What do you think?
Rate this book
Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy
The United States, Barry R. Posen argues in Restraint , has grown incapable of moderating its ambitions in international politics. Since the collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a grand strategy that he calls "liberal hegemony," one that Posen sees as unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. Written for policymakers and observers alike, Restraint explains precisely why this grand strategy works poorly and then provides a carefully designed alternative grand strategy and an associated military strategy and force structure. In contrast to the failures and unexpected problems that have stemmed from America’s consistent overreaching, Posen makes an urgent argument for restraint in the future use of U.S. military strength. After setting out the political implications of restraint as a guiding principle, Posen sketches the appropriate military forces and posture that would support such a strategy. He works with a deliberately constrained notion of grand strategy and, even more important, of national security (which he defines as including sovereignty, territorial integrity, power position, and safety). His alternative for military strategy, which Posen calls "command of the commons," focuses on protecting U.S. global access through naval, air, and space power, while freeing the United States from most of the relationships that require the permanent stationing of U.S. forces overseas.
256 pages, Hardcover
First published June 12, 2014
34 people are currently reading
365 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews
December 10, 2014
Things Posen did not address in his book on grand strategy: cyber security, cyber defense, cyber weapons, cyber anything. Also, virtually no mention of drone warfare and how it will affect future conflicts. Also, he spends 40 pages on reorganizing the US military and zero pages discussing any other instrument of national power, like the intelligence community, foreign aid and development assistance, public diplomacy, etc.
Posen fails to state his critics' position in the strongest terms possible; he flippant dismisses the democratic peace theory in one sentence on page 169. He argues against a straw man--"Liberal Hegemony"--that no one really advocates. He seems unaware that the US already retrenched after the Cold War, significantly pulling back its military presence abroad and cutting its force posture and defense budget.
He argues that advocates of "Liberal Hegemony" over rely on hypothetical chains of causation to explain how events abroad constitute threats to US security, and thus lead the US into unnecessary interventions. Yet Posen uses exactly just that kind of hypothetical explanation to argue that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are a threat to US national security.
He actually suggests that North Korea might voluntarily and willingly give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for a US withdrawal from the peninsula on page 105. This is shockingly naive and markedly unrealistic.
His recommendations for Afghanistan (pg. 127) amount to accepting a role for the Taliban while continuing to arm their opponents. This is not "strategy."
I was hoping for the strongest and most well-articulated statement of the case for restraint. This isn't it.
Posen fails to state his critics' position in the strongest terms possible; he flippant dismisses the democratic peace theory in one sentence on page 169. He argues against a straw man--"Liberal Hegemony"--that no one really advocates. He seems unaware that the US already retrenched after the Cold War, significantly pulling back its military presence abroad and cutting its force posture and defense budget.
He argues that advocates of "Liberal Hegemony" over rely on hypothetical chains of causation to explain how events abroad constitute threats to US security, and thus lead the US into unnecessary interventions. Yet Posen uses exactly just that kind of hypothetical explanation to argue that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are a threat to US national security.
He actually suggests that North Korea might voluntarily and willingly give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for a US withdrawal from the peninsula on page 105. This is shockingly naive and markedly unrealistic.
His recommendations for Afghanistan (pg. 127) amount to accepting a role for the Taliban while continuing to arm their opponents. This is not "strategy."
I was hoping for the strongest and most well-articulated statement of the case for restraint. This isn't it.
March 31, 2020
Barry's ability to communicate his impressive amount of snark in writing as well as in person never fails to disappoint.
August 17, 2021
This is a book arguing for a revised US Grand Strategy that argues for a change in US national security objectives and the supporting arguments for bringing such a strategy about. The author is a national security scholar and political scientist at MIT. I originally picked this up in advance of the 2016 campaign to refresh my memories on national securing issues that might be raised. For some reason, it got off my queue and picked it up recently, spurred by the new of the last few weeks about the war in Afghanistan. The passage of time has not harmed the basic argument which still seems reasonable.
