The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service

by Henry A. Crumpton

A legendary CIA spy and counterterrorism expert tells the spellbinding story of his high-risk, action-packed career

Revelatory and groundbreaking, The Art of Intelligence will change the way people view the CIA, domestic and foreign intelligence, and international terrorism. Henry A. "Hank" Crumpton, a twenty-four-year veteran of the CIA's Clandestine Service, offers a thrilling account that delivers profound lessons about what it means to serve as an honorable spy. From CIA recruiting missions in Africa to pioneering new programs like the UAV Predator, from running post–9/11 missions in Afghanistan to heading up all clandestine CIA operations in the United States, Crumpton chronicles his role—in the battlefield and in the Oval Office—in transforming the way America wages war and sheds light on issues of domestic espionage.

Genres: Nonfiction, History, Espionage, Politics, Military Fiction, Biography, Memoir

345 pages, Kindle Edition

First published May 1, 2012

About the author

54 Years Old
Ambassador Crumpton has been a Director of the Company since February 2008. Ambassador Crumpton has been President of the Crumpton Group since February 2007. He was Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism at the United States Department of State from August 2005 to February 2007. Ambassador Crumpton was Chief of the National Resources Division at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2003 to August 2005.

Reviews

[Sky · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book should have just been called, "How The CIA Has Never Done Anything Wrong in The History of Forever'

Maybe its too much to ask for a critical review of recent CIA actions from someone who was clearly a key member during that time, but I found this book to present an amazingly simplistic view of a complex situations. Also, the continuous FBI, and political "bureaucrat" bashing got very tiresome and really overshadowed the parts of the book that were interesting.

The other aspect of this book that was irksome was the continuous 'sanitization' of incidents; the author would refer to a 'senior member of the gov't' in a 'country in Africa' who had 'important intelligence' and how he met him and 'obtained this very critical information' that 'saved American lives'

[Jay Connor · Rating 5 out of 5]

“It is the mark of an educated mind to entertain a thought without accepting it.” – Aristotle.

This quote kept recurring to me as I read this book about the CIA and its bifurcated role in post-911 American action. On one level, the CIA and its political leader, George Tennant massively failed in warning of Al Qaeda (AQ) and equivocating on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. On the other hand, the covert action commandos of the CIA understood and acted upon the new global landscape of terror in Afghanistan in the months immediately after the attack in perhaps the most successful embodiment of intelligence informing action in our country’s history, since its founding.

Without the ability of entertaining the thought that there might be something redeemable about the CIA, I would have never picked up a book titled: “The Art of Intelligence – Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service.”

Was the title intended to be an oxymoron?

No, instead I was well rewarded. This is a powerful book, which truly makes you proud of most of the people who toil each day to safeguard this country. Yet, it is an equally powerful indictment of a neo-conservative junta that nearly destroyed our ability to defend ourselves. Cheney, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld and many more presently advising Mitt Romney, seized on the national trauma of 911 to advance their own theories and interests. Perhaps most tellingly in a meeting days after 911 held in the Situation Room at the White House, the author recounts a non-sequitor from Paul Wolfowitz, who, without the benefit of any data, said that Saddam Hussein caused all 911 and that Iraq should be the true target of reprisal.

There was a political mistake at the inception of Bush’s response. Framing it as a War on Terror failed to underscore that this was a very different kind of “war.” This was not nation on nation with a beginning and an end with an expectation of VE or VJ day; rather, it was more like fighting a disease with an enemy with the capability of mutation and spread. Thinking of it as a military war, made us slow to respond to the non-military needs and infrastructure – first in Afghanistan but more abhorrently in Iraq. AQ and the Taliban had exploited impoverished and uneducated communities, where the rule of law remained uncertain. We failed to address those conditions. Our failure to execute first in Afghanistan then Iraq was not that we hadn’t understood the three strategic objectives of counter-insurgency, but that we lacked the political leadership to achieve these three goals: (1) nullification of enemy leadership; (2) denial of safe haven, and (3) ameliorate the conditions that the enemy exploits (think Colin Powell’s “pottery barn” you break it, you bought it).

Iraq cost the US Treasury $2 Trillion of national debt. Yet, despite these expenditures, Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense failed to adjust to the emerging era of conflict, as non-state actors – as both enemy and ally – would play new key roles.
We are spending a larger % of GNP on military while the solutions are less likely to be military. The CIA covert action commandos in the first 6 weeks of the war in Afghanistan pointed us to this new truth. It was intelligence that served as the foundation of that entire campaign. In the future spies will play a more central role than pilots or soldiers, yet the present embodiment of the neo-conservatives in the Republican Party continue to bulk up on those conventional resources – calling the military budget sacrosanct.

The great gift Crumpton gives us (also see my review of Rachel Maddow’s excellent “Drift” from earlier this summer) is clarity about the shift in warfare and the new role for intelligence. He calls out three facts.

First. The degree of asymmetry in warfare has reached a new height. A single actor could have global impact – computer or biological virus are just some of the possible weapons.

Second. The presence of non-state actors is increasing. AQ challenging nation-states as threats, whereas Afghan tribes were more powerful allies in the early months in Afghanistan than any of the UN nation-states. The non-state actors are global NGOs, businesses, tribes, media outlets, universities, etc.

Third. At the tactical level, the battlefield is global with impacts measured in seconds.

Our present conception of military, and attendant budget excesses, doesn’t fit any of Crumpton’s three facts. Whereas all three require a significant improvement and transformation of intelligence. Pay close attention to what our leaders are saying is morally required in the budget: largess to military contractors or investments for succeeding in a world of these three facts.

“It is the mark of an educated mind to entertain a thought without accepting it.” – Aristotle.

[Megan · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is up and down in enjoyability. There are often dry, policy- and theory-heavy sections where Crumpton lists a lot of questions that the CIA tries to answer, or general tactics that they pursued in a particular situation, or other sort of vague ideas that made my eyes skim a little. At other times, though, Crumpton provides very engaging stories of sources he interacted with or meetings he had, interludes that are not just exemplative of the points he's making, but well-written and interesting on their own. One of the strengths of Crumpton's career is that he worked in several different branches of the CIA, starting in foreign service in Africa, moving later to Counter-Terrorism, then in the division that partners with companies and organizations within the US. So, whether he's telling engaging personal stories or covering dry theory, there's a good overview of a lot of what the CIA does. Crumpton was intimately involved with the initial attacks on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, so that section of the book was also very interesting. It's a good look at details of that whole situation after 9/11 without the filter of party politics or the media. This book is too personable to be entirely academic, but too procedural to be entirely a memoir. If one has the patience to get through some of the blander sections, though, this is a good option for someone who wants to get a better grasp of the oft-maligned and poorly-understood work of the CIA.

[Denise · Rating 3 out of 5]

On the one hand, Crumpton has a lot of interesting insights into and stories from the intelligence business to tell - and he tells them well enough that even anecdotes that are left ridiculously vague ("There was a person in a country", that sort of thing... CIA censorship strikes again, doubtlessly for super important security reasons. Yes, I was rolling my eyes while writing that.) remain sufficiently intriguing. If you're interested in these kinds of tales, this is certainly worth a read.
On the other hand, if you're looking for a balanced, critical view of the CIA, especially its post-9/11 exploits, look elsewhere. As Crumpton would have it, the CIA has never done (nor even so much as dreamed of doing) anything wrong or morally reprehensible, all its officers are "great guys" (and gals, presumably, though fewer of those grace these pages) and certified American Heroes™, and everybody everywhere should jump at any chance to collaborate with the CIA, that shining beacon of all that is good and honourable. (I swear, I'm gonna strain something with the amount of eye-rolling required here.)
Oh boy, do I have issues with some of his views. Noone who defends the use of extraordinary rendition, torture (don't gimme that EIT bullshit) and more and more assassinations by drone strike is going to be a friend of mine, and while I don't have to agree with an author's views to be interested in what they have to say, I've had it up to here with people defending torture with the good old spiel along the lines of "The CIA never tortured anyone, but if it did, it was perfectly legal and also those evil terrorist fuckers totally had it coming anyway." Just because someone declared something legal doesn't mean it's right and doesn't mean you should be doing it... and the "I was just following orders I believed to be legal at the time" defense didn't fly in other circumstances, it shouldn't apply here either. Crumpton also seems to take great pleasure in recounting bombing and killing campaigns, presents the development of yet more lethal weapons with a glee I find quite frankly disgusting, and hails all the wonderfully accurate precision bombing with not a single mention of civilian casualties as "collateral damage".

[Jim Angstadt · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author was a CIA spy for decades. He was, apparently, highly-successful in recruiting foreign nationals to spy for the US.

He describes some of the motivations for such spying: MICE:
- Money, the potential spy simply want money.
- Ideology, what ideal did the spy pursue?
- Compromise, is the spy threatened by disclosure?
- Ego, a smart, hard-working spy may simply need to be part of a "Mission".

Later, in the book, 2 more motivations emerge:
- Revenge
- Coercion

In total: MICE/RC

During a cross-fertilization assignment to the FBI, the author starts to appreciate the overlap and under-lap wrt CIA/FBI focus.

The FBI was concerned only with domestic law-enforcement. The CIA was looking for international, threat trends, and how to stop them. Major under-lap

The FBI was concerned with "discovery" by opposing attorneys, which fostered an oral recital. The CIA did not have the concern of opposing counsel, so was disposed to written accounts.

Later, as the threat from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban became better known, "Hank" cranked up the covert activity in Afghanistan. After 9/11, the CIA and "Hank" went full throttle after AQ. Their overall strategy had 3 parts:
1. Nullification of enemy leadership.
2. Denial of safe havens.
3. Amelioration of conditions that the enemy exploits.

Along the way, the CIA was able to frustrate AQ throughout Afghanistan, and attack the AQ stronghold in southern Afghanistan at Kandahar, partly through the use of drones, and partly through the use of a GIS for mapping friendly and enemy forces, in near-real time. When UBL and other top AQ leadership left Afghanistan for Pakistan, seeking safe havens, it was clear that the CIA had shifted the momentum away from AQ and towards the forces for democracy.

Hanks total commitment, along with that of countless other CIA operatives, had paid off. Now the focus shifted from covert to obvert. As DOD took a more prominent role, the covert role could, and needed to, fade into the background.

Helped me think about the roles and missions of the CIA, as opposed to NSA, DOD or FBI.

[Brian Greiner · Rating 2 out of 5]

I've always enjoyed books about spy tradecraft. This is yet another of that ilk, and that part of it is probably going to be enjoyable to those that like that sort of thing.
On the other hand, there is very little here that is critical of the CIA or its operatives or its methods. Every operative is portrayed as supremely competent and heroic. Every operation in every foreign country is designed to either protect the USA from evil-doers or to bring the blessings of free-market democracy to down-trodden foreigners or both. Activities such as torture (which the author calls "enhanced interrogation") or rendition are portrayed as absolutely lawful and applied only to those that deserve it. Journalists are described in dismissive terms, almost as if a free press should be considered enemies of all that is good in the world (ie. the CIA).
There is absolutely no discussion of mistakes or errors. Military operations, such as bombings, are always described as "pin point" or "surgical". He glories in killing enemy combatants, but fails to even mention the fact that many, many innocents got killed in the process.
So, read this if you're a fan of spy tradecraft, but ignore it if you're looking for any sort of nuanced analysis of anything. In any case, be sure to pick it up in the remainder bin ... it's not worth the full price.

[Sam · Rating 3 out of 5]

I found it hard to take Henry Crumpton’s CIA memoir, "The Art of Intelligence," seriously, at least in part because it starts and ends with odes to American “Founding Father” George Washington. That level of simplistic primary school patriotism is alien to me; I love my country as if it were a dysfunctional mother, not some kind of idolised hero-father. I cannot believe that a man who was a spy in Africa, headed the CIA’s invasion of Afghanistan, and served as the State Department’s counter-terrorism coordinator can be as wholesomely naive as Mr Crumpton presents himself. This book felt like a public relations effort to me: perhaps for the “global strategic advisory” firm Mr Crumpton founded after leaving government service in 2007, perhaps for his old pals at the Agency, or perhaps for a future political career Mr Crumpton is planning.

Although Mr Crumpton started off as a CIA operations officer in various African nations he declines to name, and tells a few disguised stories about his efforts recruiting sources as a spy in the field during this time, most of the action in this book is bureaucratic infighting. While reading, I kept comparing The Art of Intelligence with Robert Baer’s much-more-fun 2003 CIA memoir, See No Evil. I no longer have my copy, but if I recall correctly, it includes an episode in the 1990s when Mr Baer is stationed in Tajikistan and a warlord blows up his house. Luckily, he’s at his office at the time. A friend comes by and offers to loan him a tank. For what? Mr Baer asks. Well, this guy blew up your house, so as a matter of honour you’ve got to blow up his house, the man explains.

Compare that to Mr Crumpton’s The Art of Intelligence, which also touches on Tajikistan. Mr Crumpton, at a desk in Washington, is sending a team into Afghanistan via Dushanbe. “Rich’s team would stage from Tajikistan, under the auspices of the Central Eurasia (CE) Division, although Afghanistan was bureaucratically within the Near East (NE) Division. CTC (the Counter-Terrorism Center) had the mission and the money, but the geographic divisions had the turf.” Later, when Mr Crumpton goes to Yemen in 2000 after the attack on the USS Cole, he brings along “a Navy SEAL on loan to the CIA. In addition to other duties, he would serve as my capable bodyguard.” A CIA agent with a bodyguard?

To chase Al Qaida in Afghanistan without putting US personnel at too much risk, Mr Crumpton embarked on one of his greatest bureaucratic battles in the hallways of Washington. The way he tells it, his organization within the CIA created the drones that have killed hundreds of people in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. First, they got the “Predator” unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) as a surveillance system. Using that, they sighted Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and asked for a missile strike to kill him, but were told it would take six hours and Bin Laden might be gone by then so there was no point. They missed the opportunity. So they turned to a guy with the nickname “Boom Boom,” to arm the Predator with “Hellfire” missiles.

Mr Crumpton describes this process in a paragraph representative of the kind of battles on which his book tends to dwell. “In only a few months, Rich, Alec and their mission driven bureaucratic subversives, operating inside the huge and lumbering security establishment, had imagined and produced an armed UAV. To succeed, these operatives also relied on the inter-agency leadership of a visionary air force general, a brash White House counter-terrorism czar, an aggressive Pentagon admiral, a tough assistant director of central intelligence (ADCI), and the CIA’s counter-terrorism chief.”

These Predators provided surveillance and lethal air support during the invasion of Afghanistan and their proliferation has since then lowered the level of commitment required of the US to go into a country and kill people. When there is no risk of US casualties, the politicians in their safe offices in Washington are surely more likely to order strikes in faraway countries: some of which hit the right targets; some of which hit men the CIA thinks are terrorists, but may have been implicated by rivals who want them dead so they can snatch their land or wives; and some of which kill innocent bystanders by mistake.

If you think that the US having the ability to conduct these kinds of no-risk strikes is a good thing, then the creation of the Predator-Hellfire package by Mr Crumpton’s shop was a great victory. But I am not so sure that the leaders of my country are mature enough and deserve to hold this kind of power. By Mr Crumpton’s account, these are people ~ including himself ~ who see the world in black and white, and can call people “evil” with sincerity. When Mr Crumpton’s deputy grabs him before the invasion of Afghanistan and asks him, “Have you got yourself right with the fact that we are going to be responsible for the deaths of thousands?” Mr Crumpton recalls telling him: “They need to die.”

Do not be fooled into thinking that President Barack Obama’s election has changed things: he has stepped up drone attacks on the Af-Pak border to an unprecedented level.

Mr Crumpton also retells the story of a 16-member commando team in Afghanistan preparing for a mission in 2002. They prayed over a buried relic from the World Trade Center, under an American flag. “We ask your blessings and guidance, dear God, in our efforts to find and destroy those responsible for the acts that have brought us here today.” Then they pledged: “We will export death and violence to the corners of the earth in defense of our great nation.” Their pledge, written on their group photo, landed on Mr Crumpton’s desk in Washington. “This is why we are winning. I thought, because of men like this. God-fearing, humble servants of our nation,” Mr Crumpton recalls thinking. Later, he reads the pledge to President George W Bush in the Oval Office. “I almost choked up at one point … I later learned that he displayed it in his private office, next to the Oval Office,” he writes.

I know there are terrorists that are trying to kill innocent people to make political points. I know there are many brave men and women from many intelligence and military organisations all over the world ~ including the CIA ~ who have managed to stop such plots already, and are risking their lives daily to try to stop more. I recognise the pain that the 9/11 attacks caused. I covered the aftermath for an American newspaper, and spent time in a room in a basement in Manhattan where functionaries with piles of computer printouts were telling mothers and husbands and sisters and sons whether their loved ones were among the thousands who died that day. I watched people post futile, desperate “lost” posters with photos of their spouses on fences and stand there sobbing in the rain, hoping against hope that those who they’d lost would reappear if they wanted it badly enough.

I know these things, but I also know that Mr Crumpton’s fable of heroic American counter-terrorism efforts bears little relation to the world in which we live. It is too simple, too unambiguous. Not everyone who is “with us” is a well-intentioned, clean-cut Good Guy, and not everyone who is “against us” is an evil and treacherous Bad Guy. On both sides, there are people ~ neither good nor evil, just people ~ who have done terrible things that they thought were justified, in the names of causes they believed in; this is not to say that their ends are morally equivalent, but their means often seem disturbingly close. Surely this includes Mr Crumpton and his eagerness to kill thousands of Afghans, many of whom were likely fighting his commandos because their homes had been invaded, not because they hated America. A little acknowledgement of this moral ambiguity ~ inherent in espionage, war, and life ~ would have made this book feel more interesting, more believable, and more useful.

This review was first published in The Statesman, Kolkata on 14 July 2012.
http://www.thestatesman.net/index.php...

The reviewer, Sam Tranum, is on the staff of The Statesman

[Philip · Rating 4 out of 5]

Halfway through this fascinating memoir by former ops officer and head of the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center, Hank Crumpton. However, if you're looking for a story about the "traditional" CIA (which to me is more the John le Carré, back alley Europe, Cold War variety), this is NOT that book. The whole second section of the book focuses on the post-9/11 Global War on Terrorism, which is the CIA at its most non-traditional (and controversial) — covert action, paramilitary action, drone strikes, renditions, etc.

Separately, Colacci's narration is very good, but it drives me frickin' nuts every time he spells out "HQS" as "H-Q-S," rather than simply saying "headquarters" like EVERYONE IN THE WORLD DOES. (This problem arises again in the second half of the book, when he reads out "JSOC" as "J-S-O-C," rather than the infinitely more common "jay-sock.")

UPDATE: Annnnd...done. Again, the middle half of the book is an interesting account of the CIA's role in post-9/11 Afghanistan, and I now better understand why this was initially handed to the Agency rather than the Pentagon. But I still hope that in future, the military sticks to its military mission and reverses its "mission creep" into traditional, strategic intel, (which unlike tactical battlefield intel, it basically sucks at); while the CIA sticks to its core function "recruiting spies and stealing secrets," rather than acting as boots-on-the-ground warfighters.

I did find the final section on Crumpton's work with NR — "National Resources," the Agency's domestic intelligence program — very enlightening. Most people are of the opinion that either (A), the CIA just doesn't operate within the U.S.'s borders; or (B) it's a sinister, "black helicopter" organization that's spying on all of us (!!). Well, turns out both are wrong. The Agency does conduct robust CONUS-based operations, BUT...they only (A) target non-US citizens in the States for possible recruitment as spies when they go back home; or (B) work cooperatively with fully witting US persons and organizations — universities, corporations, national labs, etc. — on a number of fronts. What the CIA does not do is spy on US citizens. Ever. End of story.

Overall, this was a good book — more memoir than "CIA for idiots" primer, and more relevant and timely than other "classics" in the field, going all the way back to Allen Dulles' The Craft of Intelligence, which I gotta believe inspired Crumpton's title. With the Agency — and the world of intelligence — changing so rapidly, it's good to have such books coming out on a regular basis, in order to keep up with the always-evolving world of targets, tradecraft and technology.

[Steve Cran · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book gives you an insiders view of how the CIA works. Starting off the author explains to the reader the ultimate value of intelligence. Without intelligence you can not win a war and if you are not winning wars then you cannot defend your country. The founding fathers knew the value of great intelligence and espionage.

Today’s policy makers have forgotten the value of good intelligence and espionage. The public does not understand the value,. Oft times the CIA has their budget cut or they are overly scrutinized for what they do. Their are constraints as to what they can do all based on the current politics .

Hank entered the service after three tries and he had no military experience. He had lots of travel experience and had gotten into several fights while abroad. He was lucky to get in.

After training on th farm he was stationed in Africa. Most agents there are very independently and kind of knowledgeable eccentric. Working in Africa he learns what it means to be a case manager and run contacts. He discusses how he vets and grooms people to get info about their government. He talks about the difference between handling a case and be a liaison with different government where in the share information.

Hanks biggest claim to fame was taking down Al Quaida. After Al Quaida bombed two US Embassies. Hank to work with the FBI on investigating Al Quaida and who bombed the Embassy. Hank would end up working for the FBI and he explains the different operating procedure between the two organizations. Later in his career he would lead the CIA against Al Quaida. Ultimately it was another unit the brought down Bin Laden.

The book will open your eyes to the flawed view of our politicians who underestimate the threat that Al Quaida posed. The CIA understood it and had they been listened to it might have been avoided. The Department of Defence is locked in a rigid mentality of state to state war. Now things are much different. If you want the truth about espionage this book is it.

[Murtaza · Rating 3 out of 5]

Reasonably interesting memoir of a former CIA officer with experience in Afghanistan. The most fascinating parts were actually the pre-9/11 sections which discussed the ordinary work of handling and recruiting sources. His later account of his foray into private sector liaison was also disturbing and enlightening. A useful piece of insight was the difference between CIA intelligence gathering and FBI criminal investigation and how that division helps feed a divergence of interest between the two agencies.

The author himself sees the world in complete black and white, as per the narrative. Books like these often make me wonder how involved the agency was in the editing process, given the nearly uniform consistency of message and tone across different accounts. A light read that helps give an insight into the agency’s perspective.

[Olivia Sessum · Rating 5 out of 5]

the most engaging autobiography of an intelligence professional i've ever read

[jihad]

كتاب تجاري هابط .

[Laura · Rating 1 out of 5]

When I received The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service, I was intrigued and couldn’t wait to find out about the secret missions of a CIA agent. Unfortunately, this audiobook fell flat for me and I did not finish it. I almost fell asleep before half of the first CD was over, and totally gave up 1.5 CDs into the book. I like non-fiction, but I found this book to be incredibly dry. The narrator, David Colacci, did not help. I thought the reading was rather tedious without much inflection. It was hard for me to pay attention and remain interested while I was driving.

There was also not much action in the parts I listened too. Crumpton gave a brief history of the CIA particularly in the age of 9/11 to present. I thought this part was interesting as it gave a rundown of basically how it is hard to work with different political parties and do what is best for the country. And it was parties, not just one or the other. Crumpton also discussed becoming an ambassador and how he first started out working for the CIA. Missing was any action to keep me interested. I think this book would have worked before for me as a regular book to read and not an audiobook. For an audiobook, I need a good plot to keep me interested on my way to and from work.

This review was originall published on my blog, Laura's reviews at: http://lauragerold.blogspot.com/2012/...

[Shawn · Rating 3 out of 5]

I found this look into the workings of the CIA to be very intriguing. The perspective of someone very familiar with many of the agencies and groups involved in security and espionage made this credible. It was apparent that some of the anecdotes were deliberately fuzzy on details (names, places, etc.) to preserve security. The reality lives up to the James Bond hype in many instances it seems. I disliked the overuse of acronyms and found that the sheer number of acronyms used to identify US agencies alone was enough to make me appreciate the confusion and communication challenges those working in these areas must face. I also disliked that the author frequently cited "revenge" as a primary motivation for pursuing Bin Laden and other responsible for acts of terrorism. I couldn't buy into the prayer offered by special forces in Afghanistan who sought help from the Almighty in carrying out their revenge. Being motivated to bring about justice is one thing, but revenge is something else that is entirely unsavory. Also, I found it a tad bit trust-eroding how the author had no qualms about stating that CIA operatives didn't break US laws--just foreign ones.

[Maria · Rating 3 out of 5]

Crumpton spent his career in the CIA, mostly in Africa before joining the Counterterrorism group in the late 1990s. Because of that, Al Qaeda was on his radar long before 9/11. The embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, the attack on the USS Cole brought frustration as the Clinton administration responded weakly. After 9/11, Crumpton didn't have time to waste complaining about the Bush administration, he was too busy leading the CIA response and coordinating the Afghan uprising against the Taliban.

Why I started this book: Another professional reading list title that recently became available on my library's Overdrive account.

Why I finished it: Another reviewer title this "the CIA can do no wrong..." but imagine that you are given an extremely difficult job. You do it anyway, writing the report, making the predictions and its ignored. Then the worst happens and you were right. Your job is to recover and find the bad guys. You do that too and get blamed for missing the signs, the attack and screwing up the fight. I'd write a book like this saying... you know, maybe you should blame the politicians.

[Tom Schulte · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting and engaging CIA agent memoir with a lot of common tactics and methods to "clandestinely spot, assess, develop, recruit, and handle non-U.S. citizens with access to foreign intelligence vital to U.S. foreign policy and national security decision-makers." I feel his politics are a bit right of center or right of me, but this is no screed. His remarks suggest to me he is comfortable with Bush-era "enhanced interrogation" and feels it was valuable, such as in Qari Ahmadullah's supposed death:

The CIA would pay a price in a geopolitical policy environment often led by those who did not understand intelligence or who chose to manipulate it for their own preconceived agendas. President George W. Bush would order legal covert action, such as the detention of terrorist combatants and enhanced interrogation techniques, only to have President Barack Obama direct his attorney general to investigate CIA officers for possible illegal conduct.

[...]

Tony gave the signal. He and his team overpowered the Taliban contingent. They bound and gagged them and left them on the hut floor. They rolled Amadullah’s representative into a carpet. In broad daylight, they walked out of the house and down the road with the extra-bulky carpet under their arms. They made it to the predesignated LZ. After a gutwrenching delay, a helicopter picked them up.

Within twenty-four hours of his capture, the Taliban prisoner revealed AQ and Taliban command posts and other positions along the Pakistan border. Based on this intelligence, confirmed by other sources, including our UAVs, we requested an air strike.

U.S. aircraft transformed these enemy sites into a mix of rubble, dust, flesh, and bone. Scores of AQ and Taliban died. During the bombing, the Predator picked up one individual fleeing on foot. He made it to a motorbike and tried to escape. He did not get far. He disappeared in a fiery blast.

We watched on the video monitor. We later learned the fleeing man was Taliban intelligence chief Amadullah.

Crumpton reveals himself to be the "Hank" interviewed by Woodward in Bush at War.

[Dolly · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is an engaging and fascinating autobiography that explains a bit about the culture of the CIA and the experiences of an Operations officer in that agency. Mr. Crumpton also details his experiences as a liaison officer in the FBI and goes into lengthy detail of his counterterrorism experience before and after 9/11.

I listened to this book narrated by David Colacci and while it was rather lengthy, it was very also interesting. At times I felt that Mr. Crumpton was a bit full of himself, and a bit of a blowhard as well. But I suppose he did have a lot to be proud of.

I was impressed by his unwavering commitment to joining the CIA from a very young age, as well as his ability to rise so high in the ranks despite his sketchy start. Overall, it was a worthwhile tale and I learned a lot about the CIA.

The title of this book appealed to me as I perused the various audio CDs at my work library. I have been working in the intelligence community for over a year now, but I am not an intelligence officer, so I was interested in learning more about the CIA's perspective on intel. And the obvious connection of the title with Sun Tzu's The Art of War intrigued me.

My spy experience has been limited to visiting the International Spy Museum as well as reading some Mrs. Pollifax books. And our girls and I have really enjoyed hearing Melissa Mahle speak a couple of times at our local library and reading her books for children. Her book, Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA, looks like it would be an intriguing read as well. Still, we all decided that it's more fun to read about being a spy than to actually be one. Safer, too.

interesting quotes (page numbers based on hardcover book with ISBN13 978-1594203343):

"This book's title is a tribute to the late CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, who in 1961 wrote The Craft of Intelligence: America's Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free World, and to the fifth-century-B.C. Chinese strategist Sun Tzu and his The Art of War." (p. 13)

"Most of all, the FBI tour informed me about my country as seen through the eyes of law enforcement and the larger political system. The enduring power of the law and the respect it garnered was awesome. The law enforcement community, from the FBI to the local police force, depended on civil society. So did the intelligence community.

But I worried about the gap between the intelligence community and civil society. I also was concerned about the rigidity of our national security structure and the resistance to change." (p. 119)

"...intelligence and security agencies should not have foreign-policy agendas (although some do), because intelligence informs policy but does not make it." (p. 125)

"His mix of confidence and fatalism struck me hard. He was right. They had no choice. From my new perspective, neither did we." (p. 238)

"The convergence of our recent history in counterterrorist operations with the intellectual rigor of SAIS, reaching back through centuries of scholarship, brought into focus what a fundamental shift in warfare I had just lived through. Three facts leaped to the fore. First, the degree of asymetry in warfare had reached a new level. The trend was not just increasing, but accelerating at an alarming rate...Second, the role of nonstate actors was increasing...Third, at an operational, even tactical level, the battlefield was now global." (pp. 279-280)

"Randomness and uncertainty, often acute in times of rapid change, can breed anxiety and fear. But change plays to America's strengths. Our Constitution and our liberal institutions are designed for adaptability. With strong, adaptable, and resilient citizens who demand leaders worthy of the name, the best years may still be ahead of us. We need leaders who embrace intellectual integrity, constructive political discourse, and hard-nosed governance rather than prideful ignorance, dogmatic rhetoric, and divisive ideology on the left and the right." (p. 324)

[Eric Klamm · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very interesting book, really helps you understand what the CIA does and why they are important. Also it scares you about the state of the world today

[Brittany Butler · Rating 5 out of 5]

I’m going to be talking a lot about Henry A. Crumpton’s book The Art of Intelligence, in the upcoming weeks on social media because I don’t think that there is a more important book to read other than his if you’re seriously considering a career at CIA. Crumpton spent the majority of his career as a case officer in Africa but held a number of very important leadership positions in the CIA's counterterrorism center, including leading our CT mission in Afghanistan. A lot of what you’ll learn from this book is how to not make the same mistakes of our past and the importance of forging alliances with both state and nonstate actors in intelligence and covert action campaigns, especially in the Middle East. I can not recommend this book enough.

[Shaydy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting insider’s perspective that focuses on heroes and lacks critical reflection.

[Jared · Rating 3 out of 5]

“The essence of espionage is access.” - Allen Dulles, ‘The Craft of Intelligence’

WHO IS THE AUTHOR?
- Henry A. “Hank” Crumpton, a twenty-four year of the CIA’s Clandestine Service

WHAT IS THE BOOK ABOUT?
- The author offers lessons about what it means to serve as an honorable spy. Crumpton chronicles his role-in the battlefield and in the Oval Office-in transforming the way America wages war and sheds light on issues of domestic espionage.

BOOK’S TITLE
- The book’s title is a tribute to the late CIA Director Allen Dulles, who in 1961 wrote The Craft of Intelligence, and to the fifth-century-B.C. Chinese strategist Sun-tzu and his The Art of War.

THE CURRENT THREAT
- Both Russia and China probably have more clandestine intelligence operatives inside the United States now, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, than at the height of the Cold War.

WHY IS THE CIA PLAYING A LEAD ROLE?
- And why is the CIA at the forefront of this conflict? This is not just intelligence collection but covert action on a grand, global scale. Why so much covert action? What about other instruments of statecraft?

- At the root of all this, it seemed, was a weak understanding of intelligence among policy makers, elected officials, and leaders, both in government and in the broader society.

THE BIG PICTURE
- CIA operations fall into a larger political context, although sometimes CIA officers forget this. Intelligence serves a political purpose and supports policy makers and implementers.

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH
- “Because covert action is not a substitute for policy, it is generally counterproductive when used by a government that has not decided what it wants to do—a government that acts simply to do something while it refuses to commit resources in a sustained, coordinated manner. Nor is covert action a magic bullet to be used alone when almost everything else has failed. It must be coordinated with and supported by diplomatic, military, and/ or economic measures.”

NEW WAY OF WAR; NEED TO ADAPT
- While CENTCOM and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) were adapting, some Pentagon leaders held on to their old paradigm of state-on-state war: They saw victory in terms of destruction of fixed sites and standing armies. They searched for a geographic center of gravity on the battlefield, failing to understand that the center of gravity rested in the minds of the Afghans.

- Cohen argued that we will face “wars that resist neat classifications of those who impart military doctrine at war colleges, or of politicians and generals who seek clarity and order when all is obscurity and confusion.” He added, “This war, unlike most others, has the potential to take new and dangerous forms with great speed and little warning.”

CIA AND FBI RIVALRY
- I witnessed many examples of this, including foreign services manipulating CIA and FBI rivalry to their advantage. The British and Israelis routinely worked that angle.

ESPIONAGE
- The heart of intelligence, however, is human espionage. At its most elemental, spying is about understanding and influencing the scope of behavior, from evil to exalted, and maneuvering through this emotional labyrinth in pursuit of valuable information otherwise unavailable. Espionage is also the foundation for covert action, which is not collection but rather another tool of statecraft, a supplement to foreign policy.

POWER OF COMMUNICATION
- Communication, especially the crucial but sometimes mundane work of writing reports, is fundamental to espionage.

CIA IS ‘CUSTOMER-FOCUSED’
- This acute awareness of customer needs is what makes the CIA different from other intelligence agencies. Others only collect for their own missions; the FBI works to acquire evidence to prosecute a case; the DIA seeks to fill military requirements. The CIA, on the other hand, collects and analyzes for a range of customers from the president to the diplomat to the soldier.

RECRUITMENT
- The instructors outlined the ingredients of a recruitment operation: MICE. This stood for money, ideology, compromise, and ego. I thought of another, revenge, perhaps an extension of ego but nonetheless powerful enough to warrant its own designation.

- money, ideology, compromise, and ego (MICE). Years later in Afghanistan, revenge and coercion (RC)

- Each act was unique. No recruitment operation ever evolved exactly as envisioned.

WILL AMERICA KEEP ITS PROMISES?
- After an hour or so, they got to the heart of the matter. Although politely expressed, the question was blunt: Could they depend on the United States to keep its word? They explained how they had fought the Soviets, convinced that the United States and the international community would help them rebuild their country and establish a national government of unity. That did not happen, despite the promises. The United States had lied. What, they demanded, would be different this time?

“DEEP INTELLIGENCE”
- Intelligence collectors and analysts without empathetic intuition, or “deep intelligence,” can yield deeply flawed conclusions, bungled operations, and catastrophic policy decisions. In contrast, by understanding local norms in a human intelligence context and by working to build common policy purpose with local partners, risks diminish and rewards grow.

SELF-AWARENESS
- Self-awareness through self-examination is essential for a successful intelligence officer, especially a recruiter. Without a solid, central reference point of yourself, every other assessment and judgment is skewed.

KNOW WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW (TO INCLUDE YOURSELF)
- Those operations officers who best understand themselves, their own motivations, their own ignorance, while exploring the ideologies, faults, anger, fears, hopes, and aspirations of others, are the ones who recruit the best spies. Those who realize what they don’t know acquire the best intelligence. This is key: If an intelligence officer does not appreciate his own lack of knowledge, how can he know the gaps that need filling? If he does not look and listen with an open mind, and if he does not have a broad array of divergent experiences, how can he recruit sources and collect intelligence?

BROAD RANGE OF EXPERIENCE
- the best officers were usually those who had accumulated a broad range of diverse and enlightening experiences prior to joining government service.

INCOMPLETE RESULTS
- An intelligence officer’s professional challenge, among many others, is living with incomplete results.

LEADERSHIP
- He would encourage and recruit the hardheaded, iconoclastic, passionate original thinkers whom others would often dismiss as too much trouble. They not only followed him, they challenged him to be better. They pushed him. They questioned him. They constructively, fearlessly voiced dissent if warranted. He did the same with me. That’s a mark of superlative subordinates; they make their bosses better leaders.

- Clausewitz in his classic On War stressed the courage of responsibility over all other forms of courage. Without that type of bravery, there can be no leadership and no victory.

- Initial victory would unfold faster than any of us anticipated. It was because of the flat chain of command, the networked design, and the extraordinary leaders we selected and empowered.

SEEING CHALLENGES AS OPPORTUNITIES
- The physical geography, spectacular and daunting, could be overwhelming if viewed as a barrier. If seen through the eyes of an insurgency, which we were, it offered great advantage.

THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE AND OTHER NON-STATE ACTORS
- The private sector, like al Qaeda and their affiliates, is a network of nonstate actors. This network can often respond to a threat better than a government.” “What do you mean? Give me an example.” “Well, consider our response to 9/ 11. The only effective countermeasure that day didn’t come from U.S. fighter jets but from a handful of private citizens on United Flight 93. They collected intelligence from friends and family via their cell phones. They learned about the other aircraft being used as suicide attack vehicles. So they overpowered the hijackers and stopped the plane from smacking into Washington, D.C. Those patriots transformed themselves from passive passengers into a self-organized network of nonstate actors. They saved hundreds, maybe thousands of lives. The U.S. government didn’t save anybody that day.

*** *** *** *** ***

GOOD QUOTES
- Close alliances with despots are never safe for free states.—DEMOSTHENES, SECOND PHILIPPIC ORATION

- “I have never faced a problem that could not be solved with an appropriate amount of explosives.” - U.S. Air Force explosives expert, Chuck “Boom Boom” Vessels

- In my office, I posted a copy of a statement that the great British explorer Ernest Shackleton had used during his recruiting campaign for his 1914 Antarctica expedition: “Officers wanted for hazardous journey. Small wages. Bitter cold. Long months of complete darkness. Constant danger. Safe return doubtful. Honor and recognition in case of success.”

- We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know about living.—OMAR N. BRADLEY

- It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.—ARISTOTLE

FACTOIDS
- The CIA’s dossier on her, known as a 201 file,

- Only much later did I learn that AQ had attempted to attack the USS The Sullivans in the port of Aden, Yemen, as part of the Millennium Plot. Their overloaded suicide skiff had sunk in the harbor as they approached their intended target. Ten months later, AQ would regroup and attack the USS Cole in Aden harbor.

- ‘clientitis’ - is the term used to describe the alleged tendency of resident in-country staff of an organization to regard the officials and people of the host country as "clients".

HAHA
- The student, with a grimace, pointed to his crotch and whispered, “My penis, it hurts.”...“I don’t know,” he whined. “Maybe you should look?” “Nope, that will not happen,” I politely responded. “I only inspect my own penis. Let me get a doctor.”...I had never imagined this chore as part of my duty. I could not recall any briefings, books, or James Bond movies about this.

- I never met a North Korean diplomat who did not want porn, either for personal use or resale.

- Rich and Alec consulted with CIA specialists, including a quiet older lady who was probably somebody’s grandmother. She was also an expert in terminal ballistics. She calmly explained the effects of overpressure and fragmentation. She supplemented her instruction with PowerPoint presentations depicting the kill range of certain warheads. Alec and his crew called them bug-splat slides. They affectionately dubbed her the Black Widow.

- “The vice president asked about the alliance between AQ and Iraq. Are they cooperating, and if so, how?” “That’s the dumbest fucking question I’ve heard all week.” “Do you want me to tell the vice president that?” “Uh . . . probably not.”

[Laura Snyder · Rating 4 out of 5]

4.5 as I’m partial to non-fiction. I loved reading Crumpton’s recounted tales of recruiting and counterterrorism in the CIA.

His first-hand experience shed light on critical strategies and considerations made on a daily basis to analyze, decode and preempt adversarial sources that threaten US National Security.

It was so interesting to learn about how global relationships with local agents began, how the CIA handled the Millennium Plot and how the Predator evolved into a first-of-its-kind surveillance apparatus. The book continuously got better and better.

Crumptom skillfully disclosed enough information to clarify and explain technicalities while simultaneously protecting sensitive details that needed to remain confidential.

Although it was redundant and slow at times, this book overall reinvigorated my interest in global politics and national security and sparked a new interest in intelligence, specifically.

[Todd N · Rating 4 out of 5]

Checked this book out at Kepler's and eventually decided to buy it.

I don't know much about the CIA except I've worked for some In-Q-Tel funded companies and that you aren't supposed to call them buy their real name if they are a customer. But I do like that Person Of Interest show with Ben from Lost, so I thought I should learn more about it.

The main take away is I would last about 5 minutes in the CIA. For one thing it is a pretty irony-free environment, and for another thing there are not a lot of rewards. If anyone finds out what a good job you are doing, then you have failed.

So Mr. Crumpton and his team pretty much invent (or at least rediscover) the Predator drone, put missiles on it, send out about a zillion warnings about Al Qaeda, and ask for some sort of deployment in Afghanistan. Then 9/11 comes along, and he routs the Taliban and AQ out of Afghanistan in a few weeks with a few hundred operatives and special forces (while the DoD is still trying to find their butt with a funnel).

Then the 9/11 Commission has the gall to blame "failures of intelligence" rather than feckless policies and feckless responses to the previous half dozen or so previous AQ attacks. I don't think I could handle that without completely freaking out. I mean, at Google if there was no sushi left in the closest micro kitchen I would loudly complain and threaten to go work at Facebook. The guy had bin Laden frickin' live on Predator video and was told to stand down by the White House.

It's very interesting reading, partly because I knew nothing about this kind of career but mainly because Mr. Crumpton did all kinds of kick-ass stuff around the world as a spy. I'm glad he got at least a little revenge on the policy makers that vexed him by pointing them out in his book. A lot details were redacted, I guess by the CIA, but I still got the gist of it. The dude is a serious patriot, and he was clearly driven by something other than a craving for celebrity, which will hard for a lot of people to wrap there head around.

I'm not sure why, but I was a little shocked when Mr. Crumpton and an aide said a prayer in his office before the bombing campaign in Afghanistan started and when one of the teams brought over part of the fallen twin towers to Afghanistan and consecrated the ground where they placed it with a prayer. That bugged me less than the story of how an Army engineer named "Boom Boom" increased the fragmentation of the Hellfire missiles by 25% to make sure fewer people walked away from the detonations.

Recommended. Very interesting story about an important point in our history and what will probably be looked on as a major turning point in the way America fights wars.

[Bill Pardi · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a book by someone who was not just a highly placed insider at the CIA, but a true believer in its mission and purpose. As such, the book is a mostly positive account of the agency from the perspective of someone who wanted to be part of the CIA from childhood, and served 24 years in its ranks at almost every level.

Crumpton spent most of his time in the CIA undercover, either as a recruiter or COS running agents and clandestine operations in many of the most dangerous stations in the world. He served in Africa during the insurgencies of the 70s and in Afghanistan after 9/11. He describes his missions with as much detail as he is able (though sometimes leaving out all but the most general descriptions of places and people), and usually with a clear operational objective. Crumpton makes no apology or excuse for the directive of the CIA -- they are an instrument of the United States that uses all manner of tradecraft and statecraft to protect the safety and security of its citizens.

For much of my adult life I have had a fascination with the CIA and it's role in US geopolitics. I think that's both because of the cutting edge technology they use to do their jobs, but also because they play the role of a hyper-secret government agency acting on behalf of a largely open society. Because of that the CIA is at the same time often our only blanket of cover to our enemies abroad, but also a potential threat to freedom and privacy here at home.

I've read several "insider" books on the CIA, but this one really clarified for me a couple key elements of the agency that can sometimes get muddled. First, Crumpton makes it very clear that the CIA's primary mission is to gather and analyze intelligence (foreign intelligence) and provide it to its customers, be they the military, foreign liaison, or the President. Second, at times the CIA must go outside the bounds of its primary purpose and act as a clandestine army complete with the tools and often lethal objectives of the traditional military. Both activities often require the CIA to operate in the foreign field in ways that would be wholly illegal here on US soil.

I enjoyed the book overall, especially the details of CIA tradecraft and the inside look at some of the international politics up to and after 9/11. But I was left with the distinct impression that Crumpton and others in the CIA act with a certain blind, almost religious adherence to do "whatever it takes" to meet US objectives. I wondered if there was ever a point at which they would question whether policy makers could cross the line and risk the very thing they are putting their lives on the line to protect.

[MountainAshleah · Rating 3 out of 5]

Midway through listening to The Art of Intelligence, I had the good fortune to catch the author (Henry Crumpton) on a local talk show. Crumpton spent 24 years of distinguished service as an operations officer in the CIA’s Clandestine Service, followed by his appointment as the US coordinator for counterterrorism. His impressive career included leading the CIA's post-9/11 global covert operations in Afghanistan. If you have the opportunity to listen to Crumpton’s views, whether on the talk show circuit or on this informative CD, do so. Crumpton’s insights into global politics are intriguing, thoughtful, and well-informed based on decades of hands-on experience and education in his field (a refreshing change from many of the lesser-informed media pundits). While the book is titled the Art of Intelligence--the reference to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is deliberate—the book more accurately reflects the subtitle: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service. Crumpton carefully reconstructs the experiences that highlighted his career and informed his political theories, taking the reader through a detailed--if understandably not completely candid and revealing--journey from Cold War intelligence tactics to intelligence in the age of terrorism and non-state agents, addressing Al Qaida as the most notable example. The result is an extremely informative narrative that reflects shifting governments, US leadership, and the global perspective on the role of intelligence collection and analysis. Highlights of the book include Crumpton’s experiences working within both the CIA and the FBI and the at-times radically different modes of operation between the two organizations.


The CD is skillfully narrated by David Colacci, a familiar name to fans of audio books. The result is a compelling inquiry into the recent history and current state of American global policy from the Cold War to the age of terrorism. Highly recommended.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 5 out of 5]

Both a memoir and a study of the various elements of intelligence and covert action, Crumpton's book is humorous, gripping, and very enjoyable.

If you've read anything about the CIA's post-9/11 activities you're probably familiar with Hank Crumpton or the work of CTC. Crumpton provides a valuable addition to this literature.

Crumpton has served in almost all the capacities possible in an intelligence service, which makes his story all the more interesting. Most intelligence memoirs provide only one such perspective.

The book is direct and clearly written. In all, Crumpton is very fair and does not point fingers. However, Crumpton finds it "silly" that the White House never approved pure "kill" operations before 9/11. Crumpton finds it silly that the White House was willing to strike at bin Laden with cruise missiles in 1998 but not kill him through covert action. I think this argument is misleading. The US government has always, and I think appropriately, viewed CIA covert action differently than the use of overt military force. And despite what some officials might have said afterwards, everybody understood the difference at the time. Besides, simply signing a finding that would or would not have authorized lethal force would not have been enough. Such an operation would still have required actionable intel.

Crumpton writes that the Afghan air campaign was run out of "a Persian Gulf country", even though it is now known to have been Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. He writes of F-16s in the Afghan theater even though no F-16 units were deplyed there. Crumpton refers to "US Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel Michael Haas" even though most accounts call him Chris Haas.

Still, a valuable and enjoyable work.

[Sandy · Rating 4 out of 5]

ALL THAT YOU WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT THE CIA AND THE AUTHOR WOULD NOT GO TO JAIL FOR WRITING--

Just having read Double Cross- the True Story of the D-Day Spies, my interest in tradecraft was piqued.

Crumpton does a superb job of reducing some of the dark cloud that institutionally covers the CIA, a largely secret institution. The truth is that CIA operatives do a lot of good, hard work to find out what the US's enemies are doing. Yes, there are instances in which the CIA does retaliate with lethal force against Al Qaeda and others. Crumpton explains how the agency rebuilt its human intelligence post 9/11 and he was one of the people involved in the renaissance of that assat which was sacrificed in the post Cold War budget cutting.

The book also explains how technology has made the agency able to deal with the non state enemies. It relates the surgical attack that technology guided US weapons to precise targets. Impressive stuff.

Perhaps the most important tale is how intelligence identified the real post 9/11 enemy and contradicted the DoD and State Department broad attack on rogue "states" rather than the real threats like Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Crumpton does a commendable job of explaining the unexplainable. He is a bit defensive about some things and his enmity toward some of the Cabinet Members does not help his cause. With a future of shadowy targets, The Art of Intelligence is a MUST READ for anyone who wants to follow international affairs, terrorism, the military and the policy that envelopes those spheres of America's global role. He has made the case for less is more.

[J.E. Jr. · Rating 4 out of 5]

I became aware of Henry Crumpton in a 60 Minutes Interview a day before his book "The Art of Intelligence" was released. Marketing worked because I was intrigued by Crumpton's thoughts in the interview and pre-ordered the e-book online later that night. I was not disappointed.

Hank Crumpton from the very start creates a very detailed very compelling story about life inside the CIA. He manages to do this in very general terms without talking about specific people or places, but still keeping an astounding level of information about his clandestine career and how assets are acquired and used to gather intelligence for the United States.

After the events of 9/11 Crumpton enters the spotlight of history as teams he is personally responsible for take the lead in the U.S. operations to overthrow the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afganistan. Those segments were fascinating. The exciting story of the development and use of the Predator drones and the CIA's leading of foreign units on the ground in Afghanistan was better than any fictional espionage novel I've ever read.

The books final chapters, dealing with Crumpton's move into domestic operations and finally into government policy with the Bush State Department reveal a surprisingly pragmatic opinion of the balance between civil liberties and the need for intelligence by a man who spent his whole career on the intelligence side of that equation.

The "Art of Intelligence" was a very enjoyable and informative read and I'm very happy that I tuned into 60 Minutes that night to hear about it.

[Josh · Rating 4 out of 5]

I love books that open my eyes and reveal a whole new world. This book recounts a life in the CIA and lessons learned along the way. The author, Henry Crumpton, tells how he began as a CIA operative in the field and climbs through the ranks to U.S. Coordinator of Counter Terrorism.

Crumpton's vast experience provides a very informed perspective on geopolitics, but he is candid about the uncertainty of global security policy and best practices. He explains what roles the CIA had in the Middle East and it's counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups. Crumpton also tells fascinating stories about his responsibility providing intelligence to President Bush... intelligence that directly affects decision making and policy formation.

Raises fascinating questions like: what is the future of terrorism? what are government the private sector's roles in global asymetric power? how will nano-technology or bio-weapons develop? and how will the United States respond to the increasingly dynamic and complex world?

Note: some occasional strong language in dialogue.

[Patrick · Rating 3 out of 5]

One-sided autobiography and high-level overview of the CIA. Bashes the FBI and general bureaucracy a fair bit. Delves into some interesting stuff! Less of an introduction/history of the CIA and more focused on case officer experiences and CTC during the late 20th century through early 2000s post-9/11. Cool tidbits on international political theory.

A very “CIA has never done anything wrong” approach. I found myself googling people, places, and events and finding that the author is predictably tilted to protecting the CIA’s reputation even when it should be looked at critically.