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The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order
It was 2004, and Sean McFate had a mission in Burundi: to keep the president alive and prevent the country from spiraling into genocide, without anyone knowing that the United States was involved. The United States was, of course, involved but only through McFate's employer, the military contractor DynCorp International.
Throughout the world, similar scenarios are playing out daily. The United States can no longer go to war without contractors. Yet we don't know much about the industry's structure, its operations, or where it's heading. Typically led by ex-military men, contractor firms are by their very nature secretive. Even the U.S. government - the entity that actually pays them - knows relatively little.
In The Modern Mercenary, Sean McFate lays bare this opaque world, explaining the economic structure of the industry and showing in detail how firms operate on the ground. A former U.S. Army paratrooper and private military contractor, McFate provides an unparalleled perspective into the nuts and bolts of the industry, as well as a sobering prognosis for the future of war. While at present, the U.S. government and U.S. firms dominate the market, private military companies are emerging from other countries, and warlords and militias have restyled themselves as private security companies in places like Afghanistan and Somalia.
To understand how the proliferation of private forces may influence international relations, McFate looks back to the European Middle Ages, when mercenaries were common and contract warfare the norm. He concludes that international relations in the twenty-first century may have more in common with the twelfth century than the twentieth. This back-to-the-future situation, which he calls neo-medievalism, is not necessarily a negative condition, but it will produce a global system that contains rather than solves problems. The Modern Mercenary is the first work that combines a broad-ranging theory of the phenomenon.
Throughout the world, similar scenarios are playing out daily. The United States can no longer go to war without contractors. Yet we don't know much about the industry's structure, its operations, or where it's heading. Typically led by ex-military men, contractor firms are by their very nature secretive. Even the U.S. government - the entity that actually pays them - knows relatively little.
In The Modern Mercenary, Sean McFate lays bare this opaque world, explaining the economic structure of the industry and showing in detail how firms operate on the ground. A former U.S. Army paratrooper and private military contractor, McFate provides an unparalleled perspective into the nuts and bolts of the industry, as well as a sobering prognosis for the future of war. While at present, the U.S. government and U.S. firms dominate the market, private military companies are emerging from other countries, and warlords and militias have restyled themselves as private security companies in places like Afghanistan and Somalia.
To understand how the proliferation of private forces may influence international relations, McFate looks back to the European Middle Ages, when mercenaries were common and contract warfare the norm. He concludes that international relations in the twenty-first century may have more in common with the twelfth century than the twentieth. This back-to-the-future situation, which he calls neo-medievalism, is not necessarily a negative condition, but it will produce a global system that contains rather than solves problems. The Modern Mercenary is the first work that combines a broad-ranging theory of the phenomenon.
272 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2014
88 people are currently reading
1176 people want to read
About the author
Sean McFate
15 books190 followersI have been a paratrooper in the US Army’s 82nd Airborne Division. A para-military contractor. An operative in the private intelligence world (think: Wall Street meets CIA). I’ve dealt with African warlords, raised armies for U.S. interest, rode with armed groups in the Sahara, conducted strategic reconnaissance for oil companies, transacted arms deals in Eastern Europe, and helped prevent an impending genocide in the Rwanda region. In between this, I earned degrees from Brown, Harvard, and a PhD from the London School of Economics.
Now I’m an author, my favorite job by far. I write about the world as I’ve witnessed it. Unlike most, I write both serious non-fiction and fiction. What I can’t discuss in my non-fiction ends up in my novels, which are like Tom Clancy for the 2020s.
You can learn more about me here http://www.seanmcfate.com and you can follow me on twitter or Instagram @seanmcfate. I appreciate your support, and answer emails from readers.
Now I’m an author, my favorite job by far. I write about the world as I’ve witnessed it. Unlike most, I write both serious non-fiction and fiction. What I can’t discuss in my non-fiction ends up in my novels, which are like Tom Clancy for the 2020s.
You can learn more about me here http://www.seanmcfate.com and you can follow me on twitter or Instagram @seanmcfate. I appreciate your support, and answer emails from readers.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 32 reviews
August 26, 2016
Honestly, only about 70 pages discussed modern mercenaries and only talked about situations the author was familiar with: Liberia and Somalia. Other than that, it was 140+ pages of medieval history of mercenaries and nation-states. If you want a history lesson, then read on. Otherwise, this book could have easily been condensed to about 100 pages.
March 23, 2016
Brief, interesting and clear. McFate looks to the medieval past to help explain the rising use of PMSCs and what it could mean for international security. Private armies were common in a pre-Westphalian Europe and may become common again as the world grows increasingly multipolar and globalized. I found his distinction between mercenaries and PMSCs helpful to frame the issues, but perhaps not as useful in the real world. The distinction can be easily blurred. I'd have like to have read more about the third-country nationals who work for PMSCs and local companies that have spun off in Iraq and Afghanistan. I also wonder if pre-Westphalia Europe is the only comparison he could have looked at. I'd be curious about other places and times in history when paid armies were an issue.
May 31, 2025
The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order by Sean McFate is, in my opinion, a wonderful look at both the inner workings of private military companies and also on how the world is changing around them. An ex-contractor for the private military enterpriser DynCorp himself, McFate provides a rich account of the medieval and modern history of mercenarism together from both thorough research and his own personal experience. His objective here is twofold: he provides a lens into the often secretive world of PMCs, and uses that evidence to make the claim that, while the rise of mercenaries is not necessarily a bad thing, they should be regulated by both states and transnational organizations in order to protect order and stability. Throughout the novel, McFate’s core argument is that, in the 21st century, the world is experiencing a breakdown of the incumbent Westphalian system of geopolitics as what the author terms “neomedievalism” rises to take its place. While the text uses large words to describe the two systems, they essentially mean a system where recognized states have a monopoly on authority, and a system where states have to share authority with sub- and supranational organizations. McFate does a quite good job of backing up his argument, notably by providing two case studies of private military corporations in the field in Liberia and Somalia towards the end of the book. He makes frequent connections to history, especially the history pertaining to mercenarism in Renaissance Italy and the Thirty Years’ War, so those who enjoy history like me will certainly find this book interesting. Additionally, the author provides pages upon pages afterwards of figures, tables, and primary source documents straight from the topics he is talking about. For example, on pages 169 to 172, he provides the full IDIQ contract for DynCorp’s stint in Liberia that he discusses in depth in Chapter 10, connecting readers to the topic of the chapter with a raw, primary source. However, there are some issues with this text that should be mentioned. Many times, it feels as if McFate is restating himself. I believe that the phrase, “The world order may be returning to the status quo ante of the Middle Ages. If so, it would best be described as neomedievalism: a non-state centric, multipolar international system of overlapping authorities and allegiances within the same territory” (73), while an insightful comment, was made at least four to five times in some variation across the book, and the case is the same with topics such as Westphalianism, the difference between mercenaries and military enterprisers, and the history of condottieri in Italy. It can get quite repetitive at times, though some of that is due to the topic; PMC activity, even from an insider perspective, is quite a secretive business, with hardly enough information to fill under 300 pages, so I applaud his efforts at doing so. Additionally, it is limited by its dating, having been written in the period between the fall of Blackwater but before the rise of the Wagner Group, though McFate does a good job with what he is given with. The book is similar to other books such as Jeremy Scahill’s Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army, Phil Miller’s Keenie Meenie: The British Mercenaries who Got Away with War Crimes, and Jack Margolin’s The Wagner Group: Inside Russia’s Mercenary Army—but stands out from the rest because McFate both focuses on the industry as a whole instead of examining one group in depth and has a much more neutral and nuanced perspective as an ex-PMC himself compared to the much more negative—even “Westphalian-minded”, as the author would describe it—perspectives of the civilian authors who wrote the books above. I give this book four out of five stars. It is replete with neutrality, factuality, narrative, objectivity, and industry know-how, but can get quite annoyingly repetitive at times.
May 21, 2020
A thought-provoking book that tends to overstate (and restate) it main case.
While much of the analysis in the book seems spot on, a lot of things have changed since this book was initially published which have revealed some of the issues with its prognosis of a "neomedieval" world order. Most notably the huge reactionary push against some of the forces taken for granted in McFate's model, like globalism. The rise of Trump/Brexit/far-right generally has seen a push back towards nation-states as the single most important source of power, to the detriment of intranational organizations like the EU, UN, and even multinational corporate capitalism. Even nations and countries that have benefited greatly from the trend away from national absolute sovereignty (like China) have propagated a nationalist agenda. COVID has also exposed which countries are able to deal with a crisis and help their citizens through difficult times, and which have edged towards becoming (or outright become) failed states.
Which brings me to the major criticism of the book: it's main "neomedieval" thesis, in which nations no longer hold the monopoly on violence, and instead we wind up living in a multipolar world of competing tensions with the capacity for violence (religion, sect, clan or tribe, etc.). Despite making it clear that failed states are growing more prevalent in a world with only a single superpower, McFate tends to extrapolate from his examples of failed states the idea that the whole world will eventually fall victim to the neomedieval structure, which is simply not likely in most developed nations. Nationalism has too strong a hold and has provided too many benefits for most nations to conceivably fall back into the neomedieval realm of divided loyalties. Certainly those states which are proving themselves less-than-solid may fall prey to a civil war, violent ethnic tensions, or revolutions; but by and large, the nation-state is not going away. All the examples brought up in the book take place in those failed states: Liberia, Afghanistan, post-invasion Iraq, Somalia, etc. In many of those instances the idea of a "nation" at all was something imposed by colonialism - they are not so much "failed" states as states that never existed in any real sense in the first place.
This is an important misreading of the history of these locales, and generally the forces at work in McFate's description: he reads them as arising out of the ashes of nationalism, but generally they have always been the most important facets of power in a number of these locales at all times. That things like tribe, religious difference, and other aspects of human life were overwhelmed from the 50s-90s by the two competing superpowers of that time (both of which were heavily invested in a Westphalian state system), is the real historic anomaly of our time, not the idea of "states" entirely, as McFate contends. He ignores the relatively strong states of Asia (China and Korea in particular come to mind, though Japan during the Tokugawa era also developed much of the state apparatus that the Meiji would inherit), which developed independently of European-Westphalian timelines but which were nonetheless made up of complex legal systems by which the state held a monopoly on violence. In doing so, he poses the idea that states are an aberration. They don't appear to be though. States are certainly just one way of organizing power, but they are definitely not flashes in the pan, nor are there any signs they are due to start falling apart, at least where they are strong with a long lineage (Western and Central Europe, parts of the Americas, East Asia): citizens in most functioning nations today do not and will not accept the state sacrificing its monopoly on violence, at least within its own borders. The book could have done a better job of making those delineations between areas where states are weak and those where they are strong, to provide a better context for the overall message, without unnecessarily extrapolating beyond its comfort zone.
However, outside of stretching into a geo-socio-political lens in which it felt like it was taking too much for granted, the book is an amazing overview of the private military industry as it existed at time of publication. McFate's analysis of existing practices, issues, benefits, etc. are all very illuminating and his experience in the sector and his thorough (like, incredibly thorough) research provide amazing insights into the factors at play in private military force. The historical analogies provide a great reference point, and the dozens of examples help to illuminate the ways in which the industry moves and operates. It also does a good job of explaining the terminology, and the chapter devoted to how the US Government contracted out the building of the Liberian army was a masterful case study.
As far as McFate's writing goes, it is decidedly academic, but also thoroughly engaging. He writes clearly, gets complex ideas across with ease, and manages to keep the flood of acronyms to a minimum (always dangerous when talking about the military). The most annoying part of the book, by far, was the repetitious nature: thesis statements are repeated often, to the point that I was skipping over whole pages by the end of the book, because I'd read the thought several times already. However, it is fitting with a book published by OUP, so I could easily forgive it.
All told, I'd definitely recommend this to anyone interested in looking into the underbelly of Private Military Companies (PMCs). Prior to this book my only education on the topic was from Metal Gear Solid 4, which had only a slightly more pessimistic view of states' inabilities to control violence than McFate's. In the years since that game and this book, I'm happy to say that the world has not fallen into a mercenary-run chaos, at least not yet.
While much of the analysis in the book seems spot on, a lot of things have changed since this book was initially published which have revealed some of the issues with its prognosis of a "neomedieval" world order. Most notably the huge reactionary push against some of the forces taken for granted in McFate's model, like globalism. The rise of Trump/Brexit/far-right generally has seen a push back towards nation-states as the single most important source of power, to the detriment of intranational organizations like the EU, UN, and even multinational corporate capitalism. Even nations and countries that have benefited greatly from the trend away from national absolute sovereignty (like China) have propagated a nationalist agenda. COVID has also exposed which countries are able to deal with a crisis and help their citizens through difficult times, and which have edged towards becoming (or outright become) failed states.
Which brings me to the major criticism of the book: it's main "neomedieval" thesis, in which nations no longer hold the monopoly on violence, and instead we wind up living in a multipolar world of competing tensions with the capacity for violence (religion, sect, clan or tribe, etc.). Despite making it clear that failed states are growing more prevalent in a world with only a single superpower, McFate tends to extrapolate from his examples of failed states the idea that the whole world will eventually fall victim to the neomedieval structure, which is simply not likely in most developed nations. Nationalism has too strong a hold and has provided too many benefits for most nations to conceivably fall back into the neomedieval realm of divided loyalties. Certainly those states which are proving themselves less-than-solid may fall prey to a civil war, violent ethnic tensions, or revolutions; but by and large, the nation-state is not going away. All the examples brought up in the book take place in those failed states: Liberia, Afghanistan, post-invasion Iraq, Somalia, etc. In many of those instances the idea of a "nation" at all was something imposed by colonialism - they are not so much "failed" states as states that never existed in any real sense in the first place.
This is an important misreading of the history of these locales, and generally the forces at work in McFate's description: he reads them as arising out of the ashes of nationalism, but generally they have always been the most important facets of power in a number of these locales at all times. That things like tribe, religious difference, and other aspects of human life were overwhelmed from the 50s-90s by the two competing superpowers of that time (both of which were heavily invested in a Westphalian state system), is the real historic anomaly of our time, not the idea of "states" entirely, as McFate contends. He ignores the relatively strong states of Asia (China and Korea in particular come to mind, though Japan during the Tokugawa era also developed much of the state apparatus that the Meiji would inherit), which developed independently of European-Westphalian timelines but which were nonetheless made up of complex legal systems by which the state held a monopoly on violence. In doing so, he poses the idea that states are an aberration. They don't appear to be though. States are certainly just one way of organizing power, but they are definitely not flashes in the pan, nor are there any signs they are due to start falling apart, at least where they are strong with a long lineage (Western and Central Europe, parts of the Americas, East Asia): citizens in most functioning nations today do not and will not accept the state sacrificing its monopoly on violence, at least within its own borders. The book could have done a better job of making those delineations between areas where states are weak and those where they are strong, to provide a better context for the overall message, without unnecessarily extrapolating beyond its comfort zone.
However, outside of stretching into a geo-socio-political lens in which it felt like it was taking too much for granted, the book is an amazing overview of the private military industry as it existed at time of publication. McFate's analysis of existing practices, issues, benefits, etc. are all very illuminating and his experience in the sector and his thorough (like, incredibly thorough) research provide amazing insights into the factors at play in private military force. The historical analogies provide a great reference point, and the dozens of examples help to illuminate the ways in which the industry moves and operates. It also does a good job of explaining the terminology, and the chapter devoted to how the US Government contracted out the building of the Liberian army was a masterful case study.
As far as McFate's writing goes, it is decidedly academic, but also thoroughly engaging. He writes clearly, gets complex ideas across with ease, and manages to keep the flood of acronyms to a minimum (always dangerous when talking about the military). The most annoying part of the book, by far, was the repetitious nature: thesis statements are repeated often, to the point that I was skipping over whole pages by the end of the book, because I'd read the thought several times already. However, it is fitting with a book published by OUP, so I could easily forgive it.
All told, I'd definitely recommend this to anyone interested in looking into the underbelly of Private Military Companies (PMCs). Prior to this book my only education on the topic was from Metal Gear Solid 4, which had only a slightly more pessimistic view of states' inabilities to control violence than McFate's. In the years since that game and this book, I'm happy to say that the world has not fallen into a mercenary-run chaos, at least not yet.
September 4, 2021
Denna bok är lika mycket debattinlägg som historisk beskrivning av relationerna mellan stater och legoknektskompanier. Argumentet är det samma som Kissinger framförde - att den moderna teknologin slår undan benen för Westphalen-kontraktet, och ersätter detta med nymedivalism, dvs med ett slags distribuerad lojalitet där världen blir ett gigantiskt heligt tyskromerskt rike.
Argumentet är intressant, och i huvudsak trovärdigt. Slutsatserna är inte lika självklara som McFate vill göra dem till, men som vanligt är det lättare att se ett problem än att lösa det.
Den historiska biten - stora legoknektskompanier sedan ww2, och dessförinnan, är spännande och trevlig.
För samhällsintresserade kan detta vara god badkarsläsning.
Argumentet är intressant, och i huvudsak trovärdigt. Slutsatserna är inte lika självklara som McFate vill göra dem till, men som vanligt är det lättare att se ett problem än att lösa det.
Den historiska biten - stora legoknektskompanier sedan ww2, och dessförinnan, är spännande och trevlig.
För samhällsintresserade kan detta vara god badkarsläsning.
January 11, 2021
An interesting book that serves as an excellent primer on the growth and nature of the modern private military industry. He differentiates between two major types of PMC industries: mediated and free market. The former is made up of companies that serve states with a monopoly on force. The latter is an industry where there is no monopoly on force. A simple example of a mediated market: the use of contractors by the U.S. military (roughly 50% of the U.S. military machine). Comparatively, an extreme example of a free market: Somalia.
Some reviews argue the book could have been shorter had some of the redundancy been eliminated. On the contrary, I think it has so much opportunity for elaboration that it is, in a sense, premature.
The author's central argument is that mercenaries are common to history, but uncommon to history characterized by states holding a monopoly on force. That's because private military actors are antithetical to a monopoly on force. To the author, the rise of the PMC industry signals an end to the "Westphalian system." Evidence of this includes the expansion of "free markets" for force, namely within the scope of failed states (Somalia, Mexico, Lybia, et cetera), but also the growth of mediated markets.
The growth of mediated markets is important to the author because, historically, they signaled a transition from free markets to monopolized markets of force. During the Thirty Years War, the mercenary that came out of it was the one training the armies of the state. Simplistically, free market -> mediated market -> monopolized market. Therefore, monopolized market -> mediated market -> free market? There's this bigger picture of geopolitical shift that's taken for granted by the author and not well elaborated. He does a good job of showing us the opportunity for research, but does not commit to the research himself. Maybe that research isn't his responsibility, but the conclusions he comes to assume the accuracy of the bigger picture. If the bigger picture isn't accurate, what of his conclusions?
Along the same vein as the above, that we're going through a transition does not imply a retrogression. It might imply an evolution, something other than the modern world and "neomedievalism." How would this change McFate's conclusions?
Nevertheless, he does a good job of showing us the reasons for concern. The modern PMC industry arises from a mediated market created by the demands of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Most contracts are logistical or combat support systems in nature, i.e. supply of armies and support of combat forces (cybersecurity, intelligence, etc.). There are also combat arms of PMCs in these two wars, but they are a minority (although a growing minority as U.S. forces pull out of both countries). The problem being that the people who work for these companies spin-off and found their own, serving other sources of demand. These include warlords in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Any constraints on the industry are unraveling, as a result.
Something else that would be interesting to explore is how the outsourcing of combat systems and even combat capabilities to private companies will affect the efficiency of American armed forces in the future. Will they lose the capacity to do these things themselves? Will the quality of our military decrease? And when these PMCs have alternative contract sources, will the American military always be able to count on them?
All in all, I enjoyed McFate's book. I think that it leads to so many questions and to curiousity is a good thing. There's an opportunity to grow its thesis into something much larger.
Some reviews argue the book could have been shorter had some of the redundancy been eliminated. On the contrary, I think it has so much opportunity for elaboration that it is, in a sense, premature.
The author's central argument is that mercenaries are common to history, but uncommon to history characterized by states holding a monopoly on force. That's because private military actors are antithetical to a monopoly on force. To the author, the rise of the PMC industry signals an end to the "Westphalian system." Evidence of this includes the expansion of "free markets" for force, namely within the scope of failed states (Somalia, Mexico, Lybia, et cetera), but also the growth of mediated markets.
The growth of mediated markets is important to the author because, historically, they signaled a transition from free markets to monopolized markets of force. During the Thirty Years War, the mercenary that came out of it was the one training the armies of the state. Simplistically, free market -> mediated market -> monopolized market. Therefore, monopolized market -> mediated market -> free market? There's this bigger picture of geopolitical shift that's taken for granted by the author and not well elaborated. He does a good job of showing us the opportunity for research, but does not commit to the research himself. Maybe that research isn't his responsibility, but the conclusions he comes to assume the accuracy of the bigger picture. If the bigger picture isn't accurate, what of his conclusions?
Along the same vein as the above, that we're going through a transition does not imply a retrogression. It might imply an evolution, something other than the modern world and "neomedievalism." How would this change McFate's conclusions?
Nevertheless, he does a good job of showing us the reasons for concern. The modern PMC industry arises from a mediated market created by the demands of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Most contracts are logistical or combat support systems in nature, i.e. supply of armies and support of combat forces (cybersecurity, intelligence, etc.). There are also combat arms of PMCs in these two wars, but they are a minority (although a growing minority as U.S. forces pull out of both countries). The problem being that the people who work for these companies spin-off and found their own, serving other sources of demand. These include warlords in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Any constraints on the industry are unraveling, as a result.
Something else that would be interesting to explore is how the outsourcing of combat systems and even combat capabilities to private companies will affect the efficiency of American armed forces in the future. Will they lose the capacity to do these things themselves? Will the quality of our military decrease? And when these PMCs have alternative contract sources, will the American military always be able to count on them?
All in all, I enjoyed McFate's book. I think that it leads to so many questions and to curiousity is a good thing. There's an opportunity to grow its thesis into something much larger.
August 18, 2016
Tough to get through, read like an academic research paper.
August 3, 2020
McFate uses strong repetition to make an argument that the state monopoly on violence heralded by the Westphalian order and championed by Weber in the 20th century is an international aberration over the course of human history. Using statistics from the last 20 years of conflict around the world he shows that the peace dividend of demobilizing national armed force has created a market for force more recognizable as the condottieri of medieval and Renaissance Italy.
His arguments urge national and international organizations/states to move towards a mediated market through normalization and regulations. Referencing cases in Africa and Afghanistan, he shows how neo-medieval conditions are created by the western international order through unintentional degradation of sovereignty through interventions into the affairs of States.
A thought provoking read for students of international relations and military science, McFate explains how the "true" third offset has been the proliferation of PMCs in the modern era of conflicts.
His arguments urge national and international organizations/states to move towards a mediated market through normalization and regulations. Referencing cases in Africa and Afghanistan, he shows how neo-medieval conditions are created by the western international order through unintentional degradation of sovereignty through interventions into the affairs of States.
A thought provoking read for students of international relations and military science, McFate explains how the "true" third offset has been the proliferation of PMCs in the modern era of conflicts.
May 24, 2020
Solid, thought provoking book. It is easy to get caught in the argument of one of McFate's larger assumptions over his argument, but well researched and constructed.
March 26, 2018
Este libro está muy bien. A pesar de su título, no es un libro sobre el aspecto militar de las fuerzas militares privadas, sino un libro de historia geopolítica.
Escrito por Sean McFate, un ex-paracaidista y ex-miembro de DynCorp International, una empresa que presta servicios paramilitares al gobierno de los EE,UU., "The modern mercenary" es un relato sobre las fuerzas militares privadas, desde la antigüedad hasta nuestros días. McFate argumenta que, al contrario de lo que la gente piensa, el uso de mercenarios es lo "normal" en la historia de la humanidad, y que las fuerzas militares nacionales "patrióticas" es algo de los últimos 400 años. El ejéricto persa tenía en sus filas mercenarios griegos, las guerras medievales italianas se libraban con "compañías libres" multinacionales de mercenarios (los suizos eran especialmente por su uso de la pica), y en la guerra de Independencia estadounidense los ingleses contrataron efectivos de origen alemán.
De hecho es más que probable que, con la búsqueda de conflictos militares "limitados" (ej: sí, queremos intervenir en Siria pero sin enviar soldados allí), el uso de fuerzas militares privadas sea mayor, sobre todo cuando en la última década el uso de éstas ha sido intenso por parte de los EE.UU. Se calcula que un 50% de sus efectivos en Afganistán son de origen privado, entendiendo como efectivos toda su infraestructura: logística, administración, intendencia... Porque lo que hay que entender es que, a día de hoy, por cada soldado que está en primera línea, hay más de ocho personas prestando apoyo en su despliegue.
Un libro muy recomendable para l@s que quieran aprender más de historia y de conflictos internacionales.
Escrito por Sean McFate, un ex-paracaidista y ex-miembro de DynCorp International, una empresa que presta servicios paramilitares al gobierno de los EE,UU., "The modern mercenary" es un relato sobre las fuerzas militares privadas, desde la antigüedad hasta nuestros días. McFate argumenta que, al contrario de lo que la gente piensa, el uso de mercenarios es lo "normal" en la historia de la humanidad, y que las fuerzas militares nacionales "patrióticas" es algo de los últimos 400 años. El ejéricto persa tenía en sus filas mercenarios griegos, las guerras medievales italianas se libraban con "compañías libres" multinacionales de mercenarios (los suizos eran especialmente por su uso de la pica), y en la guerra de Independencia estadounidense los ingleses contrataron efectivos de origen alemán.
De hecho es más que probable que, con la búsqueda de conflictos militares "limitados" (ej: sí, queremos intervenir en Siria pero sin enviar soldados allí), el uso de fuerzas militares privadas sea mayor, sobre todo cuando en la última década el uso de éstas ha sido intenso por parte de los EE.UU. Se calcula que un 50% de sus efectivos en Afganistán son de origen privado, entendiendo como efectivos toda su infraestructura: logística, administración, intendencia... Porque lo que hay que entender es que, a día de hoy, por cada soldado que está en primera línea, hay más de ocho personas prestando apoyo en su despliegue.
Un libro muy recomendable para l@s que quieran aprender más de historia y de conflictos internacionales.
February 5, 2020
McFate argues that neo-medievalism is the future, instead of having functioning states, in many places we will have competing layers of authority, and force. Like when local aristocrats, church officials, autonomous cities and the royal courts vied for control of territories and laid overlapping claims to it. McFate also names the different kinds of military contractors and contracts and gives examples of each.
Why I started this book: The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder was eye-opening and fascinating, so I looked for his other books.
Why I finished it: This book needed a better editor. The ideas were great, but he constantly repeated himself. And since I was listening to the audio, it was harder to skip ahead without fear of missing something. I haven't mastered the audio skim. And I think that he had a lot more faith in government responsibility and forward planning considering that Americans believe that the most prepared government arm is the military, and they are the ones that have reached for and contracted out services piecemeal.
Why I started this book: The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder was eye-opening and fascinating, so I looked for his other books.
Why I finished it: This book needed a better editor. The ideas were great, but he constantly repeated himself. And since I was listening to the audio, it was harder to skip ahead without fear of missing something. I haven't mastered the audio skim. And I think that he had a lot more faith in government responsibility and forward planning considering that Americans believe that the most prepared government arm is the military, and they are the ones that have reached for and contracted out services piecemeal.
March 9, 2018
Although I disagree with many of Mr. McFate’s assumptions, I really enjoyed this book. He tackles some really big and important topics from an historical and philosophical perspective. The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World really shines in that it provides a late modern history of Private Armies. From an historical perspective the author spends a considerable amount of time discussing Medieval European Mercenaries while barely recognizing the role of private armies throughout history. Mr. McFate’s discussion of the philosophical concepts involved was particularly interesting to me. I found it to be a refreshing debate on the Westphalian system vs the New world order. As I mentioned that I disagreed with many of his Globalist point of views, but I give him credit for trying to objectively cover the topic. His idea for a Free Market Solution to continue to use Private Military Contractors in conflicts is innovative. Like I said I found this book quite enjoyable and interesting.
July 17, 2023
Good one, opened up my thinking in an area I had little understanding. The main concept in the book, sometimes repeating, is the monopolization of violence by state. State sponsored standing armies are a much recent innovation, an outcome of the bloody thirty years war that ended in 1648, called the Westphalian security order. The author argues that this monopolization is an oddity, world prior to the thirty year war had more competing claims to resources, mercenary forces were the norm. The 350 or so years to the end of Cold War was an anomaly. We are going back to a world where peacetime and wartime power structure will be shared between states and non state actors ( PMC- for profit Private Military Corporation). Good historical research, but felt a bit repetitive and textbook like. But worth reading as we hear so much about the Wagner group as the Ukraine war drags on at this point ( jul-23). Some of the author’s assertion at the time of writing (2014) are coming true.
October 29, 2025
You know, when you read a lot of fiction regarding mercenaries, you sorta get an idea of what goes on in the real world. I have to admit that as a writer of mercenary fiction (in the military science fiction vein), I had some ideas, but this book helped me realize more about what to do and how. The book is not exhaustive, but it offers a wealth of information on current PMC and mercenary operations and how they mesh with the real world. Such as PMCs during OEF, and my ignorance of the fact that Afghan PMCs guarded (to some degree) the supply convoys we all depended on. That was an eye-opener, and the book goes over a lot more, and helps you understand the legalities and the fine legal details of PMCs and mercenaries today—stuff which can be used in fiction to give some authenticity and the like.
August 22, 2022
“Unlike the Westphalian order, medieval sovereignty was fragmented, as different political actors—church, emperor, king, princes, city-states, monasteries, and so on—made overlapping claims of authority over people, places, and things. In the Middle Ages, rulers rarely retained absolute authority within a large territory.
This created divided loyalties. Under the Westphalian order, states demanded that people be patriots first and everything else second; in the Middle Ages, individuals had dueling loyalties to church, kingdom, region, family lineage, ethnic group, monastic order, knightly order, and so forth. ”
Great book!
This created divided loyalties. Under the Westphalian order, states demanded that people be patriots first and everything else second; in the Middle Ages, individuals had dueling loyalties to church, kingdom, region, family lineage, ethnic group, monastic order, knightly order, and so forth. ”
Great book!
December 31, 2022
An excelent book to close the year, making it the 35th of the past twelve months.
Full of details, data and historical facts, I really liked the style of the writer, even though there were some minor errors and repeated paragraphs.
The aim of the book is to analyze how modern mercenaries look like, what they do and how their role could change the international order.
This work is the first serious approach on this matter I've came across, and I agree with the thesis of the author: mercenaries are not bad per se, it is the scenario and intentions of the actor that is paying for their services (countires, UN agencies, NGOs, multinationals...) that makes them good or bad.
Full of details, data and historical facts, I really liked the style of the writer, even though there were some minor errors and repeated paragraphs.
The aim of the book is to analyze how modern mercenaries look like, what they do and how their role could change the international order.
This work is the first serious approach on this matter I've came across, and I agree with the thesis of the author: mercenaries are not bad per se, it is the scenario and intentions of the actor that is paying for their services (countires, UN agencies, NGOs, multinationals...) that makes them good or bad.
January 28, 2020
The book provides a good overview of mercenary/PMC operations throughout the world at the time of its writing. McFate lays out well-considered ideas on the rise of PMCs in recent decades, arguing that PMCs will become more numerous, important, and powerful in the near future as the power of nations wanes in the face of growing non-state powers, a status he calls neofeudalism.
Game value: Very high, especially for modern or near-modern games. I’m using it as reference material for a planned guide to PMCs in such games. Recommended.
Game value: Very high, especially for modern or near-modern games. I’m using it as reference material for a planned guide to PMCs in such games. Recommended.
March 8, 2021
The first half of the book is a good introductory read to the world of private military contractors, how they work and what types of contracts exist. It also provides insight on the concept of neo-medievalism in contrast with what he calls the "wesphalian" world, and how warfare is returning to the ways of old, before the primacy of states.
The autor provides two examples to illustrie the positives and cons of private military contractors (Libera and Somalia), and provides insight on the posible futures of the industry.
The second half contains annexes which I didn't read.
The autor provides two examples to illustrie the positives and cons of private military contractors (Libera and Somalia), and provides insight on the posible futures of the industry.
The second half contains annexes which I didn't read.
April 10, 2023
Book's thesis is that world order is becoming more "neomedieval" — nonstate actors are gaining capacity to use force — and that two primary types of mercenary companies — warlords/conventional security and military training companies like Dyncorp — are coming back because of that.
Book is certainly informative about certain adventures of modern mercenary firms like Dyncorp building the Liberian army, but is somewhat repetitive/could be better written.
Overall informative on the issue of mercenaries.
Book is certainly informative about certain adventures of modern mercenary firms like Dyncorp building the Liberian army, but is somewhat repetitive/could be better written.
Overall informative on the issue of mercenaries.
August 31, 2025
This book significantly undersells itself. It’s really about how the rise of various types of private military corporations is a manifestation of the return to a more medieval state of affairs of overlapping power centers (ie a return to a pre-Westphalian state of affairs in which the national sovereign isn’t supreme but instead mediates several overlapping power structures). In the process of describing this state of affairs (ie neo-medievalism) it makes a convincing case for why PMCs are a force for good and bad which are here to stay and should thus be managed more effectively.
September 21, 2017
An outstanding work. A very detailed story of how the warfare has evolved in the last five to six centuries, & a real insider's account of the modern day warfare & the dynamics of international & interstate relations in today's world.
July 10, 2019
Slavish to academic theorizing if fundamentally insightful. Meant to be titled Neomedlivism: A Facet. Neglects to mention that the central thesis- that we have reverted to a medieval definition of sovereignty- really only applies to the Global South
March 8, 2020
Fascinating read, well written, with interesting predictions on the rise of the market for private force. Some of the author’s themes do get repetitive.
August 10, 2022
A comprehensive review of the Modern Mercenary system.... the logic for the movement " back to" this system is un-deniable ..
December 12, 2022
Historical as much if not more than present state of affairs.
December 26, 2015
This book combines the history and political precedents of mercenaries and their evolution into contemporary private military contractors. This isn't an exciting tell all style book (from someone who worked in the industry) but rather an intellectual and thoughtful history lesson examining the nexus between government and so called mercenaries. This book is good for anyone who has an interest in how governments use the private military contractor option when outsourcing certain needs. I enjoyed this book and recommend it to anyone who wants a serious, apolitical look at the industry with a well researched historical and political perspective.
May 12, 2016
I dipped in and out.
I came to the book because McFate took part in training Liberia's soldiers while the country was rebuilding after fighting stopped in 2003. I stayed because I wanted to see the way that McFate takes up the analysis of the Neomedievalist school of political theory.
Overall, I found this a helpful introduction to the growing importance of private military forces and military contractors, though I didn't feel compelled to follow the argument page-to-page. I'll likely come back to this at some point when or if I want to cement my grasp of who is hiring guns these days.
I came to the book because McFate took part in training Liberia's soldiers while the country was rebuilding after fighting stopped in 2003. I stayed because I wanted to see the way that McFate takes up the analysis of the Neomedievalist school of political theory.
Overall, I found this a helpful introduction to the growing importance of private military forces and military contractors, though I didn't feel compelled to follow the argument page-to-page. I'll likely come back to this at some point when or if I want to cement my grasp of who is hiring guns these days.
December 19, 2022
I usually give books a chance and read them till the end. Sean McFate gives a great description of the world of private military corps (PMCs) and how they operate. Although his first few chapters were pretty interesting, the later ones seemed to lose track and repeat the same arguments that he made earlier which made for terrible reading.
Admittedly, I didn't finish the book in one sitting (and hence, I may come back and finish the book).
Admittedly, I didn't finish the book in one sitting (and hence, I may come back and finish the book).
January 20, 2016
Fascinating look at the return of a fixture of the Middle Ages--the private army
September 22, 2016
Excellent book. Well-organized. Well-researched. Easy to read.
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