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The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective
The wars since 9/11, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, have generated frustration and an increasing sense of failure in the West. Much of the blame has been attributed to poor strategy. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, public enquiries and defence think tanks have detected a lack of consistent direction, of effective communication, and of governmental coordination. In this important book, Sir Hew Strachan, one of the world's leading military historians, reveals how these failures resulted from a fundamental misreading and misapplication of strategy itself. He argues that the wars since 2001 have not in reality been as 'new' as has been widely assumed and that we need to adopt a more historical approach to contemporary strategy in order to identify what is really changing in how we wage war. If war is to fulfil the aims of policy, then we need first to understand war.
338 pages, Hardcover
First published December 5, 2013
About the author
Hew Strachan
83 books76 followersHew Strachan was born and brought up in Edinburgh, and was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh 2003 and awarded an Hon. D.Univ., (Paisley) 2005. He is also Life Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, where he was successively Research Fellow, Admissions Tutor and Senior Tutor, 1975-92. From 1992 to 2001 he was Professor of Modern History at the University of Glasgow, and from 1996 to 2001 Director of the Scottish Centre for War Studies.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
October 29, 2015
I work at a 'Strategic & Defence Studies Centre' and like to use the word strategy. But I confess to not being really sure what the word means. In this confusion I am not alone.
In The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective Hew Strachan (pronounced ‘strawn’) examines the ‘lost meaning of strategy’. Today most government departments try to be ‘strategic’ as do businesses, health coaches, schools and caterers.
This is a far cry from what the term classically meant. Strachan compelling argues that for 18th and 19th century thinkers such as Clausewitz and Jomini, strategy meant ‘the use of the battle for the purposes of the war’. This was the notion which World War One generals carried with them into the conflict. The change in meaning occurred after World War Two and with the rise of the nuclear age.
No longer could states use battles for war, because war could no longer be risked. The total war of Hitler, Stalin and Hirohito was too high a burden, and nuclear weapons made conflict seem cataclysmic. As Bernard Brodie famously wrote ‘Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose’. Ever since, Strachan laments, strategy has been broad, grand, and banal. It covers peacetime and war, economics and policy and is thoroughly confused about its purpose and role.
Through a series of thematic essays Strachan traces this change and the harm it has done to our modern understanding and use of war. While total wars between powerful states have thankfully paused, warfare continues in a variety of forms.
In one fascinating chapter, Strachan highlights and critiques the emergence of the ‘operational’ level. This is a domain of thinking that had not existed in the past and represents an attempt by the military to recapture that original element of strategy — and their control of this highly valued term.
While Strachan rightly attacks the sloppy thinking and misuse of the term strategy, I admit to still being unclear exactly how he thinks we should use it. Perhaps a re-reading would help. This is a detailed, analytical book that weaves its way to a conclusion rather than setting out easy to follow guideposts. As a series of reprinted and updated works from other contexts the book is coherent but not comprehensive.
If I have caught the thread, Strachan believes that strategy should not be thought of as a constant but a discussion. An intersection between policy (what the nation wants) and tactics (the use of force by the state). In the middle, and negotiated between those with responsibility for policy (the politicians) and tactics (the military) is strategy.
Where we have gone wrong is to try and split the term. So the relationship between policy and strategy occupied the West during the Cold War, leading to meaningless Presidential rhetoric about a “forward strategy of Freedom”. At the same time, the operational concept only looks at the relationship between strategy and tactics. This ignores the purpose of fighting and confuses military concerns with the resources and approach of the nation undertaking it.
Strachan also usefully highlights the temporal shift in our thinking about strategy. Instead of a discussion between past and present it is now between present and future. As a historian who resents this shift, he lays blame for this change at the feet of two groups.
First theorists from the Navy and Air Forces who either don’t have much of a history to draw on. Or who believe their machines sufficiently different and perfectible in the future as to be ‘revolutionary’. The other group is political scientists, particularly those after WW2 who Strachan believes got lost in abstract game theories and formal logics that ignored actual human conflict.
In The Direction of War, Strachan judges strategic studies a very troubled discipline. He demonstrates it is confused about its key terms, divorced from its origins, and subverted in its purposes. At the heart of this is the inability of many in the discipline to shake the romance of World War Two. That is, wanting to plan for, discuss and debate grand strategy in total war scenarios without being sullied by looking at the actual occurrences and use of strategy in mundane, limited, and localised conflicts today.
There’s much to this. We have a generation of Western leaders who think every crisis is Munich, and Churchill is the only model of good leadership. And this generation, in war and peace has been terrible at using force to support national interests. Too willing, too reticent. Too fearful, too hubristic. And rarely clear minded in why and how the conflict will serve their nation. But we can’t just blame the leaders. Those who advise and write on these matters need to also take responsibility.
This is a slow read but a valuable one. There is wisdom on every page, but not every page seems to take you in the same direction. The essays wander through history, shift to theory and then back again. Unsurprisingly for a Professor at Oxford, European and especially British experience is the go-to, though Strachan does an admirable job of providing as much information as you need to understand the reason why he is raising each example.
Ultimately, I still feel some confusion about strategy. Restoring strategy to its original meaning seems an unhelpful move. It would seem to exclude many critical peacetime choices, such as the development of alliances and much of defence planning (do we build ships to defend the air-sea gap, or land forces to be interoperable with coalition partners overseas?).
The present wide use of the term also suggests a need for a term that helps us connect policy and action to secure the nation and its interests. Thanks to Strachan’s consistent effort to demand clear, historically grounded thinking I now feel I at least have a firm foundation upon which to build my own views.
In The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective Hew Strachan (pronounced ‘strawn’) examines the ‘lost meaning of strategy’. Today most government departments try to be ‘strategic’ as do businesses, health coaches, schools and caterers.
This is a far cry from what the term classically meant. Strachan compelling argues that for 18th and 19th century thinkers such as Clausewitz and Jomini, strategy meant ‘the use of the battle for the purposes of the war’. This was the notion which World War One generals carried with them into the conflict. The change in meaning occurred after World War Two and with the rise of the nuclear age.
No longer could states use battles for war, because war could no longer be risked. The total war of Hitler, Stalin and Hirohito was too high a burden, and nuclear weapons made conflict seem cataclysmic. As Bernard Brodie famously wrote ‘Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose’. Ever since, Strachan laments, strategy has been broad, grand, and banal. It covers peacetime and war, economics and policy and is thoroughly confused about its purpose and role.
Through a series of thematic essays Strachan traces this change and the harm it has done to our modern understanding and use of war. While total wars between powerful states have thankfully paused, warfare continues in a variety of forms.
In one fascinating chapter, Strachan highlights and critiques the emergence of the ‘operational’ level. This is a domain of thinking that had not existed in the past and represents an attempt by the military to recapture that original element of strategy — and their control of this highly valued term.
While Strachan rightly attacks the sloppy thinking and misuse of the term strategy, I admit to still being unclear exactly how he thinks we should use it. Perhaps a re-reading would help. This is a detailed, analytical book that weaves its way to a conclusion rather than setting out easy to follow guideposts. As a series of reprinted and updated works from other contexts the book is coherent but not comprehensive.
If I have caught the thread, Strachan believes that strategy should not be thought of as a constant but a discussion. An intersection between policy (what the nation wants) and tactics (the use of force by the state). In the middle, and negotiated between those with responsibility for policy (the politicians) and tactics (the military) is strategy.
Where we have gone wrong is to try and split the term. So the relationship between policy and strategy occupied the West during the Cold War, leading to meaningless Presidential rhetoric about a “forward strategy of Freedom”. At the same time, the operational concept only looks at the relationship between strategy and tactics. This ignores the purpose of fighting and confuses military concerns with the resources and approach of the nation undertaking it.
Strachan also usefully highlights the temporal shift in our thinking about strategy. Instead of a discussion between past and present it is now between present and future. As a historian who resents this shift, he lays blame for this change at the feet of two groups.
First theorists from the Navy and Air Forces who either don’t have much of a history to draw on. Or who believe their machines sufficiently different and perfectible in the future as to be ‘revolutionary’. The other group is political scientists, particularly those after WW2 who Strachan believes got lost in abstract game theories and formal logics that ignored actual human conflict.
In The Direction of War, Strachan judges strategic studies a very troubled discipline. He demonstrates it is confused about its key terms, divorced from its origins, and subverted in its purposes. At the heart of this is the inability of many in the discipline to shake the romance of World War Two. That is, wanting to plan for, discuss and debate grand strategy in total war scenarios without being sullied by looking at the actual occurrences and use of strategy in mundane, limited, and localised conflicts today.
There’s much to this. We have a generation of Western leaders who think every crisis is Munich, and Churchill is the only model of good leadership. And this generation, in war and peace has been terrible at using force to support national interests. Too willing, too reticent. Too fearful, too hubristic. And rarely clear minded in why and how the conflict will serve their nation. But we can’t just blame the leaders. Those who advise and write on these matters need to also take responsibility.
This is a slow read but a valuable one. There is wisdom on every page, but not every page seems to take you in the same direction. The essays wander through history, shift to theory and then back again. Unsurprisingly for a Professor at Oxford, European and especially British experience is the go-to, though Strachan does an admirable job of providing as much information as you need to understand the reason why he is raising each example.
Ultimately, I still feel some confusion about strategy. Restoring strategy to its original meaning seems an unhelpful move. It would seem to exclude many critical peacetime choices, such as the development of alliances and much of defence planning (do we build ships to defend the air-sea gap, or land forces to be interoperable with coalition partners overseas?).
The present wide use of the term also suggests a need for a term that helps us connect policy and action to secure the nation and its interests. Thanks to Strachan’s consistent effort to demand clear, historically grounded thinking I now feel I at least have a firm foundation upon which to build my own views.
April 21, 2014
While not perfect, certainly one of the best works on strategy I've read recently and possibly the best work on post-1945 strategic history I've read in a while. Two main flaws or issues of contention: Strachan's critique of civil-military relations is at times lucid, but at other times appears to come slightly off the rails. Second, the books origin as a (much altered and added too) collection of articles shows through in the many areas which it doubles back on itself covering ground previously well trodden. While at times this is done to build on previously mentioned ideas, at other times it seems overly repetitive. On the whole it is an excellent assessment and striking critique of the recent history of Strategic Studies as a field. Admittedly, as a historian I find many of his disciplinary critiques regarding the history/IR balance within the discipline quite convincing, but I suppose I'm biased.
April 18, 2023
I lacked an appropriate frame of reference to fully understand this book. At times I thought it was really interesting, at times it felt like an elaborate book review of Clausewitz’s ‘On War’ and at times it got a bit repetitive hammering down on the same central point over and over.
All in all I would not recommend it to casual readers. Which - I suppose - I could have known since it was published by a university press.
All in all I would not recommend it to casual readers. Which - I suppose - I could have known since it was published by a university press.
February 18, 2014
The best book on the subject in recent memory. A little uneven thanks to the format (collated articles from the last decade or so), and a little bit repetitive at times. Still the most insightful approach to strategy of any modern writer, and a damn sight more fluent and enjoyable to read than Colin Gray. If you leave aside his weird views on American politics and his bizarre civil-military relations paradigm, everything Strachan writes is pure gold.
March 30, 2014
a series of lectures and essays, shop there's no central thesis, really. some chapters are better than others. he defines a real problem, but is hard to tell what he's proposing as a solution.
June 30, 2026
4,5/5
uma coletânea de artigos sobre as relações entre as esferas civis e militares que formam a "ponte estratégica", parafraseando a teoria de colin gray, assim como o relevo da história na tomada de decisão estratégica. dado o facto de ter sido publicado há uma década prende-se quase exclusivamente às campanhas ocidentais no iraque e afeganistão. isto poderá para alguns fazer do livro um produto do seu tempo.
mesmo assim, é leitura essencial para a área de estudos estratégicos e para pessoas interessadas.
uma coletânea de artigos sobre as relações entre as esferas civis e militares que formam a "ponte estratégica", parafraseando a teoria de colin gray, assim como o relevo da história na tomada de decisão estratégica. dado o facto de ter sido publicado há uma década prende-se quase exclusivamente às campanhas ocidentais no iraque e afeganistão. isto poderá para alguns fazer do livro um produto do seu tempo.
mesmo assim, é leitura essencial para a área de estudos estratégicos e para pessoas interessadas.
August 23, 2017
This is a really good summary of the state of strategy as a discipline in the twenty-first century. Each chapter can be read independently. He addresses various contested issues like grand strategy versus strategy versus operational levels of analysis, maritime versus naval strategy, new versus old wars, the obsolescence of major wars, and the continued relevance of Clausewitz. There is an Anglo-American bias, which is to be expected.
February 16, 2018
Excellent Book - One of the best on the subject of contemporary strategy. Contrast with nuclear, game theory.
February 25, 2019
I am dealing with military history and I need to say I found Hew Strachan's book very instructive and informative. It is a little repetitive but very useful. I think Strachan's critics on Paret-Howard edition of On War has crucial importance to understand the American military bureaucrats' approach to war warfare and strategy.
December 28, 2017
There are books you chew and books you drink. This one is a perfectly prepared cut of filet mignon. You do a bit of chewing, but it is worth every bite. Sir Strachan explains they 'why' of and brings many of the ideas in the phenomenon of war to their logical conclusion. He clearly and completely shows where strategic thinking has evolved from and the risks of it not following true strategic formation and execution. He does have some repetitive ideas, but that is due to the fact it is an anthology stitched together in a logically grouped set of ideas. This is a top shelf book I will no doubt continue to refer to and study further.
August 29, 2014
I like Strachan, but I have to agree with the other reviewers. The essays can become repetitive, highly theoretical, and somewhat inconsistent. Still, he writes well on important topics, particularly the taxonomy of strategy, policy, and operational art. Recommended.
February 20, 2017
Inconsistent and incoherent. The book could have been published as an article with only the last chapter because that was the only chapter that seemed to support is overarching argument. The book was utterly confounding.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews