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Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo
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After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.
"
After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.
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- GenresPoliticsNonfiction
359 pages, Paperback
First published June 6, 2000
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About the author
Ivo H. Daalder
27 books20 followersIvo Daalder served on the national security council staff in the Clinton administration and is now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. His most recent book, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (with James M. Lindsay) won the 2003 Lionel Gelber Prize.
Daalder was educated at the University of Kent, Oxford University, and Georgetown University, and received his Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
He was fellow at Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs and the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He received a Pew Faculty Fellowship in International Affairs and an International Affairs Fellowship of the Council on Foreign Relations. Daalder was an associate professor at the University of Maryland's School of Public Affairs, where he was also director of research at the Center for International and Security Studies. He was a Senior Fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution from 1997 to 2009, where he was a specialist in European security, transatlantic relations, and national security affairs.
Daalder was educated at the University of Kent, Oxford University, and Georgetown University, and received his Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
He was fellow at Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs and the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He received a Pew Faculty Fellowship in International Affairs and an International Affairs Fellowship of the Council on Foreign Relations. Daalder was an associate professor at the University of Maryland's School of Public Affairs, where he was also director of research at the Center for International and Security Studies. He was a Senior Fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution from 1997 to 2009, where he was a specialist in European security, transatlantic relations, and national security affairs.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
February 9, 2019
Analytically strong, but not very entertainingly written. Measured assessment of US and Allied policy, but rather dismissive of concerns about NATO expansion and activity (as was typical when the book was written).
January 9, 2026
https://fromtheheartofeurope.eu/winning-ugly-natos-war-to-save-kosovo-by-ivo-h-daalder-and-michael-e-ohanlon/
A good full-throated defence of the NATO conflict with Serbia over Kosovo in 1999, written shortly after the event, and coinciding largely with my own views: the conflict was a deliberate, unforced choice by Slobodan Milošević, and western policy rather floundered into NATO participation, but once a ground invasion was seriously being discussed, the Serbian leadership folded and the conflict ended with NATO and the UN, and of course the Kosovars, taking control.
It was written so soon after the conflict that a lot of important later developments are missing because they had not happened yet: the 2001 Macedonia conflict, the 2004 Kosovo riots, the 2006-08 independence process. This last, the future status of Kosovo, is the one point that the authors are a bit mealy-mouthed about, as the Western policy community had not quite got to the stage of comprehending that it was only going in one direction. (I am glad to have been part of the debate pushing that comprehension.)
But otherwise, the authors deal efficiently with a number of counter scenarios as to how the conflict could have been averted; the fact is that the USA and the rest of the western alliance had limited scope for affecting events, and while that limited scope was not always exploited to the full, in particular in the early phase of the NATO bombing campaign, this was not the big problem; the big problem was Milošević and his policies.
A good full-throated defence of the NATO conflict with Serbia over Kosovo in 1999, written shortly after the event, and coinciding largely with my own views: the conflict was a deliberate, unforced choice by Slobodan Milošević, and western policy rather floundered into NATO participation, but once a ground invasion was seriously being discussed, the Serbian leadership folded and the conflict ended with NATO and the UN, and of course the Kosovars, taking control.
It was written so soon after the conflict that a lot of important later developments are missing because they had not happened yet: the 2001 Macedonia conflict, the 2004 Kosovo riots, the 2006-08 independence process. This last, the future status of Kosovo, is the one point that the authors are a bit mealy-mouthed about, as the Western policy community had not quite got to the stage of comprehending that it was only going in one direction. (I am glad to have been part of the debate pushing that comprehension.)
But otherwise, the authors deal efficiently with a number of counter scenarios as to how the conflict could have been averted; the fact is that the USA and the rest of the western alliance had limited scope for affecting events, and while that limited scope was not always exploited to the full, in particular in the early phase of the NATO bombing campaign, this was not the big problem; the big problem was Milošević and his policies.
February 19, 2022
A decent overview, could probably have been more concise as there were a lot of repeated points/arguments.
July 25, 2011
Solid discussion of the events that led up to the NATO air war against Serbia in in support of the Kosovar Albanians in 1999. Daalder examines United States and NATO diplomacy and decision-making, and is strong on considering the many options available.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews