1943: The Victory That Never Was

by John Grigg

Book by Grigg, John

Genres: History, War, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Military History, World War II, Politics

248 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1980

Reviews

[Nadienne Williams · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting look into not only how the invasion of northwest Europe, e.g. France, could have been conducted by the Allies in the Summer of 1943, instead of 1944, and would most likely not only have been easier, but more beneficial overall to not only the victims of the Nazis, but the socio-political dynamics of the post-war world.

It also illustrates how badly managed the war was within the Allies, with their often-times at odds with one another views of the post-war world, as well as their somewhat incompatible aims and goals to achieve. It's hard to avoid the fact that FDR was actively trying to tear apart both the British and French Empires whilst simultaneously helping them defeat the Germans. Far from a monolithic crusade against Fascism, the Allies were united together by the fact that the Hitler had declared war on all of them and they were simply responding to that. An argument can be made that, had Hitler not declared war on the USA, the American public would not have agreed with our entry into the war in Europe, wanting FDR to worry only about the Japanese.

Put quite simply, there were too many people with too many contrary goals "united" together to defeat an enemy, with no real clear strategy on what to do once that enemy was defeated - nor what to do with the nations once occupied by that enemy - as well as a fundamental misunderstanding of the very people's they were liberating - and a desire to work only with the "right kind of people" rather than people who would actually benefit the liberated (i.e. the intense dislike Americans had for De Gaul - hell, the fact that the USA recognized the Vichy French as the legitimate government of France is disgusting).

[David Hill · Rating 3 out of 5]

Grigg makes a compelling case that WWII could have been won a year earlier by executing a cross channel invasion in 1943 instead of 1944. He's careful not to support his arguments by using facts not known at the time. He concentrates on strategic errors, political blunders, and personality conflicts. The result of an earlier invasion would have been a much reduced death toll, particularly for civilians, and a meeting between the Western Allies and the Soviets perhaps at the Vistula instead of the Elbe, ultimately saving much of eastern Europe from Stalin's grasp.

[Jason Hebert · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a fascinating look at WWII and the many mistakes that were made.