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British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One
The author convincingly argues that a large number of casualties during WW I were caused by British commanders who were vain, egocentric, incompetent and uncaring.
214 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1988
About the author
John Laffin
118 books6 followersJohn Laffin was a prolific author with nearly 130 books to his name. Many of his books concerned military history.
Laffin's parents both served in WWI, his father in the 20th Battalion and his mother as a nurse. In 1940, aged 24, having worked with Smith's Weekly and The Wagga Advertiser, he enlisted in the 2nd AIF. He trained as an infantryman and later completed an officer course before serving in New Guinea. While convalescing in Sydney in 1943 he met his wife Hazelle.
After the war Laffin worked for a number of newspapers and magazines, wrote short novels and began his own feature service and editing unit. With his family he left for England in 1956 where he resided for nearly 40 years. He wrote articles for Australian newspapers and taught English, history and geography in secondary colleges.
Laffin traveled extensively in Europe, especially the Western Front areas of WWI and in the Middle East. He returned to Australia in 1995 but Hazelle developed heart problems and died in early 1997. He is survived by his two daughters, Bronwen and Pirenne, and a son, Craig.
Laffin's parents both served in WWI, his father in the 20th Battalion and his mother as a nurse. In 1940, aged 24, having worked with Smith's Weekly and The Wagga Advertiser, he enlisted in the 2nd AIF. He trained as an infantryman and later completed an officer course before serving in New Guinea. While convalescing in Sydney in 1943 he met his wife Hazelle.
After the war Laffin worked for a number of newspapers and magazines, wrote short novels and began his own feature service and editing unit. With his family he left for England in 1956 where he resided for nearly 40 years. He wrote articles for Australian newspapers and taught English, history and geography in secondary colleges.
Laffin traveled extensively in Europe, especially the Western Front areas of WWI and in the Middle East. He returned to Australia in 1995 but Hazelle developed heart problems and died in early 1997. He is survived by his two daughters, Bronwen and Pirenne, and a son, Craig.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
October 22, 2026
John Laffin's British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One is a scathing indictment of British and, to a lesser extent, French military leadership during the First World War. Laffin makes no effort to disguise his contempt for the generals he holds responsible for the appalling casualties suffered by their armies. His assessment is perhaps best captured in his own words: "Their bungling was callous and culpable and led to butchery." The sheer magnitude of the losses is almost incomprehensible, and Laffin provides example after example of questionable command decisions, failed offensives, and seemingly pointless sacrifices. I came away disturbed by the apparent inability, or unwillingness, of senior military leadership to recognize that the nature of warfare had fundamentally changed.
My knowledge of the First World War is admittedly limited, and I recognize that reading such an aggressively critical account risks creating a rather one-sided perspective. The emergence of industrialized warfare presented extraordinary challenges. Machine guns, modern artillery, aviation, armor, and communications technology were transforming the battlefield, while the doctrine and organizational structures necessary to employ these capabilities effectively remained immature. Nevertheless, the machine gun's devastating effectiveness was hardly an unknown phenomenon in 1914. What troubles me most is the apparent willingness of commanders to accept enormous casualties while continuing to employ tactics that experience had repeatedly demonstrated were inadequate. There were innovative officers developing better approaches, but the institutional ability to recognize, disseminate, and implement those lessons seems to have been painfully slow. The problem was not simply incompetent generals, but also a command culture that too often favored conformity over initiative and adherence to established doctrine over adaptation.
And herein lies what I consider the book's greatest failing. Laffin devotes considerable energy to condemning individual generals, particularly Douglas Haig, but comparatively little to examining why the British command system struggled to learn and adapt effectively. A book condemning generals for failing to learn would have been a far more powerful work of military history had it seriously examined the institutional failures that prevented learning. Instead, Laffin's relentless denunciations eventually begin to resemble a personal grudge rather than a balanced historical assessment. I do not doubt that serious failures of leadership contributed to unnecessary casualties, but assigning blame is not the same as understanding the organizational, doctrinal, and cultural conditions that allowed those failures to persist. That deeper examination would have transformed this book from an angry indictment into a valuable study of military leadership and institutional learning.
Perhaps my strongest reaction to the book comes from a personal experience at the Scottish National War Memorial in Edinburgh Castle. Within the memorial are records of the staggering losses suffered by Scotland's regiments during the Great War. Some sustained cumulative losses equivalent to several times their normal strength. Consider what that means: a military formation effectively destroyed, replenished with replacements, and then devastated again. These regiments often recruited heavily from particular communities, meaning the losses were not merely military statistics but tragedies that reached deeply into towns, villages, and families. Standing there, contemplating the human cost, was profoundly moving. Ironically, Edinburgh Castle also contains a statue of Field Marshal Haig. I can only imagine what Laffin might have written about the presence of a man he so thoroughly condemns within the same historic fortress that houses a memorial to Scotland's war dead.
Despite my criticism, I am glad I read this book. Laffin succeeds in forcing the reader to confront the human consequences of military decisions and the responsibilities of those entrusted with command. But his uncompromising approach ultimately limits the book's value as military history. I finished it with considerable sympathy for his outrage, less confidence in his objectivity, and a desire to better understand the First World War beyond the familiar narrative of lions led by donkeys. The most important question is not simply which generals deserve condemnation, but why an institution responsible for the lives of millions struggled to adapt to the realities of modern warfare quickly enough to spare so many of them.
My knowledge of the First World War is admittedly limited, and I recognize that reading such an aggressively critical account risks creating a rather one-sided perspective. The emergence of industrialized warfare presented extraordinary challenges. Machine guns, modern artillery, aviation, armor, and communications technology were transforming the battlefield, while the doctrine and organizational structures necessary to employ these capabilities effectively remained immature. Nevertheless, the machine gun's devastating effectiveness was hardly an unknown phenomenon in 1914. What troubles me most is the apparent willingness of commanders to accept enormous casualties while continuing to employ tactics that experience had repeatedly demonstrated were inadequate. There were innovative officers developing better approaches, but the institutional ability to recognize, disseminate, and implement those lessons seems to have been painfully slow. The problem was not simply incompetent generals, but also a command culture that too often favored conformity over initiative and adherence to established doctrine over adaptation.
And herein lies what I consider the book's greatest failing. Laffin devotes considerable energy to condemning individual generals, particularly Douglas Haig, but comparatively little to examining why the British command system struggled to learn and adapt effectively. A book condemning generals for failing to learn would have been a far more powerful work of military history had it seriously examined the institutional failures that prevented learning. Instead, Laffin's relentless denunciations eventually begin to resemble a personal grudge rather than a balanced historical assessment. I do not doubt that serious failures of leadership contributed to unnecessary casualties, but assigning blame is not the same as understanding the organizational, doctrinal, and cultural conditions that allowed those failures to persist. That deeper examination would have transformed this book from an angry indictment into a valuable study of military leadership and institutional learning.
Perhaps my strongest reaction to the book comes from a personal experience at the Scottish National War Memorial in Edinburgh Castle. Within the memorial are records of the staggering losses suffered by Scotland's regiments during the Great War. Some sustained cumulative losses equivalent to several times their normal strength. Consider what that means: a military formation effectively destroyed, replenished with replacements, and then devastated again. These regiments often recruited heavily from particular communities, meaning the losses were not merely military statistics but tragedies that reached deeply into towns, villages, and families. Standing there, contemplating the human cost, was profoundly moving. Ironically, Edinburgh Castle also contains a statue of Field Marshal Haig. I can only imagine what Laffin might have written about the presence of a man he so thoroughly condemns within the same historic fortress that houses a memorial to Scotland's war dead.
Despite my criticism, I am glad I read this book. Laffin succeeds in forcing the reader to confront the human consequences of military decisions and the responsibilities of those entrusted with command. But his uncompromising approach ultimately limits the book's value as military history. I finished it with considerable sympathy for his outrage, less confidence in his objectivity, and a desire to better understand the First World War beyond the familiar narrative of lions led by donkeys. The most important question is not simply which generals deserve condemnation, but why an institution responsible for the lives of millions struggled to adapt to the realities of modern warfare quickly enough to spare so many of them.
June 15, 2018
The folly of man and egos in the British High command, clearly laid out and presented.
August 3, 2018
A very engaging albeit on the short-side book which anyone with an interest in the Great War should read, maybe even own. His premise is not entirely original but he lays out his stall with cogency and conviction. It is not quite as drastic as "Lions Led by Donkeys" but the view cannot be resisted; the British Army was not the only participant with deficient senior staff and likely it has been thus all down through history (and maybe into the future).
I am still trying to understand the "why" of the GW and this helped a bit. He asks a lot of men who were clearly looking over their shoulders aloof from the Front and those with modern fighting experience. Of course, the war was not just about slugging it out with the foe, it was about The Empire and politicians muddied the already muddy waters. Throw in the Frence, Russians and Italians and you begin to think no one would want, for example, Haig's job...
I am still trying to understand the "why" of the GW and this helped a bit. He asks a lot of men who were clearly looking over their shoulders aloof from the Front and those with modern fighting experience. Of course, the war was not just about slugging it out with the foe, it was about The Empire and politicians muddied the already muddy waters. Throw in the Frence, Russians and Italians and you begin to think no one would want, for example, Haig's job...
September 26, 2019
Goes beyond the usual hand-wringing about casualty statistics to offer real alternatives to the "HCI" (high casualty inevitable) tactics. Reread from 2011.
August 16, 2013
When one asks how much human life counted for the generals at the time, this book gives a concise and documented answer. Not much. When one knows that General Haig's conclusion of the Boer War (machine guns and dum-dum bullets used) was that the cavalry lance was the weapon of the future, it is really questionable as to how such an unimaginitive officer could become Commander in Chief and why such carnage was tolerated.
June 24, 2011
One sided review of the conduct of Worls War 1. However he conveys his arguments to back his assertions well and succintly. Refutes a lot of the ascertains made by Haig and official British apologists.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews