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Dynamics of Reason
This book introduces a new approach to the issue of radical scientific revolutions, or "paradigm-shifts," given prominence in the work of Thomas Kuhn. The book articulates a dynamical and historicized version of the conception of scientific a priori principles first developed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant. This approach defends the Enlightenment ideal of scientific objectivity and universality while simultaneously doing justice to the revolutionary changes within the sciences that have since undermined Kant's original defense of this ideal.
Through a modified Kantian approach to epistemology and philosophy of science, this book opposes both Quinean naturalistic holism and the post-Kuhnian conceptual relativism that has dominated recent literature in science studies. Focussing on the development of "scientific philosophy" from Kant to Rudolf Carnap, along with the parallel developments taking place in the sciences during the same period, the author articulates a new dynamical conception of relativized a priori principles. This idea applied within the physical sciences aims to show that rational intersubjective consensus is intricately preserved across radical scientific revolutions or "paradigm-shifts and how this is achieved.
Through a modified Kantian approach to epistemology and philosophy of science, this book opposes both Quinean naturalistic holism and the post-Kuhnian conceptual relativism that has dominated recent literature in science studies. Focussing on the development of "scientific philosophy" from Kant to Rudolf Carnap, along with the parallel developments taking place in the sciences during the same period, the author articulates a new dynamical conception of relativized a priori principles. This idea applied within the physical sciences aims to show that rational intersubjective consensus is intricately preserved across radical scientific revolutions or "paradigm-shifts and how this is achieved.
- GenresPhilosophyScienceLogic
155 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 2001
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About the author
Michael Friedman
10 books18 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name.
Michael Friedman was an American philosopher who was Emeritus Patrick Suppes Professor of Philosophy of Science and Professor, by courtesy, of German Studies at Stanford University. Friedman was best known for his work in the philosophy of science, especially on scientific explanation and the philosophy of physics, and for his historical work on Immanuel Kant. Friedman has done historical work on figures in continental philosophy such as Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer. He also served as the co-director of the Program in History and Philosophy of Science and Technology at Stanford University.
Michael Friedman was an American philosopher who was Emeritus Patrick Suppes Professor of Philosophy of Science and Professor, by courtesy, of German Studies at Stanford University. Friedman was best known for his work in the philosophy of science, especially on scientific explanation and the philosophy of physics, and for his historical work on Immanuel Kant. Friedman has done historical work on figures in continental philosophy such as Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer. He also served as the co-director of the Program in History and Philosophy of Science and Technology at Stanford University.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
February 6, 2023
Although I do have some serious nitpicking issues with parts of this book, particularly at the end where he kind of compromises his position with a form of socially constructed holism, and provides a very poor comparison with other scientific revolutions and not even mentioning the thermodynamic revolution, and always only seeming to be able to compare all these movements with Kant as if that is the ultimate authority even on revolutions he had little to nothing to do with.
Nevertheless, setting those concerns aside, the majority of this book is a great analysis of the development of reason from the Kantian Synthetic a priori, to the non euclidean geometries and Riemannian manifolds of general relativity, and how these and the revolution away from Newtonian Absolute space and time impact upon our ability to reason within a Kantian synthetic a priori style framework.
He highlights well some of the strengths at times of the early positivists, and also their later failings influenced by incorrect views of logic and empirical verification by Wittgenstein and others, which took them down the wrong path which led to Quinean holism etc. It was insightful to see how early on figures such as Schlick and Carnap grappled well with attempts to place Einsteins new revolutionary theory of physics in its proper philosophical context.
It seems to me influenced early on by Poincares views they felt able to retain a kind of Kantian synthetic a priori, but that this was only applicable to the three non-euclidean geometries , not to the full general covariance of general relativity and variable spacetime curvature and its metric which raised new questions about where theory and experience meet.
Later unfortunately they lost their way, perhaps the views of Wittgenstein gaining influence over the vienna circle were pivotal, but perhaps also the scattering caused by the rising threat of world war in the 1930's led to a less focused and concentrated effort to grapple with the core philosophical and metaphysical issues at the foundation of physical theories.
Friedman comes round to a suggestion of a relativised a priori. I won't go into the technical details of this, some of which I think are worth looking into, some of which I think tends to fall into just another kind of holism unfortunately. And this happens I think because he does not claim to base his views on a kind of realism. We need a true realism and connection with the surrounding world to evade holism. The relativised a priori always relies on a community of consensus, and such things are always temporary. To say it is internally real to those in the community, I hardly see as an adequate way to avoid holistic accusations, as this is what holists would say also.
I think it is always the problem when one tries to analyse at one step removed from doing the actual work, you tend to get a passive account of events that almost inevitably led to the current "consensus" on the a priori. We need more than this. Fundamental physics is now in the midst of a new revolution, perhaps it was only just getting started at writing of this book, with loop quantum gravity and more and more aspects of the standard model coming in for closer critical scrutiny. Even aspects of Special and general relativity such as relativity of simultaneity and constancy of speed of light are being called into question by top physicists.
One gets the feeling of the relativised a prior that it will unfortunately reduce to an after the fact back patting of the people who happened to turn out successful in society in their view. This kind of subsidiary role to science of philosophy playing as like a house wife to science for me is not enough and we are seeing a return to more bold metaphysical speculation of late and I think it is welcome and much needed.
All these things, once again, are very nitpicky points I am making. This is a quality book and a high quality study that can greatly further your understanding of some of the real nitty gritty details of how general relativity came to be developed relative to the philosophical context of Kant's synthetic a priori epistemology. It has done this for me and I am sure it can do this for many others too.
Nevertheless, setting those concerns aside, the majority of this book is a great analysis of the development of reason from the Kantian Synthetic a priori, to the non euclidean geometries and Riemannian manifolds of general relativity, and how these and the revolution away from Newtonian Absolute space and time impact upon our ability to reason within a Kantian synthetic a priori style framework.
He highlights well some of the strengths at times of the early positivists, and also their later failings influenced by incorrect views of logic and empirical verification by Wittgenstein and others, which took them down the wrong path which led to Quinean holism etc. It was insightful to see how early on figures such as Schlick and Carnap grappled well with attempts to place Einsteins new revolutionary theory of physics in its proper philosophical context.
It seems to me influenced early on by Poincares views they felt able to retain a kind of Kantian synthetic a priori, but that this was only applicable to the three non-euclidean geometries , not to the full general covariance of general relativity and variable spacetime curvature and its metric which raised new questions about where theory and experience meet.
Later unfortunately they lost their way, perhaps the views of Wittgenstein gaining influence over the vienna circle were pivotal, but perhaps also the scattering caused by the rising threat of world war in the 1930's led to a less focused and concentrated effort to grapple with the core philosophical and metaphysical issues at the foundation of physical theories.
Friedman comes round to a suggestion of a relativised a priori. I won't go into the technical details of this, some of which I think are worth looking into, some of which I think tends to fall into just another kind of holism unfortunately. And this happens I think because he does not claim to base his views on a kind of realism. We need a true realism and connection with the surrounding world to evade holism. The relativised a priori always relies on a community of consensus, and such things are always temporary. To say it is internally real to those in the community, I hardly see as an adequate way to avoid holistic accusations, as this is what holists would say also.
I think it is always the problem when one tries to analyse at one step removed from doing the actual work, you tend to get a passive account of events that almost inevitably led to the current "consensus" on the a priori. We need more than this. Fundamental physics is now in the midst of a new revolution, perhaps it was only just getting started at writing of this book, with loop quantum gravity and more and more aspects of the standard model coming in for closer critical scrutiny. Even aspects of Special and general relativity such as relativity of simultaneity and constancy of speed of light are being called into question by top physicists.
One gets the feeling of the relativised a prior that it will unfortunately reduce to an after the fact back patting of the people who happened to turn out successful in society in their view. This kind of subsidiary role to science of philosophy playing as like a house wife to science for me is not enough and we are seeing a return to more bold metaphysical speculation of late and I think it is welcome and much needed.
All these things, once again, are very nitpicky points I am making. This is a quality book and a high quality study that can greatly further your understanding of some of the real nitty gritty details of how general relativity came to be developed relative to the philosophical context of Kant's synthetic a priori epistemology. It has done this for me and I am sure it can do this for many others too.
October 9, 2016
Very detailed explanation of the neo-Kantian elements in the neo-positivist philosophy as well as of the mathematical developments which allowed the formulation of Einstein's Relativity Theory.
I am not sure whether telling the history of the mathematical development necessary for the progress of physics corresponds to a defence of the role of philosophy in scientific change, as Friedman claims. Also, I am not sure how much Firedman's model could be generalised and extended to other crucial instances of revolutionary scientific change. Nor I am sure whether Friedman has actually understood what Kuhn's theory of incommensurability amounts to before trying to establish a 'post-Kuhnian historiography of science' capable to show the fundamental rationality of the theory-change process undermined by the notion of incommensurability. (But Kuhn repeated ad nauseam that his notion of incommensurability did not imply incommunicability, incomparability, irrationality and all the other crazy stuff that many philosophers speak about when they speak about the fairy-tale version of Kuhn.)
I am not sure whether telling the history of the mathematical development necessary for the progress of physics corresponds to a defence of the role of philosophy in scientific change, as Friedman claims. Also, I am not sure how much Firedman's model could be generalised and extended to other crucial instances of revolutionary scientific change. Nor I am sure whether Friedman has actually understood what Kuhn's theory of incommensurability amounts to before trying to establish a 'post-Kuhnian historiography of science' capable to show the fundamental rationality of the theory-change process undermined by the notion of incommensurability. (But Kuhn repeated ad nauseam that his notion of incommensurability did not imply incommunicability, incomparability, irrationality and all the other crazy stuff that many philosophers speak about when they speak about the fairy-tale version of Kuhn.)
October 30, 2019
Fave book on philosophy of space-time
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews