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The MIT Press Essential Knowledge
Free Will
A philosopher considers whether the scientific and philosophical arguments against free will are reason enough to give up our belief in it. In our daily life, it really seems as though we have free will, that what we do from moment to moment is determined by conscious decisions that we freely make. You get up from the couch, you go for a walk, you eat chocolate ice cream. It seems that we're in control of actions like these; if we are, then we have free will. But in recent years, some have argued that free will is an illusion. The neuroscientist (and best-selling author) Sam Harris and the late Harvard psychologist Daniel Wegner, for example, claim that certain scientific findings disprove free will. In this engaging and accessible volume in the Essential Knowledge series, the philosopher Mark Balaguer examines the various arguments and experiments that have been cited to support the claim that human beings don't have free will. He finds them to be overstated and misguided. Balaguer discusses determinism, the view that every physical event is predetermined, or completely caused by prior events. He describes several philosophical and scientific arguments against free will, including one based on Benjamin Libet's famous neuroscientific experiments, which allegedly show that our conscious decisions are caused by neural events that occur before we choose. He considers various religious and philosophical views, including the philosophical pro-free-will view known as compatibilism. Balaguer concludes that the anti-free-will arguments put forward by philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists simply don't work. They don't provide any good reason to doubt the existence of free will. But, he cautions, this doesn't necessarily mean that we have free will. The question of whether we have free will remains an open one; we simply don't know enough about the brain to answer it definitively.
152 pages, Paperback
First published February 14, 2014
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About the author
Mark Balaguer
14 books5 followersMark Balaguer is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at California State University, Los Angeles. He is the author of Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics and Free Will as an Open Scientific Question (MIT Press).
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March 1, 2015
I found myself upset that Balaguer, after a solid start to the book that laid out the debate on free will very lucidly, made an irrational logical leap at the end of the book in Chapter 6 to carelessly discredit the argument against free will. The reason I was upset is that anytime an author writes a book - as opposed to say, having a dialog - he makes it a one-sided lecture without answering counterarguments. And so the entire book becomes somewhat useless because I cannot discuss his logical leap and get a better sense of what his thinking is. Anyway. Here is the general argument against free will that Balaguer goes on to "disprove":
1. Free will does not exist because the laws of physics are deterministic - everything is caused by a prior action or set of actions.
2. But wait! Quantum physics tells us that certain events are random, at the subatomic level. They are probabilistic - 50% A / 50% B.
3. So Free will can exist right, because things are not necessary completely pre-determined? There is a random element.
4. No - free will still doesn't exist because if things are pre-determined, you have no free will, and if on the other hand things are probabilistic - you still have no free will similar to how you have no free will over a random dice roll. This is the "random-or-predetermined" argument against free will.
Okay, up to this point I am completely on board with what Balaguer is saying. It makes sense. It is hard to refute. Then he makes a logical leap that is really unforgivable. I can't help but feel he does this on purpose, sacrificing his intellectual honesty in order to make a point he desperately wants to make - that free will exists - either for personal reasons or to appeal to his readers. Weak shit, in any case. The logical leap he takes is:
1. So we have the "random-or-predetermined" argument against free will. We all agree that the predetermined concept really means no free will. But let's examine the random part, in case determinism is not real.
2. If something is truly random - say a decision you make - and cannot be explained by determinism, then what caused it? Science cannot explain it. There is no chain of events that led to it. If it cannot be explained, then a random event IS an event of free will. After all, you made the decision. No one else did. That decision was made, it cannot be explained by previous events, so while it could be called random, in actuality it is the very definition of free will we are looking at. The apparent "randomness" and unexplainability of certain decisions implies free will.
On the surface, the argument looks fine. After all, if certain decisions we make are truly random-seeming to the scientifically empirical observer, then sure - free will could be the cause. Of course, it could also be that we do not know how to correctly observe/measure/explain these decisions and they are not random at all. But certainly, free will could be the cause as well. Within the limits of science today, we have to maintain that there is a possibility that there is free will in this scenario. But that's only on the surface of Balaguer's argument. Let's go a little deeper into the logical leap that he makes. To do that let's go back to the original description of the "random-or-predetermined" argument against free will up above, focusing on the quantum physics aspect that opens the door to Balaguer's "randomness" escape clause as opposed to predeterminism.
Quantum physics does not say that events are random, as a blanket statement. It says that at very specific subatomic junctures, there are events which we cannot predict that have a 50% probability of A and a 50% probability of B (simplifying here). Imagine them to be coin flips. The entire concept that something on the macro level like a visible physical movement or a human decision is random has to stem from the chain of subatomic events that add up to that higher-level macro level. Things do not happen randomly at the macro level - there is no macro-level coin flip. At the macro level, Newtonian physics, which are predetermined, rule the earth. But even so, let's go with the idea that the macro-level action is a result of billions of subatomic-level coin flips added up. This is a really important distinction. Balaguer glosses over this point carelessly when he states that if things are "random" then free will is possible. Sure, that might be a possibility, as I describe in the previous paragraph, if things are truly getting coin-flipped at the macro level - but they aren't. They are only getting coin-flipped at the lowest possible level - the subatomic level, a level much beneath our neurons or actions or decisions.
So instead, what Balaguer's is really implying with his "randomness enables the possibility of free will" argument is the following:
1. So far, science cannot explain the randomness of certain subatomic characteristics which appear to be PROBABILISTIC. We don't know what causes them. It could very well be free 2. Our free wills may be able to manipulate billions of heads-or-tails coin flips on the micro level that somehow add up to a decision totally generated from within our wills.