The book’s initial intuition is that with traditional communism going out of business in 1989, the traditional motivation for US national security strategy - summed up in terms like “Containment” - became out of date and in need of modification. Without such modification, the US would find itself involved in various wars of choice that were difficult to justify, extremely costly, and of potentially unlimited duration. Such a course, whatever the results, would prove unsustainable. The I modified strategy, which Professor Posen refers to as “liberal hegemony” is what transpired with results seem most dramatically in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (lasting 20 years until this week). Posen provides a well developed argument and ties in lots of examples from Vietnam to the present day. His account seems consistent with what I have read elsewhere recently.
So if Liberal Hegemony does not cut it as a strategy, then what is the alternative? The alternative is a strategy of “Restraint” - hence the title of the book. What is that? Restraint involves rethinking national objectives in terms of the current state of the world - post-USSR - and a rethink of strategy and force posture that reflects the rethought national objectives. Forces need to support the strategy, but the strategy needs to be consistent with national resources and capabilities. Not all crises end up as threatening dominos. Not every crisis requires an intervention.
So is “Restraint” just “Liberal Hegemony” with a budget constraint? Not really. Restraint adds another feature to the strategic mix — “Command of the Commons” — which implies that the US should make further investments to ensure that the Sea and Air capabilities of the US armed services are sufficient to enable the US to effectively defend its more limited interests effectively and globally. That is not to suggest that air and sea warfare has not already been a part of strategic capabilities, but rather that the new strategy of Restraint puts command of the Commons in a more central role.
So Alfred Thayer Mahan was onto something? Yes, although there is more to this than Mahan.
The tension in the book between belt tightening and strategic rethinking is present, but handled fairly well. Given the impact of current events in Afghanistan, the issue of unsustainable commitments came across well - although I don’t know how that would have changed the history, at least initially. Nobody has questioned going after Bin Laden. It is the “nation building” ideas that needed more review from the beginning of the campaign.
This book is still well worth reading.
The book’s initial intuition is that with traditional communism going out of business in 1989, the traditional motivation for US national security strategy - summed up in terms like “Containment” - became out of date and in need of modification. Without such modification, the US would find itself involved in various wars of choice that were difficult to justify, extremely costly, and of potentially unlimited duration. Such a course, whatever the results, would prove unsustainable. The I modified strategy, which Professor Posen refers to as “liberal hegemony” is what transpired with results seem most dramatically in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (lasting 20 years until this week). Posen provides a well developed argument and ties in lots of examples from Vietnam to the present day. His account seems consistent with what I have read elsewhere recently.
So if Liberal Hegemony does not cut it as a strategy, then what is the alternative? The alternative is a strategy of “Restraint” - hence the title of the book. What is that? Restraint involves rethinking national objectives in terms of the current state of the world - post-USSR - and a rethink of strategy and force posture that reflects the rethought national objectives. Forces need to support the strategy, but the strategy needs to be consistent with national resources and capabilities. Not all crises end up as threatening dominos. Not every crisis requires an intervention.
So is “Restraint” just “Liberal Hegemony” with a budget constraint? Not really. Restraint adds another feature to the strategic mix — “Command of the Commons” — which implies that the US should make further investments to ensure that the Sea and Air capabilities of the US armed services are sufficient to enable the US to effectively defend its more limited interests effectively and globally. That is not to suggest that air and sea warfare has not already been a part of strategic capabilities, but rather that the new strategy of Restraint puts command of the Commons in a more central role.
So Alfred Thayer Mahan was onto something? Yes, although there is more to this than Mahan.
The tension in the book between belt tightening and strategic rethinking is present, but handled fairly well. Given the impact of current events in Afghanistan, the issue of unsustainable commitments came across well - although I don’t know how that would have changed the history, at least initially. Nobody has questioned going after Bin Laden. It is the “nation building” ideas that needed more review from the beginning of the campaign.
This book is still well worth reading.
November 10, 2024
Barry Posen's book on restraint as a new foundation for American Grand Strategy is fascinating. While he applies these lessons to the USA, I am convinced most, or all, countries follow this approach.
The book follows a logical procession, from a first discussion of the elements of a grand strategy to an analysis of the American strategy, a discussion of the key issues in different parts of the world, and a discussion with firm recommendations.
The book is about ten years old, yet his recommendations are valid. You may argue about his regional analysis and disagree with some of his analyses. However, I do not believe disagreement should detract from the book's overall quality and methodological approach.
The writing is dry, bordering on the academic, yet is accessible for a patient reader. Any reader must remember a few key points, the major one being that the world has changed since he wrote the book. We now have a war in Ukraine, disaster in the Middle East, growing conflict in South Asia and China, and a changing world order.
What should the Americans do in such a scenario? Should they adopt a belligerent strategy or follow one of restraint?
Barry Posen's book is brilliant because its lessons remain valid, even though the global situation has changed and will remain unstable.
Barry Posen's book must be a primer for anyone engaged in geopolitics.
The book follows a logical procession, from a first discussion of the elements of a grand strategy to an analysis of the American strategy, a discussion of the key issues in different parts of the world, and a discussion with firm recommendations.
The book is about ten years old, yet his recommendations are valid. You may argue about his regional analysis and disagree with some of his analyses. However, I do not believe disagreement should detract from the book's overall quality and methodological approach.
The writing is dry, bordering on the academic, yet is accessible for a patient reader. Any reader must remember a few key points, the major one being that the world has changed since he wrote the book. We now have a war in Ukraine, disaster in the Middle East, growing conflict in South Asia and China, and a changing world order.
What should the Americans do in such a scenario? Should they adopt a belligerent strategy or follow one of restraint?
Barry Posen's book is brilliant because its lessons remain valid, even though the global situation has changed and will remain unstable.
Barry Posen's book must be a primer for anyone engaged in geopolitics.
August 2, 2023
A tour de force that manages to diagnose the problems of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Instead of pursuing a foreign policy predicating on dominating the globe, Posen crafts an alternative US security strategy, which he terms "restraint."
His strategy recognizes that the main threat to American prosperity would be the rise of a superpower on the Eurasian landmass. A power capable of becoming a hegemon (Napoleon's France, the Kaiser's Germany, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union) would have access to most of the world's resources and position it to possibly dominate the United States. Posen's solution is to focus US military power on the maritime domain. Technological evolution allows naval power to more efficiently project firepower and to defend allies than in previous eras. The mobility of a strong navy would allow the US to move naval capabilities between different theaters of war as different great powers rise on the Eurasian land mass. He sees some possibility for China to emerge as a candidate for hegemony but also describes how Beijing faces geographic and demographic challenges that could prevent it from dominating an area outside the Pacific. Posen is also skeptical about Russia being able to do more than project power past its immediate borders. Thus, the conventional great power threats to American security are low.
Restraint would mean reducing the size and scope of American land power, which would save the US money and better husband resources. Reducing the size of ground forces means withdrawing significant forces from Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Many of those countries are wealthy and can afford to take on more of the responsibilities for their defense. Germany and Japan are particularly equipped to spend more on their militaries. The US should act only as the security provider of last resort.
In addition to the challenges of great powers, Posen focuses on nuclear proliferation and terrorism. He sees the nuclear revolution as permanently preserving nuclear weapons. Rather than pursuing disarmament, the US should aim to slow the spread of weapons and encourage good nuclear hygiene. The main danger with nukes would be their possession by non-state actors, who don't have the incentives of regime continuity that nation-states possess. The US should continue dedicating itself to the mission of securing nuclear arsenals and identifying those might steal weapons. This connects with the mission of counter-terrorism. US policy should aim to identify terrorist groups with the will and the means to attack the American heartland. This is really only a handful of groups and it will likely decrease if the US withdraws from the Middle East.
His strategy recognizes that the main threat to American prosperity would be the rise of a superpower on the Eurasian landmass. A power capable of becoming a hegemon (Napoleon's France, the Kaiser's Germany, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union) would have access to most of the world's resources and position it to possibly dominate the United States. Posen's solution is to focus US military power on the maritime domain. Technological evolution allows naval power to more efficiently project firepower and to defend allies than in previous eras. The mobility of a strong navy would allow the US to move naval capabilities between different theaters of war as different great powers rise on the Eurasian land mass. He sees some possibility for China to emerge as a candidate for hegemony but also describes how Beijing faces geographic and demographic challenges that could prevent it from dominating an area outside the Pacific. Posen is also skeptical about Russia being able to do more than project power past its immediate borders. Thus, the conventional great power threats to American security are low.
Restraint would mean reducing the size and scope of American land power, which would save the US money and better husband resources. Reducing the size of ground forces means withdrawing significant forces from Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Many of those countries are wealthy and can afford to take on more of the responsibilities for their defense. Germany and Japan are particularly equipped to spend more on their militaries. The US should act only as the security provider of last resort.
In addition to the challenges of great powers, Posen focuses on nuclear proliferation and terrorism. He sees the nuclear revolution as permanently preserving nuclear weapons. Rather than pursuing disarmament, the US should aim to slow the spread of weapons and encourage good nuclear hygiene. The main danger with nukes would be their possession by non-state actors, who don't have the incentives of regime continuity that nation-states possess. The US should continue dedicating itself to the mission of securing nuclear arsenals and identifying those might steal weapons. This connects with the mission of counter-terrorism. US policy should aim to identify terrorist groups with the will and the means to attack the American heartland. This is really only a handful of groups and it will likely decrease if the US withdraws from the Middle East.
August 9, 2023
For anyone interested in restraint, or US foreign policy overall, this book is a must-read. I've been a proponent of significant altering US policy for sometime, and Posen really puts forward a coherent, well-thought out strategy for how to alter US grand strategy. This book is an excellent analysis of the failures of US attempts at liberal hegemony, and clearly illustrates a different path forward. The book was published in 2014 however, and some of Posen's predictions and critiques have not aged particularly well. I would love to see an updated "10 years later" edition, should Professor Posen ever feel the need to produce one.
January 1, 2023
Posen's Restraint, published in 2014, is a hauntingly prescient examination of American foreign policy's challenges and failings since the collapse of the USSR - one that lays out a compelling better path for how our nation should approach the world in a secure and sustainable way.
May 27, 2020
An important viewpoint on now and the future
November 20, 2014
Posen describes the recent grand strategy of the US as "Liberal Hegemony" and believes that the US has overused its military unnecessarily during a time of hegemony. That time is coming to a close, however, and he recommends a move towards a strategy of restraint. While I don't disagree with some of his statements, he does not always provide proper support for his conclusions. I believe he oversimplifies primacy and assigns a coherency of purpose throughout the Clinton and Bush administration that is not justified. Monteiro's description of defensive and offensive dominance are more useful for discerning a useful future strategy, but I can see why Posen combined them to highlight his perception of the overuse of our military (and I cannot argue with CVC's description of war on page 23). I dislike that he uses the EU nations as proof that we spend too much on our military and then turns around and uses our expenditures as rationale on why the EU spends too little. He mentions the goldilocks "just right" without ever really explaining what that level looks like beyond military force structure and basing. He attacks our allies for not doing enough (EU and Japan) while deriding reckless drivers (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel), again not that I disagree but was hoping for some more cogent proof. He agrees with many experts that the unipolar moment for the US is not quite over, but wisely recommends preparing for a multipolar future. I agree with his assessment that we have engaged in costly wars not in line with vital national interests and that the expansion of NATO to include the former satellite nations of the USSR was risky. I disagree with his interpretation of China's increased balancing and think it is more a reality of their position (who else can they trade weapons with?) and, as he mentions, their rising power potential. I also disagree with his assertion that the strategy of the US could not affect the world reserve status of the dollar as well as his dismissal of the importance of including economic strategies within a grand strategy. His basic prescriptions for restraint include the dissolution of NATO, a balance of power strategy with China, no change in current policy with pesky Russia, and a slow but steady disengagement with Japan and South Korea (army first then air force), with nuclear proliferation to S Korea as a backup if the Chinese get too expansionist. He also goes into a quite detailed recommendation for the Middle East, Israel-Palestine, and South Asia. He is against global zero and rather advocates for managed nuclear proliferation.
BL: I liked the book, but I would like to see an updated version with some enhanced support.
BL: I liked the book, but I would like to see an updated version with some enhanced support.
October 19, 2018
Posen argues that the United States is spending too much on defense and that our Allies are free-riding. Either not spending anything for their defense or recklessly making assumptions that the US will pick up the tab for their decisions. (Looking at you Israel.) The United States needs to gradual withdrawal from it's forward positions and let their allies step up to the plate.
Why I started this book: Professional Army Reading list with a Navy ship on the cover... I was intrigued.
Why I finished it: Interesting perspective focused on the military. No mention of State Department or plans to increase diplomacy to exercise restraint. Other reviewers also noted that there is little mention of drones.
Final thoughts: This was written and published when Obama was president, our current President is reactive not strategic. His self-generated chaos will drive our allies away and strengthen the hands of dictators. This may result in our allies spending more for their own defense, but I can easily see a political backlash when the next US president spends even more money and increases promises trying to rebuild trust and ties.
Why I started this book: Professional Army Reading list with a Navy ship on the cover... I was intrigued.
Why I finished it: Interesting perspective focused on the military. No mention of State Department or plans to increase diplomacy to exercise restraint. Other reviewers also noted that there is little mention of drones.
Final thoughts: This was written and published when Obama was president, our current President is reactive not strategic. His self-generated chaos will drive our allies away and strengthen the hands of dictators. This may result in our allies spending more for their own defense, but I can easily see a political backlash when the next US president spends even more money and increases promises trying to rebuild trust and ties.
February 26, 2015
Convincing critique of some of the excesses of post-cold war US grand strategy, but to a considerable extent the US seems to be moving in the direction Posen would like to see. His recommendations for US force structure were thorough, but it is remarkable that he didn't have more to say about drones as a low-cost method of power projection. They don't go unmentioned, but they play at best a marginal role in his vision for the US military. Meanwhile, I think he could have spent a lot more time on some of the challenges associated with transitioning away from US predominance to restraint. To the extent that US hegemony is a regime (or set of institutions), it should be subject to path dependence and other processes that frustrate institutional change.
Read
June 15, 2015"Restraint is a seminal contribution to the grand strategy debate. It is too bad we cannot guarantee that presidential aspirants and congressional leaders wrestle with its challenge to the prevailing paradigm. Indeed, in an America tired of the burden of empire but with a strong belief in the utility of power, Posen provides a playbook for policymakers who want to appeal to the weary without provoking fear of going soft. He offers a clear path to secure American interests and maintain a robust force able to meet the challenges of the future, while avoiding the entangling commitments and idealistic projects whose costs have weighed so heavily on the nation."
William Ruger reviews: http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
William Ruger reviews: http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
November 11, 2015
Essentially a foreign-policy position paper, well-written and persuasive, and the first two chapters are really helpful as a quick primer in modern-day military geopolitics if, say, ahem, you know less than you should about that subject. The last part, which gets into details of force posture and other nitty-gritty stuff does start to drag a bit, and listening to the Republican debates makes a lot of this stuff really unlikely.
April 13, 2015
I ended up sort of reviewing this one on my blog so rather than re-write that I'll just drop this here.
http://geotrickster.com/2015/04/13/a-...
http://geotrickster.com/2015/04/13/a-...
August 22, 2025
Must read for aspiring strategists.
Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews