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304 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1990
In particular, such a conciliatory measure might have very possibly convinced these groups to give up arms and/or the use of terror and play the role of a revolutionary loyal opposition. Such a process would have of course facilitated the reorganization and growth of groups and parties that had supported the October Revolution and yet were more sympathetic and responsive to the peasantry than all of the wings of the Bolshevik party. These groups and parties, due to their undeniable weaknesses, could not have possibly offered an alternative to the Bolsheviks as a party of government. Yet they could have played a major role in peacefully integrating the bulk of the peasantry into the post-October revolutionary process.
While the overall objective reality may have indeed completely precluded the development of a Russian socialist democracy in the 1920s, there could have also been a stronger vector or component of resistance from below. For example, this could have happened if Trotsky had not failed to appeal for mass self-organization, both inside and outside party ranks, in support of the relatively democratic opening outlined in his proposed 'New Course' policy of December 1923. This might have also in turn helped to preclude the eventual rise of Stalinist totalitarianism. Again, as I suggested in the Introduction, it was not a matter of indifference which one of the various possible kinds of non-democratic society might have come to prevail in Soviet Russia.
All the Woulda-Coulda-Shouldsas
Layin' in the sun
Talkin' 'bout the things
They woulda-coulda-shoulda done
But those Woulda-Coulda-Shouldsas
All ran away and hid
From the one little did.
Yet an elementary sense of proportion and perspective demands that we distinguish between Lenin's flawed conception of democracy, which he by and large upheld until at least the Spring of 1918, and the clearly anti-democratic perspective that, with his associates, he began to adopt shortly before and especially during the course of the Civil War. As we have seen, these anti-democratic views and practices fully crystallized in the period 1921-3, even as Lenin reacted in genuine horror against the practical outcomes of those very views and actions. It was particularly during and after the Civil War that many undemocratic practices that may have indeed been justified as necessary came to be seen and defended by Lenin and the other mainstream party leaders as intrinsically virtuous. The existence of this attitude is also demonstrated, as I mentioned earlier, by the virtual absence of statements by Lenin attesting to the temporary or conjunctural nature of his repressive and anti-democratic measures, except in a few isolated instances, e.g. when the 1921 ban on party factions was originally declared to be temporary. This is one reason I think Sirianni, Miliband, and other intelligent critics of Lenin's political theory are in a sense missing the key issue. That is, in the last analysis the main problem was not the theoretical inadequacies of State and Revolution. Rather, the problem was Lenin's willingness to forget about it as a guideline for government policy, even if that meant merely to go on record indicating why he had to depart from it given the circumstances facing Soviet Russia. Consequently, the political vision of State and Revolution became in fact social poetry rather than an actual guideline for social policy.