What do you think?
Rate this book
The History of Sexuality #3
The History of Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care of the Self
Michel Foucault takes us into the first two centuries of our own era, into the Golden Age of Rome, to reveal a subtle but decisive break from the classical Greek vision of sexual pleasure. He skillfully explores the whole corpus of moral reflection among philosophers (Plutarch, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Seneca) and physicians of the era, and uncovers an increasing mistrust of pleasure and growing anxiety over sexual activity and its consequences.
288 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1984
177 people are currently reading
11457 people want to read
About the author
Michel Foucault
763 books6,469 followersPaul-Michel Foucault was a French philosopher, historian of ideas, writer, political activist, and literary critic. Foucault's theories primarily address the relationships between power and knowledge, and how they are used as a form of social control through societal institutions. Though often cited as a structuralist and postmodernist, Foucault rejected these labels. His thought has influenced academics, especially those working in communication studies, anthropology, psychology, sociology, criminology, cultural studies, literary theory, feminism, Marxism and critical theory.
Born in Poitiers, France, into an upper-middle-class family, Foucault was educated at the Lycée Henri-IV, at the École Normale Supérieure, where he developed an interest in philosophy and came under the influence of his tutors Jean Hyppolite and Louis Althusser, and at the University of Paris (Sorbonne), where he earned degrees in philosophy and psychology. After several years as a cultural diplomat abroad, he returned to France and published his first major book, The History of Madness (1961). After obtaining work between 1960 and 1966 at the University of Clermont-Ferrand, he produced The Birth of the Clinic (1963) and The Order of Things (1966), publications that displayed his increasing involvement with structuralism, from which he later distanced himself. These first three histories exemplified a historiographical technique Foucault was developing called "archaeology".
From 1966 to 1968, Foucault lectured at the University of Tunis before returning to France, where he became head of the philosophy department at the new experimental university of Paris VIII. Foucault subsequently published The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969). In 1970, Foucault was admitted to the Collège de France, a membership he retained until his death. He also became active in several left-wing groups involved in campaigns against racism and human rights abuses and for penal reform. Foucault later published Discipline and Punish (1975) and The History of Sexuality (1976), in which he developed archaeological and genealogical methods that emphasized the role that power plays in society.
Foucault died in Paris from complications of HIV/AIDS; he became the first public figure in France to die from complications of the disease. His partner Daniel Defert founded the AIDES charity in his memory.
Born in Poitiers, France, into an upper-middle-class family, Foucault was educated at the Lycée Henri-IV, at the École Normale Supérieure, where he developed an interest in philosophy and came under the influence of his tutors Jean Hyppolite and Louis Althusser, and at the University of Paris (Sorbonne), where he earned degrees in philosophy and psychology. After several years as a cultural diplomat abroad, he returned to France and published his first major book, The History of Madness (1961). After obtaining work between 1960 and 1966 at the University of Clermont-Ferrand, he produced The Birth of the Clinic (1963) and The Order of Things (1966), publications that displayed his increasing involvement with structuralism, from which he later distanced himself. These first three histories exemplified a historiographical technique Foucault was developing called "archaeology".
From 1966 to 1968, Foucault lectured at the University of Tunis before returning to France, where he became head of the philosophy department at the new experimental university of Paris VIII. Foucault subsequently published The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969). In 1970, Foucault was admitted to the Collège de France, a membership he retained until his death. He also became active in several left-wing groups involved in campaigns against racism and human rights abuses and for penal reform. Foucault later published Discipline and Punish (1975) and The History of Sexuality (1976), in which he developed archaeological and genealogical methods that emphasized the role that power plays in society.
Foucault died in Paris from complications of HIV/AIDS; he became the first public figure in France to die from complications of the disease. His partner Daniel Defert founded the AIDES charity in his memory.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 116 reviews
September 24, 2021
Oh Foucault, you make me so fervently wary. Like delayed orgasms, I want to stop but I also want to go on, reach that peak and think 'crap, it could've been better. Oh well, next time.' My creative juices are drained right now, but I know this is the best time to talk about Foucault or talk to Foucault, had he been alive and accessible outside the celebrity pedestal that France placed its intellectuals on. You need, no, I need my mind to be sufficiently clouded if I am to benefit from my experience of reading these volumes on sexuality even though the books are very academic in nature and Foucault probably peered into ancient texts with the dexterity of a squirrel that accidentally ate a psychedelic mushroom and has been frantically looking for a special nut ever since. Like that squirrel from the ice age series, you know. I'm fairly certain it was perpetually high. Maybe all squirrels are. How are they so energetic all the time, everywhere?
This volume is just Foucault dissecting a lot of texts on sexual health and practices, love of women and love of boys (ahem, no women's love for girls unfortunately) written by dudes (probably why there is next to nothing on lesbianism, damn those ancient patriarchs) who ceased to exist long before Foucault himself came into this world and so are of little relevance to me now. It was also the most boring of the first three books, but I appreciate the number of hours Foucault must have spent on researching and writing this. He was nothing if not a chronic nerd.
This volume is just Foucault dissecting a lot of texts on sexual health and practices, love of women and love of boys (ahem, no women's love for girls unfortunately) written by dudes (probably why there is next to nothing on lesbianism, damn those ancient patriarchs) who ceased to exist long before Foucault himself came into this world and so are of little relevance to me now. It was also the most boring of the first three books, but I appreciate the number of hours Foucault must have spent on researching and writing this. He was nothing if not a chronic nerd.
Read
May 14, 2021It's funny to me how separate the popular image (such as it is) of Foucault is from the actual writings of Foucault himself. Because he was, at his very core, the nerd in the library, poring over Greek texts and analyzing the conception of sexuality and the cultivated self.
Full disclosure. This was left at my apartment by a woman I was in love with, who is in my life no longer, who did very little cultivation of the self, but a lot of thinking about sexuality and a lot of reading Foucault. In fact, assuming galleries will be open in Bangkok towards the end of the year, you'll be able to see photographs of her sitting on my back in shibari as I read Foucault to her while she drinks vodka-on-the-rocks and smokes a joint.
Basically, she lived Foucauldian in her synthesis of nerdery and kinky sexuality (which is basically just sex-nerdery), and Foucault's insights -- as often-trenchant as they are -- are still tinged with the pain of her absence and the memories of the bad times as well. And so my reading was clouded.
Full disclosure. This was left at my apartment by a woman I was in love with, who is in my life no longer, who did very little cultivation of the self, but a lot of thinking about sexuality and a lot of reading Foucault. In fact, assuming galleries will be open in Bangkok towards the end of the year, you'll be able to see photographs of her sitting on my back in shibari as I read Foucault to her while she drinks vodka-on-the-rocks and smokes a joint.
Basically, she lived Foucauldian in her synthesis of nerdery and kinky sexuality (which is basically just sex-nerdery), and Foucault's insights -- as often-trenchant as they are -- are still tinged with the pain of her absence and the memories of the bad times as well. And so my reading was clouded.
January 22, 2022
في الجزء الثالث من تاريخ الجنسانية- الإهتمام بالذات. الذي هو امتداد في شكل من أشكاله للجزء الثاني، يستمر فوكو بالإسهاب في الحديث عن الماضي البعيد: اليونان القديمة والكلاسيكية والهلنستية؛ الجمهورية والإمبراطورية الرومانية؛ المسيحية المبكرة. بتفاصيل أكثر حول اللذة الجنسية وتأملاتها، الأفروديزيات، والغلمية-في " التاريخ القديم" الإغريقي. - ونص بلوتارك على تكوين غلمية هي، في بعض نقاطها الجوهرية، مختلفة عن غلمية الحضارة الإغريقية ، كما عرفتها وطّورتها. الحمية وإشكالية الصحة، والحياة الزوجية بقوانينها وأصولها التي كانت سائدة في الرعوية المسيحية ومع هيكليتها الخاصة في العصر الوسيط أو إبان القرنين الأولين. ( ثمة مبادئ هامة عديدة، بخصوص العلاقات بين التعامل مع اللذات والحياة الزوجية، تمت صياغتها في بعض النصوص.)، مع استيعاب العلاقات بين النّصوص المعقّدة الّتي كانت موضع بحث ودراسة في تلك الفترة الزمنية- الّذي مكّنت فيه السيرورة والتحوّلات والتكرار والاختلافات من تفعيل بعضها بعضًا. "ويؤكّد البحث الفوكوي من جهة، أنّه لا يوجد أصل واحد بل أصول مشتّتة متعدّدة، وهي مجموعة من احتمالات المعرفة في إطار زمكانيّ ما من التاريخ. "
…، المرأة وإشكالية الزواج، وأخلاقيات الاعتناء أو الاهتمام بالذات -" استشكال المتعة الجنسية من المنظور التاريخي لجنيالوجيا الذات، صاحبة الرغبة ضمن الأفق النظري لفنون الوجود- من خلال إعادة قراءة فلاسفة وأطباء، وخطباء، إلخ.، العصر اليوناني- الروماني القديم." والتي كان لها النصيب الأكبر في هذا الجزء ." الانشغال بعين الذات."-( الأسئلة المطروحة في هذا الجانب حول الحقيقية- حقيقة ماعليه المرء من وضع، مايقوم به وما هو يقدر القيام به- في صميم تكوين الشخص الأخلاقي. ومدى سيطرة الفرد على ذاته كنواة أخلاقية جوهرية" البحث لمعرفة تطور تهذيب النفس ". وكيف أن السؤال حول الحقيقة ومبدأ معرفة الذات تطورا في نطاق ممارسات التقشف.)
وفقًا للنماذج اليونانية والرومانية للرعاية الذاتية، كانت الاهتمامات المرتبطة بالجسم المادي (مثل التمارين، والنظام الغذائي، والعادات الجنسية، والإتقان في الأنشطة الموسيقية والبدنية ، وما شابه ذلك)مهمة. ركز فوكو في أخلاقيات الاهتمام بالذات: على العلاقة بين أخلاقيات رعاية الذات كأسلوب للحكم الذاتي والإشراف، حكم الآخرين؛ العلاقة بين حكم الآخرين والممارسة الفلسفية للتعبير، لنمط معين من قول الحقيقة؛ العناية بالذات وأخلاقيات الرعاية السياسية.( الذات بين المعرفة والسلطة.) - كيف تتحرّك الذات في ثنائيّة السلطة\المعرفة؟ ، الشرور والأمراض التي يمكن أن يفضي لها الاستعمال المتواتر لمتع الجنس.
"الذاتيّة، في البحث الفوكوي هي حركة ووقفة تأمليّة أي أفعال مقصودة وطوعيّة لا يضع الإنسان من خلالها قواعد سلوك لنفسه وحسب، بل يسعى أيضًا إلى تحويل نفسه وحياته إلى أعمال. إنّ الذات تكوينيّة (self-constructed)، بحسب المجلّدين الثاني والثالث من تاريخ الجنسانية. وهي لا تعطى أو تمنح، بل تتشكّل من خلال مجموعة من الممارسات في سياق تاريخيّ معيّن. وتاليًا، الذات هي موضوع (object) للتاريخ خاضع للتغيّر والتحوّل. يمكّننا التحليل والبحث التاريخيّان من تحديد تلك الممارسات المكوّنة لأنواع مختلفة من الذوات، وعلى عكس ما يشاع لا يزوّدان الذات بهويّة."
—أنطونيوس نادر
الذات، التذويت، والذاتية كمفهوم، ذات أهمية فلسفية خاصة بالنسبة لميشيل فوكو، إذ كان لها أثر وتصور مغاير في فكره وأعماله وخطابه؛ اختلافاً جوهريًا عن كانط وهوسرل.
“Subjectivity” and its cognates are philosophical terms that describe a possibility for lived experience within a larger historical and political context. “The subject” (le sujet) is not simply a synonym for “person”; instead the term captures the possibility of being a certain kind of person, which, for the theorists who tend to use it, is typically a contingent historical possibility rather than a universal or essential truth about human nature.
These terms are especially philosophically important for Michel Foucault, who, in his middle works Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Volume I, develops a theoretical-historical account of the emergence of the modern subject in the context of what he calls “disciplinary power”.
—Subjectivity and power
from PART III - SUBJECTIVITY
By Cressida J. Heyes.
…، المرأة وإشكالية الزواج، وأخلاقيات الاعتناء أو الاهتمام بالذات -" استشكال المتعة الجنسية من المنظور التاريخي لجنيالوجيا الذات، صاحبة الرغبة ضمن الأفق النظري لفنون الوجود- من خلال إعادة قراءة فلاسفة وأطباء، وخطباء، إلخ.، العصر اليوناني- الروماني القديم." والتي كان لها النصيب الأكبر في هذا الجزء ." الانشغال بعين الذات."-( الأسئلة المطروحة في هذا الجانب حول الحقيقية- حقيقة ماعليه المرء من وضع، مايقوم به وما هو يقدر القيام به- في صميم تكوين الشخص الأخلاقي. ومدى سيطرة الفرد على ذاته كنواة أخلاقية جوهرية" البحث لمعرفة تطور تهذيب النفس ". وكيف أن السؤال حول الحقيقة ومبدأ معرفة الذات تطورا في نطاق ممارسات التقشف.)
وفقًا للنماذج اليونانية والرومانية للرعاية الذاتية، كانت الاهتمامات المرتبطة بالجسم المادي (مثل التمارين، والنظام الغذائي، والعادات الجنسية، والإتقان في الأنشطة الموسيقية والبدنية ، وما شابه ذلك)مهمة. ركز فوكو في أخلاقيات الاهتمام بالذات: على العلاقة بين أخلاقيات رعاية الذات كأسلوب للحكم الذاتي والإشراف، حكم الآخرين؛ العلاقة بين حكم الآخرين والممارسة الفلسفية للتعبير، لنمط معين من قول الحقيقة؛ العناية بالذات وأخلاقيات الرعاية السياسية.( الذات بين المعرفة والسلطة.) - كيف تتحرّك الذات في ثنائيّة السلطة\المعرفة؟ ، الشرور والأمراض التي يمكن أن يفضي لها الاستعمال المتواتر لمتع الجنس.
"الذاتيّة، في البحث الفوكوي هي حركة ووقفة تأمليّة أي أفعال مقصودة وطوعيّة لا يضع الإنسان من خلالها قواعد سلوك لنفسه وحسب، بل يسعى أيضًا إلى تحويل نفسه وحياته إلى أعمال. إنّ الذات تكوينيّة (self-constructed)، بحسب المجلّدين الثاني والثالث من تاريخ الجنسانية. وهي لا تعطى أو تمنح، بل تتشكّل من خلال مجموعة من الممارسات في سياق تاريخيّ معيّن. وتاليًا، الذات هي موضوع (object) للتاريخ خاضع للتغيّر والتحوّل. يمكّننا التحليل والبحث التاريخيّان من تحديد تلك الممارسات المكوّنة لأنواع مختلفة من الذوات، وعلى عكس ما يشاع لا يزوّدان الذات بهويّة."
—أنطونيوس نادر
الذات، التذويت، والذاتية كمفهوم، ذات أهمية فلسفية خاصة بالنسبة لميشيل فوكو، إذ كان لها أثر وتصور مغاير في فكره وأعماله وخطابه؛ اختلافاً جوهريًا عن كانط وهوسرل.
“Subjectivity” and its cognates are philosophical terms that describe a possibility for lived experience within a larger historical and political context. “The subject” (le sujet) is not simply a synonym for “person”; instead the term captures the possibility of being a certain kind of person, which, for the theorists who tend to use it, is typically a contingent historical possibility rather than a universal or essential truth about human nature.
These terms are especially philosophically important for Michel Foucault, who, in his middle works Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Volume I, develops a theoretical-historical account of the emergence of the modern subject in the context of what he calls “disciplinary power”.
—Subjectivity and power
from PART III - SUBJECTIVITY
By Cressida J. Heyes.
August 2, 2011
After finishing the third volume of this series, I realized that my rating for volume 1 (four stars) was too low. By the end of this book, Foucault's method--much slower-paced and careful than in his previous works--has begun to make sense. Volume 2 wasn't bad, its points were interesting and arranged in a clever way, but it's volume 3--in which MF begins to make a series of subtle points about the changing nature of the conjugal relationship and the propriety of love for adolescent boys--where it all seems to come together. The sources used here range from some of Plutarch's lesser works to a book on dream interpretation by Artemidorus (Foucault's discussion of this intriguing text makes for an excellent first chapter, even if some of the conclusions he draws from it about the acceptability of various sex practices (such as mother-son incest) aren't sufficiently developed later in the book). The novelty of these sources sets this book apart from volume 2, which had been built around the "greatest hitmakers" of Greek science and philosophy (Hippocrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, etc.); however, given its frequent references to that earlier book, volume 3 shouldn't be read as a standalone text. The real pity here is that Foucault never finished volume 4, which probably would have stood among his greatest achievements. All of his references to the development of Christian thinking about sex (which this volume is careful to remind us is NOT merely the product of Stoic self-denial or earlier Greek attempts at mastery and moderation, but yet another stage in the history of this subject), which are foreshadowed throughout the series, thus remain unresolved.
By way of aside, this volume probably represents Foucault's clearest writing, as well his most useful "history" from the standpoint of actually learning about and remembering the material discussed therein.
By way of aside, this volume probably represents Foucault's clearest writing, as well his most useful "history" from the standpoint of actually learning about and remembering the material discussed therein.
October 4, 2019
This installment advances historically beyond the ancient Athenian polis to the writings of the late Roman Republic and early Empire, developing from the chresis aphrodision to the epimeleia heautou, and their consequent romanization.
He opens with a discussion of the Oneirokritikon of Artemidorus Ephesius, which involve a hermeneutics of dreams, and which has much to say about erotic dreams (4 ff). Much typology here—dreams of sex in conformity with law, against the law, against nature—it reminds one of the typology of passions in de Sade’s 120 Days, there the erotic dreams of the French aristocracy. For Foucault, the importance of Artemidorus is that his “interpretation quite regularly discovers a social signification in sexual dreams” (27)—there are reasons for this, such as the linguistic ambivalence in key Greek terms that can be sexual or political, depending on context, but more salient is that Artemidorus wrote his oneirics “mainly to men in order to help them lead their lives as men” (28)—so, an impossibility of disentangling, as in Volume II, sex and gender from sexuality, orientation, and identity, on the one hand, and one’s life in the oikos from life in the polis, on the other.
Artemidorus’ presentation itself is a model of “restraint”: “no caresses, no complicated combinations, no phantasmagoria; just a few simple variations around one basic form—penetration” (29). This is because his interest is “the male organ—the one called anagkaion (the ‘necessary’ part, whose needs compel us and by whose force others are compelled” (33). The important Greek concept is Anagke, 'necessity'--it is the force that requires Agamemnon to sacrifice his daughter, the force that compels Odysseus to cast infant Astyanax from the walls of Troy--it is the ultimate engine of Greek tragedy and its inevitable dilemmas, what brings into confrontation the equal rights of the agonists, between whom force must ultimately decide.
So follows the Romanization of the ancient epimeleia heautou as the cura sui (45 et seq.), working through the Roman philosophical schools, with attention to Stoics, Epicureans, and so on. Roman marriages (70 et seq.)—“love is carefully differentiated from the habitual sharing of existence” (79). The analysis of the ‘body’ is informed by Galen and the Roman physicians (105 ff). Sex is medicalized in this context as both “an involuntary violence of tension and an indefinite, exhausting expenditure” (113). Nevertheless, “sexual abstinence was not regarded as a duty, certainly, nor was the sexual act represented as an evil”—though this medical literature’s emphasis on health risks helped create later moralisms through “an insistence on the ambiguity of the effects of sexual activity” (122). Ultimately, the physicians proposed “a sort of animalization of the epithumia; that is, a subordination, as strict as possible, of the soul’s desire to the body’s needs; an ethics of desire that is modeled on a natural philosophy of excretions” (136). (This is not the belief of the Stoics, on the one hand, or Diogenes, on the other, of course.)
The argument regarding the Roman proprietor’s relation to his wife follows the trajectory of “a stylistics of living as a couple”: “in an art of conjugal relationship, in a doctrine of sexual monopoly, and in an aesthetics of shared pleasures” (149), which would have been innovative at the time, we must note. Marriage itself is not considered an aesthetic beneficence, but is rather a “duty” (155). Later a “Christian pastoral ministry” will “attempt to regulate everything—positions, frequency, gestures, each partner’s state of mind, knowledge by one of the intentions of the other, signs of desire on one side, tokens of acceptance on the other” (165); Greek and Roman writings are not concerned with this sort of totalitarian control. But, we did see some writers discuss the aphrodisia dikaia, “legitimate pleasures,” which concerns “pleasures that the partners enjoy together in marriage and for the purpose of begetting children” (168-69). Though that seems thuggish to me, there are subtleties:
The final chapter concerns the significance of the pederasty and ephebophilia (190 et seq.). As in Volume II, plenty more of interest. Very precise local readings of the writers at issue. Bring on the English translation of recently discovered Volume IV.
Recommended for readers who approach cum multa modestia et timore.
He opens with a discussion of the Oneirokritikon of Artemidorus Ephesius, which involve a hermeneutics of dreams, and which has much to say about erotic dreams (4 ff). Much typology here—dreams of sex in conformity with law, against the law, against nature—it reminds one of the typology of passions in de Sade’s 120 Days, there the erotic dreams of the French aristocracy. For Foucault, the importance of Artemidorus is that his “interpretation quite regularly discovers a social signification in sexual dreams” (27)—there are reasons for this, such as the linguistic ambivalence in key Greek terms that can be sexual or political, depending on context, but more salient is that Artemidorus wrote his oneirics “mainly to men in order to help them lead their lives as men” (28)—so, an impossibility of disentangling, as in Volume II, sex and gender from sexuality, orientation, and identity, on the one hand, and one’s life in the oikos from life in the polis, on the other.
Artemidorus’ presentation itself is a model of “restraint”: “no caresses, no complicated combinations, no phantasmagoria; just a few simple variations around one basic form—penetration” (29). This is because his interest is “the male organ—the one called anagkaion (the ‘necessary’ part, whose needs compel us and by whose force others are compelled” (33). The important Greek concept is Anagke, 'necessity'--it is the force that requires Agamemnon to sacrifice his daughter, the force that compels Odysseus to cast infant Astyanax from the walls of Troy--it is the ultimate engine of Greek tragedy and its inevitable dilemmas, what brings into confrontation the equal rights of the agonists, between whom force must ultimately decide.
So follows the Romanization of the ancient epimeleia heautou as the cura sui (45 et seq.), working through the Roman philosophical schools, with attention to Stoics, Epicureans, and so on. Roman marriages (70 et seq.)—“love is carefully differentiated from the habitual sharing of existence” (79). The analysis of the ‘body’ is informed by Galen and the Roman physicians (105 ff). Sex is medicalized in this context as both “an involuntary violence of tension and an indefinite, exhausting expenditure” (113). Nevertheless, “sexual abstinence was not regarded as a duty, certainly, nor was the sexual act represented as an evil”—though this medical literature’s emphasis on health risks helped create later moralisms through “an insistence on the ambiguity of the effects of sexual activity” (122). Ultimately, the physicians proposed “a sort of animalization of the epithumia; that is, a subordination, as strict as possible, of the soul’s desire to the body’s needs; an ethics of desire that is modeled on a natural philosophy of excretions” (136). (This is not the belief of the Stoics, on the one hand, or Diogenes, on the other, of course.)
The argument regarding the Roman proprietor’s relation to his wife follows the trajectory of “a stylistics of living as a couple”: “in an art of conjugal relationship, in a doctrine of sexual monopoly, and in an aesthetics of shared pleasures” (149), which would have been innovative at the time, we must note. Marriage itself is not considered an aesthetic beneficence, but is rather a “duty” (155). Later a “Christian pastoral ministry” will “attempt to regulate everything—positions, frequency, gestures, each partner’s state of mind, knowledge by one of the intentions of the other, signs of desire on one side, tokens of acceptance on the other” (165); Greek and Roman writings are not concerned with this sort of totalitarian control. But, we did see some writers discuss the aphrodisia dikaia, “legitimate pleasures,” which concerns “pleasures that the partners enjoy together in marriage and for the purpose of begetting children” (168-69). Though that seems thuggish to me, there are subtleties:
In the same way, and just as the task of Dionysus is not in the fact of drinking intoxicating wine, the task of Aphrodite (ergon Aphrodites) is not in the mere relating and conjoining of bodies (synousia, meixis); it is in the feeling of friendship (philosophrosyne), the longing (pothos), the association (homilia), and the intimacy (synetheia) between two people. (182)This leads inexorably to “the monopolistic principle, however: no sexual relations outside marriage. A requirement of ‘dehedonization’: sexual intercourse between spouses should not be governed by an economy of pleasure. A procreative finalizations: its goal should be the birth of offspring” (id.)
The final chapter concerns the significance of the pederasty and ephebophilia (190 et seq.). As in Volume II, plenty more of interest. Very precise local readings of the writers at issue. Bring on the English translation of recently discovered Volume IV.
Recommended for readers who approach cum multa modestia et timore.
August 21, 2015
This book is not about sex and sexuality, it's rather concerned with the discourse about sex and sexuality between the 17th and 20th century. Foucault discusses discretion in the discourse about sexuality and other related aspects, from a psychological/sociological/political point of view.
He first explains The Repressive Theory which claims that the history of sexuality in the past couple of centuries was based on repression. Where sex was considered taboo in case it wasn't for reproduction purposes. And the only way to liberate ourselves from that repression is to be basically more open about our sexuality. To talk about sex and to enjoy it.
But Foucault disagrees with that claim and tackles the progress in sexual discourse in the past 300 years. How it developed from a topic that is discussed strictly between spouses, into part of confessions Christians made in the church, only the become a matter of public interest in the 18th century in schools, especially regarding children and gender separation. It is also worth mentioning that Foucault discusses how homosexuality ceased to be associated with acts, and became associated with the person's identity later in the 19th century.
It's interesting how Foucault regards prostitution and psychiatry as "safe" outlets for confessing "improper" sexual feelings, in the repressive theory.
I also like how he suggests that discourse on sexuality, a mere revolt against this repressive system, is a matter of political liberation rather than intellectual analysis.
The bottom line from this book for me is the following:
The notion of secrecy regarding sex (and any other subject that is dealt with with discretion) is itself part of the discourse on sex (or that subject). Meaning that our talking about something as if it were a secret, as something hidden, is what drives us to uncover it and learn about it.
He first explains The Repressive Theory which claims that the history of sexuality in the past couple of centuries was based on repression. Where sex was considered taboo in case it wasn't for reproduction purposes. And the only way to liberate ourselves from that repression is to be basically more open about our sexuality. To talk about sex and to enjoy it.
But Foucault disagrees with that claim and tackles the progress in sexual discourse in the past 300 years. How it developed from a topic that is discussed strictly between spouses, into part of confessions Christians made in the church, only the become a matter of public interest in the 18th century in schools, especially regarding children and gender separation. It is also worth mentioning that Foucault discusses how homosexuality ceased to be associated with acts, and became associated with the person's identity later in the 19th century.
It's interesting how Foucault regards prostitution and psychiatry as "safe" outlets for confessing "improper" sexual feelings, in the repressive theory.
I also like how he suggests that discourse on sexuality, a mere revolt against this repressive system, is a matter of political liberation rather than intellectual analysis.
The bottom line from this book for me is the following:
The notion of secrecy regarding sex (and any other subject that is dealt with with discretion) is itself part of the discourse on sex (or that subject). Meaning that our talking about something as if it were a secret, as something hidden, is what drives us to uncover it and learn about it.
February 3, 2017
Neste último volume, Foucault liga toda a história que escreveu até aqui à modernidade, à criação da sexualidade e sexologia - algo que tomamos como certo mas que também é cultural (os termos são muito recentes na história humana).
Surpreende-nos com uma inesperada ligação (feita numa longa e tortuosa transição). A discursificação do cristianismo, que foi tratanto o sexo no confessionário através dos pecados rigorosamente catalogados, onde já as palavra pederastia e pederasta tinham sido herdadas dos gregos ganhando contornos malignos deu lugar às patologias da sexologia.
Antes ainda de Freud, a obsessão em descobrir parafilias e patologias sexuais deu-nos a fauna classificativa que ainda hoje usamos e muita que abandonámos visto que hoje seria considerada insultuosa ou cientificamente aberrante. Invertido era palavra usada quer por clérigos quer por sexólogos. Quando os psicanalistas começam a sentar as pessoas no divã é com a ideia de que os pacientes se devem libertar das ideias negativas, das leis que a o cristianismo criou, associando o sexo ao pecado, e com a culpa impedindo o prazer sexual de ser experimentado na sua plenitude. Era uma ideia utópica, que foi reinventado de muitas maneiras, de que libertando da culpa as pessoas, a sexualidade seria melhor. A ideia surpreendente, que Foucault traz é que o método da psicanálise foi precisamente o de criar discurso, apresentando esta discursificação específica alguma continuidade ou pelo menos pontos de contacto com o cristianismo. Foi, mais uma vez, fazer as pessoas confessar. Escutá-las, fazê-las dizer o que tinham feito, com quem. Ainda que não no sentido de se sentirem culpadas, mas no sentido oposto, de que as pessoas deixassem de se sentir-se culpadas.
Nunca mais a sexualidade no ocidente deixaria, até hoje, de ser vivida como um discurso de si.
Esta obra imensa de Foucault, estes três volumes, são uma obra de história do pensamento, como o autor avisa no início. Abre horizontes e dá imensa bibliografia para percebermos de onde vêm as limitações da nossa cultura - com isso também perceber pistas para nos superarmos. É um trabalho muito bem fundamentado, rigoroso e, felizmente, muito bem escrito. É um prazer ler Foucault.
Esta é a nossa história, a da cultura ocidental (à falta de melhor palavra). Fico com uma ideia de que houve outros percursos. A moral foi uma moral masculina, as relações de poder foram desiguais. O sexo foi sobretudo discurso. E acabámos por nos interessar sobretudo pela sua patologia. Quando nos interessámos finalmente pelo sexo, inventámos-lhe uma sexualidade e uma sexologia. O que Foucault chama de "scientia sexualis". Noutras culturas, como a indiana, a chinesa e a árabe (até há uns séculos atrás, a cultura árabe que produziu o Jardins Perfumados) inventou-se o que Foucault chamou de Ars Erotica. Nessas culturas, o importante não foi descobrir patologias, invertidos. Foi escrever manuais sobre como o sexo, vê-lo como uma forma de arte e, em alguns momentos, como uma forma de transcendência e algo de espiritual.
Para mim, um exemplo onde se nota a cristalização da nossa cultura de "sexualidade" e "discursificação" é na produção obsessiva de discurso sobre pontos erógenos. Que continua na discussão sobre, por exemplo, o ponto G. Sobre se existe, não existe. Tudo isto, sempre, como discurso, "conversa", "tema", algo "académico", "conselhos". Ao ponto de de discutir que pressão coloca falar-se spobre algo que assume contornos de mito, que novas expectativas coloca sobre a mulher, o casal, a "relação sexual", o "prazer", o "sexo". E entretanto dizendo a frase sacramental da sexualidade ocidental, o enorme paradoxo:
"O maior ponto erógeno é o cérebro".
A contrastar a esta imprecisão obsessiva do discurso da "scientia sexualis" ocidental, a ars erotica oriental tem uma imprecisão serena, que é notória por exemplo no kama sutra. As posições sexuais sugeridas em ilustraçoes antigas. A irrealidade que por vezes assumem, são uma delícia. Não interessa nenhuma noção de rigor anatómico. Estimulam a imaginação. Existe uma ideia de arte erótica, que serve como forma de estimular a líbido. E é isso que se procura fazer, de forma prática e directa: estimular quem vai ter sexo. Numa analogia, se houvesse um conselho como, existe um ponto (chamemos-lhe o ponto da manga, já que por exemplo os genitais são por vezes comparados a frutos) que é bom estimular, não é dado como sexologia. Como um conselho médico, de anatomia. É dado como um conselho de um guru do prazer. E ao ser lido, já é lido com prazer. O próprio texto já se aproxima do erótico. A ideia de ficar ansioso por ler o kama sutra ou por receber conselhos para o prazer não faz sentido.
O Zizek diz que hoje ao contrário do que acontecia no tempo de Freud, os psicanalistas dizem aos seus pacientes que são livres de dizerem que não têm prazer. Que se não são felizes, que se não estão a ter prazer a toda a hora, isso é normal, e podem expressá-lo livremente. Porque existe uma pressão enorme para o gozo.
Tempos estranhos.
As traduções da Relógio d' Água são excelentes.
Surpreende-nos com uma inesperada ligação (feita numa longa e tortuosa transição). A discursificação do cristianismo, que foi tratanto o sexo no confessionário através dos pecados rigorosamente catalogados, onde já as palavra pederastia e pederasta tinham sido herdadas dos gregos ganhando contornos malignos deu lugar às patologias da sexologia.
Antes ainda de Freud, a obsessão em descobrir parafilias e patologias sexuais deu-nos a fauna classificativa que ainda hoje usamos e muita que abandonámos visto que hoje seria considerada insultuosa ou cientificamente aberrante. Invertido era palavra usada quer por clérigos quer por sexólogos. Quando os psicanalistas começam a sentar as pessoas no divã é com a ideia de que os pacientes se devem libertar das ideias negativas, das leis que a o cristianismo criou, associando o sexo ao pecado, e com a culpa impedindo o prazer sexual de ser experimentado na sua plenitude. Era uma ideia utópica, que foi reinventado de muitas maneiras, de que libertando da culpa as pessoas, a sexualidade seria melhor. A ideia surpreendente, que Foucault traz é que o método da psicanálise foi precisamente o de criar discurso, apresentando esta discursificação específica alguma continuidade ou pelo menos pontos de contacto com o cristianismo. Foi, mais uma vez, fazer as pessoas confessar. Escutá-las, fazê-las dizer o que tinham feito, com quem. Ainda que não no sentido de se sentirem culpadas, mas no sentido oposto, de que as pessoas deixassem de se sentir-se culpadas.
Nunca mais a sexualidade no ocidente deixaria, até hoje, de ser vivida como um discurso de si.
Esta obra imensa de Foucault, estes três volumes, são uma obra de história do pensamento, como o autor avisa no início. Abre horizontes e dá imensa bibliografia para percebermos de onde vêm as limitações da nossa cultura - com isso também perceber pistas para nos superarmos. É um trabalho muito bem fundamentado, rigoroso e, felizmente, muito bem escrito. É um prazer ler Foucault.
Esta é a nossa história, a da cultura ocidental (à falta de melhor palavra). Fico com uma ideia de que houve outros percursos. A moral foi uma moral masculina, as relações de poder foram desiguais. O sexo foi sobretudo discurso. E acabámos por nos interessar sobretudo pela sua patologia. Quando nos interessámos finalmente pelo sexo, inventámos-lhe uma sexualidade e uma sexologia. O que Foucault chama de "scientia sexualis". Noutras culturas, como a indiana, a chinesa e a árabe (até há uns séculos atrás, a cultura árabe que produziu o Jardins Perfumados) inventou-se o que Foucault chamou de Ars Erotica. Nessas culturas, o importante não foi descobrir patologias, invertidos. Foi escrever manuais sobre como o sexo, vê-lo como uma forma de arte e, em alguns momentos, como uma forma de transcendência e algo de espiritual.
Para mim, um exemplo onde se nota a cristalização da nossa cultura de "sexualidade" e "discursificação" é na produção obsessiva de discurso sobre pontos erógenos. Que continua na discussão sobre, por exemplo, o ponto G. Sobre se existe, não existe. Tudo isto, sempre, como discurso, "conversa", "tema", algo "académico", "conselhos". Ao ponto de de discutir que pressão coloca falar-se spobre algo que assume contornos de mito, que novas expectativas coloca sobre a mulher, o casal, a "relação sexual", o "prazer", o "sexo". E entretanto dizendo a frase sacramental da sexualidade ocidental, o enorme paradoxo:
"O maior ponto erógeno é o cérebro".
A contrastar a esta imprecisão obsessiva do discurso da "scientia sexualis" ocidental, a ars erotica oriental tem uma imprecisão serena, que é notória por exemplo no kama sutra. As posições sexuais sugeridas em ilustraçoes antigas. A irrealidade que por vezes assumem, são uma delícia. Não interessa nenhuma noção de rigor anatómico. Estimulam a imaginação. Existe uma ideia de arte erótica, que serve como forma de estimular a líbido. E é isso que se procura fazer, de forma prática e directa: estimular quem vai ter sexo. Numa analogia, se houvesse um conselho como, existe um ponto (chamemos-lhe o ponto da manga, já que por exemplo os genitais são por vezes comparados a frutos) que é bom estimular, não é dado como sexologia. Como um conselho médico, de anatomia. É dado como um conselho de um guru do prazer. E ao ser lido, já é lido com prazer. O próprio texto já se aproxima do erótico. A ideia de ficar ansioso por ler o kama sutra ou por receber conselhos para o prazer não faz sentido.
O Zizek diz que hoje ao contrário do que acontecia no tempo de Freud, os psicanalistas dizem aos seus pacientes que são livres de dizerem que não têm prazer. Que se não são felizes, que se não estão a ter prazer a toda a hora, isso é normal, e podem expressá-lo livremente. Porque existe uma pressão enorme para o gozo.
Tempos estranhos.
As traduções da Relógio d' Água são excelentes.
June 18, 2019
Zunächst einmal zur Ausgangssituation: Ich habe diesen dritten Band der Reihe „Sexualität und Wahrheit“ eigentlich nur gelesen, um für die soeben erschienene deutsche Übersetzung des aus dem Nachlass veröffentlichten vierten Band, „Die Geständnisse des Fleisches“, ein wenig auf dem letzten Stand zu sein. Den zweiten Band der „Sexualität und Wahrheit“ habe ich bis heute noch nicht gelesen. Und das hat sich wahrscheinlich ein wenig gerächt, bilden der zweite und dritte Band doch eigentlich mit der Antike eine historische Einheit. Allerdings ist in diesem dritten Band die spätere Antike, genauer die Römische Kaiserzeit, historischer Ausgangspunkt der Analyse. Ungeachtet dessen dreht sich auch dieser Band um die Frage, wie das Sexualverhalten im klassischen griechischen Denken reflektiert worden ist, hier allerdings im Gegensatz zur klassischen Zeit vor allem in Form des Hellenismus und damit einhergehend auch bei römischen Autoren wie Marc Aurel.
Hauptgegenstand ist wie schon im zweiten Band die chresis aphrodision — der Gebrauch der Lüste. Wie der Titel „Die Sorge um sich“ erkennen lässt, wird der Entwicklung der Lüste auch durch die einhergehende Subjektivierung nachgezeichnet. So dreht sich das zweite Kapitel dann auch um die „Kultur seiner selbst“ — ohne jedoch hier großartige Informationen zu gewinnen. Und das ist auch gleich der Hauptkritikpunkt, der für nahezu alle Kapitel gilt: Foucault argumentiert hier ungewohnt schwach, mit teils wenigen Quellen. Die Argumente wirken teils sehr konstruiert, sodass die Glaubwürdigkeit des Gesamtprojekts stark unter der durchschnittlichen Qualität leidet. Ein weiteres Indiz hierfür ist auch der im Vergleich zum zweiten Band stark gesunkene Umfang. Und so wirken die einzelnen Kapitel eher wie lose Abschnitte, deren Zusammenhang nicht immer klar ist bzw. nicht immer argumentativ stichhaltig ist.
Das erste Kapitel etwa, über das Traumbuch des Artemidor, ist ein gutes Beispiel hierfür. Foucault verwendet diesen Abschnitt, um anhand des Traumbuches (eine Art Anleitung zum Verstehen von Träumen) einen Moralkodex abzubilden, wie er etwa laut Artemidor in Geltung war. Foucault ist sich dabei natürlich der Schwäche dieser Methode klar — es wird teilweise etwas als unmoralisch (ungesetzlich bis hin zu widernatürlich) dargestellt, allerdings wir nur wenig darauf eingegangen wieso dies so war. Andererseits galten manche Vorzeichen wie Inzest mit der Mutter im Traum als gutes Vorzeichen, was natürlich einer allgemeinen Moral ebenfalls nicht entsprach. Jedenfalls stellt Foucault dieses Kapitel an den Beginn. Inhaltlich zwar teils interessant stellt sich die Frage, wie dieses Werk jetzt in den Gesamtdiskurs eingeordnet werden kann. Was für Dispositive ergeben sich etc. Auf all diese Fragen gibt Foucault nicht wirklich eine Antwort, sondern geht direkt über in das zweite bereits erwähnte Kapitel.
Das dritte Kapitel „Man selber und die anderen“ gibt eine erste mögliche Ahnung, wo Foucault hinwill mit diesem Werk. Der erste Abschnitt in diesem Kapitel widmet sich der Rolle der Ehe — die uns im folgenden in allen Kapiteln weiter beschäftigen wird und deren „Genealogie“ noch am interessantesten und plausibelsten scheint, da sie von verschiedenen Seiten aus betrachtet wird. Der zweite Abschnitt im dritten Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit dem politischen Spiel bzw. den Veränderungen zwischen der Rolle der Politik im persönlichen Leben in der klassischen Zeit und eben in der Spätantike im römischen Reich. Ist zwar nicht uninteressant, aber ziemlich kurz.
Das vierte Kapitel widmet sich antiken Aufzeichnungen über den Körper in Bezug auf den Gebrauch der Lüste. Das wirkt beim Lesen unfreiwillig komisch, ist von Foucault aber durchaus systematisch und überzeugend aufbereitet — lediglich die Einbettung in das Gesamtwerk erschließt sich gar nicht, das Kapitel bleibt lose im Raum stehen.
Das fünfte (und zusammen mit dem sechsten Kapitel das längste) Kapitel widmet sich der veränderten Rolle der (Ehe)Frau. Foucault zeichnet hier sehr deutlich eine historische Veränderung nach, von der Rolle der Frau als reine Hausverwalterin in der klassischen Zeit hin zur Ideal der monogamen Ehe. Hier gelingt es Foucault sehr gut, die verschiedenen Änderungen aus diversen Blickwinkeln zu betrachten und die Veränderung der Stellung der Frau glaubhaft nachzuzeichnen. Dieses Kapitel stellt somit das mit Abstand beste Kapitel in dem Band dar.
Das sechste und abschließende Kapitel über die Entwicklung der Reflektion über die Knabenliebe (=Päderastie) ist interessant, aber hier bezieht sich Foucault wiederum nur auf drei Werke, die er en detail beschreibt. Das ist wieder ein wenig mager, auch wenn dieser Abschluss in Bezug auf Inhalt des zweiten Bandes der „Sexualität und Wahrheit“ verständlich und aus dieser Sicht nicht schlecht gewählt ist.
————————————————————————
Es bleibt ein langweiliger Nachgeschmack nach der Lektüre. Man hat den Eindruck, dass Foucault entweder die Zeit gefehlt hat oder er schon so sehr mit der nachfolgenden Forschung, der Sexualmoral im Christentum, beschäftigt war, als dass er mit dieser Thematik schnell abschließen wollte. Und dass ist schade. Der Zeitraum der Kaiserzeit wäre sicherlich ein sehr breites und interessantes Feld, das im Gegensatz zum Mittelalter oder der klassischen Antike noch weit weniger aufgearbeitet ist. Hier wäre imho noch einiges möglich gewesen. Für die ansonsten in meinen Augen sehr hohe Qualität in Foucault’s Werken ist die Lektüre dieses Werkes leider enttäuschend.
Hauptgegenstand ist wie schon im zweiten Band die chresis aphrodision — der Gebrauch der Lüste. Wie der Titel „Die Sorge um sich“ erkennen lässt, wird der Entwicklung der Lüste auch durch die einhergehende Subjektivierung nachgezeichnet. So dreht sich das zweite Kapitel dann auch um die „Kultur seiner selbst“ — ohne jedoch hier großartige Informationen zu gewinnen. Und das ist auch gleich der Hauptkritikpunkt, der für nahezu alle Kapitel gilt: Foucault argumentiert hier ungewohnt schwach, mit teils wenigen Quellen. Die Argumente wirken teils sehr konstruiert, sodass die Glaubwürdigkeit des Gesamtprojekts stark unter der durchschnittlichen Qualität leidet. Ein weiteres Indiz hierfür ist auch der im Vergleich zum zweiten Band stark gesunkene Umfang. Und so wirken die einzelnen Kapitel eher wie lose Abschnitte, deren Zusammenhang nicht immer klar ist bzw. nicht immer argumentativ stichhaltig ist.
Das erste Kapitel etwa, über das Traumbuch des Artemidor, ist ein gutes Beispiel hierfür. Foucault verwendet diesen Abschnitt, um anhand des Traumbuches (eine Art Anleitung zum Verstehen von Träumen) einen Moralkodex abzubilden, wie er etwa laut Artemidor in Geltung war. Foucault ist sich dabei natürlich der Schwäche dieser Methode klar — es wird teilweise etwas als unmoralisch (ungesetzlich bis hin zu widernatürlich) dargestellt, allerdings wir nur wenig darauf eingegangen wieso dies so war. Andererseits galten manche Vorzeichen wie Inzest mit der Mutter im Traum als gutes Vorzeichen, was natürlich einer allgemeinen Moral ebenfalls nicht entsprach. Jedenfalls stellt Foucault dieses Kapitel an den Beginn. Inhaltlich zwar teils interessant stellt sich die Frage, wie dieses Werk jetzt in den Gesamtdiskurs eingeordnet werden kann. Was für Dispositive ergeben sich etc. Auf all diese Fragen gibt Foucault nicht wirklich eine Antwort, sondern geht direkt über in das zweite bereits erwähnte Kapitel.
Das dritte Kapitel „Man selber und die anderen“ gibt eine erste mögliche Ahnung, wo Foucault hinwill mit diesem Werk. Der erste Abschnitt in diesem Kapitel widmet sich der Rolle der Ehe — die uns im folgenden in allen Kapiteln weiter beschäftigen wird und deren „Genealogie“ noch am interessantesten und plausibelsten scheint, da sie von verschiedenen Seiten aus betrachtet wird. Der zweite Abschnitt im dritten Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit dem politischen Spiel bzw. den Veränderungen zwischen der Rolle der Politik im persönlichen Leben in der klassischen Zeit und eben in der Spätantike im römischen Reich. Ist zwar nicht uninteressant, aber ziemlich kurz.
Das vierte Kapitel widmet sich antiken Aufzeichnungen über den Körper in Bezug auf den Gebrauch der Lüste. Das wirkt beim Lesen unfreiwillig komisch, ist von Foucault aber durchaus systematisch und überzeugend aufbereitet — lediglich die Einbettung in das Gesamtwerk erschließt sich gar nicht, das Kapitel bleibt lose im Raum stehen.
Das fünfte (und zusammen mit dem sechsten Kapitel das längste) Kapitel widmet sich der veränderten Rolle der (Ehe)Frau. Foucault zeichnet hier sehr deutlich eine historische Veränderung nach, von der Rolle der Frau als reine Hausverwalterin in der klassischen Zeit hin zur Ideal der monogamen Ehe. Hier gelingt es Foucault sehr gut, die verschiedenen Änderungen aus diversen Blickwinkeln zu betrachten und die Veränderung der Stellung der Frau glaubhaft nachzuzeichnen. Dieses Kapitel stellt somit das mit Abstand beste Kapitel in dem Band dar.
Das sechste und abschließende Kapitel über die Entwicklung der Reflektion über die Knabenliebe (=Päderastie) ist interessant, aber hier bezieht sich Foucault wiederum nur auf drei Werke, die er en detail beschreibt. Das ist wieder ein wenig mager, auch wenn dieser Abschluss in Bezug auf Inhalt des zweiten Bandes der „Sexualität und Wahrheit“ verständlich und aus dieser Sicht nicht schlecht gewählt ist.
————————————————————————
Es bleibt ein langweiliger Nachgeschmack nach der Lektüre. Man hat den Eindruck, dass Foucault entweder die Zeit gefehlt hat oder er schon so sehr mit der nachfolgenden Forschung, der Sexualmoral im Christentum, beschäftigt war, als dass er mit dieser Thematik schnell abschließen wollte. Und dass ist schade. Der Zeitraum der Kaiserzeit wäre sicherlich ein sehr breites und interessantes Feld, das im Gegensatz zum Mittelalter oder der klassischen Antike noch weit weniger aufgearbeitet ist. Hier wäre imho noch einiges möglich gewesen. Für die ansonsten in meinen Augen sehr hohe Qualität in Foucault’s Werken ist die Lektüre dieses Werkes leider enttäuschend.
January 25, 2018
يتحدث فوكو عن مبدأ الانهمام بالذات كممارسة عقلانية تجاه الذات والمجتمع والسلطة السياسية، كطريقة للعيش بتجاوب مع العالم وفي نفس الوقت لخلق حياة ناشطة منظمة.
Read
May 29, 2020The Plutarch chapter alone is worth the price of admission.
October 3, 2022
Foucault is, actually, surprisingly neutral given his position on the direction the dominant morality of his time took towards sexuality. This is an incredibly rich, truly interdisciplinary work - which becomes all the more clear, the further one progresses along the volumes. Although I might very well need a break from ‘The History of Sexuality’, I am definitely looking forward to reading (and, admittedly, buying) the fourth and final volume. I am keen to read how Foucault rounds this project off in ‘Confessions of the Flesh’, all the more so because it is about double the size of the average amount of pages for the first three volumes. If about half of that work consists of the address of a topic as all the former three have done (which will likely be the long-awaited topic of the approach to sexuality as held in christianity, and (philosophical) ground thereof), that would mean the other half would likely be spent on a synergy of all four parts. To me, that sounds like an absolute treat.
Truly exhilarating to come to realise not only the extent to which sexuality (in)forms our outward identity, but even more so the extent to which sexuality can be seen as a practice of the inner self. This way, it stresses how identity really is not much more than the outer layer of our personality, the layer of veneer that is shown and shaped in interaction with others, of which we can wonder if it is even connected to the self at all, and not rather a mask of sorts. It opens possibilities to distinguish the discrepancies between self and identity that are so prevalent in humanity, especially in our current societal blueprints. Additionally, note how this opens the way to various other incarnations of 'The History of...' - if this goes for sexuality, why not for the discussed dietetics (understood as that which we consume as to best suit our individual bodies)? Or of friendship? Or affectionality, intellectuality, sensuality?
If there is one thing to take away from these series, it is that none of us are exactly the same, although we might have been wrought from the same matter.
Truly exhilarating to come to realise not only the extent to which sexuality (in)forms our outward identity, but even more so the extent to which sexuality can be seen as a practice of the inner self. This way, it stresses how identity really is not much more than the outer layer of our personality, the layer of veneer that is shown and shaped in interaction with others, of which we can wonder if it is even connected to the self at all, and not rather a mask of sorts. It opens possibilities to distinguish the discrepancies between self and identity that are so prevalent in humanity, especially in our current societal blueprints. Additionally, note how this opens the way to various other incarnations of 'The History of...' - if this goes for sexuality, why not for the discussed dietetics (understood as that which we consume as to best suit our individual bodies)? Or of friendship? Or affectionality, intellectuality, sensuality?
If there is one thing to take away from these series, it is that none of us are exactly the same, although we might have been wrought from the same matter.
September 12, 2023
[Nos primeiros séculos da nossa era,] está-se ainda longe de uma experiência dos prazeres sexuais em que estes serão associados ao mal, onde o comportamento deverá submeter-se à forma universal da lei e onde a decifração do desejo será condição indispensável de acesso a uma existência purificada. Contudo, pode já ver-se como a questão do mal começa a influenciar o antigo tema da força, como a questão da lei começa a inflectir o tema da arte e da techne, como a questão da verdade e o princípio do conhecimento de si se desenvolvem nas práticas de ascese.
October 15, 2025
• Cada vez que Foucault pone que el rodeo de 10 páginas que acaba de dar era necesario diferimos ampliamente sobre el concepto de necesidad. Pero bueno, al final del día es su libro y claramente hace con él lo que le da la gana.
• Me fascina la obsesión antigua con que los hombres ponen la parte importante para hacer un crío. Rollo, colega, ¿has visto un embarazo? Toca césped.
• Como lea la palabra esperma una vez más voy a perder la cabeza.
• Tío, ¿quién vio el semen y dijo sí, esto es una cosa preciosa que nos hace perfectos y superiores?
• Ninguno de los hombres que hablan sobre lesbianas en este libro ha tenido nunca una conversación con una y se nota. Colegas, con lo insoportables que sois todos, las teníais mas cerca de lo que pensabais, os lo aseguro.
• Diré que este libro está siendo considerablemente menos traumático que el anterior, pero ¿qué necesidad había de usar la palabra simiente?
• Yo no sé si Foucault intenta defender la homosexualidad o al pederastia a estas alturas...
De verdad que no hay ninguna necesidad de hacer estos libros tan largos y con tantos detalles. O sea, que están bien y me están gustando, pero es too much. Siento que Foucault es un poco: si yo he leído todo esto, vosotras también. Pero bueno, solo queda 1 y espero que empecemos a poner a parir el cristianismo y la heteronormatividad pronto, que me estoy cansando.
• Me fascina la obsesión antigua con que los hombres ponen la parte importante para hacer un crío. Rollo, colega, ¿has visto un embarazo? Toca césped.
• Como lea la palabra esperma una vez más voy a perder la cabeza.
• Tío, ¿quién vio el semen y dijo sí, esto es una cosa preciosa que nos hace perfectos y superiores?
• Ninguno de los hombres que hablan sobre lesbianas en este libro ha tenido nunca una conversación con una y se nota. Colegas, con lo insoportables que sois todos, las teníais mas cerca de lo que pensabais, os lo aseguro.
• Diré que este libro está siendo considerablemente menos traumático que el anterior, pero ¿qué necesidad había de usar la palabra simiente?
• Yo no sé si Foucault intenta defender la homosexualidad o al pederastia a estas alturas...
De verdad que no hay ninguna necesidad de hacer estos libros tan largos y con tantos detalles. O sea, que están bien y me están gustando, pero es too much. Siento que Foucault es un poco: si yo he leído todo esto, vosotras también. Pero bueno, solo queda 1 y espero que empecemos a poner a parir el cristianismo y la heteronormatividad pronto, que me estoy cansando.
December 14, 2025
2.5/5
Trata-se de um pequeno livro com textos extraídos do volume III (O cuidado de si) da História da Sexualidade de Michel Foucault. Portanto, não é o volume integral, embora o livro, por razões que eu desconheço, esteja ligado ao volume integral aqui no Goodreads.
A escrita não mostra dificuldades, embora tenha, por vezes, o seu "quê" de erudição. Aqui, o filósofo/historiador liga a conduta sexual em referência à mulher (matrimônio) e aos rapazes (pederastia) a uma conduta ética mais ampla e, muito de passagem, trata do cuidado de si.
Quando leio os textos de Foucault, sinto falta de análises que ele aparentemente deixa de lado para alcançar suas teses e, portanto, parece mais uma visão ideal do que uma análise.
Trata-se de um pequeno livro com textos extraídos do volume III (O cuidado de si) da História da Sexualidade de Michel Foucault. Portanto, não é o volume integral, embora o livro, por razões que eu desconheço, esteja ligado ao volume integral aqui no Goodreads.
A escrita não mostra dificuldades, embora tenha, por vezes, o seu "quê" de erudição. Aqui, o filósofo/historiador liga a conduta sexual em referência à mulher (matrimônio) e aos rapazes (pederastia) a uma conduta ética mais ampla e, muito de passagem, trata do cuidado de si.
Quando leio os textos de Foucault, sinto falta de análises que ele aparentemente deixa de lado para alcançar suas teses e, portanto, parece mais uma visão ideal do que uma análise.
January 20, 2016
Before I start, I'd like to warn you that there's a NSFW link in this review: it's the one about Sappho.
Foucault analyzes the importance of self discipline when it comes to sexual relationships and marriage, the normalization of heterosexuality through marriage and the condemnation of homosexuality by greek and by some roman thinkers, argues that a lot of it, though it influenced Christianity is not quite at the same level of banning homosexuality and masturbation. He analyzes the medical and philosophical point views and quotes authors, but bases his views on a fundamentally incorrect reading of Church Fathers, to argue that married couples out not to get any kind of pleasure out of sexual acts, which is not what they meant at all. I wonder how interested would Foucault be in Theology of the Body, considering it didn't exist at his time, but probably not much. Or probably a lot... just to trash talk it because it's presented in a friendly way but it's "more repressive stuff from the Church".
I disagree with Foucault, and maybe because of an Augustinian-Renaissance approach, I believe a lot of the common sense of stoics and other virtuous pagan philosophers may have paved the way for Christianity. As a Catholic, of course I believe that Jesus' coming is the fulfilling of Revelation, but I think that, like Celts and Native Americans had mythologies which made it easier for them to accept the new religion, so happened with greeks and romans, so much of their thought had common points with Christians, that Christians learned to appreciate such things and used it in their favor, much like Celtic legends suffered.
Also, he seems disillusioned with the abandonement of the practice of pederasty, which makes it all more repulsive (it's not my job to judge homosexuality, but seriously? Old men chasing teens? No matter your views on homosexuality, that is a justification of pedophilia, so I'll pass). The interesting aspect of this book is that he recognizes that this self-discipline could be also applied in the education of a politician, and that is indeed useful.
It also helped me to understand stoics a bit better. So, as a closer, it's less preachy than the first volume, and less blatantly pro-male homosexuality than the second volume, but still kind of gross, because he gets on the justificactions for homosexuality, and one of them is that "women wear makeup to hide their ugliness, so basically women are liars". I'm not new to this argument, and I know it's not like he invented it, he's after all, just quoting Greek pagan people. But, just because men didn't bother to understand women back then, it didn't meant that we were uninteresting, and liars while at that.
I have survived 17 years with no makeup. I see how it could be necessary for a woman who seeks to hide a disease of the skin, or the mark of an accident, be it scar from burning, scratching, etc. I still like wearing it, I have been doing it for 6 years now, and I don't think a woman could fool a man just because she has an unnatural color in her hair for her age or genetics, extremely red lips, weirdly colored eyelids, prominent eyelashes and perfectly rosy cheeks, among with weirdly colored nails. It's just an emulation, and sometimes exaggeration of traits men like in women: youth and beauty. Basically, the greeks' argument was that women are shallow.
I don't see how Foucault is this "inclusive defensor of minorities, especially queers", if women are often looked with disdain and left out of his dissertations, the marginal allusions to lesbianism (though, I think I should say female same sex-attraction: lesbian is a political term and based loosely on opinions about Sappho), because greeks looked down on it, or at least Plato and a bunch of greek ancient doctors did, is inexcusable.
Sappho and all the myths surrounding her, would be interesting for a start, but I guess that by getting into radical feminist theory, I could get an idea of that. And radical feminists do hate his look on male homosexuality as much as I do, though for different reasons.
I agree with the idea that "hetero" and "homosexual" naming of human sexual and romantic relationships is unfortunate. For different reasons, rather than the fact that greeks did not make a distinction for it. The problem is that it allows people to tag others according to sexual "preference" or "orientation", and define them by such. I believe the use of expressions such as same-sex attraction is less aggressive. And even people who have opposite sex attraction can experience same-sex attraction. You don't get to define them by "orientations", but recognize the fact that they feel attracted (whether romantically or sexually, but those distinctions concern gender theorists more, I guess... though sexual attraction without a romantic attraction would be no less than a desire for prostitution in my opinion). You could also feel an attraction you don't want to feel, much like intrusive thoughts, so I'm also opposed to the terms "preference" and "orientation".
As always, I don't agree with Foucault, but it has been thought provoking. Not his best, though.
Foucault analyzes the importance of self discipline when it comes to sexual relationships and marriage, the normalization of heterosexuality through marriage and the condemnation of homosexuality by greek and by some roman thinkers, argues that a lot of it, though it influenced Christianity is not quite at the same level of banning homosexuality and masturbation. He analyzes the medical and philosophical point views and quotes authors, but bases his views on a fundamentally incorrect reading of Church Fathers, to argue that married couples out not to get any kind of pleasure out of sexual acts, which is not what they meant at all. I wonder how interested would Foucault be in Theology of the Body, considering it didn't exist at his time, but probably not much. Or probably a lot... just to trash talk it because it's presented in a friendly way but it's "more repressive stuff from the Church".
I disagree with Foucault, and maybe because of an Augustinian-Renaissance approach, I believe a lot of the common sense of stoics and other virtuous pagan philosophers may have paved the way for Christianity. As a Catholic, of course I believe that Jesus' coming is the fulfilling of Revelation, but I think that, like Celts and Native Americans had mythologies which made it easier for them to accept the new religion, so happened with greeks and romans, so much of their thought had common points with Christians, that Christians learned to appreciate such things and used it in their favor, much like Celtic legends suffered.
Also, he seems disillusioned with the abandonement of the practice of pederasty, which makes it all more repulsive (it's not my job to judge homosexuality, but seriously? Old men chasing teens? No matter your views on homosexuality, that is a justification of pedophilia, so I'll pass). The interesting aspect of this book is that he recognizes that this self-discipline could be also applied in the education of a politician, and that is indeed useful.
It also helped me to understand stoics a bit better. So, as a closer, it's less preachy than the first volume, and less blatantly pro-male homosexuality than the second volume, but still kind of gross, because he gets on the justificactions for homosexuality, and one of them is that "women wear makeup to hide their ugliness, so basically women are liars". I'm not new to this argument, and I know it's not like he invented it, he's after all, just quoting Greek pagan people. But, just because men didn't bother to understand women back then, it didn't meant that we were uninteresting, and liars while at that.
I have survived 17 years with no makeup. I see how it could be necessary for a woman who seeks to hide a disease of the skin, or the mark of an accident, be it scar from burning, scratching, etc. I still like wearing it, I have been doing it for 6 years now, and I don't think a woman could fool a man just because she has an unnatural color in her hair for her age or genetics, extremely red lips, weirdly colored eyelids, prominent eyelashes and perfectly rosy cheeks, among with weirdly colored nails. It's just an emulation, and sometimes exaggeration of traits men like in women: youth and beauty. Basically, the greeks' argument was that women are shallow.
I don't see how Foucault is this "inclusive defensor of minorities, especially queers", if women are often looked with disdain and left out of his dissertations, the marginal allusions to lesbianism (though, I think I should say female same sex-attraction: lesbian is a political term and based loosely on opinions about Sappho), because greeks looked down on it, or at least Plato and a bunch of greek ancient doctors did, is inexcusable.
Sappho and all the myths surrounding her, would be interesting for a start, but I guess that by getting into radical feminist theory, I could get an idea of that. And radical feminists do hate his look on male homosexuality as much as I do, though for different reasons.
I agree with the idea that "hetero" and "homosexual" naming of human sexual and romantic relationships is unfortunate. For different reasons, rather than the fact that greeks did not make a distinction for it. The problem is that it allows people to tag others according to sexual "preference" or "orientation", and define them by such. I believe the use of expressions such as same-sex attraction is less aggressive. And even people who have opposite sex attraction can experience same-sex attraction. You don't get to define them by "orientations", but recognize the fact that they feel attracted (whether romantically or sexually, but those distinctions concern gender theorists more, I guess... though sexual attraction without a romantic attraction would be no less than a desire for prostitution in my opinion). You could also feel an attraction you don't want to feel, much like intrusive thoughts, so I'm also opposed to the terms "preference" and "orientation".
As always, I don't agree with Foucault, but it has been thought provoking. Not his best, though.
January 8, 2025
a bit repetitive but very very good and so interesting
November 12, 2022
"وإذا كانت العلاقة الجوهرية في الحياة مع امرأة هي ’المرأة‘ و’الزوجة‘، وإذا كان الكائن البشري فرداً زوجياً تكتمل طبيعته في ممارسة الحياة المشتركة، فلا يمكن أن يكون هناك استحالة تطابق جوهري وأولي بين العلاقة التي يبنيها المرء مع ذاته والعلاقة التي يؤسسها مع الآخر. إن فن الزوجية يشكل جزءاً لا يتجزأ من تهذيب الذات".
تاريخ الجنسانية: الاهتمام بالذات – ميشيل فوكو
ثالث كتب سلسلة تاريخ الجنسانية، وفوكو يغرق في التحليل والتفسير والاقتباس، ومع ذلك فإن القارئ لا يضيع بين تحليلاته على عمقها، بل يظل مشدوداً لما يركز عليه فوكو وما يريد أن يثبته في كتابه.
يتحدث المجلد الثالث من سلسلة تاريخ الجنسانية عن انهمام المجتمع البشري – اليوناني القديم أنموذجاً – بالارتقاء بذاته وفكره وممارسات جسده، وبتهذيب لذاته وتحجيمها وتقنينها والتفلسف بطرقها ومواضيعها وسبلها، ضمن نظام أخلاقي يضبط المرء ويقر قوانين الملكية والعبودية وفي الوقت نفسه قوانين الارتقاء الفردي.
فمن عناية البشر بصحتهم إلى تنظيمهم أمور زواجهم وتحجيم دور المرأة الزوجة وضبط أخلاق الإخلاص المتبادل بين الزوجين، عمد الأثيني دائماً إلى التماس الحكمة في الفلسفة حول جسده ولذاته، مقارناً بين حالة الزواج المدني ودور الرجل والمرأة فيه، والغلمانية التي مثلت لذاته الخارجية و"شطحاته" الأخلاقية.
ومن اللافت أن أنموذج المجتمع الأثيني يعبر عن محاولات البشر المستمرة في تقنين ملذاتهم قدر الاستطاعة، فإن عجزوا عمدوا إلى الحط منها وإلصاق العار بها، حتى أن ذلك مثَّل جوهر العديد من الفلسفات التي تعددت زوايا نظرها إلى متعة البشر وكيفية تحصيلها، وهنا قد يتبادر للذهن سؤال محير: لماذا سعى البشر منذ البداية إلى تقنين لذاتهم؟
الكتاب مفيد وجيد للمبتدئين في القراءة لفوكو والمتمرسين على حد سواء، ��فيه من المنفعة الكثير.
تاريخ الجنسانية: الاهتمام بالذات – ميشيل فوكو
ثالث كتب سلسلة تاريخ الجنسانية، وفوكو يغرق في التحليل والتفسير والاقتباس، ومع ذلك فإن القارئ لا يضيع بين تحليلاته على عمقها، بل يظل مشدوداً لما يركز عليه فوكو وما يريد أن يثبته في كتابه.
يتحدث المجلد الثالث من سلسلة تاريخ الجنسانية عن انهمام المجتمع البشري – اليوناني القديم أنموذجاً – بالارتقاء بذاته وفكره وممارسات جسده، وبتهذيب لذاته وتحجيمها وتقنينها والتفلسف بطرقها ومواضيعها وسبلها، ضمن نظام أخلاقي يضبط المرء ويقر قوانين الملكية والعبودية وفي الوقت نفسه قوانين الارتقاء الفردي.
فمن عناية البشر بصحتهم إلى تنظيمهم أمور زواجهم وتحجيم دور المرأة الزوجة وضبط أخلاق الإخلاص المتبادل بين الزوجين، عمد الأثيني دائماً إلى التماس الحكمة في الفلسفة حول جسده ولذاته، مقارناً بين حالة الزواج المدني ودور الرجل والمرأة فيه، والغلمانية التي مثلت لذاته الخارجية و"شطحاته" الأخلاقية.
ومن اللافت أن أنموذج المجتمع الأثيني يعبر عن محاولات البشر المستمرة في تقنين ملذاتهم قدر الاستطاعة، فإن عجزوا عمدوا إلى الحط منها وإلصاق العار بها، حتى أن ذلك مثَّل جوهر العديد من الفلسفات التي تعددت زوايا نظرها إلى متعة البشر وكيفية تحصيلها، وهنا قد يتبادر للذهن سؤال محير: لماذا سعى البشر منذ البداية إلى تقنين لذاتهم؟
الكتاب مفيد وجيد للمبتدئين في القراءة لفوكو والمتمرسين على حد سواء، ��فيه من المنفعة الكثير.
August 9, 2023
(Texto publicado originalmente no site https://impressoesdemaria.com.br)
“Para algumas pessoas, a ideia de sonhar é abdicar da realidade, é renunciar ao sentido prático da vida. Porém, também podemos encontrar quem não veria sentido na vida se não fosse informado por sonhos, nos quais pode buscar os cantos, a cura, a inspiração e mesmo a resolução de questões práticas que não consegue discernir, cujas escolhas não consegue fazer fora do sonho, mas que ali estão abertas como possibilidades.”
– Ideias Para Adiar o Fim do Mundo, Ailton Krenak.
Certa vez, meu começo de noite se abria como um mar de possibilidades positivas. Devaneios que até então eram apenas sonhos longínquos começavam a ganhar uma forma mais concreta, ainda que nas horas anteriores um terror tenha armado acampamento em meus sentidos. Com a ansiedade já distante, aquela noite ficara no passado, e ao encostar minha cabeça no travesseiro me sentia um novo ser: repleto de planos futuros que sem dúvida alguma se concretizariam logo, já que aquela seria a primeira noite em que eu dormiria sem o peso na consciência que me perseguia há tanto tempo. Era um sentimento estranho, ainda que positivo, de certa forma: eu sonhava com a possibilidade de conseguir sonhar que estava realizando o sonho de finalmente ser feliz. Então, qual a razão para naquela noite ter um dos piores sonhos de toda a minha vida?
Acordei no meio da madrugada, ofegante, suado, assustado e com a respiração prestes a me abandonar. Fiquei imóvel por intermináveis 10 minutos, meu colchão ensopava a cada tentativa de recobrar os sentidos. Em choque, tentei em vão entender o motivo daquele sonho tão perturbador. Seria aquele sonho a premonição de algo? Talvez algo que já acontecera comigo na infância e que por alguma razão havia sido enterrado no fundo de minha memória por uma vida inteira? Pior: eu teria que confrontar as pessoas envolvidas no tal sonho? Exigir uma explicação, não do sonho em si, mas das atividades que aconteceram dentro deste? No dia seguinte me fiscalizei de todas as formas para esquecer o episódio e tentar interagir normalmente com todos os personagens daquele sonho de terror psicológico. Uma coisa, entretanto, não mudou: passei quase uma semana lutando contra um impulso de confrontar as pessoas lá inseridas. De alguma forma eu entendi aquilo como um aviso, e precisava tomar uma decisão drástica para possivelmente salvar vidas inocentes de um trauma futuro.
Então, para minha surpresa, sonhos, seus significados, e como proceder futuramente era o primeiro assunto abordado por Foucault no primeiro capítulo do livro História da sexualidade: O Cuidado de Si. A partir de “A Chave dos Sonhos”, de Artemidoro, o autor analisa uma série de sonhos e seus possíveis significados, e nos esclarece que a conduta moral de cada um de nós pode interferir no teor dos nossos sonhos. Devemos usar nossa moral enquanto sonhador para desenvolver uma análise e entender as interpretações, traduzir analogias que derivarão do corpo, da alma e de tabus: em certo momento ele explica por que um pai sonharia estar fazendo sexo com o próprio filho, e como isso se traduziria em algo ruim na vida real (não pelo incesto em si, mas porque, segundo Artemidoro, o ato de depositar seu esperma em seu filho homem é um ato inútil, já que nenhuma vida será gerada. Logo, o sonho só poderia significar uma futura perda enorme de dinheiro.
Curiosamente, de acordo com Artemidoro, o incesto entre mãe e filho é visto como algo positivo no contexto dos sonhos. Já sonhos sexuais entre mulheres (mãe e filhas, no caso) é sempre visto como antinatural na vida real, uma vez que, ao utilizar um objeto para possuir outra, essa mulher estaria tornando-se odiosamente abusiva pelo fato de plagiar a virilidade do homem ao penetrar outra mulher. Ironicamente, o sonho homossexual entre dois homens não é entendido como a premonição de algo negativo na vida real, e isso se dá pelo fato da virilidade e o ato da penetração serem considerados naturais. Ora, fica impossível não perceber uma discrepância nessas interpretações: o sonho sexual entre pai e filho (maior de idade, no exemplo citado) não gera vida, logo é traduzido como ruína financeira na vida real, mas ao sonho entre dois homens é entendido como algo positivo?
De certo modo, os sonhos sexuais precisam ser entendidos como um presságio em nossas vidas sociais. Ele anuncia o bom e o mau em nossas escolhas sociais, familiares e profissionais.
No capítulo “A Cultura de Si”, notamos que o autor é repetitivo, assim como foi no livro anterior, História da sexualidade: O Uso dos Prazeres. Foulcault explica que de certa forma, a Cultura de Si é, na verdade, uma versão “atualizada” do conceito do “Cuidado de Si”, que já havia sido explorado exaustivamente no volume anterior, assim como os Aphrodisia, a sua vigilância consigo mesmo e sua obstinação ao ocupar-se com a própria alma. É importante ressaltar que a ideia por trás do cuidado consigo mesmo não é a solidão, mas sim a prática social com sabedoria. É dar valor e tempo a quem (ou o que) realmente merece (interpretação minha), já que muitas vezes confundimos, ou somos levados a interpretar o bem pelo mal, a paixão pela amizade, etc. Cirúrgico, Epictero diz: “…essas precauções que tomamos de bom grado quando se trata de dinheiro, nós as neglicenciamos quando se trata de nossa alma.” (p. 81).
“Assim, surge um ser composto muito estranho. Imaginativamente, ela é da mais alta importância; na prática, é completamente insignificante. Permeia a poesia de uma ponta a outra; está quase ausente da história. Domina a vida de reis e conquistadores na ficção; na realidade, é escrava de qualquer rapaz cujos pais lhe enfiem um anel no dedo. Algumas das palavras mais inspiradas, alguns dos pensamentos mais profundos na literatura saem dos seus lábios; na vida real, ela mal sabia ler, mal sabia escrever e era propriedade do marido.” – Um quarto todo seu, Virginia Woolf, p. 60, (tradução: Denise Bottmann).
O foco principal do capítulo “Eu e os Outros” é a união matrimonial, suas mudanças políticas, e também uma nova redistribuição dos papéis político-sociais da mulher e do marido, em comparação com o período clássico. O adultério, por exemplo, passa também a condenar o homem, desde que a traição não seja com a esposa de outro homem. Ou seja: o homem só era impedido de trair sua esposa se sua traição afetasse o status social de outro homem. Essa lei completamente parcial é chamada de Lei de Adulteris.
De forma minúscula, no período helenístico a mulher passa a ganhar alguns direitos: recusar um pedido de casamento, e em caso de separação pode até mesmo recuperar parte da herança. O casamento começa a ser tratado como um contrato entre duas pessoas. Aos poucos, a ideia de que uma mulher precisaria ser “dada” pelo pai para o marido passa a desaparecer, assim como o conceito de “marido e dona de casa” começa a ser chamado “dono e dona da casa”. Em teoria, o homem passa a respeitar sua mulher como ser humano, e não como objeto. Digo em teoria porque, não obstante, somos apresentados ao conceito extremamente machista de que a mulher deve perdoar o homem em caso de adultério, já que de acordo com Plutarco, fica claro que a intenção era (e ainda é) fazer com que a mulher pare de se enxergar como sujeito e passe a aceitar-se enquanto objeto sem de amor próprio.
Em caso de adultério por parte do marido a mulher era indicada a perdoar a infidelidade, porque (a justificativa dada já naquela época era uma das mais conhecidas na sociedade atual) o marido, na verdade, busca a traição porque o amor que ele sente para com a esposa é tão poderoso que ele prefere buscar uma profissional do sexo (ou um rapaz) para não contaminar a esposa com sua devassidão, já que ao iniciar a própria esposa em prazeres demasiadamente fora do padrão, corria-se o risco de lhe ensinar algo que ela faria mau uso, e em relação às quais se arrependeria pelo ensinamento.
Podemos observar que a sexualidade da mulher, assim como sua existência enquanto ser multidimensional era constantemente negada. Mesmo no contexto dos sonhos e do incesto a relação entre duas mulheres era vista de modo tão negativo que era comparada com a bestialidade. Ou seja: de qualquer ângulo que estudarmos a mulher, encontraremos apenas opressão.
Mais adiante, Foucault aborda dois temas curiosos: a ideia por trás do ato sexual no escuro, durante a noite, e a relação do filósofo com o casamento. A primeira, é claro, tem ligação direta com o Cuidado de Si: de acordo com especialistas, o sexo noturno era indicado porque desse modo os envolvidos não transformariam o ato singelo da procriação em algo vergonhoso, carnal e repleto de “memórias sujas” durante o sono. Em alguns casos, um dos amantes, já enjoado do parceiro, chegava a usar a luz do dia ao seu favor para causar repugnância no outro com seus defeitos, e assim, ficar livre da pressão de “terminar” com os encontros sexuais.
Já sobre o casamento do filósofo nos deparamos com um paradoxo curioso: o filósofo buscava a vida de solteiro porque uma vez casado, o caos das obrigações de marido, pai e provedor da casa atrapalharia suas funções enquanto estudioso da alma, da sabedoria, e dos domínios das paixões. Mas como o casamento era sinônimo de superioridade social, e como o filósofo não era simplesmente um professor “dos assuntos da alma”, a sua solteirice o transformaria em inferior perante aqueles que ele supostamente deveria aconselhar.
Foucault traça uma longa e detalhada reflexão acerca do amor pelos rapazes, como esse tipo de amor foi perdendo força desde a época clássica, até os primeiros séculos da era moderna, culminando com o ódio semeado através do cristianismo, em um capítulo que eu classificaria como perfeito: “Os Rapazes”. Vários pontos importantíssimos serão abordados aqui.
A Lei Scantinia foi criada com o propósito de proteger os filhos “de boa origem” quando eles atingiam idade suficiente para serem considerados como objeto de desejo dos homens. Mas e os jovens escravos? A lei, como podemos esperar, não os protegia. Logo, os homens buscavam em seus escravos mais novos o “amor” que lhes era negado perante a lei.
Alguns dos argumentos que são feitos pelos defensores do amor pelos rapazes são ao mesmo tempo interessantes e risíveis: o amor entre homem e mulher era considerado inferior pelo caráter “artificial” das mulheres; elas eram sempre feias e precisavam de um grande esforço “para enganar” os homens através de uma beleza de mentira, maquiagens, roupas, penteados, tinturas de cabelo, joias e enfeites. Já o amor entre um homem e um rapaz era o mais natural dos sentimentos, pois sua beleza era orgânica, ele não precisaria recorrer a truques baratos de sedução, não precisaria de perfumes artificiais, já que “o suor dos rapazes cheira melhor do que toda a caixa de perfumes de uma mulher”, e principalmente, por tratar-se de um amor não ligado à uma obrigação de reprodução, de perpetuar a espécie, e sim baseado na amizade, do amor puro, em outras palavras: uma relação de amor com a alma do amado, e não com o corpo. A ausência do desejo da beleza física da velhice se tornaria uma bela amizade entre dois homens, ao contrário do amor entre o homem e a mulher, que não tinha nada de extraordinário, uma vez que trata-se apenas de algo “imposto” pela natureza, que é encontrado entre os animais. Ou seja: a relação entre homens e mulheres é excludente de amor.
Todos os argumentos e reflexões escritos por Foucault geram um turbilhão de novos argumentos, pensamentos, reflexões e discussões internas. Isso é, sem dúvidas, essencial para termos uma boa leitura. À cerca da questão sobre qual amor é mais verdadeiro, fico aqui com a sabedoria de Dafne: “Se só olharmos para a verdade, constataremos que a atração pelos rapazes e a atração pelas mulheres procedem de um só e mesmo amor.”
“Para algumas pessoas, a ideia de sonhar é abdicar da realidade, é renunciar ao sentido prático da vida. Porém, também podemos encontrar quem não veria sentido na vida se não fosse informado por sonhos, nos quais pode buscar os cantos, a cura, a inspiração e mesmo a resolução de questões práticas que não consegue discernir, cujas escolhas não consegue fazer fora do sonho, mas que ali estão abertas como possibilidades.”
– Ideias Para Adiar o Fim do Mundo, Ailton Krenak.
Certa vez, meu começo de noite se abria como um mar de possibilidades positivas. Devaneios que até então eram apenas sonhos longínquos começavam a ganhar uma forma mais concreta, ainda que nas horas anteriores um terror tenha armado acampamento em meus sentidos. Com a ansiedade já distante, aquela noite ficara no passado, e ao encostar minha cabeça no travesseiro me sentia um novo ser: repleto de planos futuros que sem dúvida alguma se concretizariam logo, já que aquela seria a primeira noite em que eu dormiria sem o peso na consciência que me perseguia há tanto tempo. Era um sentimento estranho, ainda que positivo, de certa forma: eu sonhava com a possibilidade de conseguir sonhar que estava realizando o sonho de finalmente ser feliz. Então, qual a razão para naquela noite ter um dos piores sonhos de toda a minha vida?
Acordei no meio da madrugada, ofegante, suado, assustado e com a respiração prestes a me abandonar. Fiquei imóvel por intermináveis 10 minutos, meu colchão ensopava a cada tentativa de recobrar os sentidos. Em choque, tentei em vão entender o motivo daquele sonho tão perturbador. Seria aquele sonho a premonição de algo? Talvez algo que já acontecera comigo na infância e que por alguma razão havia sido enterrado no fundo de minha memória por uma vida inteira? Pior: eu teria que confrontar as pessoas envolvidas no tal sonho? Exigir uma explicação, não do sonho em si, mas das atividades que aconteceram dentro deste? No dia seguinte me fiscalizei de todas as formas para esquecer o episódio e tentar interagir normalmente com todos os personagens daquele sonho de terror psicológico. Uma coisa, entretanto, não mudou: passei quase uma semana lutando contra um impulso de confrontar as pessoas lá inseridas. De alguma forma eu entendi aquilo como um aviso, e precisava tomar uma decisão drástica para possivelmente salvar vidas inocentes de um trauma futuro.
Então, para minha surpresa, sonhos, seus significados, e como proceder futuramente era o primeiro assunto abordado por Foucault no primeiro capítulo do livro História da sexualidade: O Cuidado de Si. A partir de “A Chave dos Sonhos”, de Artemidoro, o autor analisa uma série de sonhos e seus possíveis significados, e nos esclarece que a conduta moral de cada um de nós pode interferir no teor dos nossos sonhos. Devemos usar nossa moral enquanto sonhador para desenvolver uma análise e entender as interpretações, traduzir analogias que derivarão do corpo, da alma e de tabus: em certo momento ele explica por que um pai sonharia estar fazendo sexo com o próprio filho, e como isso se traduziria em algo ruim na vida real (não pelo incesto em si, mas porque, segundo Artemidoro, o ato de depositar seu esperma em seu filho homem é um ato inútil, já que nenhuma vida será gerada. Logo, o sonho só poderia significar uma futura perda enorme de dinheiro.
Curiosamente, de acordo com Artemidoro, o incesto entre mãe e filho é visto como algo positivo no contexto dos sonhos. Já sonhos sexuais entre mulheres (mãe e filhas, no caso) é sempre visto como antinatural na vida real, uma vez que, ao utilizar um objeto para possuir outra, essa mulher estaria tornando-se odiosamente abusiva pelo fato de plagiar a virilidade do homem ao penetrar outra mulher. Ironicamente, o sonho homossexual entre dois homens não é entendido como a premonição de algo negativo na vida real, e isso se dá pelo fato da virilidade e o ato da penetração serem considerados naturais. Ora, fica impossível não perceber uma discrepância nessas interpretações: o sonho sexual entre pai e filho (maior de idade, no exemplo citado) não gera vida, logo é traduzido como ruína financeira na vida real, mas ao sonho entre dois homens é entendido como algo positivo?
De certo modo, os sonhos sexuais precisam ser entendidos como um presságio em nossas vidas sociais. Ele anuncia o bom e o mau em nossas escolhas sociais, familiares e profissionais.
No capítulo “A Cultura de Si”, notamos que o autor é repetitivo, assim como foi no livro anterior, História da sexualidade: O Uso dos Prazeres. Foulcault explica que de certa forma, a Cultura de Si é, na verdade, uma versão “atualizada” do conceito do “Cuidado de Si”, que já havia sido explorado exaustivamente no volume anterior, assim como os Aphrodisia, a sua vigilância consigo mesmo e sua obstinação ao ocupar-se com a própria alma. É importante ressaltar que a ideia por trás do cuidado consigo mesmo não é a solidão, mas sim a prática social com sabedoria. É dar valor e tempo a quem (ou o que) realmente merece (interpretação minha), já que muitas vezes confundimos, ou somos levados a interpretar o bem pelo mal, a paixão pela amizade, etc. Cirúrgico, Epictero diz: “…essas precauções que tomamos de bom grado quando se trata de dinheiro, nós as neglicenciamos quando se trata de nossa alma.” (p. 81).
“Assim, surge um ser composto muito estranho. Imaginativamente, ela é da mais alta importância; na prática, é completamente insignificante. Permeia a poesia de uma ponta a outra; está quase ausente da história. Domina a vida de reis e conquistadores na ficção; na realidade, é escrava de qualquer rapaz cujos pais lhe enfiem um anel no dedo. Algumas das palavras mais inspiradas, alguns dos pensamentos mais profundos na literatura saem dos seus lábios; na vida real, ela mal sabia ler, mal sabia escrever e era propriedade do marido.” – Um quarto todo seu, Virginia Woolf, p. 60, (tradução: Denise Bottmann).
O foco principal do capítulo “Eu e os Outros” é a união matrimonial, suas mudanças políticas, e também uma nova redistribuição dos papéis político-sociais da mulher e do marido, em comparação com o período clássico. O adultério, por exemplo, passa também a condenar o homem, desde que a traição não seja com a esposa de outro homem. Ou seja: o homem só era impedido de trair sua esposa se sua traição afetasse o status social de outro homem. Essa lei completamente parcial é chamada de Lei de Adulteris.
De forma minúscula, no período helenístico a mulher passa a ganhar alguns direitos: recusar um pedido de casamento, e em caso de separação pode até mesmo recuperar parte da herança. O casamento começa a ser tratado como um contrato entre duas pessoas. Aos poucos, a ideia de que uma mulher precisaria ser “dada” pelo pai para o marido passa a desaparecer, assim como o conceito de “marido e dona de casa” começa a ser chamado “dono e dona da casa”. Em teoria, o homem passa a respeitar sua mulher como ser humano, e não como objeto. Digo em teoria porque, não obstante, somos apresentados ao conceito extremamente machista de que a mulher deve perdoar o homem em caso de adultério, já que de acordo com Plutarco, fica claro que a intenção era (e ainda é) fazer com que a mulher pare de se enxergar como sujeito e passe a aceitar-se enquanto objeto sem de amor próprio.
Em caso de adultério por parte do marido a mulher era indicada a perdoar a infidelidade, porque (a justificativa dada já naquela época era uma das mais conhecidas na sociedade atual) o marido, na verdade, busca a traição porque o amor que ele sente para com a esposa é tão poderoso que ele prefere buscar uma profissional do sexo (ou um rapaz) para não contaminar a esposa com sua devassidão, já que ao iniciar a própria esposa em prazeres demasiadamente fora do padrão, corria-se o risco de lhe ensinar algo que ela faria mau uso, e em relação às quais se arrependeria pelo ensinamento.
Podemos observar que a sexualidade da mulher, assim como sua existência enquanto ser multidimensional era constantemente negada. Mesmo no contexto dos sonhos e do incesto a relação entre duas mulheres era vista de modo tão negativo que era comparada com a bestialidade. Ou seja: de qualquer ângulo que estudarmos a mulher, encontraremos apenas opressão.
Mais adiante, Foucault aborda dois temas curiosos: a ideia por trás do ato sexual no escuro, durante a noite, e a relação do filósofo com o casamento. A primeira, é claro, tem ligação direta com o Cuidado de Si: de acordo com especialistas, o sexo noturno era indicado porque desse modo os envolvidos não transformariam o ato singelo da procriação em algo vergonhoso, carnal e repleto de “memórias sujas” durante o sono. Em alguns casos, um dos amantes, já enjoado do parceiro, chegava a usar a luz do dia ao seu favor para causar repugnância no outro com seus defeitos, e assim, ficar livre da pressão de “terminar” com os encontros sexuais.
Já sobre o casamento do filósofo nos deparamos com um paradoxo curioso: o filósofo buscava a vida de solteiro porque uma vez casado, o caos das obrigações de marido, pai e provedor da casa atrapalharia suas funções enquanto estudioso da alma, da sabedoria, e dos domínios das paixões. Mas como o casamento era sinônimo de superioridade social, e como o filósofo não era simplesmente um professor “dos assuntos da alma”, a sua solteirice o transformaria em inferior perante aqueles que ele supostamente deveria aconselhar.
Foucault traça uma longa e detalhada reflexão acerca do amor pelos rapazes, como esse tipo de amor foi perdendo força desde a época clássica, até os primeiros séculos da era moderna, culminando com o ódio semeado através do cristianismo, em um capítulo que eu classificaria como perfeito: “Os Rapazes”. Vários pontos importantíssimos serão abordados aqui.
A Lei Scantinia foi criada com o propósito de proteger os filhos “de boa origem” quando eles atingiam idade suficiente para serem considerados como objeto de desejo dos homens. Mas e os jovens escravos? A lei, como podemos esperar, não os protegia. Logo, os homens buscavam em seus escravos mais novos o “amor” que lhes era negado perante a lei.
Alguns dos argumentos que são feitos pelos defensores do amor pelos rapazes são ao mesmo tempo interessantes e risíveis: o amor entre homem e mulher era considerado inferior pelo caráter “artificial” das mulheres; elas eram sempre feias e precisavam de um grande esforço “para enganar” os homens através de uma beleza de mentira, maquiagens, roupas, penteados, tinturas de cabelo, joias e enfeites. Já o amor entre um homem e um rapaz era o mais natural dos sentimentos, pois sua beleza era orgânica, ele não precisaria recorrer a truques baratos de sedução, não precisaria de perfumes artificiais, já que “o suor dos rapazes cheira melhor do que toda a caixa de perfumes de uma mulher”, e principalmente, por tratar-se de um amor não ligado à uma obrigação de reprodução, de perpetuar a espécie, e sim baseado na amizade, do amor puro, em outras palavras: uma relação de amor com a alma do amado, e não com o corpo. A ausência do desejo da beleza física da velhice se tornaria uma bela amizade entre dois homens, ao contrário do amor entre o homem e a mulher, que não tinha nada de extraordinário, uma vez que trata-se apenas de algo “imposto” pela natureza, que é encontrado entre os animais. Ou seja: a relação entre homens e mulheres é excludente de amor.
Todos os argumentos e reflexões escritos por Foucault geram um turbilhão de novos argumentos, pensamentos, reflexões e discussões internas. Isso é, sem dúvidas, essencial para termos uma boa leitura. À cerca da questão sobre qual amor é mais verdadeiro, fico aqui com a sabedoria de Dafne: “Se só olharmos para a verdade, constataremos que a atração pelos rapazes e a atração pelas mulheres procedem de um só e mesmo amor.”
May 9, 2024
In
The History of Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care of the Self
Michel Foucault moves his historgraphic analysis from Greece around 300 B.C. to the Greco-Roman periode in the first century A.D. All in order to track the development of sexuality and how we arrived at the oppressive sexual discourse of the Victorian-era as laid out in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction.
Foucault very nicely lays out how the discourse surrounding sexuality (in the broadest possible term) changed from the time of Plato to the time of Plutarch. The basic argument is that sexuality went from a material urge that had to be exercised like like other physical attributes. And in the Greco-Roman sexuality became the subject of a much stricter moral and spiritual framework. Essentially, Foucault sees the moral movements in the Greco-Roman periode as a step towards a separation of sexuality as a physical expression and sexuality as a moral action.
However, the weird oversights that were present in The History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure are also present in this volume. For example, there is very little discussion on female sexuality. This is all blokes all the time.
Foucault very nicely lays out how the discourse surrounding sexuality (in the broadest possible term) changed from the time of Plato to the time of Plutarch. The basic argument is that sexuality went from a material urge that had to be exercised like like other physical attributes. And in the Greco-Roman sexuality became the subject of a much stricter moral and spiritual framework. Essentially, Foucault sees the moral movements in the Greco-Roman periode as a step towards a separation of sexuality as a physical expression and sexuality as a moral action.
However, the weird oversights that were present in The History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure are also present in this volume. For example, there is very little discussion on female sexuality. This is all blokes all the time.
November 26, 2019
So I am actually glad that I read the entire three volumes of History of Sexuality by Michel Foucault. And though I enjoyed reading Foucault's dissemination of the discourse on sexuality through ancient Greek texts, God only knows how much I actually understood! Also would it be weird if I said that the second and third books felt many times like a self-help book? But in a manner of speaking, this is exactly the sort of idea of the self that Foucault examines through Aristotelian and Platonic texts. .
.
Perceiving the care of the self as one that is to be achieved through abstinence from physical desires/ aphrodisia, this view is further extended by Foucault to show how this model behavior was considered an ideal for those men responsible for management of a household or a city, as well as framing of different kinds of relationships such as through marriage or through the pursuit of one's male lover. With this view, Foucault also argues that later discourses on sexuality after the spread of Christianity sought to associate it with sin and to construct new categories of the self, that sought to contain as well as to expose 'deviant' variations of sexuality in order to define and control these repurposed ideas of sexuality.
.
.
A lot of these ideas on construct of the self, power and surveillance, are frequent themes in Foucault's book. The first book in the volume is short but utterly intriguing to read. But you do feel bogged down by the time you reach the third! And sometimes there is just too much repetition and excessive verbosity that tends to make Foucault's works a little hard to digest. Still I would say, it is definitely worth reading more than once, since these are those kind of books where you learn something new every time you go back them.
#michelfoucault #historyofsexuality #threevolumes #ancientgreektexts #readinglistforhistory #readinglist2019
.
Perceiving the care of the self as one that is to be achieved through abstinence from physical desires/ aphrodisia, this view is further extended by Foucault to show how this model behavior was considered an ideal for those men responsible for management of a household or a city, as well as framing of different kinds of relationships such as through marriage or through the pursuit of one's male lover. With this view, Foucault also argues that later discourses on sexuality after the spread of Christianity sought to associate it with sin and to construct new categories of the self, that sought to contain as well as to expose 'deviant' variations of sexuality in order to define and control these repurposed ideas of sexuality.
.
.
A lot of these ideas on construct of the self, power and surveillance, are frequent themes in Foucault's book. The first book in the volume is short but utterly intriguing to read. But you do feel bogged down by the time you reach the third! And sometimes there is just too much repetition and excessive verbosity that tends to make Foucault's works a little hard to digest. Still I would say, it is definitely worth reading more than once, since these are those kind of books where you learn something new every time you go back them.
#michelfoucault #historyofsexuality #threevolumes #ancientgreektexts #readinglistforhistory #readinglist2019
Read
November 8, 2023Más flojito que el anterior y no me sirve mucho para mis propósitos filológicos
January 30, 2019
أن «روحانية الجسد» لا تلغي الجسد وتقمعه على غرار ما تكرسه «ميتافيزيقا الروح»*
Read
April 9, 2025MF: hey, can I copy your homework?
Sigmund Freud: Sure, just don't make it too obvious
Sigmund Freud: Sure, just don't make it too obvious
October 6, 2025
Well. I am very sad that there arent subsequent novels... i wouldve loved a history 5/6/7 but alas, here we are. Of course the first is/was the best, there is no doubt. but the second and third presuppose concepts only a philologist (aka NERD) would appreciate and im here for it. the dietetics/regimen aspect just continue to feed my preoccupation with libidinal expenditure, and how that has been managed for so many different reasons. to apprehend and consolidate the soul and body. "care of the self". the reciprocity in marriage, complications of pederasty. im slowly coming to realize that digestion and metabolization play bigger roles in life than i gave credit for. you wouldnt eat the body of christ if you didnt have to shit it out after!
July 28, 2017
عندما بدأت قراءة تاريخ الجنسانية قبل عدة سنوات كانت لدي الكثير من التساؤلات حول هذا الموضوع، و يسعدني بعد استكمال قراته أن أقول أنه قد أجاب عليها و على كثير من الأمور التى لم تخطر على بالي. الجزء الثالث يعتمد على نصوص اغريقية مثل الجزء الثاني. حيث بدأ هذا الجزء بتفسير الأحلام التي هي من هذا الصدد، و تفاجأت بأن التفسير الإغريقي يشابه الإسلامي في كثير من المناطق. كما كان من أهم المقاطع التى ثبتت في ذهني من هذا الجزء هو تفضيل الذكر على المرأة على مر العصور يخلص لأن الرجل هو الذي يمتلك بذرات الحياة و استمرارية النوع، إن الرجل هل المسأمن على الحفاظ على النوع و على إمكانيات مستقبله، فهو الذي يحدد من ستكون الأم و ما هو الوضع الاإجتماعي و القصادي الذي سينموا فيه طفله، فدور المرأة بدون هذه البذرة يتراجع للمرتبة الثانية.
الجزء الثاني الذي أثار إهتمامي هو في مؤخرة الكتاب عندما تحدث فوكو عن الحب المثلي للرجال و قدم مناظرة مثيرة جدا للإهتمام، المناظرة حول شرعية الحب المثلي و تقبله في المجتمع الإغريقي.و يعقب فوكو بعدها فيرجح إدانة الحب المثلي. رغم كثرة هذا النوع من العلاقات في فترة الإغريقية إلا أنهم كانوا يدينوه حيث هو في نظرهم هدر لبذرة الحياة و عزوف عن المهمة الانسانية الأولة في إعمار الأرض. كما إنه يؤخذ على الحب المثلي نفاقه حيث يدعي مناظر الحب المثلي بأنه حب أفلاطوني مبني على الصداقة فكرية و روحية القوية وهو أمر ينفيه بوضوح واقية العلاقة بين المحبين المثليين. تأريخ الجنسانية عمل بحثي مثير للاهتمام و قل وجود أمثاله في الموضوع الذي يعالجه.
الجزء الثاني الذي أثار إهتمامي هو في مؤخرة الكتاب عندما تحدث فوكو عن الحب المثلي للرجال و قدم مناظرة مثيرة جدا للإهتمام، المناظرة حول شرعية الحب المثلي و تقبله في المجتمع الإغريقي.و يعقب فوكو بعدها فيرجح إدانة الحب المثلي. رغم كثرة هذا النوع من العلاقات في فترة الإغريقية إلا أنهم كانوا يدينوه حيث هو في نظرهم هدر لبذرة الحياة و عزوف عن المهمة الانسانية الأولة في إعمار الأرض. كما إنه يؤخذ على الحب المثلي نفاقه حيث يدعي مناظر الحب المثلي بأنه حب أفلاطوني مبني على الصداقة فكرية و روحية القوية وهو أمر ينفيه بوضوح واقية العلاقة بين المحبين المثليين. تأريخ الجنسانية عمل بحثي مثير للاهتمام و قل وجود أمثاله في الموضوع الذي يعالجه.
March 19, 2016
The third volume of Foucault’s History of Sexuality charts the changes in discourse from the ancient Greece to imperial Rome. Again examining the three fields of the body, the wife, and boys, he observes a strengthening of principles of sexual austerity. In dietetics, the shift is characterized by broader “correlations between the sexual act and the body” (238) and greater apprehension regarding the ambivalence of its effects. In economics, the conjugal bond becomes dual and reciprocal, and is valorized as a universal good. Finally, in erotics, abstinence shifts away from being a way of emphasizing the spiritual nature of love, and “a sign of an imperfection that is specific to sexual activity” (238). In all three areas, “sexual activity is linked to evil by its form and effects, but in itself… is not an evil” (239), as it will eventually become.
July 22, 2021
An excellent book at what it’s trying to do, which is map out the Roman approach to sexuality around the 2nd century AD. Foucault continues what is largely groundwork for the fourth and final volume of this series, but having the work of the previous book already done allows him to draw more contrasts and make more interesting points, discussing the movement from one era to the next. Overall I found it more enjoyable than the previous volume, but that may just be because I read this one significantly faster. As with the previous volume, it’s not his best work, but that’s due mostly to the fact that this is only one part of a larger project. Volume four should be marvellous, based on the work he does here, but I’ll reserve judgement until I’ve read it
March 6, 2020
While in the second volume of The History of Sexuality Foucault's historical work in parts seemed a bit uninspired to me, here he is again delivering a well constructed argument and concise analysis of a wide range of texts. Like in the previous volumes, he is concerned with the historical construction of the concept of sexuality, especially in relation to what he calls "techniques of the self" and an "art of existence." Especially interesting in the third volume is his discourse on individualism, which he sees clearly differentiated from the knowledge and "care" of the self. A very thorough, nuanced, and interesting historical read.
May 5, 2020
Like volume two, repetitive, debatable, and digested with a grain of salt. This passage from Seneca though:
“Disce gaudere, learn how to feel joy,” says Seneca to Lucilius: “I do not wish you ever to be deprived of gladness. I would have it born in your house; and it is born there, if only it is inside of you… for it will never fail you when once you have found its source.”
Or this Pseudo-Lucian pledge:
“To unite my bones with his and not to keep even our dumb ashes apart.”
July 26, 2007
A direct continuation of volume 2. The final section brings the whole project into a bit more clear perspective on how these works connect to modern society, but that was a task he set asside in full for the unfinished fourth volume which he was working on when he died. Still, we can pick up some of the comments previewed throughout volumes 2 and 3 as well as some of his interviews and piece together an interesting ethico-political perspective of the self and and its constitution.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 116 reviews