Human Rights and the Non-Uses of Logic
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Human rights are a remarkable piece of infrastructure (or 'UN machinery' as the author has it). Like 'the markets', they inspire awe. But what is the stuff they are made of?
In this collection of articles published in the Nation (?), the author does not quite answer the question, apart from setting the record straight as to what human rights are not. They are not revolutionary, they are not a response to the Holocaust, they were not established in the 1940s.
Maybe, they were a consolation prize for the colonized, to whom self-determination was denied immediately after the end of World War II. Maybe, they were a reaction to the disarray in which the defeat in Vietnam left American conscience. Maybe, they have something to do with liberal internationalism. Maybe, they were the brainchild of Amnesty International in the 1970s.
Maybe, Samuel Moyn is practising the neoliberal art of disinformation.
Human rights are legal in nature - like treaties and constitutions. Enforceable words. So no analysis is possible unless one looks at who enforces them on whom, and to what legal effect - i.e. at the expense of which other enforceable words. Intuitevely, human rights are enforced against something to protect someone by a third party. The third party can be Amnesty International, the UN, the US, a court of justice. 'Third partiness' - if I may - is what makes human rights the piece of infrastructure they are. And they share this infrastructural element of third partiness with the IMF, the World Bank, the EU, the ECB, Standard & Poor's and Moody's, and 'the markets'. A third party comes and tells how good or bad things are.
It is 'third partiness', not protection, what makes of human rights a dangerous weapon. But in common parlance, protection obscures intervention. Protection resonates with the public's feelings, and third partiness goes unnoticed.
Failing to disentangle protection from third partiness is an unforgivable weakness of the author's analysis. Human rights as we know them were not born in 1789 or 1776 because no triangle (oppressor-oppressed-third party) could be thought of back then. The colonies protected THEMSELVES from the British. The bourgeois protected THEMSELVES from feudalism.
The authors posits that the real puzzle of human rights is why they were dormant for twenty-five years, 1948 to 1973. And he debates at length the emergence of a 'protection' mood and culture in the seventies, which literally woke them up. But it is third partiness he should keep an eye on instead. The demise of the Keynesian welfare state and the collapse of Bretton Woods freed capital from its 'golden fetters'. Capital started to flow thus becoming third party to any government, any sovereignty, any representation. And poltics followed suit. It was free capital flows, not decolonization, that made utopia - here, legislation disconnected from teriitory and sovereignty, law coming in from nowhere - viable and useful.