The swastika first entered modern history in the uniforms of the German counterrevolutionary troops of 1918 to 1923—and because of the defeat in Germany, Russia fell into the isolation that gave Stalin his road to power. Here, Chris Harman unearths the history of the lost revolution in Germany, and reveals its lessons for the future struggles for a better world.
British journalist and political activist for the Socialist Workers Party.
Harmann was involved with activism against the Viet Nam war but became controversial for denouncing Ho Chi Minh for murdering the leader of the Vietnamese Trotskists.
Harman's work on May 1968 in France and other student and workers uprisings of the late 1960s, The Fire Last Time, was recommended by rock band Rage Against the Machine in their album sleeve notes for Evil Empire.
A masterclass in revolutionary history. As an open partisan, I normally advise you to not take historians' analyses at face value, including those of "Marxist" historians, because they're often times missing the collective work required for a truly materialist analysis. But this book not only tells the whole and full story of the German revolution, with every single major episode (November rebellion, Spartacist uprising followed by civil war, the Ruhr insurrection, the disastrous March Action insurrection, the missed revolution in 1923) in an incredibly detailed and well-sourced way, but also analyses it, to my shock, largely correctly. The mistakes made in the Sparticist insurrection are not here attributed to the usual nonsense, but instead follow the Marxist explanation of insurrection perfectly.
This is an amazing book, indeed one of the greatest history books I've ever seen. If you want to learn about one of the most important and world-shaping yet obscure events of the 20th century, you HAVE to read it.
An illuminating summary of a fascinating, rebellious period in German history. Had the German revolution been consummated the world would likely be very different today. The revolution's defeat in the early 1920's was a key factor in the rise to power of the Nazis in the 1930s. The defeat also isolated the fledgling Russian revolution, which in turn paved the way for Stalin's rise to power and the strangling of Russia's democratic socialism.
Harman's account captures the heroism and self-sacrifice of the German revolutionaries, many of whom died for their ideals. But he also writes perceptively on the weaknesses and mistakes that plagued the German Communist movement - from the early reluctance to organise separately from the reformist Social Democratic parties, to the several ill-judged and/or poorly-executed attempts at insurrection.
Walk with me! Through a review of a fairly dry political history of a particular period of German Communism (from the perspective of a British SWP member) after WW1!! The book was sitting on the shelf of an artist/activist in Berlin who's apartment I am subletting. I was wanting some historical knowledge. It was good timing.
Now, when I say that I've read this book I mean that I've read the first 5 chapters and the conclusion. And look, it's *possible* that I missed some crucial details in the chapters I skipped. However, it has filled in some gaps in my dodgy understanding of euro history.
The author narrative goes like this: the willing and enthusiastic mostly volunteer Prussian WW1 soldiers got smashed in a crazy expansionist invasion of the neighbouring states and as a result people were feeling pretty pissed off and anti-authoritarian. They didn't like capitalism very much, they were sick of war. All the things that made people ok with the Prussian state, made it's rule (thinly veiled monarchic rule where rich people got more votes in elections than poor people, and only men voted) 'acceptable' to the majority of people before the war failed. So people took part in some great very wide scale revolt, disobeying orders etc. And in fact, set up a network of local workers/soldiers councils that took over power in most cities across the country. And most people were happy about that, overjoyed even.
That's impressive - the area called Prussia was pretty huge. But, and here a bit more of my simplificating summary, the author argues that ultimately no one had their wits about them enough to stop all that energy and work being headed off at the pass by the social democratic party (who were closely linked to the rich people/monarch/previous government wot took the nation to first world war). These anti-revolutionary conservatives who wanted nice cheap labour for their factories etc took back power from these local councils and a few years later installed Hitler in a political system where his cabinet had total power and could do whatever they liked ie: no two houses of parliament etc. Motivated in part by retaining power/economic and social circumstances conducive to profit/wealth retention.
In the face of such promise: disaster. The book makes an account of what went wrong.
Early on, in 1907 well before the first world war Rosa Luxembourg, in a letter to Clara Zetkin wrote "I see with depressing clarity that neither things nor people can be changed until the whole situation [the complacency of the social democratic apparatus] has changed - and even then we shall have to reckon with the inevitable resistance of such people if we want to lead the masses on. Our job will take years."
Which reminds me of how I feel when I think about climate change and anti-coal struggles. But anyway...
At the point that I stopped reading (chapter 6), Rosa Luxembourg (of the Spartakists - well that fills in some gaps in my knowledge of the history of socialist factions) had just been killed in anti-communist reprisals/state terror. As far as the author is concerned she was the smartest, most competent leader and most capable of leading a political movement that could result in actual communism (as opposed to Stalinism for eg).
"On 15 January they were arrested at their hiding place...and dragged off separately to one of the Freikorps headquarters...Here Captain Pabst had already made arrangements for their murder. After questioning, Liebkneckt was taken from the building, knocked half unconscious with a rifle butt and then driven to Tiergarten where he was killed. Rosa was takem out shortly afterwards, her skull smashed in and then she too was driven off, shot through the head and thrown into the canal. The news caused immense joy amongst the middle classes"
This is a powerful sentence when one is actually in Berlin and you know, walking along the canal every day and you know, these are real places. She was far from alone in experiencing such a brutal end - many unionists, leftists and others experienced the same during this period.
What I found fascinating in this book was the account of the level of organisation that did exist before this repression, in the first throes of the revolution - daily leftist newspapers were printed across the country - hundreds of different ones. Millions of people were engaged in some form of anti-capitalist/republican revolt/organising/struggle. Soldiers and police were walking off the job left right and centre to join the 'revolution'. However these same people and their desire for change and a better life were led to throw their weight behind Nazism. It seems that they retained respect/trust for some social democratic leaders and failed to identify when they were being disempowered. Oh yeah, and I guess the majority also failed to identify anti-semitism as bullshit. And/or they were beaten to submission by the waves of state terror that Nazism deployed. The museum/exhibition Topographies of Terror that sits on the grounds of the former Nazi administration gives a good account of these things and was fresh in my mind while I read this book. Startling are the photographs of people being publicly humiliated, marched through the streets with signs around their necks, heads shaved etc (for having 'relations' with prisoners of war, disagreeing with the regime, voting the wrong way, shopping in jewish stores) in front of crowds of people who seem to think it's all great entertainment.
The author makes the argument that the lack of progress from revolution to communism in Germany, which was one of the biggest economies in the world at that time, fed into Stalins rise, and Stalinist orthodoxy in turn contributed to the failings of the leadership of the German left/communists. "Not only in Germany did the defeat of the revolution spell catastrophe for mankind. Next to Germany lay the huge landmass of the former Tsarist empire. Those who had led the revolution there in 1917 had believed its destiny to be tied up with the destiny of the German industrial giant. The spread of the revolution from Russia to Germany was no idle dream. As we have seen, there was a brief moment in 1918 when workers' councils were the only power all the way from the Urals to the North Sea. There was a world movement with its Red Armies in the Ruhr as well as Siberia, Batavia as well as the Don Basin, its councils in Turin and Bremen as well as Tsaritsyn...[then after a series of failures/counter revolution scenarios] ...For the Bolshevik-turned-bureaucrat the prospect of a liberated humanity once again seemed far more distant and unreal that the enforcement of production targets and the placating of careerists; for the Russian workers, revolution was once again a distant mirage, obscured by the present reality of shortages, low wages, and an increasingly authoritarian regime...'the parties were changing their faces and even their language: a conventional jargon was settling upon our publications - we called it 'Agitprop Pidgin'. Everything was now only a matter of '100 percent approval of the correct line of the Executive' or Bolshevik monotheism...The German Communist Party made numerous profound mistakes in the first five years of it's existence. But at least, if we read the records of the congresses and debates of those years, we feel in the presence of human beings attempting, however blunderingly, to change history. By contrast, in the congresses and debates from 1924 onwards, what we find are backstage manoeuvres sanctified with the out of context quote and the invented 'fact'...The German Communist Party was no longer a 'positive' factor..."
And I think this is probably the authors most controversial (but enjoyably epic) claim: "Social democracy in the West begat Stalinism in the East. The blood spilt by Stalin, as much as the blood spilt by Hitler, lies also at the door of the right wing Social Democrats."
He concludes "Moscow had decreed that social democracy was the same as fascism and the German Communist leaders then ignored the threat of real fascism. The KPD's (ie German Communist Party) own membership remained at only half the 1923 figure. Despite it's five million votes, it positioned itself on the sidelines of history, refusing to challenge the Social Democrat leaders...While the Nazis made their way towards power, the KPD continued to talk gibberish about the danger of 'social fascism' and to lull workers to sleep with the slogan, 'After Hitler, us'. The degeneration had come full circle. The whole world has had to pay the price."
And there ends my excursion into a communist history from the perspective of a socialist party member, for today.
The idea that having leaders with the correct analysis and timing can save the day is an intoxicating one but is it real lyfe? Of course knowing and analysing history is important but is the far reaching, lasting change we need/they desired (assuming a common desire) possible in as short a time as a decade?
What I'd love to read is an account that draws on oral history and tells me what it was like for non-politicos to live during this time. What on earth were they thinking? And why? I want to know what living conditions were like for them and the preceding generation and how industrialisation unfolded in Germany.
While I don't agree with all of the author's analysis, this book certainly cements the fact that the German Revolution came agonizingly close to succeeding and all of humanity paid a horrific price that it did not.
The end of this short history of the German revolution made me pretty sad--the German Communist Party came within minutes of seizing power in 1923, launching a civil war against the Nazis and other rightists, then called it off.
Before reading this book, I knew next to nothing about this period of revolutionary history. The time and experience is packed with good lessons for sensible revolutionaries, and the author does a great job of drawing them out.
La révolution allemande Chris Harman. Un excellent livre sur une période où 3 révolutions auraient pu arriver. On y voit ntment un KPD non stalinisé, mais souffrant de n'avoir connu d'organisation avant 1918. Le livre n'est cependant pas exempt de problèmes : il est ainsi peut à assez sentencieux, l'auteur étant peut être trop sur de lui-même sur les problèmes des différentes organisations de l'époque. Harmann se retrouve aussi extrêmement (trop) indulgent envers des figures comme Paul Levi et Brandler. À l'inverse de ses avis très définitifs sur certaines situations, Harmann se retrouve bien trop bienveillant voir complaisant avec ces personnages. Malgré tout ce livre est extrêmement bien informé et intéressant, mais il est bon de contrebalancer ses avis avec d'autres ouvrages sur la période révolutionnaire de la république de Weimar.
The German Revolution was the most important failed revolution in history (unless one counts the Russian Revolution as a failure, but that's a whole other conversation). I've been meaning to read a full treatment of this event for a long time, but was deterred by the paucity of English sources. I chose this one because it seemed the most adequate and up-to-date book that covered the whole revolutionary period (rather than Robert Gerwarth's book that just covers 1918), even though I was wary that this might be a polemic. My feelings for Trotskyism range from ambivalent at best and hostile at worst (especially with regard to the notorious Socialist Workers Party, which Harman was associated with). However I was pleasantly surprised to find that, despite some obvious axes to grind here and there and some irritating invectives against "ultraleftism" (a term Harman uses very liberally to describe council communists and Stalinists alike), this is quite a balanced and highly informative and analytical account. I was gripped by the tragedies and farces of this pivotal event in history that are brilliantly illustrated with long quotes from primary sources, although the latter half of the book certainly slows down a bit as the events shift more towards debates and squabbles within the Communist Party. A nitpick I have is that Harman was a bit inconsistent with his footnoting. That said, I would definitely recommend this to anyone interested in the subject, with the caveat that they compliment Harman's Trotskyite analyses by reading some other perspectives, such as the pamphlets of the dreaded ultraleftist councilists as I aim to do.
Chris Harman's book is a necessary book on a not widely known or understand defeated revolution. Many know the name and tragic fate of Rosa Luxemburg, but hardly known the details of the spartacist uprising much less the following years of revolutionary Germany. Harman introduces Germanys revolutionary years of 1918 to 1923 by explaining the wider context and WWI that leads to the possibility of Germany continuing the predicted global revolution.
Harman was a member of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and he presents a history of the German Revolution from that perspective constantly argues about the necessity to create a strong party able to handle organized resistance. He argues that the failure of the communists to create a viable party before the spartacist uprising was an essential part of the failed revolution of 1919.
Although party organs were built up elsewhere after this a few other things frustrated a liberatroy future. In particular, the failure of the 'left' mainly the Social democrats tragic policies of opposing the more radical left, which often put them on the side of reaction including supporting right wing paramilitary at points. One salient example is the failure of the Social Democrat power holders of the government to utterly disarm the right following the military coup or the Kapp putsch 1920, which was heroically resisted by working class struggle. The results of these failure are well known, but the story itself is recounted here from a very sympathetic, yet critical, perspective.
Chris Harman is one of my favorite Marxist writers. What I like about him and the rest of the SWP guys is that, when writing about a particular historical event, he did not restrict himself just to storytelling, but provided insights about how a revolutionary should have acted in the particular situation. "The Lost Revolution" is not an exception in that respect, which makes it a great book.
Amazing account of the political upheavals in Germany from 1918 to 1923, sympathetic to the Communist Party. And the whole time you have a knot in your stomach because you know what's coming and how it ends.
It's a brilliant book. Harman's writing style is clear and cutting, and it explains the second most important revolution in the history of the workers' movement. It's a tragedy, but an extremely important one to understand.
A helpful, concise examination of the failures of Germany's social democracy and communist parties immediately after the first World War. Vanguard parties are pretty necessary.
An excellent and I think defininite account of the failure of Germany's 1918-19 revolution. But it will be controversial because it bears on issues still hotly contested today: whether revolutions are roads to freedom or lead inevitably to dictatorship, and, for those who believe in workers' revolution, whether Lenin's Bolshevik party model is a vital asset or horrible liability. Harman is a revolutionary and Leninist. (William Pelz, in his People's History of the German Revolution, calls Harman's book "one of the best written from this political viewpoint", though Pelz himself is no Leninist.)
Harman's case is this. The German workers, soldiers and sailors who made the revolution trusted their historical leaders, the Social Democrats, to end capitalism and introduce a new type of society, based on the popular councils which had been set up from below during the revolt. The Social Democrat leaders used radical phrases to maintain their authority, and briefly led a government resting on the council structure. But they wanted to close the councils down asap and introduce a western style parliamentary regime. What was needed, Harman says, was a powerful Bolshevik party to explain this and fight for what the workers actually wanted. But such party wasn't there.
Revolutionary Germany had what Harman calls a mosaic of workers power in early 1919: workers were in control here and there, to varying extents and with varying sorts of leadership, but with no central coordination. The Social Democrat government picked off these scattered opponents one by one, using reactionary soldiers in a bloody campaign of suppression. Again, Harman says, a German Bolshevik party was needed, to coordinate resistance.
There was a final hope for the revolution: the hyper-inflationary meltdown of 1923, which brought near total social breakdown (and also melted away the vast officialdom of the Social Democrats, which could no longer be paid). The councils were long gone but by now there was a sizeable revolutionary party. All depended on the guidance from Moscow, centre of the one successful revolution. Trotsky called on Germany's Communists to challenge for power: the situation was so very fluid they could rally the workers behind them, and perhaps, probably, take power; councils could then be reestablished. But in Russia Trotsky was becoming isolated as the old Bolshevik party was slowly swallowed up by a rising bureaucracy. Timidity prevailed, there was no challenge for power, the moment was lost. Instead of workers power in an advanced economy, which could have rescued the drowning revolution in Russia, the world got Hitler and Stalin.
On Paul Levi and March Action: Zehetmair, Sebastian, and John Rose, 2012, “Germany’s Lost Bolshevik: Paul Levi Revisited”, International Socialism 136 (winter), www.isj.org.uk/?id=850
On the defeat of the revolution: Rose, John, 2014, “Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils in Germany, 1918-19”, talk at Marxism 2014, https://soundcloud.com/socialist-work...
Rose, John, 2016, “Revolutionary Workers’ Movements and Parliaments in Germany 1918-1923: a Reply to Tony Phillips”, International Socialism 150 (spring), http://isj.org.uk/revolutionary-worke...
Phillips, Tony, 2016, “The Kapp Putsch and the German October: A Reply to John Rose”, International Socialism 152 (autumn), http://isj.org.uk/the-kapp-putsch-and...
VIDEO: “Debating the German Revolution 1918-23 - Ian Birchall, Tony Phillips and John Rose”, 2016, https://youtu.be/ENkN3_2LHKU
On Müller and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards: Rose, John, 2015, “Luxemburg, Müller and the Berlin workers’ and soldiers’ councils”, International Socialism 147, https://isj.org.uk/luxemburg-muller-a...
This book clarifies much & is a great supplement to other works detailing The German Revolution. It doesn’t focus on the errors in meetings & discussions as what Broué does in his account of the German Revolution in addition to blunders at critical moments. Harman talks about errors at critical moments of action as well as failures of assessing the situation throughout the Revolution & beyond which contributed to the rise of Hitler & helped solidify Stalin & the bureaucracy’s power in Russia due the revolution no longer having a international character.
It demonstrates how failures in Germany helped set off a chain of events, the effects of which we still feel today & are dangerously close to events being repeated in the U.S. with inflation, lack of affordability for basic needs, how virtually no one can afford rent & mortgages with the possible return of Trump to office. Germany has many lessons for those who have any hope to organize.
A straightforward blow-by-blow account of the German Revolution from an explicit Trotskyist point of view. Harman writes as an activist, single-mindedly obsessed with the question of political power and whether Germany's revolutionary leftists could have won a better outcome. He is at least as much concerned with critiquing the strategy and tactics of the socialist movement as he is with recounting events (which he explicates in terms of bog-standard Marxist categories).
Look elsewhere if you want a fully-rounded portrait of German society in these heady and violent years. However, if you share Harman's narrow interest in political questions then you will probably find this account useful.
This is a relatively comprehensive look at the various left revolutionary movements and moments in post-WWI, pre-Nazi Germany. The scope of it, along with the writing style both make it fairly dry and rote in certain ways but the intruige of it all helps power you along.
It's very obviously written from a Trotskyist perspective that I don't particularly share. But moreso, it's style doesn't have a particularly compelling flow, often feeling like a list of events in search of a narrative. But it's hard for me to fault a document with as much useful content. It would certainly be a good starting point for research for a better written piece on the same subject matter.
olayların yorumunu yaptığı son 2 bölüm hariç, faydalı kitap. Olayların dökümünü fazla yorum yapmadan anlatıyor.
Son iki bölümse "kendince" bire sonuç bölümü ve tipik Troçkist tezler tekrarlanıyor: bürokratlaşmış Sovyetler Birliği, hain Stalin vs vs. DSİP'lilerin pek sevdiği Tony Cliff'e de büyük paye biçmiş, çeviren de eski DSİP'li yeni AKP'li Cengiz Alğan :)
Son iki bölüm hariç, olayların izlediğini görmek açısından okunabilir.
J'ai malheureusement abandonné la lecture de cet ouvrage qui m'attirait pourtant depuis plusieurs mois, après en avoir lu une petite moitié. Mon état de fatigue et de maladie n'y est sans doute pas pour rien, mais j'ai eu du mal à rester concentré sur ce récit très dense, quasiment au jour le jour de la révolution allemande. Ce sera peut-être pour une autre fois ?
"But when the dust settles a little, it is those still half connected with the old order who command mass support - for the masses do not abandon overnight the prejudices hammered into them over a lifetime. There is no easy path by which the hard lessons of experience, that alone will change their views, can be evaded."
I've read half the book, but I don't have my own copy and I've too much other stuff to read anyway, so not sure if I'll get around finishing this. Anyway, it's an extremely interesting book about a history that you for some reason won't hear about in history class. I never knew the German revolution was this big and could so easily gone the other way, as in a full-blown Bolshevik style revolution in one of world's most industrialized countries (rather than just in the Russian peasant economy). It's quite a lengthy book, perhaps a bit too much for me now on such a specific topic, although it's highly readable and the topic highly interesting. Of course, you can see why Chris Harman, being one of the most prominent people in the SWP, wrote this book, and he makes the argument for the need of a revolutionary party, as this revolution could've turned out way different with better organization and strategy from the revolutionaries. It's a valid argument I feel and the commentary makes for a good discussion on the classic 'what is to be done' question.
A very clear, concise, cogent analysis of the German revolution and it's ultimate failure. I would recommend it to anyone as a primer. That said, it's an ancillary and not very important part of the book, but I do believe the hagiographic treatment of Lenin, and to a lesser extent Trotsky, reach a level of absurdity that is difficult to read at times. There are points in the book where I literally cringe at the crudity of the hero worship. It's a strange thing for a Marxist historian to exhibit, but, I suppose, given the level of crudity that's being passed around by the current SWP leadership in this period of turmoil, one ought not be too surprised.
Overall, it IS a very good book, and one that deserves to be read.
A condensed account of the failed German socialist revolution of 1918-1919 and the rise of reactionary, conservative forces which would come to be known as the Nazi party. A good read for the politics of revolution as well as for the history, and a compelling case for some sense of cohesion among revolutionaries, but runs the risk of sounding Leninist-authoritarian, particularly in the neat little summaries presented at the end of each segment. A great book that's a little heavy on the commentary without support
The utterly chaotic situation in Germany between 1918 and 1923 is somewhat reflected in the book itself. It is at times difficult to follow the timeline and connections between events. That aside, I think the book is a really fascinating and well written work on the period. Obviously, it is sympathetic to the revolutionary cause, if not always to the bumbling Communist party. As in most left history writing, the SPD/social democrats emerge as the worst culprit. In the German case there are many reasons to support this view. Definitely recommended.