3. In other words, before the decision is ever made, our minds somehow intuitively break randomness and determine the billions of probabilistic dice rolls in exactly such a way so that our final macro-result is the decision that we somehow wanted to make...without knowing we wanted to make it until the billions of deterministic dice rolls added up to that decision. It is a Catch 22. There are so many holes in this argument. Here are just a few:
- In this later chapter, Balaguer assumes randomness means unpredictability. But that is false. These subatomic characteristics are not just unpredictable, they are very predictable. We can always predict they will be A or B, with 50% odds. This is VERY different than saying it can be any number of infinite possibilities with truly random odds that follow no statistical distribution. No - it can only be A or B. But more importantly, we know for a fact that A or B will be rolled equally 50/50. This is a huge point. It means that there IS no free will. We CANNOT determine which 50/50 roll gets rolled, because it is random. And if we were able to, then it would not be 50/50. It would be truly unpredictable probabilistically. Because if I wanted to make the same decision over and over again, I would supposedly be able to make it land on A every time, but in fact, the probabilistic nature tells us it will always be a 50/50 distribution. This kills the notion of free will because by definition, you cannot control an event which has a proven statistical distribution of outcomes. This alone disproves his argument for free will via randomness, but I will keep going and show the other flaws in his argument, though you can stop reading here because nothing else really needs to be said.
- Balaguer does not describe the mechanism through which our minds would control the subatomic randomness, even if that was possible. Do we "make a decision" in our minds (e.g. chocolate over vanilla) first, or do we have to control the subatomic randomness first? It has to be the latter, because by the time we have made the decision in our minds and realized it, we have had to already get the subatomic particles moving in the way we want so that they all add up to the final decision. After all - Balaguer's entire defense of free will is driven by the concept of randomness. And that randomness happens at the subatomic level. We have to start there. So is Balaguer saying that our "free will" is actually our willpower somehow affecting billions of random dice rolls through some kind of intuition that eventually leads to the decision we wanted to make only after we've affected the billions of dice rolls to get there? It seems backwards, and a lot less neat than his superficial approach at explaining how randomness enables free will. How do our subatomic particles know which random way to turn before the thought has even entered our minds to make them turn that way? It is a chicken-or-egg argument that is difficult to argue for.
- Newtonian physics, which are deterministic, still rule the visible world around us. There is no randomness in Newtonian physics. If I drop a book from my hand, there is no "random possibility" that the book will fly into the sky rather than falling straight down. Quantum mechanics only apply at the subatomic level. So the question to answer becomes - at which point does Newtonian physics take over vs. quantum mechanics? Are neurons in our brain governed by Newtonian physics or by quantum physics? To Balaguer's credit, he does explore this last concept, and admits that the answer is inconclusive.
Well, that was the longest review ever, but for a topic as important as free will, I felt that a thorough critique was required. This was a great read, but it's really hard to excuse Balaguer's cavalier approach to linking randomness with free will, since it kind of discredits his entire conclusion.
1. Free will does not exist because the laws of physics are deterministic - everything is caused by a prior action or set of actions.
2. But wait! Quantum physics tells us that certain events are random, at the subatomic level. They are probabilistic - 50% A / 50% B.
3. So Free will can exist right, because things are not necessary completely pre-determined? There is a random element.
4. No - free will still doesn't exist because if things are pre-determined, you have no free will, and if on the other hand things are probabilistic - you still have no free will similar to how you have no free will over a random dice roll. This is the "random-or-predetermined" argument against free will.
Okay, up to this point I am completely on board with what Balaguer is saying. It makes sense. It is hard to refute. Then he makes a logical leap that is really unforgivable. I can't help but feel he does this on purpose, sacrificing his intellectual honesty in order to make a point he desperately wants to make - that free will exists - either for personal reasons or to appeal to his readers. Weak shit, in any case. The logical leap he takes is:
1. So we have the "random-or-predetermined" argument against free will. We all agree that the predetermined concept really means no free will. But let's examine the random part, in case determinism is not real.
2. If something is truly random - say a decision you make - and cannot be explained by determinism, then what caused it? Science cannot explain it. There is no chain of events that led to it. If it cannot be explained, then a random event IS an event of free will. After all, you made the decision. No one else did. That decision was made, it cannot be explained by previous events, so while it could be called random, in actuality it is the very definition of free will we are looking at. The apparent "randomness" and unexplainability of certain decisions implies free will.
On the surface, the argument looks fine. After all, if certain decisions we make are truly random-seeming to the scientifically empirical observer, then sure - free will could be the cause. Of course, it could also be that we do not know how to correctly observe/measure/explain these decisions and they are not random at all. But certainly, free will could be the cause as well. Within the limits of science today, we have to maintain that there is a possibility that there is free will in this scenario. But that's only on the surface of Balaguer's argument. Let's go a little deeper into the logical leap that he makes. To do that let's go back to the original description of the "random-or-predetermined" argument against free will up above, focusing on the quantum physics aspect that opens the door to Balaguer's "randomness" escape clause as opposed to predeterminism.
Quantum physics does not say that events are random, as a blanket statement. It says that at very specific subatomic junctures, there are events which we cannot predict that have a 50% probability of A and a 50% probability of B (simplifying here). Imagine them to be coin flips. The entire concept that something on the macro level like a visible physical movement or a human decision is random has to stem from the chain of subatomic events that add up to that higher-level macro level. Things do not happen randomly at the macro level - there is no macro-level coin flip. At the macro level, Newtonian physics, which are predetermined, rule the earth. But even so, let's go with the idea that the macro-level action is a result of billions of subatomic-level coin flips added up. This is a really important distinction. Balaguer glosses over this point carelessly when he states that if things are "random" then free will is possible. Sure, that might be a possibility, as I describe in the previous paragraph, if things are truly getting coin-flipped at the macro level - but they aren't. They are only getting coin-flipped at the lowest possible level - the subatomic level, a level much beneath our neurons or actions or decisions.
So instead, what Balaguer's is really implying with his "randomness enables the possibility of free will" argument is the following:
1. So far, science cannot explain the randomness of certain subatomic characteristics which appear to be PROBABILISTIC. We don't know what causes them. It could very well be free 2. Our free wills may be able to manipulate billions of heads-or-tails coin flips on the micro level that somehow add up to a decision totally generated from within our wills.
3. In other words, before the decision is ever made, our minds somehow intuitively break randomness and determine the billions of probabilistic dice rolls in exactly such a way so that our final macro-result is the decision that we somehow wanted to make...without knowing we wanted to make it until the billions of deterministic dice rolls added up to that decision. It is a Catch 22. There are so many holes in this argument. Here are just a few:
- In this later chapter, Balaguer assumes randomness means unpredictability. But that is false. These subatomic characteristics are not just unpredictable, they are very predictable. We can always predict they will be A or B, with 50% odds. This is VERY different than saying it can be any number of infinite possibilities with truly random odds that follow no statistical distribution. No - it can only be A or B. But more importantly, we know for a fact that A or B will be rolled equally 50/50. This is a huge point. It means that there IS no free will. We CANNOT determine which 50/50 roll gets rolled, because it is random. And if we were able to, then it would not be 50/50. It would be truly unpredictable probabilistically. Because if I wanted to make the same decision over and over again, I would supposedly be able to make it land on A every time, but in fact, the probabilistic nature tells us it will always be a 50/50 distribution. This kills the notion of free will because by definition, you cannot control an event which has a proven statistical distribution of outcomes. This alone disproves his argument for free will via randomness, but I will keep going and show the other flaws in his argument, though you can stop reading here because nothing else really needs to be said.
- Balaguer does not describe the mechanism through which our minds would control the subatomic randomness, even if that was possible. Do we "make a decision" in our minds (e.g. chocolate over vanilla) first, or do we have to control the subatomic randomness first? It has to be the latter, because by the time we have made the decision in our minds and realized it, we have had to already get the subatomic particles moving in the way we want so that they all add up to the final decision. After all - Balaguer's entire defense of free will is driven by the concept of randomness. And that randomness happens at the subatomic level. We have to start there. So is Balaguer saying that our "free will" is actually our willpower somehow affecting billions of random dice rolls through some kind of intuition that eventually leads to the decision we wanted to make only after we've affected the billions of dice rolls to get there? It seems backwards, and a lot less neat than his superficial approach at explaining how randomness enables free will. How do our subatomic particles know which random way to turn before the thought has even entered our minds to make them turn that way? It is a chicken-or-egg argument that is difficult to argue for.
- Newtonian physics, which are deterministic, still rule the visible world around us. There is no randomness in Newtonian physics. If I drop a book from my hand, there is no "random possibility" that the book will fly into the sky rather than falling straight down. Quantum mechanics only apply at the subatomic level. So the question to answer becomes - at which point does Newtonian physics take over vs. quantum mechanics? Are neurons in our brain governed by Newtonian physics or by quantum physics? To Balaguer's credit, he does explore this last concept, and admits that the answer is inconclusive.
Well, that was the longest review ever, but for a topic as important as free will, I felt that a thorough critique was required. This was a great read, but it's really hard to excuse Balaguer's cavalier approach to linking randomness with free will, since it kind of discredits his entire conclusion.
February 22, 2018
مطالعه بعضی کتابها هشدار به خودمان است، هشدار به اینکه مراقب روند فکر کردنمان باشیم؛ هرچقدر هم باهوش و هرچقدر خبره در نوشتن و شفاف فکر کردن
باهوش ازاین بابت که نویسنده قابلیت باز کردن موضوع مهمی مثل اختیار را دارد و می داند که به مرز کدام حوزه های معرفتی باید وارد شود، و می تواند فهم خودش را به روانی و با پیوستگی کافی بنویسد. تا اینجای کار جمع بندی خوبی فراهم می شود از اینکه مسئله را می توان به لحاظ علمی یا مذهبی یا فلسفی نگریست. اما مشکل از جایی شروع می شود که برای رسیدن به نتیجه گیری های خودمان چطور با رویکردهای دیگر برخورد می کنیم. مثلا نویسنده تمام نظریات فلسفی پیرامون بحث اختیار را به مبحث سازگاری جبر و اراده آزاد هیوم تقلیل میدهد و با نقد این دیدگاه، پرونده فلسفه را می بندد! و بعد با تقلیل کل دیدگاههای مذهبی به دو فرضیه درباره وجود روح، و نقد فرضیات خودش، جا را برای بحث بییشتر تنگ می کند. سطح گزارهای مطرح شده هم در این حد است که مثلا در اواخر کتاب می گوید: "اگر ما روحی غیرمادی داریم، پس چرا اصلا به مغزی احتیاج داریم تا فعالیت های ذهنی ما را انجام دهد؟" این گونه تنها فقط جا برای بحث در حوزه علم باقی می ماند
اما در این حوزه هم روش کار نویسنده تفاوت خاصی ندارد و با اینکه تخصصش در حوزه فلسفه است، و این تعجب مرا بیشتر می کند که چرا در بحث فلسفه این قدر ساده مسئله را کنار می گذارد، تنها دو آزمایش مورد استناد اتئیست ها را مطرح و سپس با ارجاع به اصل مقالات مربوط به این دو آزمایش و تفسیری متفاوت از شرایط آزمایش و نتایج آنها، پرونده این مباحث را هم می بندد. در نهایت می گوید که بر این اساس ما می دانیم که انتقادها به عدم وجود اختیار وارد نیستند و البته ما نمی توانیم آن را اثبات کنیم. اما اذعان می کند که مسئله وجود اختیار، مسئله ای کاملا علمی و در قلمرو حوزه علمی نوپای نوروساینس است! "واقعیت این است که پرسش از اختیار، سوالی بسیار دشوار درباره علت یابی رخدادهای عصبی مشخص است". این گونه است که وقتی رویکرد نویسنده در رد دیدگاههای متفاوت با دیدگاه مدنظر خودش را می بینیم، اعتمادمان حتی به دیدگاههای مورد تائیدش و نظریه شخصی خودش نیز کمرنگ می شود و ورود به چنین مباحثی نیاز به سیر منطقی محکم تر و شواهد مورد قبول تری دارد
باهوش ازاین بابت که نویسنده قابلیت باز کردن موضوع مهمی مثل اختیار را دارد و می داند که به مرز کدام حوزه های معرفتی باید وارد شود، و می تواند فهم خودش را به روانی و با پیوستگی کافی بنویسد. تا اینجای کار جمع بندی خوبی فراهم می شود از اینکه مسئله را می توان به لحاظ علمی یا مذهبی یا فلسفی نگریست. اما مشکل از جایی شروع می شود که برای رسیدن به نتیجه گیری های خودمان چطور با رویکردهای دیگر برخورد می کنیم. مثلا نویسنده تمام نظریات فلسفی پیرامون بحث اختیار را به مبحث سازگاری جبر و اراده آزاد هیوم تقلیل میدهد و با نقد این دیدگاه، پرونده فلسفه را می بندد! و بعد با تقلیل کل دیدگاههای مذهبی به دو فرضیه درباره وجود روح، و نقد فرضیات خودش، جا را برای بحث بییشتر تنگ می کند. سطح گزارهای مطرح شده هم در این حد است که مثلا در اواخر کتاب می گوید: "اگر ما روحی غیرمادی داریم، پس چرا اصلا به مغزی احتیاج داریم تا فعالیت های ذهنی ما را انجام دهد؟" این گونه تنها فقط جا برای بحث در حوزه علم باقی می ماند
اما در این حوزه هم روش کار نویسنده تفاوت خاصی ندارد و با اینکه تخصصش در حوزه فلسفه است، و این تعجب مرا بیشتر می کند که چرا در بحث فلسفه این قدر ساده مسئله را کنار می گذارد، تنها دو آزمایش مورد استناد اتئیست ها را مطرح و سپس با ارجاع به اصل مقالات مربوط به این دو آزمایش و تفسیری متفاوت از شرایط آزمایش و نتایج آنها، پرونده این مباحث را هم می بندد. در نهایت می گوید که بر این اساس ما می دانیم که انتقادها به عدم وجود اختیار وارد نیستند و البته ما نمی توانیم آن را اثبات کنیم. اما اذعان می کند که مسئله وجود اختیار، مسئله ای کاملا علمی و در قلمرو حوزه علمی نوپای نوروساینس است! "واقعیت این است که پرسش از اختیار، سوالی بسیار دشوار درباره علت یابی رخدادهای عصبی مشخص است". این گونه است که وقتی رویکرد نویسنده در رد دیدگاههای متفاوت با دیدگاه مدنظر خودش را می بینیم، اعتمادمان حتی به دیدگاههای مورد تائیدش و نظریه شخصی خودش نیز کمرنگ می شود و ورود به چنین مباحثی نیاز به سیر منطقی محکم تر و شواهد مورد قبول تری دارد
February 13, 2019
These MIT Essential Knowledge books really make it easy for people like to me to pretend to know things.
August 21, 2022
Great intro to the topic and summary of opposing views. Grateful Balaguer included helpful arguments for those of religious persuasion, although as one who believes in souls, I hope someday he reconsiders this subject.
Full review on my blog: https://classicsconsidered.com/2022/0...
Full review on my blog: https://classicsconsidered.com/2022/0...
April 4, 2014
Great introduction to the issues surrounding the free will debate in the popular literature (e.g. Sam Harris's book). Balaguer does a great job of showing how the philosophical argument against the coherence of libertarian free will isn't the knock-down objection many assume it to be. A discussion of the supposed empirical case against L-free will is also considered, and ultimately shown that the empirical data neither confirm nor falsify L-freedom.
This book is a fantastic alternative to the conceptually confused books on free will being churned out in the popular press. Balaguer has produced an easy to read introduction to a very confused area of metaphysics which presupposes no prior engagement with any philosophical literature.
This book is a fantastic alternative to the conceptually confused books on free will being churned out in the popular press. Balaguer has produced an easy to read introduction to a very confused area of metaphysics which presupposes no prior engagement with any philosophical literature.
March 12, 2023
Content is OK but Balaguer uses way too many italics. So many italics!
September 16, 2018
This bounced around in argumentation a bit too much, making it read like the kind of discussion you'd have with some friends in the dorm who happened to be taking a philosophy class from a fun teacher. I found this easy to read, and written in a light, conversational way, but not so easy to follow on audio. It requires continuous attention to catch all the arguments and counterarguments offered. Quite a few times, given lapses in attention, the arguments seemed to say something is x because it is x, which wasn't very satisfying or memorable. I will chalk this one up to learning how these MIT books work, and will look forward to the next one with some different expectations.
June 5, 2023
Do we have free will? What is free will? How can we prove (or disprove) the debate on free will? Mark Balaguer touches on all of these questions in this book.
I became interested in the argument for free will after a series of conversations with an old friend. She is a hard determinist turned necessitarian who believes that free will is a fluke. I am a deeply spiritual person who believed that we have free will completely. So obviously, to understand my friend’s point of view more, I bought this concise yet comprehensive book.
Balaguer does a wonderful job of explaining the tricky concept of free will & its main arguments within 122 pages. He discusses the main arguments for & against whether or not we have free will & points out their faults.
His conclusion? There is not enough evidence either way to have a conclusive & scientifically sound argument. This is a topic that we, the human race, must be skeptical about & constantly question (though he does say that “enemies of free will” are much more stubborn with their beliefs, which to me checks out)
My conclusion? I think that there is free will but not everywhere. I am not actively & consciously choosing to type each button free of any predetermined cause— I want to convey a specific message which includes certain words, therefore I am spelling it out so my audience can understand. But I choose what words I want to say, I choose my larger actions & paths.
I would recommend this book to anyone who wants to more about the arguments of free will & for those who have an open mind to the world of free will possibilities!!
I became interested in the argument for free will after a series of conversations with an old friend. She is a hard determinist turned necessitarian who believes that free will is a fluke. I am a deeply spiritual person who believed that we have free will completely. So obviously, to understand my friend’s point of view more, I bought this concise yet comprehensive book.
Balaguer does a wonderful job of explaining the tricky concept of free will & its main arguments within 122 pages. He discusses the main arguments for & against whether or not we have free will & points out their faults.
His conclusion? There is not enough evidence either way to have a conclusive & scientifically sound argument. This is a topic that we, the human race, must be skeptical about & constantly question (though he does say that “enemies of free will” are much more stubborn with their beliefs, which to me checks out)
My conclusion? I think that there is free will but not everywhere. I am not actively & consciously choosing to type each button free of any predetermined cause— I want to convey a specific message which includes certain words, therefore I am spelling it out so my audience can understand. But I choose what words I want to say, I choose my larger actions & paths.
I would recommend this book to anyone who wants to more about the arguments of free will & for those who have an open mind to the world of free will possibilities!!
June 11, 2017
In terms of making you think, this book is good enough. It does have a good compilation of arguments on free will (mostly against), and does a good job at refuting them (some better than others). But overall, the book seems like the author was missing enough material, so he repeats himself a lot. I would dare say that all he says would have been said in a third of the book, without the repetition. But that's not all. It devotes some pages to the spiritual/religious view, and in the end dismisses it in a single paragraph that he gives just as "food for thought". Given that he is brave enough to conclude that we should recognize when we are ignorant, and not pretend not to be, it surprises me that he goes so light on the spiritual/religious view; he is mainly pushing his own beliefs forward, without recognizing that such a view is just something else where there isn't conclusive evidence to proof anything (I'm not saying either that a soul exists). In doing so, he undermines his very own and valid point, and deprives the book from being more important.
December 22, 2023
This book approaches an analysis and certain refutation of assertions against the existence of Free Will in humans on psychological, scientific, and philosophical grounds among others. The book is presented in a very plain-spoken and jargon-free way that makes this book very beginner friendly and easy to grasp and understand. Also included at the end of the book is a helpful glossary of the terms use their in. Definitely recommended for anyone who's interested in getting a start towards understanding the arguments against free will along with their weaknesses.
That said, the book does not so much argue that we have free will but that we must remain skeptical of those who make overarching statements for or against its existence.
That said, the book does not so much argue that we have free will but that we must remain skeptical of those who make overarching statements for or against its existence.
May 4, 2015
Maybe 2.5 stars. If it didn't have several cringe-worthy attempts at humor I would have liked it more. Balaguer makes the case that the question of free will is a scientifically open one- but he is unconvincing. The main weakness is in his discussion of quantum mechanics. He conflates random events with uncaused events. Does an electron "decide" which slit to pass thru? I doubt it... Free will may be an open question- but not nearly as open as Balaguer would like to think. Why favor the positive hypothesis over the negative when everything (besides our subjective experiences) points to the lack of libertarian (non-predetermined) free will? I see no reason....
January 25, 2020
Written in a very engaging style, the book is a pleasure to read. It makes the concept of free will very accessible. However, it invokes antiquated ideas of determinism, and free will is very narrowly defined as a conscious, “torn” decision.
On pages 25-27, the author distinguishes between two kinds of causation, deterministic and probabilistic, leading two three types of decision: (1) completely caused, (2) completely uncaused, or (3) partially caused and partially uncaused (together probabilistically caused) by prior events. He then says that “the enemies of free will” consider the three types of decisions as either predetermined, random, or some of both, and therefore are not free.
In a very light-hearted manner (pages 58-69), he tries to identify when we would want free will. He dismisses actions and thoughts, appealing to the multitude of unconscious actions we do through the day and the unconscious, seemingly spontaneous, origin of thoughts. I am not sure why he thinks it must be all-or-none, why we couldn’t be conscious of and exert free will for some of our actions and thoughts. He insists that the only times when it makes sense to exercise free will are when we make certain conscious (“torn”) decisions that you care about:
'A torn decision is “when we’re in situations where we’re confronted with multiple options that seem equally good to us, and we stop and think for at least a brief moment about what we should do, and then we settle the matter with a conscious choosing. That’s it. We don’t exercise free will (and we don’t need to or want to) at any other time.”'
What about multiple options that are not equally good but still demand conscious deliberation. Examples include when we wish to (1) shake up our state, (2) experiment with uncharacteristic decision-making processes, (3) accept unlikely scenarios to delude oneself or instill new habits, (4) expose problems of dealing with states of confusion, conflicting stimuli, or conflicting accounts, or (5) to enact others’ advice against our own judgment?
And if the decision is made while torn, is the decision truly what we want (this is in regard to Hume’s notion of free will as roughly “nothing stopping me from doing what I want”)?
The author then distinguishes between four types of randomness (pages 72-75):
1. Unpredictable
2. Uncaused (just “happens”)
3. Arbitrary (without reason)
4. Not me / not my decision (happened to me)
He points to #4 as the type of randomness implicated in free will:
“For a decision to be the product of my free will, it can’t be that the decision just happened to me. It has to be that I made the decision. In other words, the decision has to be mine. I have to have been the author of the decision.
...
In other words, it needs to be the case that (a) I did it, and (b) nothing made me do it.”
On pages 97-119, the author provides compelling alternative hypotheses to counter the claims that Libet’s or Haynes’s studies refute free will, and on pages 122-126, he outlines what he believes would be required for science to refute free will: find the neural events corresponding to the chosen option of a torn decision, and “find evidence for the claim that at least sometimes, nothing causes them to be chosen.” Science, however, is in the business of testing falsifiable hypotheses, and this is much more tractable when you must show evidence for the existence of something to falsify a hypothesis than when you must show evidence for the absence of anything, including unknown factors, so a very high bar!
Given that the author takes the side of fighting “the enemies of free will” throughout the book and appeals to our strong desire to have free will, I’m not convinced that we should be consoled by the concept of uncaused, spontaneous (neural) events influencing impulsive (“torn”) decisions as the basis for conscious, non-predetermined free will. Does random definition #4 (it happened to me) confer any less autonomy or agency than the other forms of randomness?
In addition to narrowly defining free will as a particular type of decision, he also makes the assumptions that one must be conscious when engaging in an act of free will, and seems to be making the assumption that free will is either “on” or “off”, as opposed to a graded phenomenon or faculty.
My friend offers the following criticisms:
1. Virtually all the logical arguments based on determinism use a model of physics that has long since been disproven. If we could magically take the same exact universe and run it twice, we’d get divergences. Run it long enough, we can no longer predict those divergences. The real physical universe is not a billiard table.
2. Much of his argumentation uses persuasive rhetoric to exclude viable options. For example, I believe that much of our “choice” involves selecting among options that are presented to us by our subconscious. But that immediately gets discarded as not a “valid” choice, or not the “kind” we are interested in. He also uses fallacious “all-or-nothing” categorization to exclude viable approaches and situations.
3. Last but not least, the philosophical arguments nit-pick instead of follow the evidence. As scientists, we should be trying to describe and model the phenomena as it actually exists and expresses itself, not how we logically or emotionally want it to come out.
On pages 25-27, the author distinguishes between two kinds of causation, deterministic and probabilistic, leading two three types of decision: (1) completely caused, (2) completely uncaused, or (3) partially caused and partially uncaused (together probabilistically caused) by prior events. He then says that “the enemies of free will” consider the three types of decisions as either predetermined, random, or some of both, and therefore are not free.
In a very light-hearted manner (pages 58-69), he tries to identify when we would want free will. He dismisses actions and thoughts, appealing to the multitude of unconscious actions we do through the day and the unconscious, seemingly spontaneous, origin of thoughts. I am not sure why he thinks it must be all-or-none, why we couldn’t be conscious of and exert free will for some of our actions and thoughts. He insists that the only times when it makes sense to exercise free will are when we make certain conscious (“torn”) decisions that you care about:
'A torn decision is “when we’re in situations where we’re confronted with multiple options that seem equally good to us, and we stop and think for at least a brief moment about what we should do, and then we settle the matter with a conscious choosing. That’s it. We don’t exercise free will (and we don’t need to or want to) at any other time.”'
What about multiple options that are not equally good but still demand conscious deliberation. Examples include when we wish to (1) shake up our state, (2) experiment with uncharacteristic decision-making processes, (3) accept unlikely scenarios to delude oneself or instill new habits, (4) expose problems of dealing with states of confusion, conflicting stimuli, or conflicting accounts, or (5) to enact others’ advice against our own judgment?
And if the decision is made while torn, is the decision truly what we want (this is in regard to Hume’s notion of free will as roughly “nothing stopping me from doing what I want”)?
The author then distinguishes between four types of randomness (pages 72-75):
1. Unpredictable
2. Uncaused (just “happens”)
3. Arbitrary (without reason)
4. Not me / not my decision (happened to me)
He points to #4 as the type of randomness implicated in free will:
“For a decision to be the product of my free will, it can’t be that the decision just happened to me. It has to be that I made the decision. In other words, the decision has to be mine. I have to have been the author of the decision.
...
In other words, it needs to be the case that (a) I did it, and (b) nothing made me do it.”
On pages 97-119, the author provides compelling alternative hypotheses to counter the claims that Libet’s or Haynes’s studies refute free will, and on pages 122-126, he outlines what he believes would be required for science to refute free will: find the neural events corresponding to the chosen option of a torn decision, and “find evidence for the claim that at least sometimes, nothing causes them to be chosen.” Science, however, is in the business of testing falsifiable hypotheses, and this is much more tractable when you must show evidence for the existence of something to falsify a hypothesis than when you must show evidence for the absence of anything, including unknown factors, so a very high bar!
Given that the author takes the side of fighting “the enemies of free will” throughout the book and appeals to our strong desire to have free will, I’m not convinced that we should be consoled by the concept of uncaused, spontaneous (neural) events influencing impulsive (“torn”) decisions as the basis for conscious, non-predetermined free will. Does random definition #4 (it happened to me) confer any less autonomy or agency than the other forms of randomness?
In addition to narrowly defining free will as a particular type of decision, he also makes the assumptions that one must be conscious when engaging in an act of free will, and seems to be making the assumption that free will is either “on” or “off”, as opposed to a graded phenomenon or faculty.
My friend offers the following criticisms:
1. Virtually all the logical arguments based on determinism use a model of physics that has long since been disproven. If we could magically take the same exact universe and run it twice, we’d get divergences. Run it long enough, we can no longer predict those divergences. The real physical universe is not a billiard table.
2. Much of his argumentation uses persuasive rhetoric to exclude viable options. For example, I believe that much of our “choice” involves selecting among options that are presented to us by our subconscious. But that immediately gets discarded as not a “valid” choice, or not the “kind” we are interested in. He also uses fallacious “all-or-nothing” categorization to exclude viable approaches and situations.
3. Last but not least, the philosophical arguments nit-pick instead of follow the evidence. As scientists, we should be trying to describe and model the phenomena as it actually exists and expresses itself, not how we logically or emotionally want it to come out.
August 29, 2024
A fantastic book that attempts to counter some of the arguments in the "no free will" camp (and succeeds in my opinion) without trying to shove the existence of free will down your throat. Also, it made me chuckle a few times so that's definitely a plus.
December 11, 2019
Вече съм напълно убеден, че тва като цяло е една от най-тъпите теми по които човек може да реши да си загуби времето.
February 27, 2020
This may be a decent intro for anyone completely unfamiliar with the free will debate as he presents some concepts in a clear way. However I think there are some major flaws in his logic. The biggest one for me was when he said that unconscious neural events are conscious decisions. He never really goes on to defend this position and uses this to try and say that this disproves the argument against free will. Neural events happen at an unconscious level, so I don’t see how he can call this a conscious decision, especially as he doesn’t back that up. He calls the neural event a “you choosing moment”, but never describes what he means by “you” or “I” or “me”. To be fair, the point of this book is not to discuss what consciousness is or means. But it’s relevant to the free will discussion so touching on it would have been helpful.
I lean towards the “there is no free will” side and wanted to read something from another point of view to see if there were compelling arguments for free will. This book doesn’t manage to present any. The author tries to say that the debate is undecided and there is no proof either way, but you can tell that he’s pro free will.
The tone of the book also put me off. It’s too folksy and overly familiar.
If you’re looking for a good intro to the free will debate then pick up Sam Harris’ Free Will. Harris is firmly in the there is no free will camp, but his book is explains the ideas surrounding the debate better than this one does.
I lean towards the “there is no free will” side and wanted to read something from another point of view to see if there were compelling arguments for free will. This book doesn’t manage to present any. The author tries to say that the debate is undecided and there is no proof either way, but you can tell that he’s pro free will.
The tone of the book also put me off. It’s too folksy and overly familiar.
If you’re looking for a good intro to the free will debate then pick up Sam Harris’ Free Will. Harris is firmly in the there is no free will camp, but his book is explains the ideas surrounding the debate better than this one does.
July 1, 2019
Upon a second read, took a star away from my previous rating. I think it's probably the best steelman against the scientific arguments against free will, but Chapter 6, in attempting to counter the philosophical case against free will, this book seems to fall short. It lacks a sufficient investigation as what it means for there to exist 'uncaused choices/actions', and relies on a borderline equivocation to render the argument against free will invalid. The author also seems to act fast and loose with the idea of scientific materialism and so forth, avoids considering of consciousness and a non-causal epiphenomenon, and assumes that conscious experience can indeed behave as a causal agent in the physical universe. Original review in quotations below.
"It's probably going to be the best case you're going to here against that claim that we can confidently say we don't have free will. It covers the positions, including the important but generally irrelevant one of compatibilism, and provides a fairly clear summary of the various arguments for and against the standard notion of free will.
In the end, it still seems to fall short and make unfalsifiable claims as to what free will entails, and therefore is misled in the final conclusion. But nonetheless, it's an important book for all sides to have a read through."
"It's probably going to be the best case you're going to here against that claim that we can confidently say we don't have free will. It covers the positions, including the important but generally irrelevant one of compatibilism, and provides a fairly clear summary of the various arguments for and against the standard notion of free will.
In the end, it still seems to fall short and make unfalsifiable claims as to what free will entails, and therefore is misled in the final conclusion. But nonetheless, it's an important book for all sides to have a read through."
April 9, 2016
Okay arguments/discussions about whether we have free will. This book was supposed to be a somewhat unbiased view of whether the current experts are right or wrong about whether or not we have free will. As as eventually pointed out, all evidence to date, including this book, is/was subject to human interpretation. As such, one cannot make a fully informed decision about any of it. I will say that I believe we aren't there yet. There's just not enough knowledge on the human brain to make absolute determinations about a question concerning free will. Personally, I will continue to believe in a Higher Power, that God knows all & that each and every person on earth has a non-physical soul.
September 8, 2016
A short introductory text that does an incredible job clarifying the free will/determinism debate. The author takes great care unpacking what is meant by free will, randomness and determinism. The author's goal is to take down two arguments against free will: 1) the philosophical argument which argues that free will is impossible and 2) the scientific argument which provides empirical evidence stating that we cannot have free will. On both counts the author is very successful. I'd outline the arguments, but I want the readers to follow the logic. This book is highly recommended.
June 9, 2017
Mark Balaguer's approach to the subject is a terrific breath of fresh air, after having also finished Peter Tse's book on the subject. His conversational approach, and casual use of pub language, really made this book a joy to read. More importantly, Balaguer does a masterful job of distilling the basic conflict into digestible, "commonsense" terms, without stripping away so much of the important detail that we aren't talking about the same thing anymore. For anyone looking for a fantastic introduction to the subject, in a modern context, could do much worse than this book.
August 20, 2020
This was an interesting account of free will. Most authors spend their time in a pissing contest of compatibilism, it's nice to see the modern landscape of free will laid out this way instead of just rehashing crusty old arguments. On top of that the work done to make the content interesting and engaging, while providing background on psychology, neuroscience and theology is impressive. I would highly recommend reading this book if you are interested in ethical philosophy, consciousness or just the main topic of free will itself.
December 16, 2022
Balaguer says early on that the type of free will justified by Hume's argument isn't a kind of free will any humans are seriously worried about having or not having.
I'm not sure the type of free will that Balaguer's argument allegedly justifies is much more valuable. I'll probably reread this again someday. Free will always seems critically related to debates re identity/self. Since that latter dogs me, so does the former.
I'm not sure the type of free will that Balaguer's argument allegedly justifies is much more valuable. I'll probably reread this again someday. Free will always seems critically related to debates re identity/self. Since that latter dogs me, so does the former.
June 2, 2018
I almost finished this book, but disliked it enough that I did not make it to the end. (Also, it was an e-book, a format that I find difficult to deal with.)
Why is the concept of "free will" worth "saving?" What value does it have? What difference does it make whether we "have it" or not?
Balaguer reserves it for "torn decisions," which for me implies one doesn't have any will at all. At that point, what is left but to flip a coin?
Why is the concept of "free will" worth "saving?" What value does it have? What difference does it make whether we "have it" or not?
Balaguer reserves it for "torn decisions," which for me implies one doesn't have any will at all. At that point, what is left but to flip a coin?
November 12, 2021
I remain skeptical and unconvinced :D
Just a thought: If the universe is deterministic, then the belief that we have or not have free will is deterministic as well. If and when we do find evidence of one or the other, aren't we still in the same system which we now believe but cannot change by will.
Simply put, aren't we just confirming beliefs to make reality and nothing else. There is, was and will be nothing else.
Just a thought: If the universe is deterministic, then the belief that we have or not have free will is deterministic as well. If and when we do find evidence of one or the other, aren't we still in the same system which we now believe but cannot change by will.
Simply put, aren't we just confirming beliefs to make reality and nothing else. There is, was and will be nothing else.
June 26, 2022
Rather dismissive of compatibilism, but has made me rethink compatibilism too, perhaps *it* is rather dismissive of the real free will problem; perhaps it simply isn't what is relevant or is interesting to the issue. Favours a libertarian or non-pre-determined sense of free will. Considers it an open empirical scientific question and thus because current arguments for and against free will are weak, favours agnosticism.
April 1, 2014
An interesting read, but also one where you will find yourself re-reading sentences a few times!
Obviously simplified, but comprehensive enough to feel you have been given a decent review and critique of the arguments discussed.
This book isn't really designed to lead you to specific conclusion, but aims to inform you well enough to form your own opinion.
Obviously simplified, but comprehensive enough to feel you have been given a decent review and critique of the arguments discussed.
This book isn't really designed to lead you to specific conclusion, but aims to inform you well enough to form your own opinion.
September 17, 2014
I am reluctant to give this book five stars because really it is an introductory text that examines where we are now with the argument of free will and what science can say about it. But it really is that fantastic! Balaguer focuses not on what we know about free will but what some claim to know that he really thinks they do not.
December 29, 2017
It was a good run through of current beliefs on freewill, but, I thought it needed to be more thorough at some points in the book with regards to defining randomness. The majority of the book made perfect sense though since the book wasn't intended to be extremely difficult to understand. I read it in a few hours and free will is a cool topic so I'm def glad I read the book.
January 29, 2019
Author’s sticky, folksy style makes for a read too painful to finish. The content is anyway questionable since the author states early on that there is no scientific data suggestive of a lack of free will, but in fact that data readily exists, as for example described in Sam Harris’ book with the same title.
November 5, 2019
A clear, concise primer on the basic arguments of the free will debate. Ironically, I'm left with an impression of how tenuous the argument for free will is despite the position and efforts of the author. He waits until the end to explain what should be obvious from the start: there is no materialistic argument FOR free will, only arguments to deploy against the no-free-will believers.
May 11, 2021
Great intro, and more
Really solid introduction to the problem. Touching on all the big ideas. In particular a detailed refutation of fatuous denials based on simplistic interpretations of the Libet experiments and similar experiments. Well worth a careful read.
Really solid introduction to the problem. Touching on all the big ideas. In particular a detailed refutation of fatuous denials based on simplistic interpretations of the Libet experiments and similar experiments. Well worth a careful read.
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