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War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe
There is a common belief that the system of sovereign territorial states and the roots of liberal democracy are unique to European civilization and alien to non-Western cultures. The view has generated popular cynicism about democracy promotion in general and China's prospect for democratization in particular. This book demonstrates that China in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (656-221 BC) consisted of a system of sovereign territorial states similar to Europe in the early modern period. It examines why China and Europe shared similar processes but experienced opposite outcomes.
310 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2005
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
December 14, 2020
Absolutely fascinating
This is an absolutely fascinating book about how states developed and how empires were formed. The author starts by noting that many historians believe that China was destined towards imperial unity, whereas Europe was destined to fragmentation. She then shows that this was by no means true. Why did things turn out as they did? This is highlighted by the difference between what the author calls ‘self-strengthening’ and ‘self-weakening’ reforms in the military, financial and administrative fields. The conclusion is that things could easily have turned out differently, making the reasons they didn’t a truly gripping read!
This is an absolutely fascinating book about how states developed and how empires were formed. The author starts by noting that many historians believe that China was destined towards imperial unity, whereas Europe was destined to fragmentation. She then shows that this was by no means true. Why did things turn out as they did? This is highlighted by the difference between what the author calls ‘self-strengthening’ and ‘self-weakening’ reforms in the military, financial and administrative fields. The conclusion is that things could easily have turned out differently, making the reasons they didn’t a truly gripping read!
January 4, 2024
"War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe" is a fascinating work of political and historical theory that seeks to explain why ancient (Warring States period) China became a unified empire whereas early modern Europe did not. Both periods were characterized by multiple warring states, configurations of balance of power, the development of centralized bureaucracies, state-society bargains, and other similarities (both experienced their own version of an "Enlightenment" too), but one resulted in a unified empire whereas the other resulted in a continuation of a balance of power.
This is one of the most interesting geopolitical/international relations books I've read. Dr. Hui proposes a dynamic theory of world politics that postulates that, contrary to much of Western IR literature, checks and balances in the international system aren't necessarily the norm. Nor, per the Chinese perspective, is universal empire inevitable. Rather, the Chinese and European experiences represent different trajectories based on different historical foundations and the contingencies of history.
The book contrasts a "logic of balancing" with a "logic of domination," arguing that in the Chinese case the "logic of domination" overcame the "logic of balancing" through self-strengthening reforms that increased military strength and economic capability (particularly through universal military conscription, meritocratic administration, and rationalized taxation), and through ruthless stratagems and divide-and-conquer strategies.
In Europe, on the other hand, self-weakening reforms (particularly the use of mercenaries instead of national armies, as well the use of tax farmers) resulted in state deformation rather than state formation, and ruthless tactics were used less commonly than in ancient China, resulting in a balance of power being the outcome rather than universal empire. Often, European belligerents were nearly bankrupt states that did not have the capabilities to truly dominate their opponents. It wasn't until the Prussians that Europe started engaging in similar types of self-strengthening reforms that the ancient Chinese had pioneered millennia before (!). Those reforms were extended under Napoleon, who almost achieved domination and who might have done so, had he not been fiscally dependent on allies and had he been more sensible in his military strategy (i.e., not engaged in a two-front war through his attack on Russia).
Dr. Hui briefly engages and refutes a geographical explanation for the different outcomes, arguing that China had roughly as many geographic barriers to domination as Europe had. She also goes more in depth on the history of wars in both periods and on how military technology and geographical context favored offensive warfare for the ancient Chinese, and favored defensive warfare for the early modern Europeans. She also outlines how ancient China provided citizenship rights through three major concessions to the people long before this happened in Europe: greater freedom of expression, the right of access to justice, and economic rights including land grants and welfare policies. Of course, these rights disappeared once domination was achieved under the Qin Empire.
In Europe, on the other hand, state deformation made negotiations and concessions more likely, with citizenship rights eventually finding their best protection within the British system, which Dr. Hui describes as one that through its self-strengthening reforms and Parliamentary oversight embodies a rough balance between the logic of domination and the logic of balancing. Additionally, whereas ancient China had only one social order highly autonomous from the kings (the nobles), Europe had three (the nobility, the clergy, and the burgers). This fractured authority, especially the role of European traders and transnational religious networks, strengthened the balancing logic, and made both internal and external checks and balances and citizenship rights more possible. The British system, specifically, being the impetus for the era of modern liberal democratic governance that developed in the several decades following Britain's victory in the Napoleonic wars.
In the conclusion, Dr. Hui warns that we should not take the liberal order for granted. "World politics will continue to be vulnerable to the logic of domination because the coercive tools of self-strengthening reforms, divide-and-conquer strategies, and Machiavellian stratagems remain available to political actors who wish to upset the liberal world order... Although universal domination... has become increasingly impossible, attempts at regional domination can still be highly disruptive" (p. 235). She also argues that modern China can look back to state-society bargains and citizenship rights from the Warring States period, rather than to Western philosophy and history, for the basis of Chinese style liberal reforms. Unfortunately, modern China under Xi Jinping - while in some ways engaging both the logic of balancing and the logic of domination - remains a predominantly autocratic empire for the foreseeable future.
This is one of the most interesting geopolitical/international relations books I've read. Dr. Hui proposes a dynamic theory of world politics that postulates that, contrary to much of Western IR literature, checks and balances in the international system aren't necessarily the norm. Nor, per the Chinese perspective, is universal empire inevitable. Rather, the Chinese and European experiences represent different trajectories based on different historical foundations and the contingencies of history.
The book contrasts a "logic of balancing" with a "logic of domination," arguing that in the Chinese case the "logic of domination" overcame the "logic of balancing" through self-strengthening reforms that increased military strength and economic capability (particularly through universal military conscription, meritocratic administration, and rationalized taxation), and through ruthless stratagems and divide-and-conquer strategies.
In Europe, on the other hand, self-weakening reforms (particularly the use of mercenaries instead of national armies, as well the use of tax farmers) resulted in state deformation rather than state formation, and ruthless tactics were used less commonly than in ancient China, resulting in a balance of power being the outcome rather than universal empire. Often, European belligerents were nearly bankrupt states that did not have the capabilities to truly dominate their opponents. It wasn't until the Prussians that Europe started engaging in similar types of self-strengthening reforms that the ancient Chinese had pioneered millennia before (!). Those reforms were extended under Napoleon, who almost achieved domination and who might have done so, had he not been fiscally dependent on allies and had he been more sensible in his military strategy (i.e., not engaged in a two-front war through his attack on Russia).
Dr. Hui briefly engages and refutes a geographical explanation for the different outcomes, arguing that China had roughly as many geographic barriers to domination as Europe had. She also goes more in depth on the history of wars in both periods and on how military technology and geographical context favored offensive warfare for the ancient Chinese, and favored defensive warfare for the early modern Europeans. She also outlines how ancient China provided citizenship rights through three major concessions to the people long before this happened in Europe: greater freedom of expression, the right of access to justice, and economic rights including land grants and welfare policies. Of course, these rights disappeared once domination was achieved under the Qin Empire.
In Europe, on the other hand, state deformation made negotiations and concessions more likely, with citizenship rights eventually finding their best protection within the British system, which Dr. Hui describes as one that through its self-strengthening reforms and Parliamentary oversight embodies a rough balance between the logic of domination and the logic of balancing. Additionally, whereas ancient China had only one social order highly autonomous from the kings (the nobles), Europe had three (the nobility, the clergy, and the burgers). This fractured authority, especially the role of European traders and transnational religious networks, strengthened the balancing logic, and made both internal and external checks and balances and citizenship rights more possible. The British system, specifically, being the impetus for the era of modern liberal democratic governance that developed in the several decades following Britain's victory in the Napoleonic wars.
In the conclusion, Dr. Hui warns that we should not take the liberal order for granted. "World politics will continue to be vulnerable to the logic of domination because the coercive tools of self-strengthening reforms, divide-and-conquer strategies, and Machiavellian stratagems remain available to political actors who wish to upset the liberal world order... Although universal domination... has become increasingly impossible, attempts at regional domination can still be highly disruptive" (p. 235). She also argues that modern China can look back to state-society bargains and citizenship rights from the Warring States period, rather than to Western philosophy and history, for the basis of Chinese style liberal reforms. Unfortunately, modern China under Xi Jinping - while in some ways engaging both the logic of balancing and the logic of domination - remains a predominantly autocratic empire for the foreseeable future.
January 14, 2012
Sounds like a dry academic text, and it is. But it makes an interesting and unusual argument for why China and Europe have ended up politically centralized and divided, respectively. And I learned a lot about China's 'Spring and Autumn' and 'Warring States' periods, when life was nasty brutish and short, and there arguably was not yet a concept of a 'China'.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews