Conceptul de timp

by Martin Heidegger

Conferinta Conceptul de timp a fost tinuta de Heidegger in fata Societatii de Teologie de la Marburg in 1924, dar a fost publicata abia in 1989.


Este vorba de un rezumat aproape complet al celebrei lucrari Fiinta si timp, care va fi elaborata in 1927. Structurile fundamentale ale Dasein-ului sunt prezentate aici pentru prima oara. intrebarea „Ce este timpul?“ isi primeste raspunsul – „Timpul este Dasein-ul“ – prin confruntarea cu Aristotel si Sfantul Augustin. Cel dintai a pus bazele intelegerii comune a timpului in gandirea occidentala, cel de-al doilea, pe care Heidegger il va urma, a facut un prim pas catre intelegerea timpului originar.

traducere de Catalin Cioaba

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Metaphysics, Theory, German Literature

80 pages

First published January 1, 1924

About the author

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was a German philosopher whose work is perhaps most readily associated with phenomenology and existentialism, although his thinking should be identified as part of such philosophical movements only with extreme care and qualification. His ideas have exerted a seminal influence on the development of contemporary European philosophy. They have also had an impact far beyond philosophy, for example in architectural theory (see e.g., Sharr 2007), literary criticism (see e.g., Ziarek 1989), theology (see e.g., Caputo 1993), psychotherapy (see e.g., Binswanger 1943/1964, Guignon 1993) and cognitive science (see e.g., Dreyfus 1992, 2008; Wheeler 2005; Kiverstein and Wheeler forthcoming).

Reviews

[Chadi Raheb · Rating 3 out of 5]

خب آقای هایدگر عزیز،
شما با این کتابتون که به گفته خودتون حتا کتاب هم نیست و تازه فقط رساله‌ایست مقدماتی و پیش‌نیاز خوندن کتاب اصلی، به من حس احمق بودن دادید.
متشکرم که بهم فهموندید حالا حالاها نباید سراغ کتاب اصلی برم و بهتره برگردم سراغ مشقای خودم و همون بیبی استپ‌ها. امتیاز کم رو هم بذارید به پای کم‌فهمی خواننده! 😐

[Tim Pendry · Rating 5 out of 5]

Continuum have recently published a number of new English translations of Martin Heidegger’s work. This is, in effect, the first draft of his masterpiece, ‘Being and Time’. ‘Being and Time’ is a very difficult work and this early version is no piece of cake.

However, although incomplete in its thinking, it is a surprisingly clear account of the core of his philosophy as early as 1924 and it can be recommended (with care) as a decent bridge between a general textbook account of his philosophy and his larger work.

The ‘care’ resides in the advice to the non-academic reader to accept that they are not going to get very much out of the highly detailed and difficult Third Chapter on ‘Dasein and Temporality’.

The translator states at the beginning that it ‘makes few concessions to the reader’ - that is an understatement. Having said this, Chapter 2 on ‘The Original Ontological Characteristics of Dasein’ is remarkably useful.

The essence of Heidegger’s radical adoption of a phenomenological approach to our Being-in-the-World is here and it is an exciting read for anyone who ‘gets’ that this philosophical genius changed forever the way we can and should think about ourselves and the world.

While Nietzsche is a polemicist of existentialism against Christian and Hegelian essentialism, it is Heidegger who thinks through why essentialism is absurd and who presents us with a model for the individual human condition (Dasein) that places it firmly in a context of Time, of Heraclitean flux.

After Heidegger, it is no longer possible to consider any situation or person as fixed or essential nor to see a person as not embedded not merely in the material but in the social, constructed by their circumstances until that point when they become conscious of their being constructed.

The philosophy cannot be summarised without failing to do justice to Heidegger’s insights and the care with which he builds up his anti-system. Heidegger moves us beyond the idea of pure individualism and of socialisms into entirely new territory (at least in 1924).

There is no being in the world that is not experienced phenomenologically by the individual in relation to the world.

Such an individual is not fully created as person until the moment before they cease to exist. Death is central to Heidegger’s philosophy because it is a culmination of a process.

However, the world of the individual is created not only within brute material existence but also through the constructed phenomenal reality of many other individuals now and in the past so that history becomes a formative part of the process of ‘becoming’ until death.

At one point, Heidegger writes with brilliance about how generations construct their world and suggests how some individuals can think outside their generation just as they can think outside of their society.

His interest in history, of course, is to some extent a response to both Hegelian process and to German historicism. He recasts history not as forces with an essence of their own but simply as the phenomena of the ‘deals’ (my term) that are struck between people simply to get from A to B.

We are thrown into the world with a pre-existent history, we make our history as we move along our trajectory towards death and we leave behind a ‘given’ history for others to accept or change as consciousness and will permit. What this history is not is a thing outside the people who create it.

The book is primarily about time as the title suggests and how time and death at the end of personal time dictate what we are – a process that can never allow us to be a thing-in-itself unlike those things in the world that we make use of in our own process of becoming.

The world is to hand in this sense and this helps us to see how we use people as objects as if they were hammers while having relationships where our loneliness is assuaged by attempting to see persons as like us, things not in themselves but as others who are Dasein.

This is a rethinking of our old Kantian friends – the subject and the object – but it helps us to see that the imaginative universalist construction of humanity as a thing-in-itself is nonsensical. It is an aspiration that speaks of our anxieties but says nothing about the world.

A person who is Dasein can only relate to others as Dasein on an individual level of connectedness and, even then, the engagement is relative and not absolute. We cannot, as Heidegger rightly insists, live another person’s life because we can never live their death.

It is not accidental that some people with a strong universalist attitude to humanity find it difficult to engage in a direct and passionate relationship with others on an unconditional and non-exploitative way. The two attitudes – essentialist and existentialist – crowd each other out.

Being in the world (this is the concept of Dasein) is very much being in the world together with others. This social construction of self through time is at the heart of this short book.

Perhaps Heidegger over-privileges language over non-verbal communication (he was of his time and of the text-based culture of Western Europe) but, whether linguistic or non-verbal, the interplay of oneself with others and both with matter creates what we understand by culture and society.

Heidegger himself is conservative in orientation but there are no necessary conservative conclusions to be drawn from this (as Sartre attempted to demonstrate but then became trapped in his own Cartesianism and assumed Marxism).

The individual consciousness has to understand the material and social limitations of its position and the fact that there is no escaping final extinction but the process of steering oneself through the material and social in order to create the ‘right’ self might be a truly radical one.

Humanity in general is faced with anxiety (according to Heidegger) over its own dissolution, a dissolution without meaning, so it tends to construct false meaning and to adopt (Sartre extended this) a social role to avoid ‘being’.

'Becoming’ and process are frightening so the tendency is to fix things as essences.

In practice, avoidance of dealing with anxiety, death and lack of meaning merely creates a ‘false consciousness’ (Sartre again, not Heidegger) which embeds the anxious state so that the person never becomes anything other than their own historical or social construction.

Material limitations are real but history and social limitations are more or less flexible. The question is then whether the person not only understands how to manage matter ('scientia') but also how to manage and command the social and move beyond one’s past.

We have moved decades beyond Heidegger’s master work into Sartrean territory but the importance of this book and of “Being and Time” itself is that they create the possibility for individual liberation and choice without diminishing the power of the material, the social and the historical.

Adolescent irrational assertion of pure individualism and a cowed submission to the social and to the past become two sides of the same coin of incomprehension about the world and our place in it.

In addition, once death and anxiety are faced, they, like the bully, lose their power – if the knowledge does not send you insane or to suicide, it liberates in precisely the way proposed by Nietzsche even if it was not an outcome for him.

It is possible, of course, to be a Christian or a Marxist or a Liberal or whatever and accept this world view but the acceptance of such ideology or belief is then undertaken in a wholly different spirit.

There is the Kierkegaardian leap of faith or a simple acceptance of ‘what one is’ or of ‘what one chooses to be in the context of society and history’ - what it is not any more possible is a simple acceptance of what others choose one to be.

To construct meaning as a ‘leap’ is certainly very different from constructing meaning out of anxiety without further thought or curiosity. It may still be a leap derived from anxiety but one leaps knowing that this anxiety must be alleviated in this way.

For others, this no-meaning is the liberation and death is simply the last of many successive presents.

This general review fails to do justice to an excellent translation with exceptional academic support.

To read Chapter 2 of this book, supported by Chapters 1 and 4, is to see the world in an entirely different way. A difficult but recommended text – one which you might read and then return to later for more insights.

[mp · Rating 5 out of 5]

Si pienso en mi muerte tengo todo el tiempo del mundo

[Kamakana · Rating 4 out of 5]

250314: tried to read this cold, over 2 years ago. not easy. so i start at the beginning again. now, having read so much more phenomenology, some on Heidegger, some others like Sartre, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, come to this book with more educated eyes. not that it has become easy, but the original impulse for purchase- it is short, how difficult can if be?- is this time helpful, though it is dense, it is good to have some idea of terms, and if it is only first draft of Being and Time, am still not ready for that climb. this is a very good prelude. do not know if it is easier in German, but certainly translates well. there is a paragraph that captures clearly hd's question, on page 80 or so: hd refers to Descartes 'cogito ergo sum' and notes that of all the thought and questions this has spurred, no one pays attention to 'sum', and this is what he focuses on. by this point hd has come up with Dasein, with mit-sein, with anxiety, death as ownmost possibility... basically all the ideas read in previous works on him, even a few by him, have read. but now, maybe sometimes understand him...

note: this is my 312th philosophy book, of 3 000 books. yippee...

020220: more The Philosophy of Heidegger
Heidegger: Thinking of Being
The Heidegger Reader
The New Heidegger
What is Called Thinking?
Poetry, Language, Thought
The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays
Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil
Introduction to Metaphysics

[Brandon · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is basically just a summary of Heidegger’s thought before he expanded it into Being and Time. I don't know what is up with my copy, but it's very short, less than 50 pages of English, which doesn't seem to be what other people are reading.

There are some insights here that weren't
clear from Being and Time, mostly about temporality. I was sure I was missing something from that book, but The Concept of Time is pretty much just a restatement of the time sections with slightly different terminology, so I'm somewhat vindicated. Again, it's hard to know with Heidegger because so much of what he says is up to interpretation.

Once again, he critiques the idea of everyday Dasein, calling it inauthentic. Here, Dasein's authenticity is characterized almost completely as embracing the threefold aspect of temporality. The inauthentic mode is generally neglecting the futural aspect, since temporality is primarily futural. It can also be rejecting your past as YOUR past, relegating it to the no-longer-present. It can also be obsessive present-ness.

He thinks that authentic temporality is essentially being futural, of projecting. But these projections can, in turn, only be authentic if the past is authentically recognized and consulted rather than being discarded. Then, in running towards the future in our present, we can become whole, become what we are. Of course, this necessitates a healthy outlook towards death, which basically consists of not fleeing the concept and embracing it as our inevitable possibility.

This is probably better after reading Being and Time rather than before. Also, make sure your copy is a good one. Apparently there are strange editions going around.

[Chant · Rating 4 out of 5]

I AM TIME. AT THE CURRENT TIME I AM THE TIME.

[Sofia · Rating 4 out of 5]

Saps quan un emporrat et fa un monòleg sobre mogudes mentals que sembla que no tenen sentit i després et quedes molt boig pensant en el que acaba de dir? Això és aquest llibre. És una conferència prèvia a la publicació de L’ésser i el temps, on s’hi exposen els conceptes fonamentals de manera sintetitzada.

[Thomas Gallagher Romero]

Me encantaría ponerle nota pero es que no he entendido nada.

[Milo Galiano · Rating 5 out of 5]

Es un texto PRECIOSO, además de muy breve.

Quien diga que Heidegger escribe enrevesado, que comience a leerlo sin buscar las prisas.

Relaciona todo el rato el tiempo con el reloj y con el concepto "ser-ahí".

[Aung Sett Kyaw Min · Rating 2 out of 5]

I subjected myself to this exercise to atone for the sin of not finishing Being and Time like any half decent philosophy undergrad should. From what I recall, the issues thematized in this first draft appear early in the final draft of BT--the rejection of Descarte's 'res cogitans' approach to conceiving Dasein and its consciousnesss as being a substantial entity in the world like any other , the demand to positively obliterate the received tradition until we arrive at the primordial way of determining the nature of being, etc.,
The main takeaway of this propaedeutic study is that Dasein can only achieve authenticity by authentically living inauthentic temporalness/futuralness. Inauthenticity is therefore, in a certain optimistic rendition, an 'enabling' condition, instead of a curse. The kind of 'resolute running ahead' at what the Dasein (in the mode of Time) will be, which is death, is what individuates each of us and all of us equally. But this running ahead cannot be accomplished without suspending or bracketing off our natural attitude towards the past as the by-gone present and the future as the present yet to come. We have to let the past be in order the present may be authentically futural.

While I agree that Heidegger's 'subtle' terminological distinctions often have the tendency to confound the discussion with no explanatory pay off, his argumention is surprisingly clear once you get a bit more familiar with the basic trajectory of his overall project, which in this case is to inquire into the immanent, ontological and dare I say 'temporalizing' features that Time itself takes in the form of that one particular being (Dasein).

[Alessandra · Rating 4 out of 5]

Domandando [...] del «quando?» e del «quanto?» l’esserci perde il suo tempo. Che ne è di questo domandare che perde il tempo? Dove va a finire il tempo? Proprio l’esserci che fa i conti con il tempo, che vive con l’orologio in mano, proprio questo esserci che calcola il tempo dice costantemente: non ho tempo. Con ciò non si tradisce forse da sé in quello che fa del tempo, in quanto è egli stesso il tempo? Perdere tempo e, per farlo, procurarsi un orologio! Non viene qui prepotentemente alla luce l’inquietante spaesatezza dell’esserci?

[Michael Ledezma · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great little book. Offers some key insights and nuances, especially when it comes to the translator's word choices (Vorlaufen as running ahead to the past=anticipation in S&Z) Ends on an ambiguous note: "What is time?" became the question "Who is time?" More closely: are we ourselves time? Or closer still: am I my time?" Beautiful!!

[Madlen Zagorska · Rating 3 out of 5]

"being-in-the-world is characterized as concern."
facts

[Στέφανος Στοϊκός · Rating 1 out of 5]

Being-here, Being-there, Being-everywhere

I’ll give it to Ifantis (Υφαντής): the translation of Dasein as “Είναι-εδώ” definitely beats “ενθαδικότητα.” Also it’s clear that reading most philosophers, even including Heidegger, is easier than reading their (more than) eager interpreters (see my last critique on Biemel).

I’m not going to comment again on the inane use of the polytonic system in “high-brow” books in Greece, and I don’t have much to add to my critique on Heidegger himself. He does outrageously mention the theory of relativity (the nerve!), of which he has less of an understanding than a toddler picking his nose in a sandbox, only to declare that “Being-here” which only means (of course) the “human” Being-here IS time.

Is that enough to ridicule him? Yes, but I’m not done. He doesn’t even have the spine to admit this as a “categorical” statement, as the real task of a philosopher should be exactly to lack a spine, so he transforms it to the groundbreaking question, “Am I my own time?” That along with other morsels of profundity like:

“Το να μην μπορεί να ξεπεράσει κανείς την απώλεια ενός πράγματος, δηλώνει την επιθυμία του να εξακολουθεί να το έχει στη διάθεσή του στο παρόν.” Page 169: “Being unable to overcome the loss of something equals a desire to keep it available in the present.” Mind blown!

However, the saddest thing about Heidegger is that he cannot avoid seeing the world as such, humans as such, as real, breathing, living, existing matter, social and natural, and yet he will not, shall not, never, ever, eveeeer! Surrender his idealistic badge of honour, his birthright as a representative of the tradition of ruling class philosophy to reject it as such.

For Heidegger the being itself (I do NOT mean the thing-IN-itself), be it here or there or anywhere, is not enough of a being in itself, in the things it holds or produces or works on, in all its material manifestations and relationships with other beings. We NEED to find the thing behind the thing. Does he mean the deeper guiding principles of matter and society, the inner layers of nature as it unravels before the onslaught of human progress? Is he an actual scientist? A Marxist, even worse? (GOD save us) NO!

Being does not mean existing! In fact, our pleb interpretation of being is “trapped” in the thing itself, the existing thing itself. The real being of the being is beyond the existing of the being, it’s beyond the beyond of that being. It’s the beingness of the being of the being. It’s the quality of the beingness of the being of the beingness of the being.

My question to Herr Heidegger is this: if to expose the real beingness of the being, we need to discuss the being of the being, then who guarantees that the being we have reached is not simply another existing being? Who is he to tell me that the real being of the being, does not lie in the being of the being of the being? Of the being of the being of the being of the being? And so on and so forth ad infinitum?

Well, I guess if he were cornered, Herr Heidegger would simply answer in his infinite wisdom: “Beingness being what it might be, your question is being the best version of the being of a question that can be.”

I take a solemn oath to never read Heidegger again. Evaaaa!

[Iacopo · Rating 3 out of 5]

Primo libro del filosofo letto per conto mio e non iniziamo bene.
Uno sproloquio di una sua conferenza in cui alla fine non dice nulla. Capisco perché l'autore a suo tempo lo avesse ritirato. (Sfortuna averlo scoperto a fine lettura)
Le domande che si pone sono interessanti, peccato che per tutto il saggio ci giri in torno senza che si arrivi mai a un punto di riferimento.
Inoltre non capisco perché lui, come altri filosofi, debba utilizzare forzatamente un linguaggio aulico e forbito complicando notevolmente concetti che altrimenti rischiavano di essere anche semplici.

3⭐

[Rubén Sainz Jiménez · Rating 5 out of 5]

Un gran texto que comprende el tiempo desde el propio tiempo. Muy recomendado.

[Patricia · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Intrebarea 《Ce este timpul?》 a devenit intrebarea 《Cine este timpul?》. Mai exact: sintem noi insine timpul? Sau mai exact: sint eu timpul meu?"

[Oliver Corujo]

No puedo opinar de algo tan complejo; Perdón a mis Fans.

[Daniel Gargallo · Rating 4 out of 5]

This very short lecture will tell you very specifically what Dasein means. I wish I had read this lecture before I tried to read Being and Time because it’s very clear. If you’re interested in reading H, but don’t do well with the difficult language in big philosophical texts, this is a good starting point. It touches some major Heideggerian themes like hermeneutics and could form the good basis of your exploration into Heidegger. If you’re already an expert on the man then I suppose this book can only give you an idea of what he was thinking before Being and Time, in which case you should read only if you appreciate thought process.

[Saverio Mariani · Rating 3 out of 5]

Le idee di un giovane Heidegger (il testo propone una conferenza tenuta nel luglio del 1924) sul concetto di tempo. Vengono citati Einstein e Aristotele, come riferimenti per le argomentazioni dell'autore. A mio avviso, però, dietro questo discorso vi è tutta l'intuizione bergsoniana che, in quegli anni, era così di moda da farla sembrare una corrente artistico-letteraria. Tutt'altro.
Come ha più volte detto Lévinas, senza il concetto di durata e la rivalutazione del concetto di tempo di Bergson, non ci sarebbe stato il Dasein e la temporalità dell'essere e dell'esserci di Heidegger.

[Hunter · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Philosophy will never get to the root of what history is so long as it analyses history as an object of contemplation for method. The enigma of history lies in what it means to be historical.”

“The past—experienced as authentic historicity—is anything but what is past.” (notice the Faulkner parallel!)

Great lecture. Gadamer calls it the Ur-text for what became Being and Time , and it is certainly clarifying as a sketch of the main points in Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein.

[Jodie Foster · Rating 4 out of 5]

It definitely made me think, but it was so complicated that I didn’t really understand the nuances in his writing. I recommend reading this after you already know some basic information about Niedegger and his work, or else it could be a bit difficult.

[Kia Taheri · Rating 4 out of 5]

هایدگر از دید تازه‌ای به مفهوم زمان نگاه می‌کند. دیدی که محدود به «بودن» یا «شدن» نیست. زمانِ هایدگر، بی‌توجه است نسبت به فلسفه‌ی یونان باستان.

[MissFede · Rating 3 out of 5]

Raccomanderei questo libriccino solo a chi ha già un'infarinatura su Heidegger.

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

A LECTURE HEIDEGGER GAVE THREE YEARS BEFORE “BEING AND TIME” WAS PUBLISHED

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was an influential and controversial German philosopher, primarily concerned with Being, and phenomenology---who was widely (perhaps incorrectly) also perceived as an Existentialist. His relationship with the Nazi party in Germany has been the subject of widespread controversy and debate [e.g., 'Heidegger and Nazism,' 'Heidegger and the Nazis,' 'Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany,' 'Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism,' etc.]

The Translator’s Preface notes, “’The Concept of Time’ is a translation of … a lecture which Heidegger delivered to the Marburg Theological Society in July 1924… The lecture presents in a concise yet developed form many of the analyses which were subsequently expanded into Heidegger’s major work ‘Being and Time’ (1927). On account of its concise form (the analyses being presented, as Heidegger says, ‘in the form of theses’ rather than that of detailed explication), the lecture can only be adequately understood and assessed in the light of that later work.”

Heidegger states, “If time finds its meaning in eternity, then it must be understood starting from eternity. The point of departure and path of this inquiry are thereby indicated in advance: from eternity to time… If our access to God is faith and if involving oneself with eternity is nothing other than this faith, then philosophy will never have eternity… Philosophy can never be relieved of this perplexity. The theologian, then, is the legitimate expert on time.” (Pg. 1)

He states, “Time is that within which events take place. This is what Aristotle has already seen, in the context of the fundamental kind of Being pertaining to natural being: change, change of place, locomotion… Since time itself is not movement, it must somehow have to do with movement. Time is initially encountered in those entities which are changeable; change is in time.” (Pg. 3-4)

He explains, “Dasein is that entity which is characterized as being-in-the-world. Human life is not some subject that has to perform some trick in order to enter the world. Dasein as being-in-the-world means: being-in-the-world in such a way that this Being means: dealing with the world; tarrying alongside it in the manner of performing, effecting and completing, but also contemplating, interrogating, and determining by way of contemplation and comparison. Being-in-the-world is characterized as CONCERN.” (Pg. 7)

He asserts, “The authenticity of Dasein is what constitutes its most extreme possibility of Being… Authenticity as the most extreme possibility of Dasein’s Being is that ontological determination in which all the aforementioned characters are what they are. The perplexity concerning our grasp of Dasein is grounded not in the limitation, uncertainty or incompleteness of our cognitive faculty, but in the very entity to be apprehended: it is grounded in a fundamental possibility of its Being.” (Pg. 10)

He continues, “Dasein is authentically alongside itself, it is truly existent, whenever it maintains itself in this running ahead. This running ahead is nothing other than the authentic and singular future of one’s own Dasein. In running ahead Dasein IS its future, in such a way that in this being futural it comes back to its past and present. Dasein, conceived in its most extreme possibility of Being, is TIME ITSELF, not IN time.” (Pg. 13-14)

He observes, “What Dasein says about time it speaks out of everydayness. Dasein as clinging to its present says: the past is what is past, it is irretrievable. This is the past of the everyday present which resides in the present of its busyness. This is why Dasein, thus determined as present, fails to see what is past. That way of viewing history arising in the present merely sees in history an irretrievable busyness: what was going on. The contemplation of what was going on is inexhaustible. It loses itself in its material.” (Pg. 19)

He concludes, “Philosophy will never get to the root of what history is so long as it analyses history as an object of contemplation for method. The enigma of history lies in what it means to be historical.” (Pg. 20) He continues, “Let us… repeat the question… It has transformed itself. ‘What is time?’ became the question: ‘Who is time?’ More closely: are we ourselves time? Or closer still: am I my time? In this way I come closest to it, and if I understand the question correctly, it is then taken completely seriously. Such questioning is this the most appropriate manner of access to and of dealing with time as in each case mine. Then Dasein would be: being questionable.” (Pg. 22)

This very short book will be of keen interest to anyone studying the development of Heidegger’s thought, or of ‘Being and Time’ in particular.

[Epifras]

Nedbrytningen av kronos, den döda, anonyma, beräknade tiden till kairos, det ödesmättade, kritiska ögonblicket - själva livs-tiden.

Heideggers utkast till Vara och tid som han presenterade framför Freiburgs teologiska samfund 1924. Det är en provocerande föreläsning då han börjar med att indirekt ifrågasätta Guds evighet. Vi kan inte gå från Guds tid till vår tid som så många andra filosofer och teologer har gjort, utan vi måste börja med tillvarons tid och sedan försöka förstå Guds tid (evigheten).

Tiden timar sig. Tiden är inte någonting, något varande. Och tiden går inte heller att förstå som utsträckning, genom rumsliga metaforer (en samling nupunkter som vi kan mäta och utmarkera på en spatiell linje). Detta senare är vetenskaperna och metafysikens förvillelse. Tiden är inte en sträcka likartade (homogena) punkter av ”nu” som vi passerar genom och som sedan ”förloras” såsom för-flutna. Detta är en nivellering och en slags utradering av tiden till ett dött, formellt och allmänt begrepp som inte bevarar den rikedom som den ursprungliga tiden innehåller. Tiden har inget gemensamt mått, inget mått - ur/klock-måttet är bara "världs-tid" som i sin tur förlitar sig på tillvarons tid. Naturens tid bygger vidare på den förfrämligade världs-tiden genom ett mångfaldigande av nu-punkter. Ju mer vi tror att tiden är mätbar och ”något vi kan ha”/en entitet, desto mindre tid är vi. Vi förlorar tid när vi mäter och räknar den. Ett mer passande vokabulär för att förstå tid är inte ”för-fluten” (oåterkalleligt fluten) eller ”fram-tiden”, utan bör snarare förstås som ”för-gången” (som jag kan gå återigen) och före-löpande” (som jag kan föregripa). Tiden har inte heller bara en riktning som linjen ger ett intryck av. Tillvarons tid går åt alla riktningar, från förgånget till nuet, från föregripande utkast/förelöpande till förgånget, från nuet till förelöpande. Dessa tidsekstaser är aldrig närvarande och realiseras aldrig men de utgör min tillvaro i form av möjligvaro (förelöpande), fakticitet (förgången) och ögonblick (nuet). Vidare så har tiden inte någon given kronologi, såsom den vetenskapliga och ”världsliga” tiden ger sken av, utan alla ekstaser går in i varandra. Tiden är inte en räcka tal som man betar av i en kronologisk eller mängdbaserad ordning såsom Wittgensteins regelföljande.

Tillvaron, jag - vi -, är tid. Guds evighet är en avledd tid av tillvaron. Evigheten konstrueras med hjälp av den ursprunliga tid som vi är. Evighet föreställs med hjälp av den där varje nu-punkt är närvarande. Men frågan är ens om evigheten finns eller ens går att förstå eller föreställa sig. Evigheten verkar antingen vara ett avlett begrepp av vår tillvaro eller ett meningslöst sådant, eller båda två. Guds tid, hans evighet, är nunc stans, ett "stående nu" som aldrig passerar eller kommer. För Heidegger så är tid Jeweiligkeit, det vill säga en specifik tid, - någon tid - och detta innebär att tillvaron är där-varo, det vill säga en tillvaro i en specifik tid och plats. Denna Jeweiligkeit kan gripas av tillvaron som Jemeinigkeit - Min tid!

Spåret av den ontologiska differensen (mellan varanden och varat) i föreläsningen: Det mest förfallna/avartade tidsbegreppet frågar frågan "Hur mycket?" (Wieviel?) [Hur mycket är klockan?] som sätter tiden i relation till ett mått, medan det näst mest förfallna begreppet uppehåller sig vid "Vad?" (Was?), som om tiden är ett ting - det ursprungliga, autentiska frågandet stannar däremot vid "Wie?" (Hur?); Hur är tiden? Hur är tillvaron? Hur är vi? Hur är? Detta är uppväckandet av det ursprungliga frågandet som inte förlorar sig i varanden. Tiden är inget varande, inget ting eller någon entitet. Tiden tidigar sig eller timar sig och går inte att objektifiera eller utmarkera som "något".

Det visar sig alltså att tiden inte alls är blott ett ”begrepp” eller ett ”mått” (på rörelse såsom Aristoteles tänkte) utan tillvarons grundstruktur, själva tillvaron, och att alla andra förståelser av tid och evigheten måste hänvisa till denna tillvaro för att bli förståeliga - tänk också på McTaggarts slag mot idén om en ”objektiv” tid genom sina A- och B-serier (idén om före och efter förutsätter en position i tiden i form av då-nu-kommande). Mängden, mätandet, kalendern, uret, världstiden, räknandet, och Guds evighet finner sina rötter i tillvarons ombesörjande.

[Renxiang Liu · Rating 5 out of 5]

This short text comprises a lecture Martin Heidegger delivered to the Marburg Theological Society in 1924, which should not be confused, due to affinity in titles, with Gesamtausgabe 64 (English translation: The Concept of Time: The First Draft of Being and Time ). The latter elaborates further on the topics in the former, and was submitted to the Journal Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistgeschichte in 1924.

Hans-Georg Gadamer calls this version the "original form" of Being and Time . This seems reasonable, for the short lecture embarks upon what is the central theme in Being and Time: another sense of time that Dasein as its ownmost self is (rather than is in).

The lecture starts with God due to its audience, but soon takes off by raising the question, does time mean nothing more, as it were in theology, than eternity? The inquiry into the question is defined as a "pre-science" which prepares the ontological ground for any scientific study on time.

Like in Being and Time, Heidegger starts with world time or "the time of everydayness". In traditional view, time is the container of events. Then time is measured, both by everyday Daseins and by physicists, as something homogeneous despite the variety of things happening within it. Oriented towards the now, however, this notion of time reveals its foundedness upon Dasein's concerns. But this inauthentic mode of calculating the "nows" indicates yet an authentic mode of living time, that is, living one's own time towards the "indeterminate certainty" of the possibility of death.

Now it becomes clear that ordinary time is constituted only because everyday Dasein evades its ownmost possibility and thus slides from the "how" to the "what" of its being. Then Heidegger argues that authentic time 1) is oriented towards the future, and 2) is precisely Dasein itself as running-ahead, as radical possibility. The tendency towards inauthenticity, however, is not accidental but rather essential to Dasein.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　

This text contains nothing that later did not get developed in Being and Time. Therefore, it is not very helpful as a source of Heidegger's less-renowned ideas. It still has two uses though. First, it indicates how Heidegger's whole bunch of ideas developed, perhaps through History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena , into what was eventually presented in Being and Time. Second - and this is related - it lets us glimpse into what Heidegger was initially after in his research. My opinion is that Heidegger was more concerned with re-interpreting time, and, in order to do this, he needs fundamental ontology (the key lying in the sense of the self, the self-alienating nullity that is ontically the closest yet ontologically the farthest), which, in turn, necessitates Daseinanalytik (Being and Time Division I). Accordingly, the detailed analysis on Dasein's everyday comportment, which gets (over-)emphasized in the popular interpretation by authors like Hubert L. Dreyfus, is but some preparatory clarification in Heidegger's own terms. Zuhandensein and Vorhandensein are not even present in this draft. When writing Being and Time, Heidegger chose to start with the Dasein; this by no means implies that his thought took the same course.

Besides its significance for Heidegger scholars, this pamphlet is also a concise presentation of the ideas of Being and Time (though usually without adequate argument), especially of the less clarified second Division.

[Simona~ pagine_e_inchiostro · Rating 2 out of 5]

Recensione a cura della pagina instagram Pagine_e_inchiostro:
In questo breve ma denso testo, Heidegger si propone di indagare il fenomeno del tempo non come entità astratta o misurabile, ma come qualcosa che scaturisce direttamente dall’esperienza dell’esistenza umana, segnata dalla transitorietà. Il tempo viene quindi ricondotto alla nostra condizione esistenziale, al modo in cui “essere nel mondo” implica un costante confrontarsi con il divenire.

Cercavo un saggio filosofico sul tempo che fosse profondo ma accessibile, magari anche intriso di quella tensione poetica che spesso accompagna le riflessioni esistenziali. Invece, ho trovato un testo faticoso, che trasforma in tedio ciò che avrebbe potuto essere una riflessione vibrante. Pur essendo tratto da una conferenza, lo stile è ermetico, e le idee sembrano affiorare più per allusioni che per chiarezza. Nonostante la brevità (meno di 50 pagine) il saggio si è rivelato un’esperienza frustrante, che ho abbandonato senza rimpianti. Un approccio alla filosofia che, anziché illuminare, confonde e allontana.

[Dan · Rating 5 out of 5]

What is time, what Aristotle and St. Augustine understood by time, why Einstein's concept of time was borrowed from Aristotle, what is wrong with the scientific concept of time, why measuring time is not very helpful or insightful in understanding time, how They/the One understand time, how a succession of “nows” forces past and future into the present, why the obsession with reversible and homogeneous time in physics, what is the connection between authentic history and time, how we humans gain/lose/pass time, why temporarily is the main issue here and not really time, how time and death are connected, and how fundamentally Dasein and time are the same -- are some of the topics in this very brief lecture.

[Nikhil Waiker · Rating 5 out of 5]

The foreword starts off with the introduction of the book as a piece of 2 lectures by Heidegger. Familiarity with Being and Time, and History of The Concept of Time will help greatly since Heidegger doesn't spend much time developing the need for 'Dasein' in this book.
I needed additional material to really understand this piece, and it seems to be a brilliant work of phenomenology.
However, although Heidegger is familiar with the relativistic nature of time and measurement, it seemed like he did not spend much space for it.
However, having not read Being and Time, my ignorance might have the best of me in this case.