What do you think?
Rate this book
Making It Happen: Fred Goodwin, Rbs and the Men Who Blew Up the British Economy
HardCover. Pub Date :2013-09-12 352 English Simon & Schuster UK Based on more than 80 interviews and with access to diaries and papers kept by those at the heart of the meltdown. this is the definitive. extraordinary account of how the collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland tipped Britain into its deepest economic downturn in decades The collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). which had to be bailed out by the taxpayer in the financial crisis of October 2008. played a leading role in tipping Britain into its deepest economic downturn in seven decades. The economy shrank. bank lending froze. hundreds of thousands lost their jobs. living standards are still falling. and Britons will be paying higher taxes for decades to pay the clean -up bill. How on earth had a small Scottish bank grown so quickly to become a global financial giant that could...
352 pages, Hardcover
First published August 29, 2013
29 people are currently reading
467 people want to read
About the author
Iain Martin
16 books3 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews
September 2, 2014
A broadside of indignation aimed at the hubris behind the fall of RBS which can be distilled to the universal truths driving the financial crises:
1) If it is too good to be true it is
2) What you are paid bears little relation to what you are actually worth
3) There are no shortcuts to knowledge
4) The higher the return the more risk you are taking whether you know it or not
With so much blame to apportion to the bankers, politicans and regulators and a convenient posterboy of much that went wrong in Fred "the Shred" Goodwin it is not surprising that Iain Martin spends little time on the nuances but I was struck by a few thoughts.
The description of an autocratic CEO, who stomped on dissent, was obsessed with details and relentlessly ambitous would describe Steve Jobs down to a tee, the universally lauded Apple genius. The difference between the losers and winners was pretty fine - If RBS had lost the bid for ABN AMRO to Barclays there is a reasonable chance the same pillioried executives would have been lauded for their foresight. Finally the same character traits that make someone successful are the fatal flaws that lead to their demise. I would have liked along with mored detailed explanations of what went wrong a fuller discussion of the above, particularly more on Fred Goodwin. Here I think the author struggled at the end to make more sense of this character given his understandably limited access to the man himself. What one cannot argue with is that those who should have known and were celebrated and remunerated for knowing in the finall tally came up woefully short and for this they fully deserved the public shaming which fell woefully short of the consequences deserved.
1) If it is too good to be true it is
2) What you are paid bears little relation to what you are actually worth
3) There are no shortcuts to knowledge
4) The higher the return the more risk you are taking whether you know it or not
With so much blame to apportion to the bankers, politicans and regulators and a convenient posterboy of much that went wrong in Fred "the Shred" Goodwin it is not surprising that Iain Martin spends little time on the nuances but I was struck by a few thoughts.
The description of an autocratic CEO, who stomped on dissent, was obsessed with details and relentlessly ambitous would describe Steve Jobs down to a tee, the universally lauded Apple genius. The difference between the losers and winners was pretty fine - If RBS had lost the bid for ABN AMRO to Barclays there is a reasonable chance the same pillioried executives would have been lauded for their foresight. Finally the same character traits that make someone successful are the fatal flaws that lead to their demise. I would have liked along with mored detailed explanations of what went wrong a fuller discussion of the above, particularly more on Fred Goodwin. Here I think the author struggled at the end to make more sense of this character given his understandably limited access to the man himself. What one cannot argue with is that those who should have known and were celebrated and remunerated for knowing in the finall tally came up woefully short and for this they fully deserved the public shaming which fell woefully short of the consequences deserved.
May 16, 2022
A well detailed and readable account of one of the many banking scandals from the late 2000's/early 2010's. Mr. Martin gives a step-by-step account of how RBS screwed over Britain and what was and wasn't done in light of it. The further we get from there crisis's, the clearer it becomes that we should have seen this coming and figured out a way to prevent this. Great book for a quick and simple explanation of the scandal.
November 4, 2019
The gestalt underlying the terrible financial recession that rocked both sides of the Atlantic in the year 2008 was unrivaled greed. A petulant greed that sacrificed prudence at the Altar of Mammon. A greed that brought many a prospering economy to its hubris. No case epitomised this greed better than the ugly fall of an iconic financial institution, The Royal Bank of Scotland or RBS. The very bedrock of the Scottish financial empire, RBS under its abrasive and flamboyant head Fred Goodwin rose to dizzying heights boasting a trillion pound balance sheet before ignominiously collapsing under the weight of esoteric financial instruments such as Collaterised Debt Obligations ("CDOs").
In this compelling narrative, Iain Martin scripts the path to perfidy traversed by this once venerated banking house established in the year 1727 following the ill fated Darien Scheme conceptualised by the Dumfriesshire-born trader William Paterson. A Bank that enjoyed the patronage of its idolising customers transformed from a benign enterprise into a mammoth giant courtesy the ambitious Fred Goodwin. A slew of ill timed acquisitions including the much vaunted ABN Amro takeover (along with a basket full of toxic assets) reduced the Bank from being the pride of Scotland to a pariah denounced across the globe. An impotent board, an acquiescing band of wealth accumulating cronies and a laconic regulator all played their emphatic part in triggering what has come to be known as the most famous banking collapse and bail out in the history of British banking.
Iain Martin, in an irascible style that pulls all punches and takes no prisoners details the thoughts, actions and consequences of Fred Goodwin and his comrades that disregarded with utter disdain the future of small and innocuous shareholders while a the same time embellishing their already swelling kitty of bonuses, compensation and stock options. Although Fred Goodwin's Knighthood was consequently rescinded, the damage that was done by the actions (or the lack of it) of the Board at RBS continues to haunt the beleaguered British economy till date.
This is a book for every aspiring professional, investment banker and accountant that has to be read and re-read.
"Making It Happen" - A sorry instance which never ought to occur again!
In this compelling narrative, Iain Martin scripts the path to perfidy traversed by this once venerated banking house established in the year 1727 following the ill fated Darien Scheme conceptualised by the Dumfriesshire-born trader William Paterson. A Bank that enjoyed the patronage of its idolising customers transformed from a benign enterprise into a mammoth giant courtesy the ambitious Fred Goodwin. A slew of ill timed acquisitions including the much vaunted ABN Amro takeover (along with a basket full of toxic assets) reduced the Bank from being the pride of Scotland to a pariah denounced across the globe. An impotent board, an acquiescing band of wealth accumulating cronies and a laconic regulator all played their emphatic part in triggering what has come to be known as the most famous banking collapse and bail out in the history of British banking.
Iain Martin, in an irascible style that pulls all punches and takes no prisoners details the thoughts, actions and consequences of Fred Goodwin and his comrades that disregarded with utter disdain the future of small and innocuous shareholders while a the same time embellishing their already swelling kitty of bonuses, compensation and stock options. Although Fred Goodwin's Knighthood was consequently rescinded, the damage that was done by the actions (or the lack of it) of the Board at RBS continues to haunt the beleaguered British economy till date.
This is a book for every aspiring professional, investment banker and accountant that has to be read and re-read.
"Making It Happen" - A sorry instance which never ought to occur again!
June 6, 2019
I started reading this book expecting it to be a blow-by-blow account of RBS's collapse in 2007-08. So I was surprised by the amount of historical detail. The book does start with a fantastic, dramatic chapter set in 2008 about the crisis talks with the Treasury, but then goes back in time to the bank's beginnings in the eighteenth century and procedes in chronological order from there.
I found it an interesting read, if not a scintillating one. Iain Martin is methodical in covering the pertinent facts, but takes particular interest in the personalities involved. As a result we get a whole series of mini-biographies of often quite minor figures along with bits of speculation about their characters.
There is not much in the early chapters about the nature of banking itself and how this evolved over RBS's history. However, this improves by the time Martin reaches the 2000s, with good explanations given of securitisation, CDOs, the UK regulatory framework, the audit environment, etc.
Indeed, the chapters dealing with the 2000s are the strongest part of the book and I suspect what Martin really wanted to be writing about. There's a real feel for the dynamics in RBS as Fred Goodwin's megalomania at first finds success in the form of his multiple acquisitions, and then becomes problematic as he seeks 'organic' growth that can only be achieved by taking ever greater risks with the existing businesses.
The catastrophic ABN takeover is explained well. It's clear that this was a genuine moment of hubris. Yes, Goodwin was responsible, but Martin does a good job of showing how many others at RBS including the Board acquiesced in the decision or failed to voice their reservations.
What I felt this book sorely lacked was (with the notable exception of that excellent first chapter) a sense of drama and immediacy in the storytelling . There must have been some really hairy moments in the Board and some great anecdotes that could have brought the story to life. Perhaps Martin didn't have the access to the key characters to be able to glean these. It's a shame, because it means the narrative always feel at one step removed from events.
I found it an interesting read, if not a scintillating one. Iain Martin is methodical in covering the pertinent facts, but takes particular interest in the personalities involved. As a result we get a whole series of mini-biographies of often quite minor figures along with bits of speculation about their characters.
There is not much in the early chapters about the nature of banking itself and how this evolved over RBS's history. However, this improves by the time Martin reaches the 2000s, with good explanations given of securitisation, CDOs, the UK regulatory framework, the audit environment, etc.
Indeed, the chapters dealing with the 2000s are the strongest part of the book and I suspect what Martin really wanted to be writing about. There's a real feel for the dynamics in RBS as Fred Goodwin's megalomania at first finds success in the form of his multiple acquisitions, and then becomes problematic as he seeks 'organic' growth that can only be achieved by taking ever greater risks with the existing businesses.
The catastrophic ABN takeover is explained well. It's clear that this was a genuine moment of hubris. Yes, Goodwin was responsible, but Martin does a good job of showing how many others at RBS including the Board acquiesced in the decision or failed to voice their reservations.
What I felt this book sorely lacked was (with the notable exception of that excellent first chapter) a sense of drama and immediacy in the storytelling . There must have been some really hairy moments in the Board and some great anecdotes that could have brought the story to life. Perhaps Martin didn't have the access to the key characters to be able to glean these. It's a shame, because it means the narrative always feel at one step removed from events.
October 5, 2013
A year before the referendum on Scottish Independence, Iain Martin has timely written a metaphor about the realities of what Scotland may face as an independent nation. The book not only points the blame towards poor regulation, risk taking bankers but the back scratching political/financial world of Scotland.
Finger of blame is mainly pointed towards Fred Goodwin. Poor people skills with an obsessive attention details, he was clearly was out of his depth. Heading one of the biggest financial groups in the world with only ten years of experience in banking, he had little interest or knowledge in the fundamentals of the industry. There is a telling moment when RBS just bought the absolute horror of ABN Amro, Goodwin realises that the Santander chief has completely outwitted him.
In comparison to other 'financial crash' genre books, it provides a wider scope than the usual line when it comes to banker bashing. Far from being the image of Scottish probity, the Royal Bank of Scotland came after the spectacular failure in a Scottish venture in the Caribbean. The financial hole left impoverished Scotland little choice but to form a union with England. The bank became a national institution, but it was small and vulnerable during the aftermath of financial big bang. So a group of passionate Scots set about in creating a Scottish world class company, and so began on a maddening expansionist drive.
This great read is not only about greed but also about pride and dangerous ambition.
Finger of blame is mainly pointed towards Fred Goodwin. Poor people skills with an obsessive attention details, he was clearly was out of his depth. Heading one of the biggest financial groups in the world with only ten years of experience in banking, he had little interest or knowledge in the fundamentals of the industry. There is a telling moment when RBS just bought the absolute horror of ABN Amro, Goodwin realises that the Santander chief has completely outwitted him.
In comparison to other 'financial crash' genre books, it provides a wider scope than the usual line when it comes to banker bashing. Far from being the image of Scottish probity, the Royal Bank of Scotland came after the spectacular failure in a Scottish venture in the Caribbean. The financial hole left impoverished Scotland little choice but to form a union with England. The bank became a national institution, but it was small and vulnerable during the aftermath of financial big bang. So a group of passionate Scots set about in creating a Scottish world class company, and so began on a maddening expansionist drive.
This great read is not only about greed but also about pride and dangerous ambition.
August 3, 2014
Excellent and well-documented account of events. It reads like a novel - sadly far from fiction.
November 21, 2013
By Peter Thal Larsen
Early in 2009, the British government was preparing to bail out Royal Bank of Scotland for the second time in four months. An emergency injection of capital in October 2008 had failed to shore up confidence. Now taxpayers were being asked to cover potential losses on almost 300 billion pounds of toxic RBS assets. Yet as the details of the rescue were finalised, British public opinion was in uproar over a much, much smaller sum: the 700,000 pound a year pension being paid to Fred Goodwin, the bank’s former chief executive.
For many Britons, Goodwin personifies the financial crisis. To them, he is the ruthless cost-cutter whose greedy ambition pushed the country to the edge of the financial abyss, and then slunk into retirement refusing to admit he had done anything wrong. While Goodwin has not been charged with any crime, Britain has been unforgiving. His financial arrangements and private life have been subjected to extensive scrutiny. In Scotland, where he was once something of a hero, he is now a pariah. He has even been stripped of his knighthood – a punishment the British establishment normally reserves for traitors or murderous dictators.
Iain Martin’s “Making It Happen” is a fast-paced and entertaining account of Goodwin’s rise and fall. It also explores a mystery. As Martin puts it, Goodwin “did not rise each morning looking for ways in which to ruin the bank he ran and destroy his own reputation, while inflicting epoch-defining damage on the UK economy. So what on earth did he think he was doing?”
Martin is not an obvious person to answer the question. An experienced political journalist, he admits to having only a limited grasp of banking before embarking on the book. His encounters with Goodwin are limited to a few social encounters in Edinburgh - and the book’s central character did not tell his side of the story. Yet the lack of prior knowledge allows Martin to approach the subject with fresh perspective. He ably decodes financial jargon while sympathising with the public’s head-shaking incredulity at the size and fragility of the financial system. His Scottish background allows him to explain RBS’s social context and Goodwin’s truly remarkable ascent. Raised in a Glasgow suburb and trained as an accountant, Goodwin moved to Clydesdale Bank where his efficiency drives earned him the “Fred the Shred” nickname. Within a few years, he was in charge of RBS.
Martin portrays Goodwin as obsessive, instilling fear in his underlings while fixating on details such as the colour of the bank’s executive cars - they had to be RBS blue. He was equally relentless in his pursuit of sports sponsorship: former racing driver Jackie Stewart was paid 1 million pounds a year as a consultant. And who else but the Queen would be good enough to open the bank’s new headquarters building on the outskirts of Edinburgh?
Yet for a supposed micro-manager, Goodwin had a surprising lack of interest in the investment banking business that accounted for a large chunk of RBS’s growth during the boom. And he showed little understanding of the basic tenets of sound banking, such as conserving capital and keeping liquidity reserves.
“Learn something about banking, Fred,” a subordinate snapped in October 2008. But this only serves to underscore the reader’s bewilderment. How did an executive with such a sketchy grasp of the business end up in charge of an institution which, at its peak, had assets worth almost 2 trillion pounds? How was he allowed to charge ahead with RBS’s fatal break-up bid for ABN Amro, the Dutch lender, even as the global financial system was creaking?
Martin’s explanation is that Goodwin’s rise matched that of Britain’s financial sector, spurred on by the widespread belief among policymakers in rational, self-correcting markets and the Labour government’s desire for the tax receipts the industry brought in. The two factors combined to ensure a soft-touch regulatory regime for banks. After the crash, Goodwin became a convenient scapegoat who helped to divert attention from the shortcomings of others.
For Martin, the RBS saga evokes eerie reminders of a much earlier financial mania. In the late 17th century, Scotland poured a vast proportion of its wealth into an audacious scheme to move goods from the Caribbean to the Pacific Ocean by transporting them across Panama. The failure of the Company of Scotland, as it was known, contributed to the nation’s subsequent union with England. The fund that was used to compensate investors formed the foundations of RBS.
The modern-day mania described in “Making it Happen” serves as a cautionary tale. The true motivations of the man at the centre of the story, however, remain elusive.
Early in 2009, the British government was preparing to bail out Royal Bank of Scotland for the second time in four months. An emergency injection of capital in October 2008 had failed to shore up confidence. Now taxpayers were being asked to cover potential losses on almost 300 billion pounds of toxic RBS assets. Yet as the details of the rescue were finalised, British public opinion was in uproar over a much, much smaller sum: the 700,000 pound a year pension being paid to Fred Goodwin, the bank’s former chief executive.
For many Britons, Goodwin personifies the financial crisis. To them, he is the ruthless cost-cutter whose greedy ambition pushed the country to the edge of the financial abyss, and then slunk into retirement refusing to admit he had done anything wrong. While Goodwin has not been charged with any crime, Britain has been unforgiving. His financial arrangements and private life have been subjected to extensive scrutiny. In Scotland, where he was once something of a hero, he is now a pariah. He has even been stripped of his knighthood – a punishment the British establishment normally reserves for traitors or murderous dictators.
Iain Martin’s “Making It Happen” is a fast-paced and entertaining account of Goodwin’s rise and fall. It also explores a mystery. As Martin puts it, Goodwin “did not rise each morning looking for ways in which to ruin the bank he ran and destroy his own reputation, while inflicting epoch-defining damage on the UK economy. So what on earth did he think he was doing?”
Martin is not an obvious person to answer the question. An experienced political journalist, he admits to having only a limited grasp of banking before embarking on the book. His encounters with Goodwin are limited to a few social encounters in Edinburgh - and the book’s central character did not tell his side of the story. Yet the lack of prior knowledge allows Martin to approach the subject with fresh perspective. He ably decodes financial jargon while sympathising with the public’s head-shaking incredulity at the size and fragility of the financial system. His Scottish background allows him to explain RBS’s social context and Goodwin’s truly remarkable ascent. Raised in a Glasgow suburb and trained as an accountant, Goodwin moved to Clydesdale Bank where his efficiency drives earned him the “Fred the Shred” nickname. Within a few years, he was in charge of RBS.
Martin portrays Goodwin as obsessive, instilling fear in his underlings while fixating on details such as the colour of the bank’s executive cars - they had to be RBS blue. He was equally relentless in his pursuit of sports sponsorship: former racing driver Jackie Stewart was paid 1 million pounds a year as a consultant. And who else but the Queen would be good enough to open the bank’s new headquarters building on the outskirts of Edinburgh?
Yet for a supposed micro-manager, Goodwin had a surprising lack of interest in the investment banking business that accounted for a large chunk of RBS’s growth during the boom. And he showed little understanding of the basic tenets of sound banking, such as conserving capital and keeping liquidity reserves.
“Learn something about banking, Fred,” a subordinate snapped in October 2008. But this only serves to underscore the reader’s bewilderment. How did an executive with such a sketchy grasp of the business end up in charge of an institution which, at its peak, had assets worth almost 2 trillion pounds? How was he allowed to charge ahead with RBS’s fatal break-up bid for ABN Amro, the Dutch lender, even as the global financial system was creaking?
Martin’s explanation is that Goodwin’s rise matched that of Britain’s financial sector, spurred on by the widespread belief among policymakers in rational, self-correcting markets and the Labour government’s desire for the tax receipts the industry brought in. The two factors combined to ensure a soft-touch regulatory regime for banks. After the crash, Goodwin became a convenient scapegoat who helped to divert attention from the shortcomings of others.
For Martin, the RBS saga evokes eerie reminders of a much earlier financial mania. In the late 17th century, Scotland poured a vast proportion of its wealth into an audacious scheme to move goods from the Caribbean to the Pacific Ocean by transporting them across Panama. The failure of the Company of Scotland, as it was known, contributed to the nation’s subsequent union with England. The fund that was used to compensate investors formed the foundations of RBS.
The modern-day mania described in “Making it Happen” serves as a cautionary tale. The true motivations of the man at the centre of the story, however, remain elusive.
October 23, 2014
A good factual read on the financial crisis of 2007/2008. I won't call this book the UK equivalent of 'Too Big Too Fail' as it doesn't have that sort of scale and instead focuses on the sub-prime mortgage crisis wiht a strict focus on of RBS and it's Leaders from a viewpoint of various people within the firm, The UK government and the Regulators (BOE and FSA)
The books is a bit lardy in places as its goes into micro level depth with regards to the History of the Royal Bank and it's ill fated Executives (Matthewson and Goodwin in particular) but I guess it serves to add context to the whole story of humbles beginnings leading to greed that eventually led to catastrophic failure.
The content contains perhaps a bit too much background on various individuals that include very mundane and irrelevant facts about their lives from a very young age. However from about half way in the book is a real page turner and told in a very dramatic manner (similar to the way the events at time would have been unfolding)
A must read for anyone who wants to learn more on what happened to RBS
The books is a bit lardy in places as its goes into micro level depth with regards to the History of the Royal Bank and it's ill fated Executives (Matthewson and Goodwin in particular) but I guess it serves to add context to the whole story of humbles beginnings leading to greed that eventually led to catastrophic failure.
The content contains perhaps a bit too much background on various individuals that include very mundane and irrelevant facts about their lives from a very young age. However from about half way in the book is a real page turner and told in a very dramatic manner (similar to the way the events at time would have been unfolding)
A must read for anyone who wants to learn more on what happened to RBS
January 19, 2015
A terrible tale of greed, hubris and arrogance that affected us all in some way or another. And it is all true! In another age Fred Goodwin's head would have been stuck on a pike at the gates of Edinburgh along with his fellow directors.
August 23, 2022
This account is an absorbing read, with plenty of profiles & quotes from those involved in RBS & oversight. However it disappointed me with the lack of information about the shadowy world of CDO’s and absence of outrage at the way no one was punished, legally or professionally suffered. The writer clearly disapproves was of the way RBS was run & the weak spineless regulators but no solutions or tough measures proposed. No doubt his work as journalist for the Telegraph made his analysis less hard hitting than our finest independent investigative journalists.
April 18, 2023
The collapse of SVB got me interested in learning more about financial crisis' and 2008's GFC in particular. The details of the behind the scene machinations were fascinating.
How can a CEO not understand the riskiest part of his business? It boggles the mind
How can a CEO not understand the riskiest part of his business? It boggles the mind
Read
June 7, 2020Finance - Banking - RBS story
June 10, 2014
This is a well-written, accessible indeed gripping account of the last decade of RBS. How it went from being a long-lived and cautious Scottish bank to being bailed out for well over £40b. Toward the end, the book focused more on explanation, but largely it was about giving narrative form to events. Forgiveable – these are things that are hard to explain.
It was driven by Matthewson and then Fred the Shred Goodwin to grow – first for self-defence, swallowing Natwest at end of 90s - then for profit, aiming to be one of the world’s great businesses. Lauded by academics and the establishment. Allowed to flourish by Gordon Brown’s deal with the devil to allow for growth as well as social justice; and by the progressive weakening of the regulatory regime. Building a culture not of banking prudence but of growth targets with too little understanding or appreciation of risk. Senior execs intimidated by Fred’s shreddings into a culture where they did not ask questions. The board weak, and blinded as profit levels went up from 0 to over £10b in 10-15 years. The final hubristic purchase of ABN Amro even as the credit crunch tightened and the rationale for buying the bank was weakened as it sold off constituent parts to avoid an RBS deal.
Some remarkable facts such as:
In 1960 16 British clearing banks with balance sheets equivalent to 32% of GDP; by 2008 4 banks with 450% of GDP.
The cumulative profits of RBS: similar in scale to the sums that the British taxpayer paid out to save RBS.
It was driven by Matthewson and then Fred the Shred Goodwin to grow – first for self-defence, swallowing Natwest at end of 90s - then for profit, aiming to be one of the world’s great businesses. Lauded by academics and the establishment. Allowed to flourish by Gordon Brown’s deal with the devil to allow for growth as well as social justice; and by the progressive weakening of the regulatory regime. Building a culture not of banking prudence but of growth targets with too little understanding or appreciation of risk. Senior execs intimidated by Fred’s shreddings into a culture where they did not ask questions. The board weak, and blinded as profit levels went up from 0 to over £10b in 10-15 years. The final hubristic purchase of ABN Amro even as the credit crunch tightened and the rationale for buying the bank was weakened as it sold off constituent parts to avoid an RBS deal.
Some remarkable facts such as:
In 1960 16 British clearing banks with balance sheets equivalent to 32% of GDP; by 2008 4 banks with 450% of GDP.
The cumulative profits of RBS: similar in scale to the sums that the British taxpayer paid out to save RBS.
February 4, 2016
This book is brilliant. It combines both a gripping story telling you about all the key characters in the RBS saga but also, importantly, really insightful analysis of both the economic and political things going on at the same time. He does end up vilifying Fred Goodwin 'Fred the Shred', CEO of RBS, but doesn't put most of the blame on him and looks at the wider system and lax regulators, politicians also caught up in the growth and profit mania, all encouraging the rise of the mega-bank. The story isn't over. RBS has been nationalised but is still massive, HSBC and other banks still have the potential to sink the British Economy.
July 7, 2014
This was a reasonable book. The history parts of RBS and the founding of the Union were good, however it delved too much into the personal history of Fred Goodwin and his personality and too little into how the crash actually happened.
It does a good job of indicting the SNP in the financial crash, in particular when in quotes a letter from Salmond supporting Goodwin's attempt to take over a Dutch bank which in turn brought down RBS. The Scottish Labour finance minister was also involved.
It does a good job of indicting the SNP in the financial crash, in particular when in quotes a letter from Salmond supporting Goodwin's attempt to take over a Dutch bank which in turn brought down RBS. The Scottish Labour finance minister was also involved.
November 7, 2016
A well written book but very high level in terms of any specific details, financial details etc. focuses more on the political aspect of the situation, the personalities, the competitive nature of the individuals involved and the government policy and mandate at the time. A good summary of why things happened and a great read for those who work on boards or are involved with governance. I enjoyed it but wish it had some more detail on the numbers
October 12, 2013
Found the book dry and turgid, the padding between the anecdotes was very dull.
Thought the fact that the Santander boss managing to sell the Italian business of abn amro in 3 weeks was very telling. At the time everyone was screaming don't buy it, but they'd said that before.... According to my sources...
Thought the fact that the Santander boss managing to sell the Italian business of abn amro in 3 weeks was very telling. At the time everyone was screaming don't buy it, but they'd said that before.... According to my sources...
April 21, 2014
An enjoyable and readable insight into the implosion of RBS. Eye brow raising in terms of the sheer scale of the arrogance and ineptitude and also fairly comical when the author quotes the protagonists in the knowledge of what came later. It's kept basic so can be read by anyone with basic knowledge of the financial system (so about the same level of knowledge as Mr Goodwin).
November 16, 2013
An interesting, well written account of the stratospheric rise and fall of RBS under Fred Goodwin. Avoids the screeching hysteria of some books about the financial crisis while style being an enjoyable, accessible book about banking.
July 12, 2014
Robert Peston's comment on the cover gets it exactly right. Laughter tears and anger about the joke that RBS became. Well researched and written, Iain Martin deserves all the plaudits he gets for this book.
February 22, 2015
A riveting account of what went wrong with RBS which underlines the massive influence a single senior person can have on an organisation. I found the book clearly written and not over-burdened with background information, which made it a fascinating read and more like fiction than truth.
January 5, 2016
A great yarn, I thoroughly enjoyed it. The earlier chapters could do with a little editing as there are several unnecessary repetitions. Strange that Fred Goodwin now dedicates his time exclusively to repairing vintage cars.
April 25, 2016
Excellent read
Very well-written. The author isn't a finance expert,and misunderstands a couple of the more esoteric issues, but that's not a big problem and the style is very easy to read and informative. Gripping story.
Very well-written. The author isn't a finance expert,and misunderstands a couple of the more esoteric issues, but that's not a big problem and the style is very easy to read and informative. Gripping story.
August 20, 2017
Lucid account of the fall of Fred the shred and the hubris and lack of knowledge that did for RBS. Names the guilty men including Gordon brown
January 21, 2015
Easy to read, fascinating account of the fall of RBS. Not too technical. Enjoyed it!
January 19, 2017
Solid discussion of the fall of RBS, including a history of the years leading up to the financial crisis.
Read
June 16, 2018I've read other books about the RBS but this one is a real ripper.
Fred Goodwin's ego is only surpassed by his ability to manage up and the ineptitude of the RBS board and the British regulators. Of course he didn't blow up RBS on his own. There's plenty of blame to go around. This book takes you right into the madness that was the precursor to the GFC. Well worth the read.
Fred Goodwin's ego is only surpassed by his ability to manage up and the ineptitude of the RBS board and the British regulators. Of course he didn't blow up RBS on his own. There's plenty of blame to go around. This book takes you right into the madness that was the precursor to the GFC. Well worth the read.
Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews