This comprehensive study of China's Cold War experience reveals the crucial role Beijing played in shaping the orientation of the global Cold War and the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The success of China's Communist revolution in 1949 set the stage, Chen says. The Korean War, the Taiwan Strait crises, and the Vietnam War--all of which involved China as a central actor--represented the only major "hot" conflicts during the Cold War period, making East Asia the main battlefield of the Cold War, while creating conditions to prevent the two superpowers from engaging in a direct military showdown. Beijing's split with Moscow and rapprochement with Washington fundamentally transformed the international balance of power, argues Chen, eventually leading to the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the decline of international communism.
Based on sources that include recently declassified Chinese documents, the book offers pathbreaking insights into the course and outcome of the Cold War.
Broad overview of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China covering the years 1949 until Mao's death in 1976. As the title suggests, Mao is the driving force behind major decisions and changes, although other figures such as Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai also play some role.
Chapters cover broad trends in relationships - such as the closeless and then tension with the Soviet Union - but also specific chapters are devoted to incidents such as the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958, and Chinese involvement in the French-Indochina War and the US-Vietnam War. Chen suggests that much of Mao's foreign policy was driven from a "post-revolution anxiety" - that is, Mao's obsession for a continuous revolution both at home and abroad, and Mao's use of foreign tensions to mobilize for domestic policies; as well as a perception of China at the top of a regional hierarchy instead of as a minor player.
I don't know as much about how scholarship on foreign policy has evolved in the years since this was published, but the extensive use of archival documents - rare then and rarer now! - means this is still a serious work of scholarship.
I really liked this book! I would have to say the Cold War is my "favorite" historical war because there were so many facets to it but also because China was a huge player. I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in Cold War politics. Jian mostly talks about China, USSR, US, and a little about Vietnam and Korea. It did start to become a little redundant the further I read but overall written well.
An absolute masterpiece- a blueprint for how "New Cold War History" and diplomatic history in general should be written. Chen masterfully integrates the English and Chinese literature on Maoist foreign policy and compellingly updates it with his archival finds. I am sold on his thesis that most of Maoist foreign policy was primarily focused on domestic politics and Mao's goal of "continuous revolution." This was especially apparent in the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, where there really were no pressing security concerns at that moment, and thus Chen's explanation of it being a means to justify the Great Leap Forward is superior.
Additionally, I agree with his insight that the Sino-Soviet split was THE event of the Cold War, and it explains much of Maoist foreign policy, from the implosion of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance to Sino-American rapprochement. Chen's explanation of Sino-American rapprochement only happening after Mao's turn against the Red Guards and towards order in 1969, thus finally giving up on "continuous revolution" as his central policy, is well put. I was eagerly awaiting this chapter while reading(it is the last one), both because Sino-American relations are my main research interest and also because it seems the hardest case for his thesis- the security argument for the rapprochement is just overwhelming and obvious. However, Chen admirably integrates the security side- China truly was boxed in in 1969 between the USSR, Japan, and India- and fits it into his domestic policy framework.
I would have definitely liked an India chapter centered around the 1962 war, and a Tibet chapter as well, but overall this is incredible and I would recommend it to anyone interested in Maoism, Chinese foreign policy, or the Cold War broadly.
Read this for a grad class. Incredibly well written book on exactly what the title says. I couldn't give it five stars for a terrible, my own fault reason - you really need a bit of a background on Mao's China in general before branching out into how Mao's China fit within the international picture of the Cold War. So some places I glossed over because I had no idea what Jian was talking about. But really, that's my own fault. I'd love to come back to this one in the future, maybe after a little more reading for context.
A good read with intriguing content, although at times confusing. Jumps in and out of historical events and different decades more than a casual reader would like.
The author's overall worldview is pretty much Western liberalism, and the insistence that Mao's foreign policy was moulded around domestic concerns (principally the pursuit of "continuous revolution") is overdone. Nonetheless, Chen Jian has done extremely valuable research into some fascinating and important areas of Chinese foreign policy between 1949 and 1976, especially in relation to the Indochina wars, the Sino-Soviet split, Korea, and the US-China rapprochement. As such, this was a useful and enjoyable read.
This book provides a historic overview of China’s political structure in the second half of the 20th century, relationship between the Soviet Union and China at that time, and implications on conflicts in East Asia especially Korea and Taiwan’s sovereignty.
A very interesting read to understand some of thought processes of the leadership in China, especially Mao and how he bulldozed everyone around him to perpetuate his views. It reveals a complex man whose views got more stringent later in life and who believed in his moral superiority over everyone around him leading to the campaigns of The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural revolution.
3.5 Stars, assembled from a series of previously written articles, so a lot of repetition of key points (China's victim mentality, Mao's desire to replace the "old world" perception of China, post-revolution anxiety, continuous revolution). I wish it would have gone into greater detail on the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution
I want to give this book 4 stars, because I was fascinated by the topic and learned a whole lot of new information. The purpose of the book is to present the reasons for decision making in the People's Republic using newly available documents from their archives. However, since the book was originally written as a series of articles published in different places and at different times, the same basic points are made over and over as if they are being introduced for the first time. Chen Jian's main thesis is that Mao's decision making was much more determined by his goals and vision for Chinese society, rather than concern about the external world. Many of the chapters provide evidence to support this idea, but it is introduced as if it is a new idea over and over.
Because of the primacy of the connections between China's domestic concerns and this international decision making, the book is best understood if you have a good grasp of the situations within China that are referenced - the Great Leap Forward, the (Great Proletarian) Cultural Revolution, etc.
Overall, this is a good, useful and interesting read, despite its flaws.
It took me a while to catch the flow of this book, essentially a diplomatic history of the Cold War written with the Chinese perspective at the center. The genre doesn't come naturally to me; I tend to get bogged down in the details of who the "four marshals" who advised Mao during the late 1960s were, and the language of communiques is inherently turgid. Not Chen's fault. Once I settled in, I was impressed with the way Chen cross-references the domestic politics of Mao's commitment to "continuous revolution"--the ideological foundation of the Great Leap Forward and the almost equally disastrous Cultural Revolution--with realpolitik concerns relating to Vietnam, India, and, above all, China's uneasy relationship with the Soviet Union in the years leading up to the Sino-Soviet split. Not a great read, but a valuable book that deepened my understanding of an extremely complicated era in international relations.
Chen has a strong and compelling thesis in his contention that ideology, rather than mere strategic concerns was critical to the development of China's foreign policy during the Cold War. At the heart of foreign policy in China during the Mao era was the sense that foreign policy could be used in mobilizing support for domestic developments, such as the disastrous Great Leap Forward. Chen also uses original documents to talk about the rarely known role of China in the Hungary and Poland crises, as well as the first Vietnam War. I really enjoyed the book and thought it was a nice read for anyone interested in either the Cold War or in 20th century Chinese history. I do wish that I had a frame of reference in how other scholars would treat the same recently opened documents.
Written in 2001, this offers a nice summary of Cold War events in Asia and around the world and centers these incidents on Mao's China and influence over these events. Some different information, primarily due to the author's access to previously unreleased Chinese documents. General thesis is that China had a much greater impact on events around the world (Hungary, Poland, Vietnam, Korea, Taiwan Strait, split of Soviet-Sino relationship) thatn earlier thought and it was all controlled by Mao's Cultural Revolution and (changing) domestic policies.
Mao was a megalomaniacal demagogue who led his country into precarious international crises and wars in order to promote the concept of "continuous revolution" thereby further radicalizing his outrageous policies during his rule. This book explains how and why.