Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict

by Vipin Narang

The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states―and potential future ones―manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across important areas of the world such as the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia.

Vipin Narang identifies the diversity of regional power nuclear strategies and describes in detail the posture each regional power has adopted over time. Developing a theory for the sources of regional power nuclear strategies, he offers the first systematic explanation of why states choose the postures they do and under what conditions they might shift strategies. Narang then analyzes the effects of these choices on a state's ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, he shows that, contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others.

Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security.

Genres: Politics, Nonfiction, International Relations, Political Science

360 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2014

Reviews

[Mariam · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good book, timely, but the analysis is over categorized. Would be interesting to see a revised version. Role of AI intersecting with nuclear arsenal, possession of nuclear arsenal by non state actors, other rising players, etc.

[Alex · Rating 5 out of 5]

There are 3-4 books in the last 25 years that have changed the way I think about nonproliferation. Mitchell Reiss' Without the Bomb in the mid-90s was the first. Why don't countries proliferate? Ethel Solingen's Nuclear Logics was the second. What are the economic disincentives to proliferate and how do they work? This is the third: when is a proliferating country really dangerous? A simply fascinating must read for anyone who focuses on contemporary nuclear weapons issues.

[yoursbibliophilic · Rating 5 out of 5]

The world is in a second nuclear age where volatile regional powers, holding a small nuclear arsenal amidst active conflicts & fragile institutions has escalated the world to a perilous brink. This book “Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era” by Vipin Narang presents a unique perspective that explain, “why states choose one of these postures over the others provides novel insights into the nuclear strategies & conflict dynamics across important areas of the world including the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia” ( Loc:232-234) by analyzing the experiences of non-superpower states that have developed independent nuclear forces viz., China, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, & France. Author develops an analytical framework that helps to explain why regional nuclear states have adopted a particular nuclear posture in light of their security environment. He offers an "optimization theory" with several "yes/no" gates to guide though sequential variables facing a state & assess what nuclear posture a regional power adopts. He further tests his theory through large-n database with multinomial logit estimations to statistically analyze whether, on average, some nuclear postures deter conflict better than others. Through this analysis author answers “an article of faith among nuclear deterrence theorists that acquiring nuclear weapons fundamentally and positively changes a state’s quest for security. But what kind of nuclear forces deter conflict?” (Loc:5789-5790 )

Final two chapters, ” Chapters 9 and 10 demonstrate that there are very real differences in the deterrence consequences of these various nuclear strategies: some nuclear postures fail to deliver on their promise to deter conflict. In fact, only those states that adopt an asymmetric escalation posture enjoy significant deterrent success against conventional attacks. The catalytic and assured retaliation postures fail to do so because the risk of nuclear use even in intense conventional conflicts is so low that it does not deter opponents from attacking these nuclear powers—sometimes resulting in conflicts of very high intensity” (Loc:340-345) there by author successfully demonstrates that nuclear deterrence “should not be a nuclear weapons capability, but nuclear posture or strategy. It is nuclear posture, rather than numbers of warheads or declaratory doctrine, that should theoretically be expected to generate deterrent power against an opponent” (Loc:5892-5894)

[Patrick Anderson · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an must read for anyone who is interested in the current state of nuclear deterrence in world affairs. The fact is that the majority of nuclear weapon states are not superpowers and how they view deterrence, their strategies and outcomes are fundamentally different than those of the Cold War superpowers. The classic Cold War view of nuclear deterrence where mere possession of the bomb provides a deterrent effect on conventional conflict has proven to be increasingly unfounded both before and after the fall of the USSR. Narang establishes a framework for predicting the nuclear posture of a given nation based on it's proximate threats, availability of a superpower benefactor, civ-mil relations and relative financial and technical abilities. He then uses observable nuclear postures to demonstrate that the ability to deter conventional conflict depends on posture and not mere possession with different nuclear strategies detering unequally.

[Nate B · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dense and academic. Revitalizes the published record on nuclear thinking, which has been in need of an authoritative public sphere update since the end of the cold war. Unfortunately, this book itself now needs an additional update since it predates China’s current buildup, and reading the China section now as-is would give the impression that China is still one of the more sane nuclear keyholders. (It is not- it turns out Xi is just as insane as the rest of us.) The rest of the book is still great and informative and China’s history is still relevant.

Narang has been busy working in government, but I understand he recently returned to academia full time. Maybe a second edition is forthcoming.

[Ayushman · Rating 5 out of 5]

I found this to be an excellent book on the nuclear weapons postures of regional powers. The author's effort to review each regional power in great depth, though he did repeat himself a lot, was quite rewarding and presents some interesting conclusions on the success and failures of nuclear deterrence between regional powers.

This book also draws out questions that I didn't think existed previously and presents plenty of scope for further research and more books.

[Dan Etue · Rating 5 out of 5]

Vipin Narang’s framework is a welcome update to nuclear deterrence theory. Easy to understand and broadly applicable to modern regional nuclear powers.

[Mayank Bawari · Rating 5 out of 5]

An amazing book on the postures taken by nuclear power and how not all nuclear arsenals are the same.

[Rachel · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of the best academic books I've read recently.