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From Gettysburg to the Rapidan the Army of the Potomac July 1863 to April 1864
Originally published in 1883, From Gettysburg to the Rapidan: The Army of the Potomac, July, 1863, to April, 1864 is a narrative that recounts the pursuit/campaign made by the Army of Potomac (the principal Union Army) against the Confederate Army which retreated from Gettysburg towards Rapidan after losing the Battle of Gettysburg.
- GenresHistory
108 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1987
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December 29, 2017
This book isn’t for everybody, but was a “find” for me personally. Humphreys was on Grant’s staff and wrote volume 12 of the 16 volume Scribner’s History of the Civil War. That volume covered Grant’s Virginia Campaign of 1864-65 – the bloody battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, siege of Petersburg and Lee’s surrender at Appomattox. Humphreys really should have been given two volumes to cover so much material, so the single volume is cut to the bone, yet so detailed in movements, maneuvers and intentions that professional historians find it “still useful after 150 years” as a reference.
This little book consists of 137 pages that were cut from the opening of The Virginia Campaign. Here he follows the armies from Gettysburg to Fredericksburg where the 1864 Virginia campaign to end the war kicked off.
Many people think vaguely of Gettysburg as the “turning point” of the war in which Lee’s army was decisively broken. Though Pickett’s division was decimated in his famous charge, the army was intact and waited a full day for the Union army to counterattack. They withdrew because, although they could live off the land in Pennsylvania, the battle left them low on ammunition which they could not replenish so deep in enemy territory.
This little book covers the ten months from July 1863 to May 1864 in which Lee’s army withdrew across the Potomac into the Shenandoah valley, and then sparred actively with the Union in roughly the area from Fredericksburg to Bull Run and Centreville. Lee was by this time outnumbered 2-1, and deteriorating southern railroads had difficulty supplying him with food that lay abundant in southern warehouses. The Western theater had collapsed, and Sherman began his drive from Chattanooga to Atlanta in the spring of 1864 simultaneously with Grant’s Virginia campaign. Lee was basically buying time for something else to happen. And he did so brilliantly.
There were no decisive battles fought in these 10 months between Gettysburg and the Virginia campaign, which is why most histories skip it. I was always curious about that empty space, so I snatched this up. I don’t recommend it unless you have similar interest. Oh, and you will need maps, which you can google online.
This little book consists of 137 pages that were cut from the opening of The Virginia Campaign. Here he follows the armies from Gettysburg to Fredericksburg where the 1864 Virginia campaign to end the war kicked off.
Many people think vaguely of Gettysburg as the “turning point” of the war in which Lee’s army was decisively broken. Though Pickett’s division was decimated in his famous charge, the army was intact and waited a full day for the Union army to counterattack. They withdrew because, although they could live off the land in Pennsylvania, the battle left them low on ammunition which they could not replenish so deep in enemy territory.
This little book covers the ten months from July 1863 to May 1864 in which Lee’s army withdrew across the Potomac into the Shenandoah valley, and then sparred actively with the Union in roughly the area from Fredericksburg to Bull Run and Centreville. Lee was by this time outnumbered 2-1, and deteriorating southern railroads had difficulty supplying him with food that lay abundant in southern warehouses. The Western theater had collapsed, and Sherman began his drive from Chattanooga to Atlanta in the spring of 1864 simultaneously with Grant’s Virginia campaign. Lee was basically buying time for something else to happen. And he did so brilliantly.
There were no decisive battles fought in these 10 months between Gettysburg and the Virginia campaign, which is why most histories skip it. I was always curious about that empty space, so I snatched this up. I don’t recommend it unless you have similar interest. Oh, and you will need maps, which you can google online.
February 6, 2018
This little book consists of 137 pages removed from the opening of A.A. Humphreys "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65". This latter book was volume 12 of the Scribners History of the Civil War (1885), and covers Grant's campaign to end the war which kicked off near Fredericksburg in May of '64 and ended with Lee's surrender at Appomattox one year later. Humphreys was both a corps commander and on Grant's staff and knows this material in such detail that he ought to have been allowed two volumes. Though written with clarity, the pressure to be concise makes it a little dry and in desperate need of maps for the recreational reader. Nonetheless, professional historians find it still useful after 150 years.
