How many ways are there to mishandle a nuclear weapon? Turns out about a million: Drop them from planes, crash them in planes, catch them on fire, put them in planes and catch them on fire, leave them on top of missiles about to explode, park them at a NATO ally with an unstable government and one lone soldier armed with a revolver guarding them, forget to take warheads off the missiles and fly them across the USA, have random criticality accidents in the nuclear lab, just to name a few...
And how many ways are there to accidentally start a world-wide nuclear war? Oh gosh, let's see: Accidentally run a training program of a full scale nuclear attack on an early-warning computer, go on alert after a malfunctioning computer chip starts generating a random number of missiles attacking the USA, mistake a Norwegian weather rocket for a nuke, mistake the moon for a nuke, mistake reflections from high-altitude clouds for a bunch of nukes, mistake a low-Earth orbit satellite for a nuke, conduct missile tests during the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and so on...
And I'm not even spoiling much by mentioning these incidents.
This book is a 600-page trip down memory lane to those crazy duck-and-cover days that anyone who came of age between the LBJ Daisy ad and The Day After will have had at least a few nightmares about.
The framing story is an accident at a Titan II missile silo in Damascus, Arkansas back in the days of Governor Clinton. Routine maintenance took a decidedly non-routine turn when a dropped socket punched a hole in the side of the missile causing a fuel leak. Safe to say, it doesn't end well. But the way the event filters through checklists, bureaucracies, local media, and the brave soldiers in the midst of the situation is fascinating.
Working at startups in Silicon Valley is about as far away from this style of troubleshooting as you can get, and it's just as well that we aren't dealing with anything more dangerous than ads or search results out here. That said, there are a few McKinsey and Bain consultants I'd like to drop down a missile silo. Actually, there are some old Nike sites near Pacifica...
We jump from the Titan II story to the history of the world's nuclear arsenal, from the Manhattan Project to the present day decommissioning of nuclear weapons and trying to keep them out of the hands of rogue non-nation states. As a bonus we get some good refresher history along the way, notably on how hard Khrushchev tried and failed to make Kennedy his bitch. Personally I think it was a sublimated crush gone bad.
Though Mr. Schlosser doesn't make this point anywhere in the book, for my main take away I couldn't help but draw the parallel between the early days of the powerful bureaucracy that grew around nuclear weapons and the powerful one that is forming around the government's surveillance technologies.
Of course, the significant difference this time is that the weapons are pointed at US citizens. (We were always bargaining chips in the Cold War of course, but I'm pretty sure no US nukes were actually trained on, say, Dearborn, Michigan.)
At first the secrecy was necessary for the war effort, and then for national security. Pretty soon it was used to deny access and power to those who disagreed with prevailing political policy (i.e. Oppenheimer). Then the money started coming in -- it's not cheap to fund all the labs and keep planes in the air at all times and have other ones on permanent standby -- and you got the military industrial complex that Eisenhower warned us about. Eventually, even the president wasn't kept fully informed.
This is how you wind up with something like the SIOP general plan for nuclear war, which up until Kennedy revised it had one option: nuke all communist countries, no matter what, including China. So if Moscow tried to nuke us -- or the moon rose in the wrong spot -- no more Beijing.
Kennedy gave SIOP a handful of options of who to nuke, though in reality the targeting of missiles wasn't that great and the bombers were probably too slow to make it over in time. But at least the President could pick the general areas of which continents to nuke by the early 60s.
Given the secrecy and gobs of money associated with the NSA, and given the disappointing over/under-reaction by various parties to Snowden's revelations, and given the accelerating pace of the technology, I'm sure we are less than a decade away from something equally as boneheaded as the early revisions of SIOP for our new dystopian surveillance state. Lord help us all when the modern day equivalent of Gen. Buck Turgidson gets his hands on that.
By the way, as I checked out reviews of this book I noticed that there is some historian-hater dude who is following Mr. Schlosser around and posting negative reviews of his book in any forum that will have him. His arguments seem to boil down to (1) Mr. Schlosser wrote about fast food and pot in previous books, so how dare he write about nuclear weapons, and (2) Mr. Schlosser never served in the military, so how dare he write about nuclear weapons, and (3) Historian-hater's book is much better, so buy that one instead. I think we can safely ignore this guy. Too bad, because I wouldn't mind reading another perspective.
But I must say for all the freak outs and close calls in this book -- and really, it makes Dr. Strangelove seem more like a documentary than a dark comedy -- the USA never accidentally detonated a nuclear device. That sounds like damning with faint praise, but really I'm not. That's some complicated technology under a lot of complicated conditions, and due to safety and/or luck for all the accidents that it endured, there has never been a single nuclear failure. Yet.
Highly recommended.