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Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War
The definitive account of GI resistance to the Vietnam War. New introduction by Howard Zinn.
364 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 2005
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August 2, 2009
History never repeats itself exactly. Situations change, some lessons are learned, others not. Such it the impression I get from reading this 2005 edition of a book first published in 1975. The addition of a postscript and a new introduction serve to reinforce the findings of this study on GI Resistance During the Vietnam War. Though a Vietnam vet myself, I must confess that I was not aware of all that was going on within the military nor all that was occurring in civilian society. Perhaps it was because when I was in Vietnam (Oct. 68 to Oct 69) I was in a small support unit with its own compound on a division size base camp and when I returned to the states I was on small bases in the hinterland. I took an early out and have been sporadically involved with anti-war groups. Now I understand why I was able to take an early out. What makes this work doubly interesting is its applicability for today.
The first part of this book catalogues and discusses the numerous instances of GI resistance in all the services except the Coast Guard. Underground newspapers were established with appropriate names, e.g. gigline, FTA, Attitude Check. The Carrier KITTY HAWK had “Kitty Litter” while the submarine tender HUNLEY had the “Hunley Hemorrhoid” with the motto ‘We serve to preserve the pain in your ass.’ The military tried to suppress these papers but like Samizdat in the Soviet Union, they were hard to suppress. The author also discusses the issue of race and the discrimination that took place and is possibly place now in the military.
In many cases civilians (some veterans of Vietnam) helped with staffing of these GI based anti-war organizations. But it was not a one-way street, the GI resistance cooperated with unions. One of the first indications of this coordination (between civilian and military activists) and heightened political awareness came in early 1971, with GI movement support for the lettuce boycott organized by the chicano farm workers in California.
Some GI resistance was refusing to report for duty. Cortright found that volunteer soldiers were more prone to go AWOL than draftees. Having been deceived by the recruitment racket they expressed their bitterness through unsophisticated but effective means they voted with their feet. Numerous instances of what could be called mutinies occurred with small groups refusing to go aboard ship and/or deploy to the war zone. In the latter part of the Vietnam conflict groups of GIs refused to enter combat, especially those who were short-timers and were fed up with the lies about why we were there. While not as prevalent as in Vietnam some GIs are refusing to go to Iraq and/or have gone to Canada and at least one group in the Iraqi conflict refused to drive a convoy due to lack of proper equipment
Many GIs turned to drugs to escape from reality both in Vietnam and back in the states. Iit has been shown that Vietnam led to increased drug use in the US. Some may have been involved with drugs before Nam but many more got addicted there. It must be borne in mind that to obtain the manpower necessary to wage the war in Vietnam the military lowered their standards, accepting individuals with low test scores and/or criminal records.
This led to perhaps the most tragic symptom of disorder within the armed forces - the level of serious crime…. In the 197th Brigade, at Ft. Benning, the 1971 crime rate was nearly double that of 1970; in the 4th Mechanized Division, at Ft. Carson, there had been 173 thefts in just one month. The press has reported an increase in domestic violence and suicides in the military since Bush took us into Iraq. On July 17, 2009 the Army released a study on violent crimes committed by members of a Combat Brigade stationed at Fort Carson. The study did not reveal any one single cause, but rather a comprehensive list of individual predisposing factors, such as prior criminal behavior, drug or alcohol abuse, prior behavioral issues and barriers to seeking behavioral health care,
Cartright claims “the GI movement imbued the military with the voice of a troubled citizenry, providing a measure of democratic restraint on the otherwise unresponsive and imperious institutions of war.” He later refers to George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four where war is envisioned “as no longer an annihilating mass struggle but ‘a warfare of limited aims.’ In the lurid world of the future, military conflict would become a continuous affair without victory or defeat, fought ‘on the vague frontiers . . . or round the floating fortresses,’ involving ‘very small numbers of people, mostly highly trained specialists.’ As we look at the current conflicts in the Middle East we see technology in the form of unmanned vehicles taking part in these wars of ‘limited aims’ (if there are any real aims). The new GI is a specialist using all sorts of new technology. Perhaps Orwell deserves a re-read.
Part II of the work could be called the lessons learned portion. Cartright notes “For the Pentagon, perhaps the chief lesson of Vietnam has been that sustained counterinsurgency warfare is no longer a realistic option, that the commitment of a huge expeditionary force is politically and militarily disastrous and threatens the very survival of the armed forces.” He continues his analysis with “by relying on the armies of foreign military dictatorships (Iran, South Korea, Brazil), the United States can continue its interventionist policies despite insufficient manpower resources.” Having been written in 1975, it is understandable that Iran was included, though in 2009 it is not the case, reliance on foreign forces is no longer an option
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan show that the author was right in suggesting that “an integral part of the new military strategy is an increase in the readiness of the nation’s 900,000 standby-reserve forces. The Pentagon has abandoned the disastrous Vietnam-era policy of increasing draft calls and expanding the size of the active forces to meet an emergency, and in the future will rely instead on a smaller force backed up by combat-ready reserves.” There has been some questions early on about the combat readiness of the Reserve and National Guard units sent into Iraq. Now it is a war weariness that is sapping the strength of the military.
While we have an all-volunteer military which, in Cartright’s view, “was introduced and accepted. . . primarily because of the political and social pressures caused by resistance to the military [in Vietnam:].” In the mid-seventies Cartright found “The available evidence indicates that most volunteers join the military to escape limited personal and economic opportunities,” and that “predictably, the current recruitment system is attracting a disproportionate share of youth from working-class and lower-class income backgrounds.” Under-employment and the need for extra income also play a role in individuals enlisting in the National Guard and reserves. When we look at the ads for the military at least from the 1990s to today the push is money for college and we should note that many of the units in the war zone are reserve and National Guard units composed of enlistees expecting to play soldier one week-end a month and two weeks a year. They did not sign up for multiple lengthy tours in a war zone.
The military had also opened up in the mid-seventies to recruit more women. However, Cartright says: “[w:]hile some have interpreted these changes (increased role for women) as a victory for the feminist movement, in fact the Pentagon has been motivated not by the advances of women’s liberation but by insufficient enlistments among men. . . . As in the larger society, women in the military are excluded from positions of authority and are disproportionately assigned t low-skill, service occupations. . . . The subjugation of women in the ranks is closely tied to the sexism of military life.” Fortunately, society and the military, while still sexist, have opened up more opportunities for women in skilled and dangerous occupations.
In part I Cartright said “the GI movement imbued the military with the voice of a troubled citizenry, providing a measure of democratic restraint on the otherwise unresponsive and imperious institutions of war.” However, there were instances of GIs running amok such as the My Lai massacre and there were more such occurrences if we believe the Winter Soldier and other such events. In many cases the perpetrators were not prosecuted but in the case of My Lai the Lieutenant in charge was put on trial. This didn’t sit that well with some GI resisters and on Nov. 23, 1970 six Concerned Officers Movement (COM) members held a news conference on urging that the Calley trial be halted and announcing the formation of a ‘Citizens Commission of Inquiry’ to investigate the criminal responsibility of senior American commanders. In the Iraqi war we have the incident at Abu Gharib where untrained reservists took part in what are considered war crimes. It was the lower ranks that were scape-goated.
In Part II, (written in 1975) the author noted international military differences, e.g. the soldiers law of West Germany with the soldier-superior relationship very carefully defined to prevent coercive and unthinking submission to commanders. i.e. the individual soldier must be given not only the right but the responsibility to think and act independently. Thus the Nuremburg defense of ‘I was only following orders” could not be used. If the troops were provided a clear understanding of the rules of war and could exercise their right to refuse an unlawful order knowing they would be supported by the system, the U.S. might not have received the ‘black eye’ from the Abu Gharib incident.
Cartright ends the 1975 portion of his book with “[t:]he central lesson of the GI movement – and, I hope this book – is that people need not be helpless before the power of illegitimate authority, that by getting together and acting upon their convictions people can change society and, in effect, make their own history.” His statement is as true today as it was then. We should advocate the bringing to justice of those who commit crimes including using lies to get us into and keep us in illegal wars.
Cartright’s postscript has the benefit of information that has surfaced since his 1975 work. He notes that “ [In original edition:] I argued that American forces were withdrawn in 1969 and afterwards because they ceased to function as an effective fighting force. Richard Nixon brought the troops home not only to accommodate domestic opinion, but to save the armed forces from internal ruin. Stretched beyond their capacity by a prolonged, fiercely fought war in a foreign jungle, lacking domestic political support for their mission, the U.S. armed forces suffered the worst defeat in their history.” Looking back at the divisions within society in the late 60s and early 70s that could be an easily drawn conclusion and perhaps that is what is occurring now. Society is attempting to choose where it wants its ‘sons and daughters’ to go in defense of our values.
Though it is not an exact analogy, Cartright’s conclusion “in Vietnam, an American army that was supported by the most lavish firepower in military history, that never lost a battle, nonetheless lost the war. Vietnam confirmed that military and technological power alone can never assure victory if the cause is unjust and lacks popular support.” Without really knowing the real aims of the Bush administration in going into Iraq, one cannot judge victory or defeat. We support our troops and do not want to see them used unjustly, unwisely and illegally. Cartwright notes: “[I:]ronically, it was Powell himself, as Secretary of State under George W. Bush, who presided over the violation of the Weinberger/Powell doctrine when the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003. Once again, political leaders in Washington sent the armed forces into dubious battle for a cause that lacked legitimacy and political support. “
There are many comparisons between wars but none fit exactly. Vietnam was a war with draftees, Iraq and Afghanistan are not. Vietnam took place mainly in the jungle and highlands; Iraq and Afghanistan are mainly in the cities and villages. Our entry into both conflicts was based on questionable circumstances. However, in the Iraq conflict evidence was intelligence was purposely cooked and presented to get us into an illegal war.
This work is thought provoking and I suggest it to all who want to understand more about ‘limited’ war and its effect on society.
The first part of this book catalogues and discusses the numerous instances of GI resistance in all the services except the Coast Guard. Underground newspapers were established with appropriate names, e.g. gigline, FTA, Attitude Check. The Carrier KITTY HAWK had “Kitty Litter” while the submarine tender HUNLEY had the “Hunley Hemorrhoid” with the motto ‘We serve to preserve the pain in your ass.’ The military tried to suppress these papers but like Samizdat in the Soviet Union, they were hard to suppress. The author also discusses the issue of race and the discrimination that took place and is possibly place now in the military.
In many cases civilians (some veterans of Vietnam) helped with staffing of these GI based anti-war organizations. But it was not a one-way street, the GI resistance cooperated with unions. One of the first indications of this coordination (between civilian and military activists) and heightened political awareness came in early 1971, with GI movement support for the lettuce boycott organized by the chicano farm workers in California.
Some GI resistance was refusing to report for duty. Cortright found that volunteer soldiers were more prone to go AWOL than draftees. Having been deceived by the recruitment racket they expressed their bitterness through unsophisticated but effective means they voted with their feet. Numerous instances of what could be called mutinies occurred with small groups refusing to go aboard ship and/or deploy to the war zone. In the latter part of the Vietnam conflict groups of GIs refused to enter combat, especially those who were short-timers and were fed up with the lies about why we were there. While not as prevalent as in Vietnam some GIs are refusing to go to Iraq and/or have gone to Canada and at least one group in the Iraqi conflict refused to drive a convoy due to lack of proper equipment
Many GIs turned to drugs to escape from reality both in Vietnam and back in the states. Iit has been shown that Vietnam led to increased drug use in the US. Some may have been involved with drugs before Nam but many more got addicted there. It must be borne in mind that to obtain the manpower necessary to wage the war in Vietnam the military lowered their standards, accepting individuals with low test scores and/or criminal records.
This led to perhaps the most tragic symptom of disorder within the armed forces - the level of serious crime…. In the 197th Brigade, at Ft. Benning, the 1971 crime rate was nearly double that of 1970; in the 4th Mechanized Division, at Ft. Carson, there had been 173 thefts in just one month. The press has reported an increase in domestic violence and suicides in the military since Bush took us into Iraq. On July 17, 2009 the Army released a study on violent crimes committed by members of a Combat Brigade stationed at Fort Carson. The study did not reveal any one single cause, but rather a comprehensive list of individual predisposing factors, such as prior criminal behavior, drug or alcohol abuse, prior behavioral issues and barriers to seeking behavioral health care,
Cartright claims “the GI movement imbued the military with the voice of a troubled citizenry, providing a measure of democratic restraint on the otherwise unresponsive and imperious institutions of war.” He later refers to George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four where war is envisioned “as no longer an annihilating mass struggle but ‘a warfare of limited aims.’ In the lurid world of the future, military conflict would become a continuous affair without victory or defeat, fought ‘on the vague frontiers . . . or round the floating fortresses,’ involving ‘very small numbers of people, mostly highly trained specialists.’ As we look at the current conflicts in the Middle East we see technology in the form of unmanned vehicles taking part in these wars of ‘limited aims’ (if there are any real aims). The new GI is a specialist using all sorts of new technology. Perhaps Orwell deserves a re-read.
Part II of the work could be called the lessons learned portion. Cartright notes “For the Pentagon, perhaps the chief lesson of Vietnam has been that sustained counterinsurgency warfare is no longer a realistic option, that the commitment of a huge expeditionary force is politically and militarily disastrous and threatens the very survival of the armed forces.” He continues his analysis with “by relying on the armies of foreign military dictatorships (Iran, South Korea, Brazil), the United States can continue its interventionist policies despite insufficient manpower resources.” Having been written in 1975, it is understandable that Iran was included, though in 2009 it is not the case, reliance on foreign forces is no longer an option
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan show that the author was right in suggesting that “an integral part of the new military strategy is an increase in the readiness of the nation’s 900,000 standby-reserve forces. The Pentagon has abandoned the disastrous Vietnam-era policy of increasing draft calls and expanding the size of the active forces to meet an emergency, and in the future will rely instead on a smaller force backed up by combat-ready reserves.” There has been some questions early on about the combat readiness of the Reserve and National Guard units sent into Iraq. Now it is a war weariness that is sapping the strength of the military.
While we have an all-volunteer military which, in Cartright’s view, “was introduced and accepted. . . primarily because of the political and social pressures caused by resistance to the military [in Vietnam:].” In the mid-seventies Cartright found “The available evidence indicates that most volunteers join the military to escape limited personal and economic opportunities,” and that “predictably, the current recruitment system is attracting a disproportionate share of youth from working-class and lower-class income backgrounds.” Under-employment and the need for extra income also play a role in individuals enlisting in the National Guard and reserves. When we look at the ads for the military at least from the 1990s to today the push is money for college and we should note that many of the units in the war zone are reserve and National Guard units composed of enlistees expecting to play soldier one week-end a month and two weeks a year. They did not sign up for multiple lengthy tours in a war zone.
The military had also opened up in the mid-seventies to recruit more women. However, Cartright says: “[w:]hile some have interpreted these changes (increased role for women) as a victory for the feminist movement, in fact the Pentagon has been motivated not by the advances of women’s liberation but by insufficient enlistments among men. . . . As in the larger society, women in the military are excluded from positions of authority and are disproportionately assigned t low-skill, service occupations. . . . The subjugation of women in the ranks is closely tied to the sexism of military life.” Fortunately, society and the military, while still sexist, have opened up more opportunities for women in skilled and dangerous occupations.
In part I Cartright said “the GI movement imbued the military with the voice of a troubled citizenry, providing a measure of democratic restraint on the otherwise unresponsive and imperious institutions of war.” However, there were instances of GIs running amok such as the My Lai massacre and there were more such occurrences if we believe the Winter Soldier and other such events. In many cases the perpetrators were not prosecuted but in the case of My Lai the Lieutenant in charge was put on trial. This didn’t sit that well with some GI resisters and on Nov. 23, 1970 six Concerned Officers Movement (COM) members held a news conference on urging that the Calley trial be halted and announcing the formation of a ‘Citizens Commission of Inquiry’ to investigate the criminal responsibility of senior American commanders. In the Iraqi war we have the incident at Abu Gharib where untrained reservists took part in what are considered war crimes. It was the lower ranks that were scape-goated.
In Part II, (written in 1975) the author noted international military differences, e.g. the soldiers law of West Germany with the soldier-superior relationship very carefully defined to prevent coercive and unthinking submission to commanders. i.e. the individual soldier must be given not only the right but the responsibility to think and act independently. Thus the Nuremburg defense of ‘I was only following orders” could not be used. If the troops were provided a clear understanding of the rules of war and could exercise their right to refuse an unlawful order knowing they would be supported by the system, the U.S. might not have received the ‘black eye’ from the Abu Gharib incident.
Cartright ends the 1975 portion of his book with “[t:]he central lesson of the GI movement – and, I hope this book – is that people need not be helpless before the power of illegitimate authority, that by getting together and acting upon their convictions people can change society and, in effect, make their own history.” His statement is as true today as it was then. We should advocate the bringing to justice of those who commit crimes including using lies to get us into and keep us in illegal wars.
Cartright’s postscript has the benefit of information that has surfaced since his 1975 work. He notes that “ [In original edition:] I argued that American forces were withdrawn in 1969 and afterwards because they ceased to function as an effective fighting force. Richard Nixon brought the troops home not only to accommodate domestic opinion, but to save the armed forces from internal ruin. Stretched beyond their capacity by a prolonged, fiercely fought war in a foreign jungle, lacking domestic political support for their mission, the U.S. armed forces suffered the worst defeat in their history.” Looking back at the divisions within society in the late 60s and early 70s that could be an easily drawn conclusion and perhaps that is what is occurring now. Society is attempting to choose where it wants its ‘sons and daughters’ to go in defense of our values.
Though it is not an exact analogy, Cartright’s conclusion “in Vietnam, an American army that was supported by the most lavish firepower in military history, that never lost a battle, nonetheless lost the war. Vietnam confirmed that military and technological power alone can never assure victory if the cause is unjust and lacks popular support.” Without really knowing the real aims of the Bush administration in going into Iraq, one cannot judge victory or defeat. We support our troops and do not want to see them used unjustly, unwisely and illegally. Cartwright notes: “[I:]ronically, it was Powell himself, as Secretary of State under George W. Bush, who presided over the violation of the Weinberger/Powell doctrine when the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003. Once again, political leaders in Washington sent the armed forces into dubious battle for a cause that lacked legitimacy and political support. “
There are many comparisons between wars but none fit exactly. Vietnam was a war with draftees, Iraq and Afghanistan are not. Vietnam took place mainly in the jungle and highlands; Iraq and Afghanistan are mainly in the cities and villages. Our entry into both conflicts was based on questionable circumstances. However, in the Iraq conflict evidence was intelligence was purposely cooked and presented to get us into an illegal war.
This work is thought provoking and I suggest it to all who want to understand more about ‘limited’ war and its effect on society.
September 27, 2022
This book is basically exactly what it promises to be, so I'm not too sure how to write an in-depth review about it. Cortright looks at different ways soldiers resisted the Vietnam War, from political protest to sabotage to newspapers to "fragging" (threatening officers with a frag grenade). If you're interested in the topic, this is an excellent book. My only complaint is a minor one: Cortright has really, really long paragraphs. Less page-long paragraphs would've been nice. But that it. Otherwise, it was an informative, interesting read.
January 11, 2009
This was a great and uplifting story about thinking warriors that dared to stand up for what is right by standing down. Whole companies refused orders. Pilots refused to fly bombing runs, even the intelligence people refused to pass intelligence except to warn US troops.
One sailor even disabled an entire aircraft carrier so it couldn't put to sea for two months. These men and women saved more lives and had more to do with ending of the Vietnam war than any other factor combined... and the story has been suppressed.
Written in the 70's it has been updated for the current conflict.
One sailor even disabled an entire aircraft carrier so it couldn't put to sea for two months. These men and women saved more lives and had more to do with ending of the Vietnam war than any other factor combined... and the story has been suppressed.
Written in the 70's it has been updated for the current conflict.
July 12, 2015
A good book for the topic (US soldiers protesting the war from within), but it is more an academic analysis of facts and statistics than a non-fiction narrative. A bit dry for me when compared with "Best & Brightest, " Dispatches," "Things They Carried" etc... That said, rest assured a vast tally of Vietnam servicemen were firmly against the War and actively worked to change the tide of history.
December 8, 2020
Until I read this book I only understood half the reason why the US lost the war.
July 1, 2009
Mostly whitewashed from history, is the GI resistance to the Vietnam war. And it was not only draftees that resisted. In fact more resistance actually came from non-draftees.
wishlist
July 1, 2009Saw this on Goodreads and thought it looked interesting.
May 15, 2022
Excellent history of the GI Movement with comprehensive documentation of the acts of resistance, coffehouses, GI newspapers, petitions and demonstrations that helped bring an end to the Vietnam War.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews