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Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente #53
Essays on Marx's Theory Of Value
Political economy, defined in the study of social relations and culture. Originally published in the former Soviet Union, was suppressed and after 1928 it was never re-issued. This is the first English-language edition. Includes an outstanding introductory essay on "Commodity Fetishism" by Freddy Perlman.
275 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1923
27 people are currently reading
740 people want to read
About the author
Isaak Illich Rubin
5 books20 followers(Russian: Исаа́к Ильи́ч Ру́бин) was a Jewish economist and is considered to be the most important theorist of his time on the field of Karl Marx's theory of value. His main work Essays on Marx's Theory of Value was published in 1924. He was executed in 1937 during the course of the Great Purge, but his ideas have since been rehabilitated.
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Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews
March 25, 2024
This book is a 1973 translation of the third edition published in 1928. It is difficult and detailed, but also very worthwhile for me. For Rubin the key concept of understanding Marx’s Capital is fetishism. Many books published in our time make this claim and I wonder if Rubin might be their source.
The central idea is that fetishism, or reification, is objectively present in a capitalist economy. The capitalist form is the only one in history in which social relations appear through things. This is not some kind of duping by the capitalist class or some kind of ideological mistake that the rest of us make. Rather, it is present in objective relations.
One of Rubin’s strengths is that he takes his time to show you how this reification happens. This section, pages 25-30, reminds me very much of how Anthony Giddens talks about structuration. Another of Rubin’s strengths is that he constantly compares the capitalist economy to other cultural and historical forms: the Indian caste, the organized socialist economy, feudalism, the Greek system of slavery. His pedagogical presence is intense, he is keen to make sure the reader understands his points through repetition, thoroughness, and a wide variety of examples.
He takes on his method of reading Capital against all others; he is constantly referring to alternative interpretations and showing their strengths and weaknesses. If I thought that the sea of commentary on Marx was endless, Rubin turns that sea into an ocean. Outside of Hilferding and Bohm-Bawerk, I had never heard of the dozens of Marx interpreters he cites.
He corrects two mistakes that I have always made and also supplies two crucial insights – all of which leave me grateful.
My first mistake is to think that Marx’s use of the “simple commodity economy” in the first chapters of Capital was an extension of the “state of nature” idea. The simple commodity is not an extended state of nature but rather part of the logical deduction – from simple abstract forms to more concrete forms -- that Marx is making à la Hegel. From Hobbes to Smith, we can show how speculative history is mapped on to geo-political space (see Beate Jahn’s The Cultural Construction of International Relations). But I am now convinced that Marx cannot be accused of this since his method is so deliberately historicized and so indebted to Hegel.
My second mistake that Rubin corrects was to assume that Marx short circuits the analysis of value by making value determined by labor within the production process such that the circulation process merely validates what has already occurred in production. But Rubin never tires of saying and showing that for Marx, exchange and circulation are assumed to determine value (see for example, 127). The origins of value occur in production but value’s realization occurs only in circulation and exchange. To think otherwise, Rubin shows, is to misunderstand Marx’s method altogether. Rubin admits that Marx makes it easy for us to misunderstand him. He cites the passages that would allow for a severing between production and circulation or at least for circulation to be secondary and merely reflective of production. Nevertheless, he pounds out the argument that Marx is being dialectical through and through and therefore the separation and different emphases on production and circulation are mere moments in his seamless analysis.
Here are the two insights I took away: Rubin emphasizes that value is a “social substance” (152). This substance is ideal; it cannot be measured physiologically or in any other material manner. I had always guessed at this so it was good to see it affirmed in print.
Second, and most important in this first reading of Rubin, is the clarification about the relationship between content and form. Here, I quote Rubin:
“One cannot forget that, on the question of the relationship between content and form, Marx took the side of Hegel, and not Kant” (117).
And:
“From the standpoint of Hegel's philosophy, the content is not in itself something to which form adheres from the outside. Rather, through its development, the content itself gives birth to the form which was already latent in the content. Form necessarily grows out of the content itself” (117).
And one more before I try to connect them:
“The attention of Classical Economists was directed to discovering the material-technical basis of social forms which they took as given and not subject to further analysis. It was Marx's goal to discover the laws of the origin and development of the social forms assumed by the material-technical production process at a given level of development of productive forces” (42).
Rubin’s claim is that the Classical Economists were content to reduce social forms to their economic basis but they did not ask, as Marx did, why the forms took the forms they did. It is the relationship between the content and the form that most concerned both Hegel and Marx.
For the Classical Economists, the reduction allowed them to get at essences but they turned those essences into natural universals, that is they made them immutable laws of nature. As such, they excluded a more radical analysis that sees all such natural laws as historical, sociological, cultural, and anthropological. In a word, those laws became a fetish, they were reified. What Marx shows is that it is the political economy that allows and makes that fetish and that reification an objective result within the historical time of capitalism. The result of the attention to form is we get a more radical understanding – both as analysis and as politics.
I sense that there are better things to be had in contemplating the relationship between content and form. I am not quite there yet.
Here are some quotes from the book:
“The logical structure of political economy as a science expresses the social structure of capitalist society. 92
“Only on the basis of commodity production, characterized by a wide development of exchange, a mass transfer of individuals from one activity to another, and indifference of individuals towards the concrete form of labor, is it possible to develop the homogeneous character of all working operations as forms of human labor in general. 138
“We would not be exaggerating if we said that perhaps the concept of man in general and of human labor in general emerged on the basis of the commodity economy.138
“In Marx's system, the concept of abstract labor is inseparably related to the basic characteristics of the commodity economy. 140
“In Marx's theory of value, the transformation of concrete into abstract labor is not a theoretical act of abstracting for the purpose of finding a general unit of measurement. This transformation is a real social event. The theoretical expression of this social event, namely the social equalization of different forms of labor and not their physiological equality, is the category of abstract labor.” 144
The central idea is that fetishism, or reification, is objectively present in a capitalist economy. The capitalist form is the only one in history in which social relations appear through things. This is not some kind of duping by the capitalist class or some kind of ideological mistake that the rest of us make. Rather, it is present in objective relations.
One of Rubin’s strengths is that he takes his time to show you how this reification happens. This section, pages 25-30, reminds me very much of how Anthony Giddens talks about structuration. Another of Rubin’s strengths is that he constantly compares the capitalist economy to other cultural and historical forms: the Indian caste, the organized socialist economy, feudalism, the Greek system of slavery. His pedagogical presence is intense, he is keen to make sure the reader understands his points through repetition, thoroughness, and a wide variety of examples.
He takes on his method of reading Capital against all others; he is constantly referring to alternative interpretations and showing their strengths and weaknesses. If I thought that the sea of commentary on Marx was endless, Rubin turns that sea into an ocean. Outside of Hilferding and Bohm-Bawerk, I had never heard of the dozens of Marx interpreters he cites.
He corrects two mistakes that I have always made and also supplies two crucial insights – all of which leave me grateful.
My first mistake is to think that Marx’s use of the “simple commodity economy” in the first chapters of Capital was an extension of the “state of nature” idea. The simple commodity is not an extended state of nature but rather part of the logical deduction – from simple abstract forms to more concrete forms -- that Marx is making à la Hegel. From Hobbes to Smith, we can show how speculative history is mapped on to geo-political space (see Beate Jahn’s The Cultural Construction of International Relations). But I am now convinced that Marx cannot be accused of this since his method is so deliberately historicized and so indebted to Hegel.
My second mistake that Rubin corrects was to assume that Marx short circuits the analysis of value by making value determined by labor within the production process such that the circulation process merely validates what has already occurred in production. But Rubin never tires of saying and showing that for Marx, exchange and circulation are assumed to determine value (see for example, 127). The origins of value occur in production but value’s realization occurs only in circulation and exchange. To think otherwise, Rubin shows, is to misunderstand Marx’s method altogether. Rubin admits that Marx makes it easy for us to misunderstand him. He cites the passages that would allow for a severing between production and circulation or at least for circulation to be secondary and merely reflective of production. Nevertheless, he pounds out the argument that Marx is being dialectical through and through and therefore the separation and different emphases on production and circulation are mere moments in his seamless analysis.
Here are the two insights I took away: Rubin emphasizes that value is a “social substance” (152). This substance is ideal; it cannot be measured physiologically or in any other material manner. I had always guessed at this so it was good to see it affirmed in print.
Second, and most important in this first reading of Rubin, is the clarification about the relationship between content and form. Here, I quote Rubin:
“One cannot forget that, on the question of the relationship between content and form, Marx took the side of Hegel, and not Kant” (117).
And:
“From the standpoint of Hegel's philosophy, the content is not in itself something to which form adheres from the outside. Rather, through its development, the content itself gives birth to the form which was already latent in the content. Form necessarily grows out of the content itself” (117).
And one more before I try to connect them:
“The attention of Classical Economists was directed to discovering the material-technical basis of social forms which they took as given and not subject to further analysis. It was Marx's goal to discover the laws of the origin and development of the social forms assumed by the material-technical production process at a given level of development of productive forces” (42).
Rubin’s claim is that the Classical Economists were content to reduce social forms to their economic basis but they did not ask, as Marx did, why the forms took the forms they did. It is the relationship between the content and the form that most concerned both Hegel and Marx.
For the Classical Economists, the reduction allowed them to get at essences but they turned those essences into natural universals, that is they made them immutable laws of nature. As such, they excluded a more radical analysis that sees all such natural laws as historical, sociological, cultural, and anthropological. In a word, those laws became a fetish, they were reified. What Marx shows is that it is the political economy that allows and makes that fetish and that reification an objective result within the historical time of capitalism. The result of the attention to form is we get a more radical understanding – both as analysis and as politics.
I sense that there are better things to be had in contemplating the relationship between content and form. I am not quite there yet.
Here are some quotes from the book:
“The logical structure of political economy as a science expresses the social structure of capitalist society. 92
“Only on the basis of commodity production, characterized by a wide development of exchange, a mass transfer of individuals from one activity to another, and indifference of individuals towards the concrete form of labor, is it possible to develop the homogeneous character of all working operations as forms of human labor in general. 138
“We would not be exaggerating if we said that perhaps the concept of man in general and of human labor in general emerged on the basis of the commodity economy.138
“In Marx's system, the concept of abstract labor is inseparably related to the basic characteristics of the commodity economy. 140
“In Marx's theory of value, the transformation of concrete into abstract labor is not a theoretical act of abstracting for the purpose of finding a general unit of measurement. This transformation is a real social event. The theoretical expression of this social event, namely the social equalization of different forms of labor and not their physiological equality, is the category of abstract labor.” 144
March 14, 2019
for breathtaking erudition and those miracles of clarity that occasionally appear amidst endless brain-crushing study, the moments when you see the universe come into focus and for one moment score a victory in the war of attrition against ignorance, this honestly rivals the big man himself // an indispensable contribution
July 28, 2024
És molt forta l'actualitat d'aquest llibre publicat el 1928. Bona part dels debats actuals sobre el valor en Marx, el fetitxisme, la reproducció, el problema de la conversió del valor en preus, etc. es troben aquí (i amb molts més detalls que molts marxistes contemporanis!).
Algunes notes: Els primers capítols tracten la teoria del fetitxisme considerant-la com a central tant pel projecte de la crítica de l'economia política en general com per la teoria del valor en particular. Rubin ataca a les males lectures (encara ara repetides) que consideren la teoria del fetitxisme com l'assenyalament que les relacions cosificades en el capitalisme són verdaderament relacions socials. Res més lluny de la realitat, sota condicions capitalistes les coses (les mercaderies) són la verdadera mediació entre les persones. Ara bé -i aquesta és la verdadera teoria fel fetitxisme-, les relacions cosificades NO són producte dels atributs naturals de les coses, sinó que existeixen en virtut de les relacions socials capitalistes (històricament específiques). Així es pot comprendre correctament el valor com una relació social cristal·litzada en les mercaderies.
Durant la lectura vaig estar revisant la posició de Guido Starosta sobre com Rubin aborda la problemàtica d'on prové el valor. Bàsicament, Rubin ha sigut reivindicat com a circulacionista (i.e considerar que el valor només apareix en l'intercanvi per la reducció del treball concret a abstracte). Tanmateix, Starosta argumenta -i llegint a Rubin em fa aquesta sensació- que l'autor manté una contínua ambivalència entre ciruculacionsime i productisme (i.e. la consideració de la producció com a seu productora del valor). Sigui com sigui, en Rubin està in nuce tot el debat actual sobre el valor (i les teories marxistes de la forma-valor).
També és rellevant l'exposició del pas del valor a preus de producció (l'anomenada qüestió de la "transformació" o la suposada incompatibilitat entre els volums primer i tercer del capital). No hi entraré, però deixo aquí la cadena d'esglaons lògics que per a Rubin completen la teoria del preu de producció de Marx:Productivitat del treball - treball abstracte - valor - preu de producció - distribució del capital - distribució del treball.
Ale, fins aquí, ànims amb la lectura i petonets que no confonem el desplegament lògic amb l'històric!
Algunes notes: Els primers capítols tracten la teoria del fetitxisme considerant-la com a central tant pel projecte de la crítica de l'economia política en general com per la teoria del valor en particular. Rubin ataca a les males lectures (encara ara repetides) que consideren la teoria del fetitxisme com l'assenyalament que les relacions cosificades en el capitalisme són verdaderament relacions socials. Res més lluny de la realitat, sota condicions capitalistes les coses (les mercaderies) són la verdadera mediació entre les persones. Ara bé -i aquesta és la verdadera teoria fel fetitxisme-, les relacions cosificades NO són producte dels atributs naturals de les coses, sinó que existeixen en virtut de les relacions socials capitalistes (històricament específiques). Així es pot comprendre correctament el valor com una relació social cristal·litzada en les mercaderies.
Durant la lectura vaig estar revisant la posició de Guido Starosta sobre com Rubin aborda la problemàtica d'on prové el valor. Bàsicament, Rubin ha sigut reivindicat com a circulacionista (i.e considerar que el valor només apareix en l'intercanvi per la reducció del treball concret a abstracte). Tanmateix, Starosta argumenta -i llegint a Rubin em fa aquesta sensació- que l'autor manté una contínua ambivalència entre ciruculacionsime i productisme (i.e. la consideració de la producció com a seu productora del valor). Sigui com sigui, en Rubin està in nuce tot el debat actual sobre el valor (i les teories marxistes de la forma-valor).
També és rellevant l'exposició del pas del valor a preus de producció (l'anomenada qüestió de la "transformació" o la suposada incompatibilitat entre els volums primer i tercer del capital). No hi entraré, però deixo aquí la cadena d'esglaons lògics que per a Rubin completen la teoria del preu de producció de Marx:Productivitat del treball - treball abstracte - valor - preu de producció - distribució del capital - distribució del treball.
Ale, fins aquí, ànims amb la lectura i petonets que no confonem el desplegament lògic amb l'històric!
March 1, 2019
This collection of essays is what made Marx’s theory of value finally start to *click* with me when I first read it years ago. I just finished my second time through and now I can remember why. Rubin’s clarity of presentation and unique approach to Marx’s economic theory makes him one of the most insightful commentators of his time (I recommend him over say Bukharin or even Hilferding). Rubin’s focus on the “qualitative” as opposed to “quantitative” side of Marx’s Labor Theory of Value brings into focus the sociological content of the LTV. Diverging from most other approaches, Rubin begins his analysis with the theory of commodity fetishism and emphasizes the importance of the reification and materialization of social production relations under capitalism. Whereas popular accounts of Marxian economics tend to either ignore the LTV’s sociological character or, at best, treat it as an interesting supplement to the quantitative analysis of prices and values; in Rubin, the sociological character takes center stage and informs the quantitative aspects of the theory. It’s why Marx’s Capital is not merely a contribution to political economy—it’s also a critique.
And Rubin’s focus here is why this collection of essays became the foundation of the “value-form” school of Marxist economics. Rubin’s central claim could be summarized as so: it is the form of value, as a social relation between producers expressed as a material relation between things, that holds the key to understanding the “laws of motion” of the capitalist mode of production. Rubin traces the theoretical implications of this value-form through many stages: the reification of social relations and fetishism of material categories, the equalization and socialization of varied and private labors, the relation between value and production price, the distribution of labor, the distinction between productive and unproductive labor, and much more. I could go on and on though. I really cannot recommend this one enough.
And Rubin’s focus here is why this collection of essays became the foundation of the “value-form” school of Marxist economics. Rubin’s central claim could be summarized as so: it is the form of value, as a social relation between producers expressed as a material relation between things, that holds the key to understanding the “laws of motion” of the capitalist mode of production. Rubin traces the theoretical implications of this value-form through many stages: the reification of social relations and fetishism of material categories, the equalization and socialization of varied and private labors, the relation between value and production price, the distribution of labor, the distinction between productive and unproductive labor, and much more. I could go on and on though. I really cannot recommend this one enough.
October 10, 2019
An indispensable re-interpretation of Marx's mature economic system. Well ahead of its time.
December 24, 2012
Although a little turgid at times, Rubin's book is a fascinating defense of Marx's theory of economics against accusations from supply-demand theorist, and austrian marxists. This book is not readable by someone who has not already read Capital and come to serious terms with its implications.
The most fascinating aspect of this books is Rubin's thesis that Marx's theory of the commodity fetish underlies his ENTIRE economic analysis, and the nodal point at which all subsequent theories of capitalism emerge from. Most scholars take the theory of the commodity fetish as an interesting aside, dabbling in philosophy and not economics. Many believe it can be rejected or accepted, but that either position has no bearing on the rest of Capital Vol I-III. Rubin contends otherwise, and he does a damn good job of justifying his point.
As a book of his essays it can mostly be read in scattered order, but a chronological reading is helpful for ascertaining Rubin's thesis. Since each essay wrestles with various aspects of Marx's theories (often with far more detail than Marx ever provided), it serves as a great reference book too, when you're puzzling over issues like abstract labor, or value-price relations.
Unfortunately Rubin was eventually executed by Stalin, which I suppose attest to his actual legitimacy as a good Marxist theoretician.
The most fascinating aspect of this books is Rubin's thesis that Marx's theory of the commodity fetish underlies his ENTIRE economic analysis, and the nodal point at which all subsequent theories of capitalism emerge from. Most scholars take the theory of the commodity fetish as an interesting aside, dabbling in philosophy and not economics. Many believe it can be rejected or accepted, but that either position has no bearing on the rest of Capital Vol I-III. Rubin contends otherwise, and he does a damn good job of justifying his point.
As a book of his essays it can mostly be read in scattered order, but a chronological reading is helpful for ascertaining Rubin's thesis. Since each essay wrestles with various aspects of Marx's theories (often with far more detail than Marx ever provided), it serves as a great reference book too, when you're puzzling over issues like abstract labor, or value-price relations.
Unfortunately Rubin was eventually executed by Stalin, which I suppose attest to his actual legitimacy as a good Marxist theoretician.
May 27, 2013
I think this book should be read before, not after, reading Capital as the latter undertaking is a difficult assignment and a good guide is indispensable. Rubin explains the various aspects of Marx's theory of value beautifully. For example he explains how the categories of political economy express social relations, how these social relations are attached to the transfer in ownership of things and how social relations can take on reified forms just as things can take on social functions. Rubin was probably the first person to understand the significance of the theory of the fetish nature of the commodity for Marx, although Lukacs came close. Lenin wrote (after reading Hegel's Logic) that none of the so-called marxists understood the subtleties of Chapter 1 of Volume I of Capital, heavily influenced as it was by the Logic. Rubin's elegant, cogent and straightforward explanation of the theories of commodity fetishism and value (to be read in conjunction with some of his other work widely available on the Internet) makes it the perfect introduction and companion to the first chapter of Capital I - and no praise can surely be higher than that.
February 5, 2019
Very illuminating exploration of Marx's critique. Especially valuable for the explanation of how the theory of fetishism actually plays a central role in Marx's theory of value. Also interesting are Rubin's distinction between value and exchange-value; the relation between labor and value (value as 'congealed' labor); and the connection between the labor theory of value, which Marx presents in Volume I of Capital, and the theory of production price, which is introduced in Volume III (the latter of which I have not yet read). A pioneering work that inspired the "value-form theory" school, and clearly influenced later thinkers like Moishe Postone, but also functions well as a summary of Marx's critique. In the latter sense, it pairs well with Heinrich and Fine/Saad-Filho.
November 12, 2022
As with Lukács, I don’t get why some marxists love this dude: Rubin’s main proposal is that the commodity fetishism is the axis and basis of marxist theory (which of course it isn’t, if we had the need to propose such thing it would be more like the value theory).
To his own merit, his prose and style are easy to read.
To his own merit, his prose and style are easy to read.
February 22, 2015
pivotal piece of value-form theory from a victim of Stalinist purges. as the man himself says, his only real predecessor in this regard was Marx himself, and also I guess Hilferding's reply to Boehm-Bawerk. what's good in this?
- a very clear elucidation of the distinction between the form, magnitude and substance of value, and the significance of that. and a good statement of their interrelation in a way that respects Marx's dialectic of concepts here while also not trying to turn Capital into the Logic (as Tony Smith and Chris Arthur have attempted).
- crucial takes on abstract labor (made abstract thru market exchange, not thru a mental abstraction or by the "abstract" quality of human labor or something).
- also, like Colletti would later insist on, an important reading of Marx's theory of fetishism as a theory of the necessity of fetishism in a world in which human relations really are mediated by objects. and a tying-in of that idea to the point that value arises only when labor takes on this semi-private, semi-public form--immediately private, eventually social, in other words.
what did Rubin miss?
- arguably, he doesn't talk enough about production or the significance of value-form theory for Marx's overall conception.
- he still gets caught up in some of the transformation problem stuff.
overall? essential reading for anyone interested in Marx's basic theories. and an incredible achievement in its own right. Fredy Perlman's introductory essay is also interesting, both because Perlman was a non-academic and an anarchist, but he ultimately reduces the LTV to a theory of how labor is allocated under capitalism (which is what Smith, Ricardo, etc. all could have told you).
- a very clear elucidation of the distinction between the form, magnitude and substance of value, and the significance of that. and a good statement of their interrelation in a way that respects Marx's dialectic of concepts here while also not trying to turn Capital into the Logic (as Tony Smith and Chris Arthur have attempted).
- crucial takes on abstract labor (made abstract thru market exchange, not thru a mental abstraction or by the "abstract" quality of human labor or something).
- also, like Colletti would later insist on, an important reading of Marx's theory of fetishism as a theory of the necessity of fetishism in a world in which human relations really are mediated by objects. and a tying-in of that idea to the point that value arises only when labor takes on this semi-private, semi-public form--immediately private, eventually social, in other words.
what did Rubin miss?
- arguably, he doesn't talk enough about production or the significance of value-form theory for Marx's overall conception.
- he still gets caught up in some of the transformation problem stuff.
overall? essential reading for anyone interested in Marx's basic theories. and an incredible achievement in its own right. Fredy Perlman's introductory essay is also interesting, both because Perlman was a non-academic and an anarchist, but he ultimately reduces the LTV to a theory of how labor is allocated under capitalism (which is what Smith, Ricardo, etc. all could have told you).
July 1, 2019
Rubins Formalism is too extreme and circulationist most of the time, but its a wonderful read to have as a starting point against the "naturalistic"/economistic Ricardian readings of Marx's theory of Value. The essays on qualified labour and productive labour are really interesting and shed light on some tricky distinctions in terminology that marxists tend to misinterpret
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January 7, 2025DNF @ 70%ish
honestly just felt like i got what im gonna get out of this i understand theory of value a lot better now but i don't need to spend hours parsing the text that amounts to rubin disagreeing with bolshevik interpretation of marx, maybe at some point in the future i will but not rn
honestly just felt like i got what im gonna get out of this i understand theory of value a lot better now but i don't need to spend hours parsing the text that amounts to rubin disagreeing with bolshevik interpretation of marx, maybe at some point in the future i will but not rn
May 5, 2025
Incredible summation of Marx's theory, and to be quite frank a good primer for Marx's Capital. I can definitely see this helping beginner's understand Marx more thoroughly.
Some personal notes on value from this book:
Value is a threefold abstract phenomenon with many inner determinations that consists of and is analyzed by Marx in terms of form (appearance), substance (content), and magnitude (labor-time). Value is a purely social phenomenon that “does not include a single atom of matter.”
The value-form is the abstract social form that the product of labor assumes in a commodity economy – exchange-value is the concrete and specific form of value – which is merely the expression of value, the form it takes, and is not value itself – which seems like a common misconception
Value is expressed, manifests itself, and is formed in and through exchange, and in relation to other commodities. Therefore, the value-form and the form of exchangeability are the same (this should not be confused or conflated with exchange-value, but rather the necessity for exchange abstractly for value to be realized):
Value exists as a social relation of abstract labor before it is expressed in exchange. Exchange-value is its necessary form of appearance or mode of expression, but value itself is prior. Products of labor have value even if unsold, though this value is not realized. Value is not created by exchange, but is only realized through exchange (labor creates value in production; exchange socially validates it).
And as Rubin elucidates:
“As we can see, the form of value is called a form of exchangeability, or a social form of the product of labor which resides in the fact that it can be exchanged for any other commodity, if this exchangeability is determined by the quantity of labor necessary for the production of the given commodity.”
It must be clarified that the value-form is not merely the capacity for exchange. The value-form is a socially determined exchangeability, whereby it consists in the social necessity for commodities to express their value through exchange, rooted in abstract equality of labor under capitalism. Trade and exchange exist in most if not all forms of society, but under capitalism it is a systemic requirement for value to manifest. This necessity obscures the social relations of production, rendering them as relations between things (commodity fetishism).
As mentioned briefly before, the relationship between the value-form (Wertform) and exchange-value (Tauschwert) must be analyzed closely. The value-form represents the abstract social form of value, which is not tied to material objects but reflects the social necessity of commodities to express their value through relations with other commodities. The value-form is the universal property of all commodities in capitalist society, rooted in the social organization of labor. It homogenizes concrete labors into abstract labor through the act of exchange, a social construct specific to capitalism.
Exchange-value, on the other hand, is the concrete, observable proportions in which commodities trade for. It is the “phenomenal form” through which value manifests but is distinct from value itself. Exchange-value is accidental and relative, it varies with market conditions, while the value-form represents the deeper social logic underlying the ratios of exchange-values, i.e. the relation of commodities to other commodities. Exchange-value is the mode of expression of value, not its essence.
Marx separates the analysis of value from its monetary expression to avoid collapsing social form (value-form) into material content (exchange-value). As Rubin clarifies:
“Marx analyzes the 'form of value' (Wertform) separately from exchange value (Tauschwert). In order to include the social form of the product of labor in the concept of value, we had to split the social form of the product into two forms: Wertform (value-form) and Tauschwert (exchange-value). By the first we mean the social form of the product which is not yet concretized in determined things, but represents some abstract property of commodities. In order to include in the concept of value the properties of the social form of the product of labor and thus show the inadmissibility of identifying the concept of value with the concept of labor, an identification which was often approached by popular presentations of Marx, we have to prove that value must be examined not only from the aspect of the substance of value (i.e., labor), but from the aspect of the 'form of value.' In order to include the form of value in the concept of value itself, we have to separate it from exchange value, which is treated separately from value by Marx. Thus we have broken down the social form of the product into two parts: the social form which has not yet acquired a concrete form (i.e., 'form of value'), and the form which already has a concrete and independent form (i.e., exchange value).”
Value-form is the qualitative aspect of value, whereby it is grasped through abstracting it from exchange, the quantitative, empirical, observable aspect, which is incomplete without understanding the value-form. The substance (abstract labor) and form (value-form) of value are dialectically unified: abstract labor is socially validated through the value-form, which presupposes abstract labor as its substance.
The value-form evolves through stages – simple, expanded, general, and money forms – which reflects the maturation of commodity relations. Money, as the universal equivalent, is the necessary culmination of the value-form, enabling all commodities to express value quantitatively (price). The value-form’s development mirrors the historical emergence of capitalism, where labor becomes universally abstract.
Exchange-value represents a historical constant in trade but gains specificity under capitalism, whereby the variability of exchange-value masks the stability of the value-form as a regulator of production. While exchange has existed in most societies, under capitalism, exchange-value is systematized (via money) and becomes the dominant form of social reproduction. This stability reflects the law of value – socially necessary labor-time regulating prices and exchange in the long run – which governs production despite market price volatility. The law of value is enforced through capitalist competition, which compels producers to align individual labor-times with socially necessary labor-time. Exchange-value fluctuates and oscillates around value, which acts as a sort of anchor, almost like a center of gravity.
So, then, what is the substance of value? Labor:
“Now we know the substance of value. It is labor…”
The substance (content) of value is abstract human labor – labor stripped of its concrete, qualitative characteristics and reduced to homogenous, socially necessary expenditure of human labor-power. Abstract labor being the social category of labor – not a physical or technical category – that is specific to capitalist commodity production; the physical and/or technical category of labor is known as concrete labor:
“Human labor-power in its fluid state, or human labor, creates value, but is not itself value. It becomes value in its coagulated state, in objective form… On the one hand all labour is, speaking physiologically, an expenditure of human labour-power, and in its character of identical abstract human labour, it creates and forms the value of commodities. On the other hand, all labour is the expenditure of human labour-power in a special form and with a definite aim, and in this, its character of concrete useful labour, it produces use-values.”
Insofar as the substance of value is labor, it is only abstract human labor that determines and counts toward value; concrete labor does not. Labor expended inefficiently does not create value. Value is a social relation, not a calculation of concrete specific labor.
Now that form and substance have been covered, magnitude is the third manifold of value to be analyzed closely.
The magnitude of value is determined by the average labor-time required to produce a commodity under existing conditions.
Productivity reduces value as it shrinks the socially necessary labor-time for production of a given commodity (*tie into surplus-value extraction, subsumption, and TRPF* later)
Individual producers may expend more or less labor-time than SNLT, but the market enforces SNLT as a regulator, i.e. the law of value:
“The magnitude of value is determined not by the labor actually expended by an individual producer, but by the labor that society recognizes as necessary.”
The substance of value is a social abstraction enforced by the value-form; labor is homogenized into a universal “social substance” only when products take the form of commodities and equate to one another in and through exchange:
“Labor acquires the property of creating value only when it is organized in a system of commodity exchange.”
The form of value cannot exist unless labor is already abstracted from its concrete specificity. In the act of equating one commodity to another, there is a presupposition that their labor has been socially equalized. Substance of value (labor) is concealed and obscured by the form of value by presenting value as a natural property of commodities rather than a social relation. The form conceals the substance even as it expresses it.
The magnitude of value is not the sum of individual hours, but a social average. Labor only creates value if the prevailing conditions of production in society realizes it as value-creating. Expended labor that goes beyond the SNLT does not contribute to value creation. SNLT operates behind the backs of workers and production, and mostly without their knowledge; it is a mechanism that through society the value of a product of labor is accepted as valuable as far as the labor expended to produce it is determined to be necessary. Thus, SNLT is a relation of production whereby producers and consumers, i.e. society, agrees upon what labor is necessary for production.
SNLT is latent in production but is only realized through exchange; a commodity’s value exists as SNLT, but its magnitude becomes visible only in exchange. It is through the magnitude of value that the concrete form of value takes an appearance, i.e. exchange-value.
Substance, magnitude, and form are linked to each other as a unified process that expresses the inner determinations of value; as such they each play mutually determining roles on one another. The dialectic of value’s determinations reveals capitalism as a system where social relations dominate individuals, appearing as an objective ‘second nature’ governed by value’s laws.
Some personal notes on value from this book:
Value is a threefold abstract phenomenon with many inner determinations that consists of and is analyzed by Marx in terms of form (appearance), substance (content), and magnitude (labor-time). Value is a purely social phenomenon that “does not include a single atom of matter.”
The value-form is the abstract social form that the product of labor assumes in a commodity economy – exchange-value is the concrete and specific form of value – which is merely the expression of value, the form it takes, and is not value itself – which seems like a common misconception
Value is expressed, manifests itself, and is formed in and through exchange, and in relation to other commodities. Therefore, the value-form and the form of exchangeability are the same (this should not be confused or conflated with exchange-value, but rather the necessity for exchange abstractly for value to be realized):
Value exists as a social relation of abstract labor before it is expressed in exchange. Exchange-value is its necessary form of appearance or mode of expression, but value itself is prior. Products of labor have value even if unsold, though this value is not realized. Value is not created by exchange, but is only realized through exchange (labor creates value in production; exchange socially validates it).
And as Rubin elucidates:
“As we can see, the form of value is called a form of exchangeability, or a social form of the product of labor which resides in the fact that it can be exchanged for any other commodity, if this exchangeability is determined by the quantity of labor necessary for the production of the given commodity.”
It must be clarified that the value-form is not merely the capacity for exchange. The value-form is a socially determined exchangeability, whereby it consists in the social necessity for commodities to express their value through exchange, rooted in abstract equality of labor under capitalism. Trade and exchange exist in most if not all forms of society, but under capitalism it is a systemic requirement for value to manifest. This necessity obscures the social relations of production, rendering them as relations between things (commodity fetishism).
As mentioned briefly before, the relationship between the value-form (Wertform) and exchange-value (Tauschwert) must be analyzed closely. The value-form represents the abstract social form of value, which is not tied to material objects but reflects the social necessity of commodities to express their value through relations with other commodities. The value-form is the universal property of all commodities in capitalist society, rooted in the social organization of labor. It homogenizes concrete labors into abstract labor through the act of exchange, a social construct specific to capitalism.
Exchange-value, on the other hand, is the concrete, observable proportions in which commodities trade for. It is the “phenomenal form” through which value manifests but is distinct from value itself. Exchange-value is accidental and relative, it varies with market conditions, while the value-form represents the deeper social logic underlying the ratios of exchange-values, i.e. the relation of commodities to other commodities. Exchange-value is the mode of expression of value, not its essence.
Marx separates the analysis of value from its monetary expression to avoid collapsing social form (value-form) into material content (exchange-value). As Rubin clarifies:
“Marx analyzes the 'form of value' (Wertform) separately from exchange value (Tauschwert). In order to include the social form of the product of labor in the concept of value, we had to split the social form of the product into two forms: Wertform (value-form) and Tauschwert (exchange-value). By the first we mean the social form of the product which is not yet concretized in determined things, but represents some abstract property of commodities. In order to include in the concept of value the properties of the social form of the product of labor and thus show the inadmissibility of identifying the concept of value with the concept of labor, an identification which was often approached by popular presentations of Marx, we have to prove that value must be examined not only from the aspect of the substance of value (i.e., labor), but from the aspect of the 'form of value.' In order to include the form of value in the concept of value itself, we have to separate it from exchange value, which is treated separately from value by Marx. Thus we have broken down the social form of the product into two parts: the social form which has not yet acquired a concrete form (i.e., 'form of value'), and the form which already has a concrete and independent form (i.e., exchange value).”
Value-form is the qualitative aspect of value, whereby it is grasped through abstracting it from exchange, the quantitative, empirical, observable aspect, which is incomplete without understanding the value-form. The substance (abstract labor) and form (value-form) of value are dialectically unified: abstract labor is socially validated through the value-form, which presupposes abstract labor as its substance.
The value-form evolves through stages – simple, expanded, general, and money forms – which reflects the maturation of commodity relations. Money, as the universal equivalent, is the necessary culmination of the value-form, enabling all commodities to express value quantitatively (price). The value-form’s development mirrors the historical emergence of capitalism, where labor becomes universally abstract.
Exchange-value represents a historical constant in trade but gains specificity under capitalism, whereby the variability of exchange-value masks the stability of the value-form as a regulator of production. While exchange has existed in most societies, under capitalism, exchange-value is systematized (via money) and becomes the dominant form of social reproduction. This stability reflects the law of value – socially necessary labor-time regulating prices and exchange in the long run – which governs production despite market price volatility. The law of value is enforced through capitalist competition, which compels producers to align individual labor-times with socially necessary labor-time. Exchange-value fluctuates and oscillates around value, which acts as a sort of anchor, almost like a center of gravity.
So, then, what is the substance of value? Labor:
“Now we know the substance of value. It is labor…”
The substance (content) of value is abstract human labor – labor stripped of its concrete, qualitative characteristics and reduced to homogenous, socially necessary expenditure of human labor-power. Abstract labor being the social category of labor – not a physical or technical category – that is specific to capitalist commodity production; the physical and/or technical category of labor is known as concrete labor:
“Human labor-power in its fluid state, or human labor, creates value, but is not itself value. It becomes value in its coagulated state, in objective form… On the one hand all labour is, speaking physiologically, an expenditure of human labour-power, and in its character of identical abstract human labour, it creates and forms the value of commodities. On the other hand, all labour is the expenditure of human labour-power in a special form and with a definite aim, and in this, its character of concrete useful labour, it produces use-values.”
Insofar as the substance of value is labor, it is only abstract human labor that determines and counts toward value; concrete labor does not. Labor expended inefficiently does not create value. Value is a social relation, not a calculation of concrete specific labor.
Now that form and substance have been covered, magnitude is the third manifold of value to be analyzed closely.
The magnitude of value is determined by the average labor-time required to produce a commodity under existing conditions.
Productivity reduces value as it shrinks the socially necessary labor-time for production of a given commodity (*tie into surplus-value extraction, subsumption, and TRPF* later)
Individual producers may expend more or less labor-time than SNLT, but the market enforces SNLT as a regulator, i.e. the law of value:
“The magnitude of value is determined not by the labor actually expended by an individual producer, but by the labor that society recognizes as necessary.”
The substance of value is a social abstraction enforced by the value-form; labor is homogenized into a universal “social substance” only when products take the form of commodities and equate to one another in and through exchange:
“Labor acquires the property of creating value only when it is organized in a system of commodity exchange.”
The form of value cannot exist unless labor is already abstracted from its concrete specificity. In the act of equating one commodity to another, there is a presupposition that their labor has been socially equalized. Substance of value (labor) is concealed and obscured by the form of value by presenting value as a natural property of commodities rather than a social relation. The form conceals the substance even as it expresses it.
The magnitude of value is not the sum of individual hours, but a social average. Labor only creates value if the prevailing conditions of production in society realizes it as value-creating. Expended labor that goes beyond the SNLT does not contribute to value creation. SNLT operates behind the backs of workers and production, and mostly without their knowledge; it is a mechanism that through society the value of a product of labor is accepted as valuable as far as the labor expended to produce it is determined to be necessary. Thus, SNLT is a relation of production whereby producers and consumers, i.e. society, agrees upon what labor is necessary for production.
SNLT is latent in production but is only realized through exchange; a commodity’s value exists as SNLT, but its magnitude becomes visible only in exchange. It is through the magnitude of value that the concrete form of value takes an appearance, i.e. exchange-value.
Substance, magnitude, and form are linked to each other as a unified process that expresses the inner determinations of value; as such they each play mutually determining roles on one another. The dialectic of value’s determinations reveals capitalism as a system where social relations dominate individuals, appearing as an objective ‘second nature’ governed by value’s laws.
December 15, 2024
A solid book for anyone interested in the subject matter. I found everything of great interest until the last three chapters, which were, to me, a bit too technical. In these final chapters, Rubin deals with supply and demand and due to this, Rubin throws around tables, graphs and numbers. I found this uninteresting since, in the start of the book, Rubin, and the introductory chapter by Perlman, stresses the fact that Marx's economic theory (or critique) was not bound so much in technical matters (as economics is thought of today), but more of a sociological nature, i.e. how the productive forces regulate human activity and the relationships between the two. This point is shown at its best when Rubin and Perlman (in his introduction) discusses commodity fetishism, their insights on this topic is by far the most useful and especially how it relates to Marx's theory o alienation. I would almost go so far as to say that if you are either interested in this book, or if you're interested in alienation/commodity fetishism, then this book is (as far as I can say currently) indispensable to a solid understanding of it. However, due to the final chapters being more technical, I decided to cut it short. This is important for anyone reading this review since I can't really give a full-scoped review and my review is therefore quite biased.
Another point is that a lot of people will recommend this as introductory reading, and I might agree but with a few qualifications: An introduction will only serve you so much, so if you're thinking of getting into Marxist economics, I would rather recommend you read Marx himself rather than jump into Rubin. Heinrich's book on the three volumes of Capital is a far more suitable introduction. Another complication of Rubin's book, which isn't Rubin's fault at all, is that he discusses Marx's theories in relation to many of Marx's critics. This might sound useful to some, but keep in mind that he discusses it from his point in time and from Marx's (and prior to Marx) point in time. So the debates around Marxist economics today are probably much different than they were back then, since at the time of Rubin's writing (around the 1930s), the revival of interest in Marx's economic thoughts hadn't yet happened (which happened around 1960s-1970s).
Another point is that a lot of people will recommend this as introductory reading, and I might agree but with a few qualifications: An introduction will only serve you so much, so if you're thinking of getting into Marxist economics, I would rather recommend you read Marx himself rather than jump into Rubin. Heinrich's book on the three volumes of Capital is a far more suitable introduction. Another complication of Rubin's book, which isn't Rubin's fault at all, is that he discusses Marx's theories in relation to many of Marx's critics. This might sound useful to some, but keep in mind that he discusses it from his point in time and from Marx's (and prior to Marx) point in time. So the debates around Marxist economics today are probably much different than they were back then, since at the time of Rubin's writing (around the 1930s), the revival of interest in Marx's economic thoughts hadn't yet happened (which happened around 1960s-1970s).
July 25, 2024
Probably the best primer you are going to get to marx's economics. Written in about as straightforward and handholdy of a way as you can get, with short, concise chapters.
The thing I appriciate most about this book is the importance Rubin puts on Marx's theory of commodity fetishism. At first I wasn't sure why he begins a book on value theory with 60 pages of commodity fetishism, but it really is a clever move. Rubin states that Marx's theory of commodity fetishism could "...more accurately be called a general theory of production relations of the commodity capitalist economy." A pretty suprising claim, but by showing why the commodity is at the heart of the commodity economy (and is thus unsuprising why Marx begins Vol 1 with the commodity), he is able to prove its indespensability to the mode of production itself. Social relations in capital are necessarily mediated through the commodity - hence the importance of the theory of commodity fetishism.
Rubin's theory of abstract labor leaves much to be desired, and I really am unclear why people seem to be keen to make abstract labor not something people do. Marx recognized it as human labor as such, and though capitalists only treat labor as abstract in the process of exchange, that doesn't mean it doesn't exist before that. It is, of course, not specific to capitalism. An argument that claims this specificity would have to contend with the unit of account in socialism.
But Rubin gets right back on track with an explanation of Marx's later economic theories, namely those in Vol 2-4 of Capital. Production price gets a good explanation, as does Marx's historically specific concept of productive labor.
Overall, one of the best books on political economy I have ever read.
The thing I appriciate most about this book is the importance Rubin puts on Marx's theory of commodity fetishism. At first I wasn't sure why he begins a book on value theory with 60 pages of commodity fetishism, but it really is a clever move. Rubin states that Marx's theory of commodity fetishism could "...more accurately be called a general theory of production relations of the commodity capitalist economy." A pretty suprising claim, but by showing why the commodity is at the heart of the commodity economy (and is thus unsuprising why Marx begins Vol 1 with the commodity), he is able to prove its indespensability to the mode of production itself. Social relations in capital are necessarily mediated through the commodity - hence the importance of the theory of commodity fetishism.
Rubin's theory of abstract labor leaves much to be desired, and I really am unclear why people seem to be keen to make abstract labor not something people do. Marx recognized it as human labor as such, and though capitalists only treat labor as abstract in the process of exchange, that doesn't mean it doesn't exist before that. It is, of course, not specific to capitalism. An argument that claims this specificity would have to contend with the unit of account in socialism.
But Rubin gets right back on track with an explanation of Marx's later economic theories, namely those in Vol 2-4 of Capital. Production price gets a good explanation, as does Marx's historically specific concept of productive labor.
Overall, one of the best books on political economy I have ever read.
September 6, 2024
Rubin renders Marx's thoughts with clarity and forcefulness, putting their original expositions to shame. He strikes the perfect balance between detail and concision, providing enough detail to make Marx's arguments compelling but not so much as to lose the forest for the trees. It's the kind of book that's so good it makes me mad that I didn't read it sooner; I will not be making the same mistake with Rubin's other major work, A History of Economic Thought! Shoutout to the ghost of Fredy Perlman for turning me on to Rubin's work in the first place.
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July 16, 2020precariously straddling the line between ortho marxism and value critique - circulationist tendencies resolving to "essentially a theory of general equilibrium" as they say
July 9, 2022
The best and most in-depth analysis of Marx's Capital I've come across. Every copy of Capital should be accompanied by Rubin's text, it's just that good.
October 3, 2023
sort of crazy
May 5, 2013
Although Perlman's introduction reads somehow dated, the Rubin essays are excellent introduction to all those who want to go beyond basic political economy and into Marx' value theory. A must prep-read for study of Moishe Postone or Robert Kurz.
July 11, 2021
Rubin was so wise to take the first part of his work for the explication of Marx's theory of commodity fetishism. Understanding commodity fetishism is a very crucial step to recognize that Marx's theory of value inherits but significantly differs from classical school's theory of labor value.
November 25, 2021
This touches on so much but in so much detail that there isn't superficial elucidation and then skip to the next topic. Rubin repeats himself a lot and uses frequently the same terminology, which once you've gotten used to, make the book a lot easier. Definitely essential.
March 25, 2021
Its good 👍
April 24, 2017
A good for helping to understand Marx's theory of value.
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