Six Amendments is Justice Stevens’ prescription for a better America by reversing particular Supreme Court decisions through the ratification of amendments to the Constitution.
Although we typically think of the Supreme Court as being the final say in matters of constitutional interpretation, there are two ways that a Supreme Court decision may be overturned. The first is by a later Supreme Court decision that reverses an earlier decision. The second is by amending the Constitution in a way that effectively nullifies the offending Supreme Court decision. An example of the latter would be the ratification of the 13th Amendment to overturn the infamous Dred Scot decision of 1857. Justice Stevens discusses this, as well as the purposes of the other amendments, in his prologue to his proposals.
Justice Stevens’ six proposed amendments really target four areas: gun violence, our dysfunctional politics, sovereign immunity, and the death penalty. Additionally, while he does not directly discuss his theories of jurisprudence, his opinions on Court decisions and arguments for particular amendments offer some insight to his legal reasoning. He has an easy, almost conversational writing style that is very accessible; although some of his legal arguments would be more easily understood by law students than laymen.
Justice Stevens’ first and sixth proposed amendments deal with gun violence. His arguments against the “anti-commandeering rule” are among the least easy to follow in the whole work, although he makes as good an effort as anyone could to make them easy to understand. The difficulty lies not with his writing but rather the complex nature of the law in that area—fundamentally a federalism issue. The short of it is, his amendment would reverse the anti-commandeering rule adopted (or affirmed, depending on your point of view) by the Court in the Printz case, and would thus allow the federal government to require local law enforcement to enforce federal laws—in particular, mandatory background checks for firearms purchases.
When discussing his sixth proposed amendment, Justice Stevens begins with his horror at the rising gun violence in our country. He is unyielding in his interpretation of the Second Amendment of the Bill of Rights as protecting a state power. Toward that end, he proposes amending the Second Amendment to say that the right to keep and bear arms should only exist in connection with militia service and therefore would be subject entirely to the authority of the state. In other chapters, he makes better and more even-handed arguments than he does here. He does not take as much time addressing historical and legal counter-arguments as he might have. He clearly opposes the interpretation of the Second Amendment by the Court in both the Heller and McDonald cases; but he approves of some elements of the opinions, and takes pains to point out that neither opinion recognizes the individual right to keep and bear arms as absolute. At times, this chapter almost seems as if it is written by two different authors. In fact, if you were to pick this book up at a store for perusal, and your eyes fell on certain paragraphs in this chapter, and you knew anything about the author, you might think some mistake had been made. But this is more a consequence of the nature of the law itself and its complexities, than it is any inconsistency on the part of the author. In any case, Justice Stevens’ assessment is that, even with a modification to the Second Amendment, and the elimination of the anti-commandeering rule, not all gun violence would be eliminated, but his hope is that much of it would.
The inability of Congress and the states to act effectively, in the matter of not only gun control, even within the possibilities of Heller and McDonald, but also in other pressing areas, are attributable to our dysfunctional politics, according to Justice Stevens. He focuses on the issues of partisan gerrymandering and campaign finance. The chapter on partisan gerrymandering is fascinating for its discussion of unintended consequences that resulted from a series of decisions in the 1960’s forbidding racial gerrymandering and establishing the one-person-one-vote rule for both congressional and state legislature districts. Justice Stevens argues strongly against gerrymandering in any form—almost. On page 35, he references a North Carolina case from 1991 in which that state was determined to have racially gerrymandered a district not to prevent African Americans from being in a majority, but to assure that African Americans were in the majority—he notes that this was an attempt by the state to comply with provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. He further notes that “the Court invalidated the challenged plans” in a 5-4 decision, and that the “four dissenters thought that race-conscious redistricting for the purpose of benefitting minority voters was permissible.” The case he references is Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). He was one of the dissenters. Unlike other discussions throughout the book where he explains at length his reasoning as a dissenter in certain cases, here, he is relatively quiet, probably because his purpose is the elimination of partisan gerrymandering. In any case, next school year, I will probably have my AP Government students read this chapter, since gerrymandering and its effects are typically given short shrift in government textbooks, and Justice Stevens’ discussion is very readable.
The chapter on campaign finance also discusses effects, unintended and otherwise, stemming in part from the Buckley v. Valeo case in 1976, that eventually led to the Court’s Citizens United v. FEC decision in 2010. Here, Justice Stevens makes very compelling historical and legal arguments against the Court’s reasoning in Citizens United, but also shows how the result in that case came about, in part as a legacy of the Buckley case. He makes some of his strongest arguments in this chapter.
The chapter on the legal concept of sovereign immunity, and how it has developed in the United States, is particularly interesting, but, along with the chapter on the anti-commandeering rule, is particularly difficult to follow. Again, this is not due so much to Justice Steven’s writing as it is the complex nature of the law at issue. When can you sue the government for a wrong it committed against you? The answer is, it depends. It depends on the Eleventh Amendment, Supreme Court decisions about the Eleventh Amendment—which have not always been consistent, the English common law rule of sovereign immunity, and more recent amendments that contain enforcement provisions for Congress. It is a treacherous spiderweb that Justice Stevens navigates as best he can, but the reader will likely still be left with questions. Justice Stevens’ solution would indeed make things simpler: get rid of sovereign immunity entirely. He makes a strong argument for it, but spends little time discussing possible negative consequences that might have to be addressed (e.g.—Would there be a flood of litigation against government entities? Would new standards have to be developed over time for causes of action never before permissible?).
Justice Stevens’ chapter on abolishing the death penalty is the most disappointing. Although he makes an argument for the absolute elimination of the death penalty, it is not as well supported by law and history as are most of his other arguments. Death penalty opponents will not find much if anything new to support their arguments; and neither will death penalty advocates be very much swayed by anything they find here to abandon their position.
Justice Stevens shows that he is compelled by the law, history, and stark present reality. His proposals are not likely to be passed by Congress or ratified by three-fourths of the states anytime soon. This work does offer some important insight into his legal reasoning without the stuffiness one might expect of a retired Supreme Court justice. Given the momentous decisions the Court has made during his tenure, that insight alone makes the book worthwhile. His usually even-handed historical discussions of how the law and certain legal principles developed—even those he disagrees with—are the strongest part of his work. His conclusions about the death penalty and the Second Amendment are polemics and consequently are the weakest of his proposals. He does not shy away from offering his opinions on the other topics of course, but neither does he present his opinions to the exclusion of those of fellow justices with whom he disagrees—usually. Even if you disagree with Justice Steven’s opinions and conclusions, this book is still worth the read.