur des libres penseurs.
Il suffit de lire le texte pour se détromper. Ainsi, s'il n'oppose pas l'éternité du monde d'Aristote avec la création telle qu'elle est racontée dans son texte sacré, c'est parce que dans le coran que le monde existait avant sa création. Pour l'auteur, il ne peut jamais y avoir d'erreur dans le coran, mais on peut se tromper en l'interprétant, tout comme on peut se tromper en philosophant. L'investigation philosophique pourrait donc permettre de corriger des interprétations erronées dans cette perspective, mais aussi conduire à des méprises si elles sont menées avec étourderie, lesquelles entraineraient disputes, controverses, schismes et dissensions.
Il déplace donc le débat vers qui peut ou non mener ces investigations philosophiques. Comme pour prédécesseur Al Fârâbî, il considère que la connaissance ne doit être accessible qu'à un très petit nombre, et interdite à la multitude, laquelle doit se contenter de croire les interprétations données par les autorités. Mais pour Averroès, les sages eux-mêmes sont contraint de ne surtout pas divulguer les résultats de leurs investigations à la multitude, car cela pourrait la troubler, et faire naître le doute dans son esprit, et peut-être lui faire apercevoir que les dogmes qui lui sont inculqués ont surtout l'utilité politique de lui inspirer de la docilité. En particulier, les dogmes de l'immortalité de l'âme et des peines et récompenses après la mort, que Platon recommandaient dans sa lettre VII, sont à exclure de toute controverse et de tout questionnement. Les philosophes doivent donc par prudence se condamner à la solitude et au silence. Difficile de diffuser la philosophie dans ces conditions, si on restreint le nombre de ses adeptes, ainsi que leurs échanges, les livres étant à cette époque des objets très rares.
Il suffit de lire le texte pour se détromper. Ainsi, s'il n'oppose pas l'éternité du monde d'Aristote avec la création telle qu'elle est racontée dans son texte sacré, c'est parce que dans le coran que le monde existait avant sa création. Pour l'auteur, il ne peut jamais y avoir d'erreur dans le coran, mais on peut se tromper en l'interprétant, tout comme on peut se tromper en philosophant. L'investigation philosophique pourrait donc permettre de corriger des interprétations erronées dans cette perspective, mais aussi conduire à des méprises si elles sont menées avec étourderie, lesquelles entraineraient disputes, controverses, schismes et dissensions.
Il déplace donc le débat vers qui peut ou non mener ces investigations philosophiques. Comme pour prédécesseur Al Fârâbî, il considère que la connaissance ne doit être accessible qu'à un très petit nombre, et interdite à la multitude, laquelle doit se contenter de croire les interprétations données par les autorités. Mais pour Averroès, les sages eux-mêmes sont contraint de ne surtout pas divulguer les résultats de leurs investigations à la multitude, car cela pourrait la troubler, et faire naître le doute dans son esprit, et peut-être lui faire apercevoir que les dogmes qui lui sont inculqués ont surtout l'utilité politique de lui inspirer de la docilité. En particulier, les dogmes de l'immortalité de l'âme et des peines et récompenses après la mort, que Platon recommandaient dans sa lettre VII, sont à exclure de toute controverse et de tout questionnement. Les philosophes doivent donc par prudence se condamner à la solitude et au silence. Difficile de diffuser la philosophie dans ces conditions, si on restreint le nombre de ses adeptes, ainsi que leurs échanges, les livres étant à cette époque des objets très rares.
November 21, 2021
Cred că pentru un prim pas în cultura islamică Ibn Rusd (Averroes) e destul de potrivit pentru că pare să fie un punct de intersecție între ceea ce creștinilor le e mai familiar (Aristotel, Toma d`Aquino) și marele necunsocut pe care îl voi numi ”Rânduiala islamică”. Subiectul abordat și metodologia folosită sunt... medievale, scolastice aș spune, însă compehensibile și foarte utile prin referințele și notele de subsol (trimiterile la Avicenna, Abu-Hamid ș.a.) ale volumului. Ideea centrală, conform căreia cunoașterea textelor sacre este accesibilă oricui, însă nu pe aceeași cale (Averroes distinge trei căi diferite, în funcție de capacitățile înnăscute sau câștigate ale fiecărui om în parte), mi se pare nu doar îndrăptățită dar și foarte... actuală. Bineînțeles că rămân de discutat repercursiunile unei atare atitudini vis-a-vis de accesul la cunoaștere, dar Averroes n-are cont de facebook, așa că-l putem citi fără supărări!
March 9, 2022
why is this book actually impossible to get a hold of
December 10, 2025
My brief foray into Islamic theology has been paradoxical; though I agree more with al-Ghazali (I'm shocked no one else seems to see the Ghazali-Luther parallels that I do), I have enjoyed reading Averroes far more than him. Here I read something at once predictable (he values reason highly and finds any excuse to ensure it not only fits with theology, but always slightly outranks it), yet also innovative, in the best way. Though Averroes, concerned as he is with accusations of theological innovation (bid'ah), flatly denies the charge, I can't help but disagree with his starting place, despite the "middle way" which he arrives at by the end.
First off, I don't really agree that philosophical reasoning is foundational to reasoning per se; sure, it can help to learn it, but there are many times when reasoning fails (such as in love or faith, two much more important things). Secondly, I do find convincing his metaphor of the neutrality of tools ("or when a valid sacrifice is performed with a certain instrument, no account is taken, in judging the validity of the sacrifice, of whether the instrument belongs to one who shares our religion or to one who does not, so long as it fulfils the conditions for validity"), in part because I do the same thing in my reading (borrowing from philosophers and thinkers I sometimes virulently disagree with). Augustine's biblical metaphor of the Egyptian Gold is interesting in contrast to Averroes's "tools of sacrifice," especially given the various affordances the two have as metaphors. Thirdly, I also agree with Averroes that we shouldn't ever pre-judge matters, and should instead read "the works of our predecessors" on any topic, given that they "conform to what the conditions of demonstration require." This is a fairly scientific method, and it seems at the very least prudent.
I do however find sharp fault with Averroes's bias toward Mohammed; for example, he tells of a Hadith wherein Mohammed ordered a man with diarrhea take honey as medicine, but the diarrhea got worse: "When the man complained to him about it, he said, 'God spoke the truth; it was your brother's stomach that lied.'" To me, this example blatantly contradicts the prudent scientific approach he outlined in my previous point; here, paradoxically, Averroes stops reason short, not to protect revelation, but rather the charlatanism of Mohammed and his lack of legitimate medical knowledge.
The place where Averroes feels most typically modern is in his claim that "If the apparent meaning of Scripture conflicts with demonstrative conclusions, it must be interpreted allegorically, that is, metaphorically." This is a common-sense, yet I would argue, lazy and convenient way to approach texts. If it poses no problems, take it literally, but if not, then explain it away "spiritually." Rather than the four interpretive categories of Origen et al., we have only two. Averroes does further distinguish between three different classes of texts, however:
[ l ] Texts that must be taken in their apparent meaning by everyone. Since the meaning can be understood plainly by demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical methods alike, no one is excused for the error of interpreting these texts allegorically.
[2] Texts that must be taken in their apparent meaning by the lower classes and interpreted allegorically by the demonstrative class. It is inexcusable for the lower classes to interpret them allegorically or for the demonstrative class to take them in their apparent meaning.
[ 3] Texts whose classification under the previous headings is uncertain. Error in this matter by the demonstrative class is excused.
Here and earlier, he helpfully distinguishes between intellectuals and commoners, at least in how they should try (or refrain from trying) to interpret allegorically. Cleverly, Averroes explains contradictions in scripture as existing "in order to draw the attention of those who are well grounded in science" ('science' as 'knowledge', i.e. intellectuals). So basically, apparent contradictions are there for us to test our intellect upon. That's such a philosopher-coded take.
However un-egalitarian, I'd agree with him that attempting to use the allegorical interpretive approach is dangerous for the masses, though I wouldn't go as far as him to say that "Scripture has both an apparent and an inner meaning, and that the inner meaning ought not to be learned by anyone who is not a man of learning in this field and who is incapable of understanding it." I might agree if the inner meaning is inextricably tied to it being allegorical, but I don't see that as being the case (nor do I see the two as being purely exclusive categories, either). Rather, I like his explanation against the common people getting access to more advanced interpretive frameworks:
...allegorical interpretation comprises two things, rejection of the apparent meaning and affirmation of the allegorical one; so that if the apparent meaning is rejected in the mind of someone who can only grasp apparent meanings, without the allegorical meaning being affirmed in his mind, the result is unbelief, if it [the text in question] concerns the principles of religion. Allegorical interpretations, then, ought not to be expressed to the masses...
...
To explain the inner meaning to people unable to understand it is to destroy their belief in the apparent meaning without putting anything in its place.
I don't think Averroes is being classist here, per se; rather, he's acknowledging something we can't openly say in post-modern society: not everyone is sharp enough to interpret accurately (or honest enough to interpret wisely). Here Averroes disagrees with al-Ghazali's democratizing tendencies (despite Ghazali's warnings against people reading summaries and warnings against non-experts weighing in). He sees "al-Ghazali [as] caus[ing] confusion among the people", so much that "Demonstrative books should be banned to the unqualified but not to the learned." Averroes here proves more prudent and far-seeing than either Ghazali or Luther.
I'm pleasantly surprised how "pastoral" this text was; not forbidding the average person things arbitrarily, but to help protect them. For, as he writes:
The primary purpose of Scripture is to take care of the majority (without neglecting to arouse the elite), the prevailing methods of expression in religion are the common methods by which the majority comes to form concepts and judgments.
We have seen today how much damage has been wreaked by the opiate of the masses being forcefully taken away from them (that is, we see and feel the effects of the civilization-wide withdrawal symptoms). Marx seemed to forget that opium and opiates have their place, namely to dull pain; so instead, we still have the pain and only have lost the scant remedy afforded to us in this life. As Averroes put it earlier, modern science (and its harlot, lazy allegorical readings) have "destroy[ed] their belief in the apparent meaning without putting anything in its place." It's very interesting that Averroes finds bad allegorical readings at the root of all political partisanship and division:
It was due to allegorical interpretations especially the false ones-and the supposition that such interpretations of Scripture ought to be expressed to everyone, that the sects of Islam arose, with the result that each one accused the others of unbelief or heresy.
&
But when those who came after them used allegorical interpretation, their fear of God grew less, their dissensions increased, their love for one another was removed, and they became divided into sects.
Thus, Averroes wisely concludes with a call to Islam's "middle way," a call desperately needed yet rarely heeded in both his religion and mine:
This [He has done] by summoning the masses to a middle way of knowing God the Glorious, [a way] that is raised above the low level of the followers of authority but is below the turbulence of the theologians; and by drawing the attention of the elite to their obligation to make a thorough study of the principles of religion.
First off, I don't really agree that philosophical reasoning is foundational to reasoning per se; sure, it can help to learn it, but there are many times when reasoning fails (such as in love or faith, two much more important things). Secondly, I do find convincing his metaphor of the neutrality of tools ("or when a valid sacrifice is performed with a certain instrument, no account is taken, in judging the validity of the sacrifice, of whether the instrument belongs to one who shares our religion or to one who does not, so long as it fulfils the conditions for validity"), in part because I do the same thing in my reading (borrowing from philosophers and thinkers I sometimes virulently disagree with). Augustine's biblical metaphor of the Egyptian Gold is interesting in contrast to Averroes's "tools of sacrifice," especially given the various affordances the two have as metaphors. Thirdly, I also agree with Averroes that we shouldn't ever pre-judge matters, and should instead read "the works of our predecessors" on any topic, given that they "conform to what the conditions of demonstration require." This is a fairly scientific method, and it seems at the very least prudent.
I do however find sharp fault with Averroes's bias toward Mohammed; for example, he tells of a Hadith wherein Mohammed ordered a man with diarrhea take honey as medicine, but the diarrhea got worse: "When the man complained to him about it, he said, 'God spoke the truth; it was your brother's stomach that lied.'" To me, this example blatantly contradicts the prudent scientific approach he outlined in my previous point; here, paradoxically, Averroes stops reason short, not to protect revelation, but rather the charlatanism of Mohammed and his lack of legitimate medical knowledge.
The place where Averroes feels most typically modern is in his claim that "If the apparent meaning of Scripture conflicts with demonstrative conclusions, it must be interpreted allegorically, that is, metaphorically." This is a common-sense, yet I would argue, lazy and convenient way to approach texts. If it poses no problems, take it literally, but if not, then explain it away "spiritually." Rather than the four interpretive categories of Origen et al., we have only two. Averroes does further distinguish between three different classes of texts, however:
[ l ] Texts that must be taken in their apparent meaning by everyone. Since the meaning can be understood plainly by demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical methods alike, no one is excused for the error of interpreting these texts allegorically.
[2] Texts that must be taken in their apparent meaning by the lower classes and interpreted allegorically by the demonstrative class. It is inexcusable for the lower classes to interpret them allegorically or for the demonstrative class to take them in their apparent meaning.
[ 3] Texts whose classification under the previous headings is uncertain. Error in this matter by the demonstrative class is excused.
Here and earlier, he helpfully distinguishes between intellectuals and commoners, at least in how they should try (or refrain from trying) to interpret allegorically. Cleverly, Averroes explains contradictions in scripture as existing "in order to draw the attention of those who are well grounded in science" ('science' as 'knowledge', i.e. intellectuals). So basically, apparent contradictions are there for us to test our intellect upon. That's such a philosopher-coded take.
However un-egalitarian, I'd agree with him that attempting to use the allegorical interpretive approach is dangerous for the masses, though I wouldn't go as far as him to say that "Scripture has both an apparent and an inner meaning, and that the inner meaning ought not to be learned by anyone who is not a man of learning in this field and who is incapable of understanding it." I might agree if the inner meaning is inextricably tied to it being allegorical, but I don't see that as being the case (nor do I see the two as being purely exclusive categories, either). Rather, I like his explanation against the common people getting access to more advanced interpretive frameworks:
...allegorical interpretation comprises two things, rejection of the apparent meaning and affirmation of the allegorical one; so that if the apparent meaning is rejected in the mind of someone who can only grasp apparent meanings, without the allegorical meaning being affirmed in his mind, the result is unbelief, if it [the text in question] concerns the principles of religion. Allegorical interpretations, then, ought not to be expressed to the masses...
...
To explain the inner meaning to people unable to understand it is to destroy their belief in the apparent meaning without putting anything in its place.
I don't think Averroes is being classist here, per se; rather, he's acknowledging something we can't openly say in post-modern society: not everyone is sharp enough to interpret accurately (or honest enough to interpret wisely). Here Averroes disagrees with al-Ghazali's democratizing tendencies (despite Ghazali's warnings against people reading summaries and warnings against non-experts weighing in). He sees "al-Ghazali [as] caus[ing] confusion among the people", so much that "Demonstrative books should be banned to the unqualified but not to the learned." Averroes here proves more prudent and far-seeing than either Ghazali or Luther.
I'm pleasantly surprised how "pastoral" this text was; not forbidding the average person things arbitrarily, but to help protect them. For, as he writes:
The primary purpose of Scripture is to take care of the majority (without neglecting to arouse the elite), the prevailing methods of expression in religion are the common methods by which the majority comes to form concepts and judgments.
We have seen today how much damage has been wreaked by the opiate of the masses being forcefully taken away from them (that is, we see and feel the effects of the civilization-wide withdrawal symptoms). Marx seemed to forget that opium and opiates have their place, namely to dull pain; so instead, we still have the pain and only have lost the scant remedy afforded to us in this life. As Averroes put it earlier, modern science (and its harlot, lazy allegorical readings) have "destroy[ed] their belief in the apparent meaning without putting anything in its place." It's very interesting that Averroes finds bad allegorical readings at the root of all political partisanship and division:
It was due to allegorical interpretations especially the false ones-and the supposition that such interpretations of Scripture ought to be expressed to everyone, that the sects of Islam arose, with the result that each one accused the others of unbelief or heresy.
&
But when those who came after them used allegorical interpretation, their fear of God grew less, their dissensions increased, their love for one another was removed, and they became divided into sects.
Thus, Averroes wisely concludes with a call to Islam's "middle way," a call desperately needed yet rarely heeded in both his religion and mine:
This [He has done] by summoning the masses to a middle way of knowing God the Glorious, [a way] that is raised above the low level of the followers of authority but is below the turbulence of the theologians; and by drawing the attention of the elite to their obligation to make a thorough study of the principles of religion.
May 2, 2020
Defense of use of philosophy in conjunction with religion. Argues that religion demands that those capable pursue knowledge, because the fundamental precepts in a virtuous religion are true and will correspond with the findings of philosophers. Truth does not conflict with truth, says Averroes, and it’s up to us to understand the first cause as such if we are able.
- topics, some unresolved:
-distinction b/w existence and essence
- Arts as an indication of the Artisan (in what way does God make his character known?) -Aquinas speaks more about this in Summa Contra Gentiles with the proof Architectonic structure
-demonstrative knowledge/kinds of knowledge v ‘law-based syllogistic reasoning’
-Argument in defense of the Ancients, why it is obligatory to study foundational truths (Aquinas also argues for this in summa contra gentiles effectively, stating if truth wasn’t ‘fitting for belief’ it would be unattainable except by those best suited to it after a lifelong amount of time. Accepting some things by faith which we can’t know or prove may have the irrational consequence of leading us to knowledge)
- topics, some unresolved:
-distinction b/w existence and essence
- Arts as an indication of the Artisan (in what way does God make his character known?) -Aquinas speaks more about this in Summa Contra Gentiles with the proof Architectonic structure
-demonstrative knowledge/kinds of knowledge v ‘law-based syllogistic reasoning’
-Argument in defense of the Ancients, why it is obligatory to study foundational truths (Aquinas also argues for this in summa contra gentiles effectively, stating if truth wasn’t ‘fitting for belief’ it would be unattainable except by those best suited to it after a lifelong amount of time. Accepting some things by faith which we can’t know or prove may have the irrational consequence of leading us to knowledge)
May 22, 2017
Une excellente traduction avec une introduction de Alain De Libera qui résume efficacement le contexte historique de l'écriture de ce traité au caractère juridique, et qui explique clairement certaines notions ainsi que chaque section de paragraphes du texte. Une version à recommander à ceux qui souhaitent étudier la vision de l'usage de la philosophie au 12ème siècle selon Averroès.
May 20, 2020
Une superbe introduction d'Alain de Libéra qui démystifie l'Averroès construit par les Latins, en premier lieu Thomas d'Aquin dont l'image fausse et donc l'interprétation fantaisiste a persisté jusqu'au XXè siècle. La traduction et les annotations de Marc Geoffroy sont le résultat d'un remarquable travail de recherches manuscrites et de critiques largement nécessaires aux parfois errances de son lontain prédécesseur Gauthier, même si par endroit j'ai pu être embarrassé de trouver quelques oublis (sur la notion d'adventicité, de bidaa et plus généralement sur les débats historiques entre madhahib comme contexte) ou abus dans la traduction ("chariaa" devient Révélation dans les premières pages!). L'édition comprend en plus un dossier final sur la réception très éclectique après la Nahda des thèses d'Ibn Rushd ra dans le monde arabophone, tantôt philosophe inaccompli car encore comme menotté à la Révélation, tantôt apôtre du "rationalisme" (sic) triomphant contre la religion, bref un dossier d'un inégal intérêt.
Ibn Rushd ra n'écrit pas ici un essai philosophique mais bien une fatwa en 72 points sur l'obligation de l'apprentissage des méthodes philosophiques (pour ceux qui en ont du moins les capacités), prenant ainsi à revers l'accusation courante des théologiens - en premier lieu Al-Ghazali ra - de la dissémination de thèses dites hérétiques du corpus grec ancien (éternité du monde, l'ignorance de Dieu des particuliers, la corporéité dans la akhira) dans la culture savante islamique. Ibn Sina et al-Farabi ayant été décrits ainsi comme kuffar.
Il n'hésite pas pour cela à conduire une dizaine d'attaques en règles du courant théologique majoritaire dans l'Occident musulman malikite, les acha'rites, jusqu'à un point de non-retour pour eux, qui les contraindraient soit à admettre qu'ils s'égarent bien plus que les falasifa dans leur dissémination du ta'wil auprès de publics ignorants, soit à leur méconnaissance pure et simple des thèses mêmes d'Aristote et de ses suiveurs. Et ce, sans compter celles spécifiquement contre Al-Ghazali ra (et son Tahafut al-falasifa, qui n'est pourtant pas une critique en soi de la philosophie) dont il admire pourtant très clairement la vertu de son oeuvre spirituelle incontournable Ihya 'ulum ad-din et sa volonté de sortir du sectarisme et du seul conformisme imitatif produit par un fiqh sans âme.
Il recourt pour ses fins aux métaphores (Dieu comme Artisan, les dangers de l'eau ne peuvent être qu'accidentels et non essentiels, l'erreur du médecin chevronné n'est pas péché mais celle du pseudo-médecin est criminel, la Philosophie comme compagne ou soeur de lait de la Révélation) mais surtout le Qoran al-karîm lui-même dont il se fait largement commentateur pour dénier le caractère hérétique des thèses des falasifa mis au ban par les acha'rites et démontrer magistralement l'insupérabilité du Kitab Allah taala (ou "i'jaz") par le fait même qu'il contienne les trois méthodes de "production de l'assentiment", c'est-à-dire, démonstrative, dialectique et rhétorique, que l'on peut illustrer par la lecture étonnante qu'il fait de ce verset (les Abeilles, XVI, 125) : "Par la sagesse [Hikam, la philosophie] et la bonne exhortation [rhétorique] appelle (les gens) au sentier de ton Seigneur. Et discute avec eux [jadala, dialectique] de la meilleure façon. Car c'est ton Seigneur qui connaît le mieux celui qui s'égare de Son sentier et c'est Lui qui connaît le mieux ceux qui sont bien guidés." Il devient alors plus délicat pour ses opposants de s'attaquer à la Révélation même, décrite comme impeccable car notamment dotée de toutes les voies pour toucher l'entendement de tout un chacune.
Quelques points restant toutefois en suspend cela dit, car Ibn Rushd remue bien plus que la surface d'un débat qui depuis 1000 ans est bien stérile dans la pensée islamique sur la validité ou non du ta'wil : en attaquant la prétention à l'ijma' des théologiens acha'rites sur le ta'wil, on peut se demander s'il ne remet pas tout simplement en question ce principe (usûl al-fiqh) lui-même, principe non-coranique devenu canonique dont l'une des conséquences négatives est l'indépassabilité de certaines vues juridiques, quand bien même les 'ulema eux-mêmes ne sont plus bien souvent des savants dans de nombreux domaines. L'ijma' fonctionnant au final chez les sunnites sur la prétention improuvable à l'unanimité mondiale des 'ulema sur un point et, de ce fait, devenant aussi incassable que la prétention chiite d'un ayatollah à un avis masum (infaillible).
Autre point très intéressant, le 49 où il attribue un double rôle à la Révélation : l'apprentissage de la Vérité (plutôt consensuel) et celui de l'incitation à sa mise en pratique. Ce 'ilm al-'amali, praxis islamique, oeuvrant comme véridiction du message coranique par nos pratiques, serait la voie vers la béatitude finale, mais aussi une transformation de la dounia. Une sorte de démonstration (pour jouer avec les mots qu'il chérie) humaine de la puissance d'un esprit complet, qui agirait harmonieusement, selon ses moyens après avoir compris la hikma et el-Kitab.
Et pourtant, il fait aussi par endroit usage d'ahadith suspects et garde encore des traces, compréhensives car il est juriste, d'une approche très normative du fiqh pour la société.
Sa conclusion semble plaider pour l'élaboration d'un nouveau travail rationnel de savants sur le sens du qoran al-karim, qui aurait pu probablement conduire à un nouveau tafsir (dont il sème ici les germes) ou traité d'aqida plus littéral et logique, débarrassé des cadres sophistiques dangereux comme il le prétend, de théologiens incapables de maîtriser la dialectique ou la démonstration. D'ailleurs, il conclue en rappelant la rigueur des salafs as-saleh sur l'absence de publicité sur le ta'wil (mais pas son interdiction pour autant), pour un kalam et une hikma véritable, honorant les diverses voies de compréhension du monde présentantes dans al-quran
En attendant des éditions bilingues complètes et de qualité du Kashf et de Tahafut at-tahafut...
Ibn Rushd ra n'écrit pas ici un essai philosophique mais bien une fatwa en 72 points sur l'obligation de l'apprentissage des méthodes philosophiques (pour ceux qui en ont du moins les capacités), prenant ainsi à revers l'accusation courante des théologiens - en premier lieu Al-Ghazali ra - de la dissémination de thèses dites hérétiques du corpus grec ancien (éternité du monde, l'ignorance de Dieu des particuliers, la corporéité dans la akhira) dans la culture savante islamique. Ibn Sina et al-Farabi ayant été décrits ainsi comme kuffar.
Il n'hésite pas pour cela à conduire une dizaine d'attaques en règles du courant théologique majoritaire dans l'Occident musulman malikite, les acha'rites, jusqu'à un point de non-retour pour eux, qui les contraindraient soit à admettre qu'ils s'égarent bien plus que les falasifa dans leur dissémination du ta'wil auprès de publics ignorants, soit à leur méconnaissance pure et simple des thèses mêmes d'Aristote et de ses suiveurs. Et ce, sans compter celles spécifiquement contre Al-Ghazali ra (et son Tahafut al-falasifa, qui n'est pourtant pas une critique en soi de la philosophie) dont il admire pourtant très clairement la vertu de son oeuvre spirituelle incontournable Ihya 'ulum ad-din et sa volonté de sortir du sectarisme et du seul conformisme imitatif produit par un fiqh sans âme.
Il recourt pour ses fins aux métaphores (Dieu comme Artisan, les dangers de l'eau ne peuvent être qu'accidentels et non essentiels, l'erreur du médecin chevronné n'est pas péché mais celle du pseudo-médecin est criminel, la Philosophie comme compagne ou soeur de lait de la Révélation) mais surtout le Qoran al-karîm lui-même dont il se fait largement commentateur pour dénier le caractère hérétique des thèses des falasifa mis au ban par les acha'rites et démontrer magistralement l'insupérabilité du Kitab Allah taala (ou "i'jaz") par le fait même qu'il contienne les trois méthodes de "production de l'assentiment", c'est-à-dire, démonstrative, dialectique et rhétorique, que l'on peut illustrer par la lecture étonnante qu'il fait de ce verset (les Abeilles, XVI, 125) : "Par la sagesse [Hikam, la philosophie] et la bonne exhortation [rhétorique] appelle (les gens) au sentier de ton Seigneur. Et discute avec eux [jadala, dialectique] de la meilleure façon. Car c'est ton Seigneur qui connaît le mieux celui qui s'égare de Son sentier et c'est Lui qui connaît le mieux ceux qui sont bien guidés." Il devient alors plus délicat pour ses opposants de s'attaquer à la Révélation même, décrite comme impeccable car notamment dotée de toutes les voies pour toucher l'entendement de tout un chacune.
Quelques points restant toutefois en suspend cela dit, car Ibn Rushd remue bien plus que la surface d'un débat qui depuis 1000 ans est bien stérile dans la pensée islamique sur la validité ou non du ta'wil : en attaquant la prétention à l'ijma' des théologiens acha'rites sur le ta'wil, on peut se demander s'il ne remet pas tout simplement en question ce principe (usûl al-fiqh) lui-même, principe non-coranique devenu canonique dont l'une des conséquences négatives est l'indépassabilité de certaines vues juridiques, quand bien même les 'ulema eux-mêmes ne sont plus bien souvent des savants dans de nombreux domaines. L'ijma' fonctionnant au final chez les sunnites sur la prétention improuvable à l'unanimité mondiale des 'ulema sur un point et, de ce fait, devenant aussi incassable que la prétention chiite d'un ayatollah à un avis masum (infaillible).
Autre point très intéressant, le 49 où il attribue un double rôle à la Révélation : l'apprentissage de la Vérité (plutôt consensuel) et celui de l'incitation à sa mise en pratique. Ce 'ilm al-'amali, praxis islamique, oeuvrant comme véridiction du message coranique par nos pratiques, serait la voie vers la béatitude finale, mais aussi une transformation de la dounia. Une sorte de démonstration (pour jouer avec les mots qu'il chérie) humaine de la puissance d'un esprit complet, qui agirait harmonieusement, selon ses moyens après avoir compris la hikma et el-Kitab.
Et pourtant, il fait aussi par endroit usage d'ahadith suspects et garde encore des traces, compréhensives car il est juriste, d'une approche très normative du fiqh pour la société.
Sa conclusion semble plaider pour l'élaboration d'un nouveau travail rationnel de savants sur le sens du qoran al-karim, qui aurait pu probablement conduire à un nouveau tafsir (dont il sème ici les germes) ou traité d'aqida plus littéral et logique, débarrassé des cadres sophistiques dangereux comme il le prétend, de théologiens incapables de maîtriser la dialectique ou la démonstration. D'ailleurs, il conclue en rappelant la rigueur des salafs as-saleh sur l'absence de publicité sur le ta'wil (mais pas son interdiction pour autant), pour un kalam et une hikma véritable, honorant les diverses voies de compréhension du monde présentantes dans al-quran
En attendant des éditions bilingues complètes et de qualité du Kashf et de Tahafut at-tahafut...
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 17, 2021
A short but edifying read, one of ibn Rushd's most important works in terms of impact. He gives several decent arguments that philosophy as a method is not only compatible with Islam, but is an inextricable part of the religion, and that philosophical inquiry is actually mandated by Allah in the Qur'an. He chooses some interesting ayat to make this point, but leaves out a few others that arguably make his point even better than do those ayat he did choose.
He also addresses some of al-Ghazali's arguments against ibn Sina, al-Farabi, et. al. as advanced in al-Ghazali's "The Incoherence of the Philosophers", and addresses them quite well.
After this, however, ibn Rushd goes in some very questionable directions, arguing, for instance, that, while philosophical inquiry is mandated in Islam, it's mandatory only for select persons. Not only should philosophy be left to particular scholars, but those scholars should not even attempt to share or explain either the philosophical method or their reasoned conclusions as regards matters of religion with the wider Muslim audience. This and other aspects of ibn Rushd's arguments are wrongheaded and downright objectionable.
Nevertheless, the "Decisive Treatise" is a seminal work that proved very influential in the effort to combat the condemnation of philosophy by certain traditionalist currents within Islamic scholarship, and is a must-read as result.
The English and Arabic (side-by-side) edition published by Brigham Young University Press is ideal, as it contains both languages in an easy-to-read-and-compare format that serves those who can read in both languages extremely well, as the reader can refer to the Arabic to see the exact terminology used by ibn Rushd. The translation is generally excellent, but there are passages where knowing the precise Arabic terminology used by the author makes everything all the more clear.
He also addresses some of al-Ghazali's arguments against ibn Sina, al-Farabi, et. al. as advanced in al-Ghazali's "The Incoherence of the Philosophers", and addresses them quite well.
After this, however, ibn Rushd goes in some very questionable directions, arguing, for instance, that, while philosophical inquiry is mandated in Islam, it's mandatory only for select persons. Not only should philosophy be left to particular scholars, but those scholars should not even attempt to share or explain either the philosophical method or their reasoned conclusions as regards matters of religion with the wider Muslim audience. This and other aspects of ibn Rushd's arguments are wrongheaded and downright objectionable.
Nevertheless, the "Decisive Treatise" is a seminal work that proved very influential in the effort to combat the condemnation of philosophy by certain traditionalist currents within Islamic scholarship, and is a must-read as result.
The English and Arabic (side-by-side) edition published by Brigham Young University Press is ideal, as it contains both languages in an easy-to-read-and-compare format that serves those who can read in both languages extremely well, as the reader can refer to the Arabic to see the exact terminology used by ibn Rushd. The translation is generally excellent, but there are passages where knowing the precise Arabic terminology used by the author makes everything all the more clear.
December 8, 2025
Die legale Lizenz zum Selberdenken
Man stelle sich vor, man müsste vor einem strengen religiösen Gericht beweisen, dass „Nachdenken“ keine Sünde ist. Genau das tut Averroës in diesem Buch. Im Kern handelt es sich um eine juristische Klageschrift zugunsten der Philosophie. Sein genialer Schachzug: Er argumentiert, dass der Koran die Menschen ausdrücklich dazu auffordert, die Welt zu erforschen. Wer also nicht philosophiert – und Aristoteles ignoriert –, verweigert letztlich den göttlichen Arbeitsauftrag.
Der ultimative Life-Hack: Averroës erklärt, dass Religion und Philosophie wie zwei Geschwister sind, die sich nur scheinbar streiten. Und wenn der Text einmal der Vernunft widerspricht? Kein Problem: Dann ist er eben allegorisch zu verstehen.
Zweisprachiger Bonus: Diese Flammarion-Ausgabe erscheint zweisprachig (Französisch/Arabisch), damit man sich beim Klugscheißen auch wirklich auf beide Texttraditionen stützen kann.
Ein 800 Jahre altes Plädoyer dafür, dass der Verstand kein Dekorationsgegenstand ist. Pflichtlektüre für alle, die wissen wollen, wie man Fundamentalisten mit ihren eigenen Waffen schlägt.
Man stelle sich vor, man müsste vor einem strengen religiösen Gericht beweisen, dass „Nachdenken“ keine Sünde ist. Genau das tut Averroës in diesem Buch. Im Kern handelt es sich um eine juristische Klageschrift zugunsten der Philosophie. Sein genialer Schachzug: Er argumentiert, dass der Koran die Menschen ausdrücklich dazu auffordert, die Welt zu erforschen. Wer also nicht philosophiert – und Aristoteles ignoriert –, verweigert letztlich den göttlichen Arbeitsauftrag.
Der ultimative Life-Hack: Averroës erklärt, dass Religion und Philosophie wie zwei Geschwister sind, die sich nur scheinbar streiten. Und wenn der Text einmal der Vernunft widerspricht? Kein Problem: Dann ist er eben allegorisch zu verstehen.
Zweisprachiger Bonus: Diese Flammarion-Ausgabe erscheint zweisprachig (Französisch/Arabisch), damit man sich beim Klugscheißen auch wirklich auf beide Texttraditionen stützen kann.
Ein 800 Jahre altes Plädoyer dafür, dass der Verstand kein Dekorationsgegenstand ist. Pflichtlektüre für alle, die wissen wollen, wie man Fundamentalisten mit ihren eigenen Waffen schlägt.
October 30, 2020
Very difficult to read
Want to read
October 26, 2007Brigham Young University (Provo, UT) is behind this important endeavour to translate all great works from the Islamic world! i can't express how thrilled and grateful i am that some very insightful & inspired individuals/scholars at the Y have dedicated themselves to bridging this gap of ignorance about this part of the world. bravo! i salute you! and will read up soon. :)
May 7, 2007
enjoyed parrallel arabic and english texts; commentary is worthwhile - get to have a touch of ibn rushd
Read
November 21, 2009None
August 20, 2013
كتاب فصل المقال في طبعة باللغتين العربية والفرنسية يتلوها تحليل للكتاب و تفسير لمفرداتها في إطارها الفلسفي.
كتاب رائع
كتاب رائع
February 22, 2013
One of my favorite Philosophy books.
Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews