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Being Realistic about Reasons
T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a
question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.
question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.
144 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2014
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About the author
T.M. Scanlon
17 books63 followersThomas Michael Scanlon, usually cited as T. M. Scanlon, is an American philosopher. At the time of his retirement in 2016, he was the Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity in Harvard University's Department of Philosophy, where he had taught since 1984.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
May 27, 2018
This text has the advantage of being concise and careful, both strong points in Scanlon's work generally. The general claims about reasons that he articulates are easy to follow, if you're familiar with the literature. If you aren't already familiar with the literature on reasons, then this will likely make for a tough read; Scanlon jumps around through the historical literature quite a bit, and at some point it is difficult to follow how he has gotten to certain parts of his argumentation. He does eventually circle things back to center, but it can seem a bit indirect in the course of the argument; however, because the book is short, the feelings of divergence never last very long.
I would absolutely recommend this to any graduate-level philosophy student (or higher) interested in the discussion of reasons; Scanlon is one of the most important writers in that field and comments on the current state of the literature well. With that in mind, I don't think it is appropriate for those who are not so familiar with the background literature. It goes in the pile with Putnam's terrific Ethics Without Ontology. A great read that requires some real technical competence to make it worth the work.
I would absolutely recommend this to any graduate-level philosophy student (or higher) interested in the discussion of reasons; Scanlon is one of the most important writers in that field and comments on the current state of the literature well. With that in mind, I don't think it is appropriate for those who are not so familiar with the background literature. It goes in the pile with Putnam's terrific Ethics Without Ontology. A great read that requires some real technical competence to make it worth the work.
September 3, 2025
yeah!!
January 17, 2018
This book is a systematic defense of realism concerning reasons for action that challenges both expressivism and constructivism. Chapter 1 outlines the constraints that Scanlon takes to to be relevant to his project and distinguishes some of the opposing views. Constraints related to the ontology of reasons for action are addressed in Chapter 2. In this chapter, Scanlon aims to defend his view against Mackie's charge of 'queerness' concerning normative facts. The account of reasons for action developed in this chapter is premised on the idea of different domains of inquiry, domains concerning, for instance, mathematics, natural sciences, normative considerations. Scanlon argues that each domain has a certain independence from the others and that we should not confuse the world of the natural sciences with all that there is. The latter field is defined by all those entities to which we are committed to as a result of our commitment to well grounded theories in each of these domains. While this may seem to beg the question, since it is seems unlikely that all of Scanlon's opponents would accept this view of the normative domain, it also seems quite plausible to say that the reasons that we have to eat, pay taxes, or listen to enjoyable music, if they are well grounded, are largely independent of the findings of, neuroscience, for instance. In other words, if we have good reason to x, spelled out in terms of those ordinary considerations that make up our reasons for action, then we don't need to worry about external objections to these reasons. Scanlon acknowledges that domains are not impermeable but does not seek to address particular jurisdictional disputes.
Chapter 3 is one of the more interesting chapters in the book. Here Scanlon, successfully it seems, systematically challenges expressivism arguing that it is inadequate to account for our normal discourse about reasons, especially when giving advice and justifying ourselves to others. Chapter 4 addresses epistemological questions. Using an analogy with reasoning about set theory, Scanlon argues that their is nothing odd about our cognitive 'access' to reasons for action. Since we reason about reasons for action in a manner not unlike any other type of reasoning. We consider the upshot of certain facts or courses action and find certain reasons more plausible than others. We consider what principles would justify our judgments and consider the further implications of those principles. This chapter employs Rawls's notion of reflective equilibrium to spell this out. Scanlon concludes this chapter by arguing that constructivism fails as an account of reasons for action, since the Categorical Imperative is not constitutive of rational agency (a point he presupposes but does not argue in depth) and rival constructivist views are lacking. While greater consideration of the Kantian position is really needed, Scanlon's claim is not implausible. In the absence of a general constructivist procedure to derive reasons for action, our efforts must be seen to be directed toward discovering the relevant reasons for action in each varied context. The final chapter considers the varying strength of reasons for action.
In this book, Scanlon offers a powerful critique of expressivism and a defense of a realistic view of reasons for action. There is a certain quietism in Scanlon's approach, recalling McDowell and perhaps Wittgenstein, in that he ultimately provides a defense of ordinary reasoning about what one has reason to do. In defending the reasoning of ordinary persons, he does not offer some theory to explain why those reason should be treated as meaningful. Instead, he offers grounds for thinking that we don't need any additional reasons for appreciating our reasons for action.
Chapter 3 is one of the more interesting chapters in the book. Here Scanlon, successfully it seems, systematically challenges expressivism arguing that it is inadequate to account for our normal discourse about reasons, especially when giving advice and justifying ourselves to others. Chapter 4 addresses epistemological questions. Using an analogy with reasoning about set theory, Scanlon argues that their is nothing odd about our cognitive 'access' to reasons for action. Since we reason about reasons for action in a manner not unlike any other type of reasoning. We consider the upshot of certain facts or courses action and find certain reasons more plausible than others. We consider what principles would justify our judgments and consider the further implications of those principles. This chapter employs Rawls's notion of reflective equilibrium to spell this out. Scanlon concludes this chapter by arguing that constructivism fails as an account of reasons for action, since the Categorical Imperative is not constitutive of rational agency (a point he presupposes but does not argue in depth) and rival constructivist views are lacking. While greater consideration of the Kantian position is really needed, Scanlon's claim is not implausible. In the absence of a general constructivist procedure to derive reasons for action, our efforts must be seen to be directed toward discovering the relevant reasons for action in each varied context. The final chapter considers the varying strength of reasons for action.
In this book, Scanlon offers a powerful critique of expressivism and a defense of a realistic view of reasons for action. There is a certain quietism in Scanlon's approach, recalling McDowell and perhaps Wittgenstein, in that he ultimately provides a defense of ordinary reasoning about what one has reason to do. In defending the reasoning of ordinary persons, he does not offer some theory to explain why those reason should be treated as meaningful. Instead, he offers grounds for thinking that we don't need any additional reasons for appreciating our reasons for action.
January 6, 2021
Scanlon here touches on a lot of different topics related to the ontology of reasons, particularly his view of reasons as non-naturally objective. I am somewhat familiar with the issues he was discussing, so found it fairly easy to follow his dialectic. Overall, I think he makes a plausible case for non-natural objective reasons, although I would have enjoyed a more robust discussion of epistemic concerns. The answer he gives - that we can just work it out like we can work out truths about mathematics or sets - is somewhat unsatisfying. Maybe this answer is correct, but it feels like a bit of a cop-out, particularly when there is now so much discussion of debunking arguments in the literature.
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