Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War

by Ludwell H Johnson

First published in 1958, Red River Campaign examines how partisan politics, economic needs, and personal profit determined military policy and operations in Louisiana and Arkansas during the spring of 1864. In response to the demands of Free-Soil interests in Texas and the New England textiles manufacturers’ need for cotton, Lincoln authorized an expedition to open the way to Texas.  General Nathaniel Banks conducted a combined military and naval campaign up the Red River that lasted only from March 12 to May 20, 1864, but was one of the most destructive of the Civil War. “It is an ugly tale, and except piecemeal―in diaries, memoirs, and chapters in other books―has not been fully told. Ludwell H. Johnson’s book is thorough, scholarly, and moving. He goes into the complex of reasons, beginning with the annexation of Texas, that impelled men to employ shady means top attain decent ends. He goes into the Washington phase of the matter, especially Mr. Lincoln’s part in it, something until now unrevealed. . . . Johnson describes the fighting, dollying his camera nicely for close shots when he wants them, giving dreadful pictures of war.”
―James M. Cain, New York Times Book Review “At a time when so much repetitious material is being produced on the Civil War era it is refreshing to read a monograph characterized by as much originality as this one. The book is well documented and thoroughly done,and the title is well chosen, since the narrative represents a careful intertwining of the play of military factors, cotton, and politics.”
―H. H. Simms, American Academy of Political & Social Science Annals

Genres: Civil War, History, American Civil War, Transmississippi, American History

336 pages, Paperback

First published December 1, 1958

Reviews

[Bill · Rating 4 out of 5]

“The whole affair was a cotton speculation,” Adm. David Dixon Porter is quoted as saying late in this book, after the Red River Campaign was over. “It was a well-understood thing that it was a big cotton raid.”

The spring 1864 campaign, in particular the climactic Battle of Mansfield, is considered a significant, decisive moment in the Civil War. And yet it didn’t accomplish much, aside from ending the military career of Union Gen. Nathaniel Banks, causing regrets and bitter infighting among the Confederate command, and perhaps needlessly prolonging the entire war by draining resources that could have been used elsewhere. It was “a big cotton raid” in which the Union didn’t even get as much cotton as it had hoped. 

There are only a handful of books available on the campaign, and this one from nearly seven decades ago seems to have gotten the best reviews here. It reads a little old-fashioned at times, but is overall an efficient narrative that isn't any longer than it needs to be. 

The subtitle of the book, “Politics and Cotton in the Civil War,” lays out how the story is framed - this is not a book that merely recounts battles, who struck whom and where, and which side won. Johnson lays out the overlapping military, business, political and diplomatic motives that prompted the Union to pursue the campaign in northern Louisiana, southern Arkansas and eastern Texas. It was essentially a smaller-scale version of the earlier effort to secure the Mississippi, aiming to secure the Red River region in order to split the Confederate lines and interrupt their use of the Red River port at Shreveport.

But there were other motives. Lincoln wanted Louisiana fully secured in order to establish a Unionist government there before the 1864 elections. Union forces wanted to make inroads into Texas as a bulwark against French forces in Mexico who may have been looking northward. And there was cotton - lots of cotton. The region was full of the lucrative crop that could help keep Northern manufacturers supplied and help fund the Union war effort, while keeping it out of Southern hands and coffers.

The whole effort ended up being kind of a mess, though. Johnson describes how Gen. Banks’s forces, who aimed to buy up Southern cotton during their advance to sell to Northern manufacturers and provide cash for the government Treasury, instead found their naval counterparts seizing cotton as prizes of war. Other more corrupt speculators were more interested in seizing cotton to enrich themselves, all of which prompted Confederate forces to burn as much as they could of what remained to keep it out of Northern hands altogether. 

On top of that, Banks’s advance was halted by Confederate forces - Johnson recounts the battles in enough detail without getting too far into the weeds - and then naval gunboats got stuck in the river during their retreat, saved only by a feat of engineering that involved building dams to raise the water level just enough to get them moving again. 

Johnson analyzes the battles, and the overall campaign, doling out credit and blame where it’s due. For Banks’s mistakes, Johnson blames both Banks himself and the system that allowed for political generals and made it difficult to remove them for fear of political repercussions. “Banks must shoulder final responsibility” for the campaign’s failure, Johnson writes, “yet it must also be acknowledged that his mistakes did not spring from any lack of courage or intelligence, but rather from his complete lack of military training.”

In the end, the book leaves the impression that the whole thing was an unnecessary sideshow, which distracted and siphoned resources from more pressing Union priorities in the Western theater. As a result, Johnson reaches the conclusion that the campaign prolonged the war by at least two months. He ultimately appears to agree with Banks when he concludes that “Banks had at last come to the conclusion that war and commerce could not be carried on in the same place at the same time.” It also ended up being the last campaign that Banks would ever lead, as his defeat marked the end of his military career. 

Even though it shows its age in places, and I haven’t read any newer books on the same topic to compare it to, this book does the job of covering the Red River Campaign in just enough depth without going overboard into minutiae. More importantly, it places the campaign within the broader context of the politics that prompted it, and how it impacted the rest of the war. For a campaign that turned out to be little more than a sideshow, easily forgotten and dismissed, Johnson makes it worth the time to give it a closer look. 

[Sean Chick · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a classic. Johnson's prose is solid (his preface is certainly worth a read alone) and he does not ignore the dramatic moments. This is doubly good since he does not ignore political, diplomatic, and economic factors, all of which usually get the short end in classic military history. His sly and caustic wit is in evidence throughout. In addition, Johnson shows that the men of the Civil War were motivated by not just patriotism, idealism, and cold military calculations.

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

In full disclosure I have had an abiding interest in the legal and illegal trade between the USA and the states in rebellion aka CSA. I’ve read several of Johnson’s articles. Indeed, Johnson seems to be one of a few who have looked at the subject.
I’ve zero prior knowledge about the Red River campaign and feel that this book was informative as to the causes, the actions, the aftermath.
Perhaps Johnson’s window on the involvement of trade makes this book out on a limb by itself. What it begs for is a comprehensive study of the Treasury Department and the overarching effect the Prize system had on the conflict. Maybe a look at how that translates into elements of the Freedmen’s Bureau. US policy towards seized Confederate property plays a role in post-war North Carolina. And probably in other states that attempted secession.
Sometimes the language used marks Johnson as a man of his times, less objective than he should be.
Nonetheless it is an informative book that explores trade in a way that few others do.

[E · Rating 5 out of 5]

Any fans of Nathaniel Banks that might exist should probably stay away from this in depth look at the Red River campaign. One of Johnson's descriptions of the campaign is that it served to tie up large numbers of Federal forces that could have been more effectively used in other theaters. Johnson weaves in the heavy political influences as well as the cotton trade into the battle narratives in a way that provides a very interesting story. Additional coverage is provided on the failed Camden Expedition, linking it to the operations of Banks. Several maps are included, given the overall lack of maps of the Red River campaign these are very helpful in understanding the battles. Highly recommend for readers wanting to know more about this campaign.

[Sean McLachlan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent and classic study of an unusual campaign. What makes this book different from so many other campaign studies is that Johnson goes into the politics and economics behind the Union decision to head up the Red River with the intention of securing Louisiana and hopefully parts of Texas. The parts about how merchants and officers on both sides got rich off of trading with the enemy are eye-opening and thoroughly researched. This belongs on every Civil War historian's shelf.

[J.C. Paulk · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a book that may have a more regional following, regardless of how well it is written and it is well written. The Red River Campaign is a vastly understated component of the Civil War. However, the meaning will be even stronger for those who live in the central and northern part of Louisiana and would like to hear some history about their back yard.

[Fredrick Danysh · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Union's plan for the Civil War was to blockade the Confederacy. Following the fall of Vicksburg, thus splitting the Confederacy along the Mississippi River, the next step was to cut Texas and its border with Mexico from the rest of the South.