In the past thirty years, historians have broadened the scope of their discipline to include many previously neglected topics and perspectives. They have chronicled language, madness, gender, and sexuality and have experimented with new forms of presentation. They have turned to the histories of non-Western peoples and to the troubled relations between “the West” and the rest. Allan Megill welcomes these developments, but he also suggests that there is now confusion among historians about what counts as a justified account of the past.
In Historical Knowledge, Historical Error , Megill dispels some of the confusion. Here, he discusses issues of narrative, objectivity, and memory. He attacks what he sees as irresponsible uses of evidence while accepting the art of speculation, which incomplete evidence forces upon historians. Along the way, he offers succinct accounts of the epistemological road historians have traveled from Herodotus and Thucydides through Leopold von Ranke and Alexis de Tocqueville, and on to Hayden White, Natalie Zemon Davis, and Lynn Hunt.
I agree with the other reviewer, who said: "Yeah, it's a little reactionary. So why can't I help liking it?"
This book is incredibly clearly reasoned and well-written. Megill is very smart and has spent decades thinking about these issues. His parsing of difficult concepts like "objectivity" is quite useful for determining just what is at stake and what the possible positions are, whether you ultimately concur with him about the necessity of certain types of objectivity or not. Yet, I am somewhat troubled by his criticism of non-traditional histories and memory studies, which seems too dismissive of the efforts of progressive historians to combine social justice with academic rigor.