The portion edited from that book covers Lee's retreat from Gettysburg on July 4, 1863, and Meade's pursuit with the Union army. This account ends near Fredericksburg when winter ends the fighting until Grant's campaign opens the following spring.
Most people have the impression that Lee was decisively defeated at Gettysburg, which was the turning point of the war. Though Pickett's division was shattered in his famous charge, the rest of the army was largely intact but short of ammunition after three days of battle. Once Lee moves south and replenishes, there is much sparring that proves Lee's army was very much alive, though neither side was able to bring off a decisive battle in this period.
Perhaps most enlightening in these pages is Humphrey's defense of Mead, who commanded the Union army at Gettysburg. Meade has been much criticized -- then and now -- for allowing Lee to escape after Gettysburge. Heavy rains raised the Potomac to near flood stage and trapped Lee on the north bank where, many pundits argue, Meade could have attacked him and ended the war.
Humphreys, who was at Getgtysburg, details first how Lee withdrew from that place through the Fairfield and Cashtown passes. Union pursuit at either would have been difficult. A handful of Confederates could hold off a much larger force in such narrow fronts. Meade instead took his army south to cross the mountains through passes near Fredrick. By this time Lee was trapped by high waters against the north bank of the Potomac, but Meade's delay gave him time to entrench. d Meade hesitated to assault until he could reconnoiter the entrenchments. The Potomac subsided and Lee slipped across to escaped as he had done the previous year at Antietam.
Humphreys, who fought at Gettysburg, says the entrenchments across Lee's short front were impenetrable and both flanks well anchored. His opinion is that an assault by Meade would have been bloody and pointless, ending as Grant's did the following year at Cold Harbor.
Humphrey's analysis is sound and makes these pages essential to collectors of this Scribners history. The Gettysburg volume (VI) by Abner Doubleday is critical of Meade's performance throughout, and especially harsh on him for letting Lee escape. Humphreys "From Gettysburg to the Rapidan" is a more carefully considered analysis that I found a persuasive alternative.
Readers with a vague knowledge of the war should look for more popular fare. This is for serious students of the conflict and they should find it worth their time.
The portion edited from that book covers Lee's retreat from Gettysburg on July 4, 1863, and Meade's pursuit with the Union army. This account ends near Fredericksburg when winter ends the fighting until Grant's campaign opens the following spring.
Most people have the impression that Lee was decisively defeated at Gettysburg, which was the turning point of the war. Though Pickett's division was shattered in his famous charge, the rest of the army was largely intact but short of ammunition after three days of battle. Once Lee moves south and replenishes, there is much sparring that proves Lee's army was very much alive, though neither side was able to bring off a decisive battle in this period.
Perhaps most enlightening in these pages is Humphrey's defense of Mead, who commanded the Union army at Gettysburg. Meade has been much criticized -- then and now -- for allowing Lee to escape after Gettysburge. Heavy rains raised the Potomac to near flood stage and trapped Lee on the north bank where, many pundits argue, Meade could have attacked him and ended the war.
Humphreys, who was at Getgtysburg, details first how Lee withdrew from that place through the Fairfield and Cashtown passes. Union pursuit at either would have been difficult. A handful of Confederates could hold off a much larger force in such narrow fronts. Meade instead took his army south to cross the mountains through passes near Fredrick. By this time Lee was trapped by high waters against the north bank of the Potomac, but Meade's delay gave him time to entrench. d Meade hesitated to assault until he could reconnoiter the entrenchments. The Potomac subsided and Lee slipped across to escaped as he had done the previous year at Antietam.
Humphreys, who fought at Gettysburg, says the entrenchments across Lee's short front were impenetrable and both flanks well anchored. His opinion is that an assault by Meade would have been bloody and pointless, ending as Grant's did the following year at Cold Harbor.
Humphrey's analysis is sound and makes these pages essential to collectors of this Scribners history. The Gettysburg volume (VI) by Abner Doubleday is critical of Meade's performance throughout, and especially harsh on him for letting Lee escape. Humphreys "From Gettysburg to the Rapidan" is a more carefully considered analysis that I found a persuasive alternative.
Readers with a vague knowledge of the war should look for more popular fare. This is for serious students of the conflict and they should find it worth their time.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews