Why Peacekeeping Fails

by Dennis C. Jett

Dennis C. Jett examines why peacekeeping operations fail by comparing the unsuccessful attempt at peacekeeping in Angola with the successful effort in Mozambique, alongside a wide range of other peacekeeping experiences. The book argues that while the causes of past peacekeeping failures can be identified, the chances for success will be difficult to improve because of the way such operations are initiated and conducted, and the way the United Nations operates as an organization. Jett reviews the history of peacekeeping and the evolution in the number, size, scope, and cost of peacekeeping missions. He also explains why peacekeeping has become more necessary, possible, and desired and yet, at the same time, more complex, more difficult, and less frequently used. The book takes a hard look at the UN's actions and provides useful information for understanding current conflicts.

254 pages, Paperback

First published March 2, 2000

Reviews

[Greg · Rating 4 out of 5]

Jett wrote one of the best qualitative studies of peacekeeping effectiveness. It is well organized and defensible in its conclusions. He selected two cases of multi-dimmensional peacekeeping similar in many respects (decades long civil wars, super powers intervening on both sides, and lusophone countries) and deduces why one failed (UNAVEM II in Angola) and one succeeded (ONUMOZ in Mozambique).

While some reasons for the success of ONUMOZ were particular, such as a famine and withdrawal of South African support after the Apartheid regime fell, which forced the Renamo rebellion to agree to demobilize, he mainly highlights the following for success: large deployments to increase security (ONUMOZ was a huge armed peacekeeper deployment, UNAVEM II was a small unarmed observer mission), super power support for the peace settlement (which withdrew external support for the conflicting parties), and skilled Special Representatives of the Secretary General running the operations. Angola was run by a British UN bureaucrat who was a lifer and peter principled into position, who Jett describes as a spectator to events, whereas Mozambique was run by a stilled politician tapped to run it, who was skilled at negotiating a successful outcome and adapting to conditions on the ground rather than taking orders from UN headquarters in New York. That last aspect was highlighted as well in the case study done by Lise Howard in UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars.