“The debate about Dr Richard Beeching will rage until the Second Coming – and probably beyond. But in Charles Loft’s careful examination of the Beeching Report , we have as fine a study as we are going to possess in the meantime.” – Peter Hennessy “Loft’s great strength is his judiciousness. He understands the political processes and assesses them fair-mindedly. And his verdict will, I suspect, hold up better than any of Beeching’s judgements.” – Matthew Engel, Financial Times “Prepare to be impressed, shocked and saddened … This is undoubtedly one of the best books of the year – a riveting read.” – Railways Illustrated “Lucid, to the point, thought-provoking at every turn, Last Trains is a volume that everyone should read before making judgements about the rail closures of the Sixties.” – Heritage Railway “Thoughtful and well-researched analysis.” – Edinburgh Evening News *** During the course of the 1950s England lost confidence in its rulers and convinced itself it must modernise. The failing steam-powered local railways, run by Colonel Blimp, symbolised everything that was wrong with the country – surely the future lay in motorways and high-speed express trains? Along came Dr Beeching with his diagnosis, and suddenly branch-line Britain was gone for ever. The debate about the Beeching cuts has raged ever since. In this superbly researched examination, Charles Loft exposes the political failures that bankrupted the railways and lays bare the increasing alienation of bureaucrats from the public they were trying to serve. The result is a fascinating study of a nation grappling to come to terms with modernity.
A dose of salts if you subscribe to the conventional latter day view that Beeching was a heartless bureaucrat and Marples a shameless crook, or have any rose-tinted affection for outdated and barely used, hopelessly unremunerative branch lines. The economic & policy arguments are perhaps a little recondite and hard to grasp for the layman, whereas the descriptions of the lines and places in question make a welcome enough change in tone for one to wish there were more of them.
Basically puts the Beeching cuts down to the need to do SOMETHING after a decade of the railways losing ridiculous amounts of money and where many lines were of very limited value even including other social value. A few lines were probably not ideal to close but the planning, forecasting and accounting ability of the railways was very limited and it was hard to foresee some of the trends that would make them viable again. Focuses mostly on the political and economic aspects with the social stuff being very much secondary which makes the title a little misleading but with that caveat it's a well written narrative, although I'd have appreciated a few maps heh.
One thing that cropped up a few times was the total lack of co-ordination between road and rail. The Tories privatising road haulage etc in the 50s obviously hampered this significantly but it's mentioned that eg nobody on the rail side had any idea that the M25/26 was being planned along the path of the Westerham branch. This also led to rail replacement buses being useless because they just went from former station locations, which were generally in inconvenient places. There was also a failure to get to grips with the cost of roads - eg mention that one thing Beeching was wanting looked at when he left was increased taxes for heavy lorries because they weren't paying their way - apparently a concern shared at the treasury but never with any progress (In this case there's a suggestion one reason he left was because of his views on this conflicting with a TGWU official in the cabinet who were very supportive of road haulage).
The author doesn't consider anti rail bias as playing a significant role in the cuts. He points out motorways were promised by the Labour government in 1945 and the first finally opened in 1958 - if roads were seen as #1 priority more money would probably have been shifted from the hugely loss making railways. The assumption that rail was just going to continue to decline was simply based on the trends of the post war decades which saw a massive shift. It's important to view a lot of the switch to the car in this light, I think - it wasn't that it was being *forced* by the government, they were reacting to an incredibly strong trend that had alarming implications for congestion etc. There was no obvious reason to assume the trend would suddenly stop and people would switch back to less convenient trains (and this would certainly be true in rural areas where stations were inconvenient etc). From this perspective ideas like knocking down half of London to build the ringways seem due less to an infatuation with the car from planners and more fear of its effects. It's also worth linking this to assumptions made by railway planners - they didn't know what was being planned for road building but given the growth they assumed that most places which had road troubles would inevitably get theirs upgraded due to public demand and therefore it was safe to mark lines for closure.
As both a rail enthusiast and professional, I've long been aware that the current rail network was more or less completely defined by the closures proposed by Beeching in the sixties. I've also long suspected that the anger and rage some people still feel towards him is misplaced and unhelpful, and that the views of his opponents were and are frequently unrealistic.
This book has reinforced those views, and convinced me that any mistakes made during that era were cock-up rather than conspiracy. The simple fact is that something had to be done to stem the railway's losses, and if it had been left any longer, the consequences would probably have been far worse.
The author does a very good job of putting Beeching into context, describing the problems that BR failed to get to grips with in their early years, and the political climate at the time. Ultimately he argues that there were no easy solutions, and balances had to be struck in a rapidly changing world where demand for cars was rapidly increasing.
A very detailed yet accessible and readable account of a controversial and significant era in British social and political history. Highly recommended.
A good account of the Beeching era cuts. This book concentrates on the political aspects of the rail closures and consequently there is a lot of detail of the political wranglings that went on at the time. Frankly that was a bit too in-depth for me and I would have preferred more emphasis on the social consequences. Having said that, it does explain well the background to the Beeching cuts and the book has made me change my mind somewhat. I was a confirmed Beeching hater but I see that somebody had to do something to stem the losses the railways were incurring and as the saying goes - "cometh the hour, cometh the man". All in all, a valuable contribution to the debate on this topic.
I am not a huge train enthusiast though my family are. I picked this book up as it sounded interesting which it was. A good attempt at explaining all the politics that affected how the trains were run around the time of Beeching. Sometimes became a bit unclear with all the names and acronyms. Also not surprisingly assumes you are interested in trains and that you have some knowledge of all the routes it describes.
This is a very detailed account of the Beaching report, it explains the motives behind it and places it in context with the political event of the time. The examples used are contemporary and easy to understand. However, I found the content of the book heavy going, it is very much a book you dip in and out of as opposed to a continuous read.
This is an excellent account of the decline of Britain's railways, and explodes a few myths along the way. There never really was a 'golden age' of rail; even at it's height - in terms of usage - very few railways ever made money. The second world war put enormous pressure on the system, and left it virtually in ruins. The nationalisation which followed had good ntentions, but none of the tough decisions were taken. The system should have been rationalised (there were many examples of duplication which survived for decades) and massive investment was required to repair the ravages of wartime. But there was no political will to do any of this, and the system was left to flounder. Various programs of closure followed - of which Dr Beeching's was just one - but they were always resisted by vested interests, unions, or government wrangling. The author uses a few individual cases to show how impossible it was to make the changes needed, and the inevitable problems of being a political football. Britain has never decided whether the railways are a business or an inherent part of our infrastructure which requires public funding, it is interesting to note that although our railways are now privatised, they probably receive greater public subsidy now than ever before. This book gives a sober, dispassionate account of a subject which can stir many passions. Ultimately, we got the railway we were prepared to pay for.
I found this quite hard-going. Rather fuller of the details of rail policy in the 1950s and 1960s than I had expected. But balanced views of an emotive issue and well researched.