What do you think?
Rate this book
Invasion of Laos, 1971: Lam Son 719
In 1971, while U.S. ground forces were prohibited from crossing the Laotian border, a South Vietnamese Army corps, with U.S. air support, launched the largest airmobile operation in the history of warfare, Lam Son 719. The to sever the North Vietnamese Army’s main logistical artery, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, at its hub, Tchepone in Laos, an operation that, according to General Creighton Abrams, could have been the decisive battle of the war, hastening the withdrawal of U.S. forces and ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. The defeat of the South Vietnamese Army and heavy losses of U.S. helicopters and aircrews, but a successful preemptive strike that met President Nixon’s near-term political objectives. Author Robert Sander, a helicopter pilot in Lam Son 719, explores why an operation of such importance failed. Drawing on archives and interviews, and firsthand testimony and reports, Sander chronicles not only the planning and execution of the operation but also the maneuvers of the bastions of political and military power during the ten-year effort to end Communist infiltration of South Vietnam leading up to Lam Son 719. The result is a picture from disparate the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations; the South Vietnamese government led by President Nguyen Van Thieu; and senior U.S. military commanders and army aviators. Sander’s conclusion is at once powerful and persuasively clear. Lam Son 719 was doomed in both the planning and execution—a casualty of domestic and international politics, flawed assumptions, incompetent execution, and the resolve of the North Vietnamese Army. A powerful work of military and political history, this book offers eloquent testimony that “failure, like success, cannot be measured in absolute terms.”
304 pages, Hardcover
First published February 26, 2014
10 people are currently reading
35 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
April 27, 2025
An engaging, comprehensive and balanced history of the operation.
Sander, a veteran of this invasion, notes the many lapses in planning the operation. One thing that strikes the reader is the heavy reliance on aerial reconnaissance and lack of intel on the actual terrain from people on the ground. The coverage of strategy, tactics, and the effect of weather conditions is also good.
Sander also notes the political pressure for the offensive, and the reliance on ARVN troops due to the desire for a battlefield test of “Vietnamization” and the domestic backlash to the Cambodian invasion the year before. He also notes how Nixon claimed a victory after the operation in order to sell Vietnamization, even though it accomplished basically nothing. He also notes how, unusually, some US helicopters were dedicated solely to transporting reporters. The book is pretty comprehensive, and Sander does a good job outlining the background, describing US efforts to monitor and attack Trail traffic, the air war in Laos, ground operations by SOG, and operations in Cambodia.
The book does have a few typos here and there. Also, Sander attributes Lam Son 719 to the initiative of the South Vietnamese. Most accounts I’ve read attribute the origins to the White House. He also comments briefly that there is evidence that the North Vietnamese were planning an offensive in 1971, and that Lam Son 719 disrupted it, though neither the narrative or the endnotes indicate how Sander came to that conclusion. Other accounts I’ve read conclude that there is no such evidence.
In the introduction, Sander also writes of Kennedy’s acceptance of a “phased withdrawal of American advisors from Vietnam,” as well as Kennedy’s withdrawal of 1,000 US military personnel in 1963. When Kennedy was killed, Sander writes, LBJ “set aside all plans for US withdrawal.” The evidence for a “Kennedy withdrawal,” however, is scant and debatable. There were plans made by McNamara for a reduction in troop levels, but these all had provisions for residual troops. These plans were also, importantly, conditional on progress in the war. In postwar interviews McNamara also stated that he came up with the withdrawal plans, not Kennedy.
A well-researched and readable work.
Sander, a veteran of this invasion, notes the many lapses in planning the operation. One thing that strikes the reader is the heavy reliance on aerial reconnaissance and lack of intel on the actual terrain from people on the ground. The coverage of strategy, tactics, and the effect of weather conditions is also good.
Sander also notes the political pressure for the offensive, and the reliance on ARVN troops due to the desire for a battlefield test of “Vietnamization” and the domestic backlash to the Cambodian invasion the year before. He also notes how Nixon claimed a victory after the operation in order to sell Vietnamization, even though it accomplished basically nothing. He also notes how, unusually, some US helicopters were dedicated solely to transporting reporters. The book is pretty comprehensive, and Sander does a good job outlining the background, describing US efforts to monitor and attack Trail traffic, the air war in Laos, ground operations by SOG, and operations in Cambodia.
The book does have a few typos here and there. Also, Sander attributes Lam Son 719 to the initiative of the South Vietnamese. Most accounts I’ve read attribute the origins to the White House. He also comments briefly that there is evidence that the North Vietnamese were planning an offensive in 1971, and that Lam Son 719 disrupted it, though neither the narrative or the endnotes indicate how Sander came to that conclusion. Other accounts I’ve read conclude that there is no such evidence.
In the introduction, Sander also writes of Kennedy’s acceptance of a “phased withdrawal of American advisors from Vietnam,” as well as Kennedy’s withdrawal of 1,000 US military personnel in 1963. When Kennedy was killed, Sander writes, LBJ “set aside all plans for US withdrawal.” The evidence for a “Kennedy withdrawal,” however, is scant and debatable. There were plans made by McNamara for a reduction in troop levels, but these all had provisions for residual troops. These plans were also, importantly, conditional on progress in the war. In postwar interviews McNamara also stated that he came up with the withdrawal plans, not Kennedy.
A well-researched and readable work.
June 4, 2014
The war in Vietnam was slowly drawing to an end for the U.S. military and Richard Nixon was very keen on “Vietnamization.” America’s most unpopular war was supposedly coming to an end and this invasion to close off the Ho Chi Minh Trail was to be crucial in ending the war with “honor.” Robert Sanders, who was a helicopter pilot in the invasion of Laos shares his thoughts and research into why this operation was an epic failure. In his writing he finds no end to those who contributed to the failure of Lam Son 719.
An earlier plan to invade Laos was created by General William Westmoreland to stop the flow of troops and equipment through Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam, this was called Operation El Paso. This plan was never enacted and when General Creighton Abrams assumed command of the troops in Vietnam and President Nixon took office and the idea of invading Laos came up again. Because of an act of congress forbidding American military involvement on the ground in Laos, the Vietnamese military would be the invading force. They would receive air support from units of the U.S. Army as well as the Air Force, and Marines. The whole reason for the operation now was to prevent the North Vietnamese from a dry-season offensive in the South.
While America still maintained U.S. military advisors within the Vietnamese military, these advisors would not be present with the troops, which would create serious communication problems with air and artillery support during the invasion. This problem was one of many that Sander’s shares with the reader. The timing of the invasion was also a serious concern. The rainy season was not quite finished with the area and fog and morning rain greatly effected the planning and execution of the operation.
This is a serious review of the events and it is a well documented work. There are copious amounts of footnotes and quotes by those involved as well as references to the writings of those in Washington at the time. Blunders abound from the beginning of the war in Vietnam and continue throughout, and Robert D. Sander has researched it diligently and presents it in his writing.
After reading this book, it is apparent that the Greeks may have had the answer to going to war. You first abolish the standing government and create a dictator to rule until the end of the war and then let the military do its job. But in Lam Son 719, that may not have been enough as there were several occasions when staff officers dropped the ball when it came to reacting correctly to the needs of the combatants in the field. There is truly enough blame to go around for the failure of Lam Son 719.
An earlier plan to invade Laos was created by General William Westmoreland to stop the flow of troops and equipment through Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam, this was called Operation El Paso. This plan was never enacted and when General Creighton Abrams assumed command of the troops in Vietnam and President Nixon took office and the idea of invading Laos came up again. Because of an act of congress forbidding American military involvement on the ground in Laos, the Vietnamese military would be the invading force. They would receive air support from units of the U.S. Army as well as the Air Force, and Marines. The whole reason for the operation now was to prevent the North Vietnamese from a dry-season offensive in the South.
While America still maintained U.S. military advisors within the Vietnamese military, these advisors would not be present with the troops, which would create serious communication problems with air and artillery support during the invasion. This problem was one of many that Sander’s shares with the reader. The timing of the invasion was also a serious concern. The rainy season was not quite finished with the area and fog and morning rain greatly effected the planning and execution of the operation.
This is a serious review of the events and it is a well documented work. There are copious amounts of footnotes and quotes by those involved as well as references to the writings of those in Washington at the time. Blunders abound from the beginning of the war in Vietnam and continue throughout, and Robert D. Sander has researched it diligently and presents it in his writing.
After reading this book, it is apparent that the Greeks may have had the answer to going to war. You first abolish the standing government and create a dictator to rule until the end of the war and then let the military do its job. But in Lam Son 719, that may not have been enough as there were several occasions when staff officers dropped the ball when it came to reacting correctly to the needs of the combatants in the field. There is truly enough blame to go around for the failure of Lam Son 719.
April 29, 2018
Excellent I found this book by chance after reading HUE and really enjoyed the depth of information found in this book. It was easy to read and flowed in a logical sequence to where it built into the battle. LAM SON 719 was a key battle as the US began to hand over the war to the Republic of Viet. Unfortunately this book highlights that the ARVN just weren’t capable of perusing the NVA and did not win any of the real fighting. This book is an excellent read for someone who is also interested in the “Helicopter War” highly recommend this book for all interested in the Viet War.
September 4, 2020
I have always felt that the South Vietnamese have been underrepresented in the telling of the story. This book gives some names (although no faces) of Vietnamese soldiers as well as other actors.
There is a book reference from a North Vietnamese Colonel, 'From Enemies to Friends' that will go on my TBR.
There is a book reference from a North Vietnamese Colonel, 'From Enemies to Friends' that will go on my TBR.
February 14, 2023
Although a fine attempt at providing a timeline of the Lam Son 719, basically a rehash of other sources. Took his blaming of media for somehow losing the Vietnam War to the extreme when, while describing the shoot down of two South Vietnamese helicopters on February 1oth with deaths of all onboard, somehow failed to mention the deaths or names of four journalists also killed (which he certainly was aware of), including famous photographers Henri Huet and Larry Burrows. Really pathetic.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews